Ed Ball’s recent speech to the Fabians on the economy, and the attendant press coverage, is illustrative of the difficulties of economic debate in a democracy and a market economy; where messages are spun for electoral considerations, and fears about market confidence supress any instincts towards even modest radicalism.
Ball’s fairly nuanced argument is that the failure of the Tory Chancellor George Osborne to encourage economic growth has reduced tax revenue and thus increased the government’s deficit between income and outgoings. As a result the balance of deficit reduction has inevitably shifted from increasing revenue to reducing expenditure, and therefore in the public sector this raises a choice between reducing pay rises, or cutting jobs and services. Any government – of the right or left – is forced to manage the economy as they find it, and inheriting an economy damaged by Osborne’s mismanagement will constrain the options of a future Labour government.
However, in the hands of a BBC interviewer this was whittled down to a statement that Labour would oppose public sector pay rises; and Labour’s statement that they did not know whether economic circumstances when they regain power would allow them to reverse cuts is misrepresented as support for Tory cuts now. This was of course exacerbated by trade unionists, like RMT President Alex Gordon, who are predisposed to attack the Labour Party, as Alex says:
“What Ed Balls is announcing is that Labour’s given up on opposing those policies,” he said. “I think from the trade unions’ point of view, what we’re going to be asking is if Labour doesn’t want to be the opposition, then where is the opposition going to come from to this government? Our members aren’t going to stand by and take another two years of this kind of punishment and then turn out at the ballot box in 2014 and meekly vote for a Labour opposition that has supported these punishing cuts.”
Michael Meacher points out that Ed Balls’s opposition to public sector pay rises has indeed unnecessarily damaged Labour’s credibility with trade unionists, and the broader constituency of Labour voters:
At a time when the central economic problem is febrile growth because of lack of demand, it is wholly unacceptable for several reasons:
1. It would gratuitously weaken demand even further when low-paid public sector workers have a higher propensity to spend – exactly what the economy now needs – than better-off sections of the population.
2. It is grossly unfair to inflict a wage freeze for this year and next year, and then a flat 1% rise in the next two years (still a wage cut in real terms because inflation is expected to be rising at 2% a year), when 1% for a female local government worker represents less than £3 a week while for a doctor it represents £19 a week.
3. It lets the rich and particularly the ultra-rich off the hook completely, continuing to get gargantuan pay packets and bonuses hardly touched.
Why did Balls say this anyway? He didn’t have to make any such statement at all. The alleged reason – that it’s necessary to swallow the entire Tory scorched earth policy in order to gain credibility – is absurd. In fact the exact opposite is true – the Labour Party will never gain credibility whilst it continues robotically to parrot the Tory line.
Writing on this website, John Wight. eloquently expounds the type of left alternative that should command widespread support across the unions, and with the left: a clearer differentiation between Labour and the Tories over the narrative of austerity, a programme of public investment to boost demand, a shift away from economic dependence upon the finance sector, greater state intervention, and supporting wage rises for lower paid public sector workers while holding back the highest paid executives.
However, it is premature to expect that such a programme could be adopted by the Labour Party, when the left have not yet won the argument for such a strategy in the trade unions, and when we have not managed to develop a convincing political narrative that can win the middle ground in order to make such a radical stance electorally credible. That is the task ahead of us.
Ed Balls makes the point well in his Fabian speech that political debate about economics in a democracy tends to polarise around symbolic caracatures of complex arguments. Debate is further constrained by the circumspection required for parties in government, or aspiring to government, who need to maintain business confidence, especially in periods of currency exchange rate volatility.
Over the economy, Labour faces what might be called the Marks and Spencer dilemma. The chain store struggles to prosper based upon its existing customer base, but if it moves away from its frumpy image in pursuit of new customers, it may lose the ones it has got. If Labour can’t win an election, then whatever economic policy we advocate is irrelevant; so it does need to be cogniscent of the need to pitch its economic message to engage with the prevailing consensus of public opinion.
Labour hasn’t in fact endorsed the coalition’s economic policy, but in order to appease those on the right of the party who have been running a campaign to destablise Ed Miliband, this weekend the two Eds gave the impression that they have. Carl Packham accurately assesses the real problem with Ed Ball’s approach:
What Ed Balls is really to blame for is talking about this in a kind of quasi-managerial way, rather than talking about this in a way that says the coalition government are making a set of irreversible mistakes. Oddly, in an attempt to make the party’s economic message credible, they are allowing the press – from the right wingers to the left – to paint them as supportive of austerity measures that aren’t working.
Ed Balls’s five point economic plan is to nurture economic recovery, thus reducing the deficit through increased tax revenues, and for fewer spending cuts than the Tories, Boosting tax receipts through economic growth mitigates the requirement to reduce spending.
However, it is worth unpacking Balls’s argument when he says:
Of course, there will be naïve ‘Keynesians’ who will think it is always a special case – time to let rip and just ‘tax, spend and borrow’ in the hope that will deliver full employment – people who think we are always in 1930s-style depression and more borrowing is always the solution to unemployment. And that is what gave Keynesianism a bad name in the 1970s.
It is why Labour leader Jim Callaghan was right to tell the Labour Party Conference in 1976 that that you can’t just spend your way to full employment. But, as I argued well over a year ago now in my Bloomberg speech, the reason why the real Keynes is so relevant today is that the global economy has been sliding into that rare and dangerous ‘special case’ that Keynes identified in the 1930s and Japan suffered in the 1990s.
What led the paradigm shift away from Keynesianism in the 1970s was not its naïve over use, but that shifts in the structure of international capitalism had reduced the effectiveness of the conventional Keynesian mechanisms. Neither the deflationary package of July 1966 nor the Heath government’s attempt to stimulate investment supply through a Keynesian management of demand resulted in the expected outcomes.
The Labour Party’s programme of 1973, which resulted in the 1974 manifesto, was predicated upon a number of observations about Keynesianism, as operated in the post war period by British governments who had used control of interest rates to manage demand through raising or lowering the cost of credit borrowing. Although full employment could lead to a worsening balance of payments, this could theoretically be mitigated through devaluation, but political considerations acted as a constraint upon this option (the more presidential style of French government, had allowed them more freedom for devaluation). The state could also combat under-consumptionism through boosting demand. In the General Theory Keynes argues for both direct state expenditure to increase demand as well as indirect stimulus.
However, there were a number of changes that undermined the effectiveness of such measures. Firstly, there was a vicious circle that sustained slow growth rates combined with an increased organic composition of capital, which meant that the leading managers of private firms were unconvinced that costs could be recovered over the lifetime of a major investment project. This lack of confidence meant that private corporations were unresponsive to increase in demand.
What is more, the increasingly multi-national nature of capital meant that corporations were able to avoid any government attempts to restrict credit, by international transfers within their firms; and transfer pricing within corporations prevented any government price controls; and moving profits across borders allowed corporations to avoid taxation. The increasingly global nature of manufacturing meant that government stimulus for investment would be ineffective compared to the advantages of moving manufacturing to other states.
In other words, the Labour Party programme of 1973 recognised that while Keynesianism relied upon macroeconomic measures by government to create the context where private corporations would respond in a way virtuous to national economic development, the actual decisions were still left in the hands of the private sector managers of major corporations, who had institutional reasons for resisting such government intentions; and the multi-national nature and increasing size of corporations provided them with the mechanisms to avoid responding to Keynesian stimuli. Hence the commitment to undertake strategic nationalisations in profitable industries like pharmaceutical manufacturing, to allow direct government intervention at the level of corporate decision making.
This understanding that private ownership of corporations was an impediment to government intervention in the economy was fiercely resisted by the right in the party, for example in Anthony Crosland’s 1974 article “Socialism Now” he argued both that the left was wrong in identifying increased globalisation, which he argued had reached its maximum point; and also that there were no conflicts between private corporations and the public interest.
Both the left and the right in the party had in fact reached the conclusion (whether consciously articulated or not) that Keynesianism, as it was being operated by successive post-war British governments, had run its course. So Callaghan’s speech to the 1976 conference was not an attempt to defend Keynesianism from naïve over-use, as Ed Balls implies, but a deliberate signalling that Keynesianism was being abandoned in favour of allowing unemployment to rise in an attempt to curb wage-push inflation; and a rejection by the government of the 1974 manifesto commitments to nationalise sufficient leading companies to allow the government to directly intervene in the economy.
Of course, the constraint imposed by the multi-national nature of modern day capitalism is now well understood by neo-Keynesian economists, hence the enormous effort to coordinate international management of credit supply; and for international banking regulation; but the problem remains that the key decisions of whether to pursue investment are left in private hands.
These disputes are not of just historical interest as the economy which has best weathered the current recession is that of the People’s Republic of China, where a genuinely mixed economy gives the government direct access to the levers of investment and finance. There is limited possibility of really gaining popular and democratic control of the economy until we have reversed the consensus against public ownership. It is arguable that while Labour’s Five Point plan is far better than the austerity of the current government, it cannot lead to sustained prosperity in the interests of working people until the state has the capablity to directly stimulate productive investment.