

# Democracy index 2011

## Democracy under stress

A report from the Economist Intelligence Unit





## The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy 2011

### *Democracy under stress*

This is the fourth edition of the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy index. It reflects the situation as of the beginning of December 2011. The first edition, published in *The Economist's The World* in 2007, measured the state of democracy in September 2006; the second edition covered the situation towards the end of 2008; and the third as of November 2010.

The index provides a snapshot of the state of democracy worldwide for 165 independent states and two territories—this covers almost the entire population of the world and the vast majority of the world's independent states (micro states are excluded). The overall Democracy index is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. Countries are placed within one of four types of regimes: full democracies; flawed democracies; hybrid regimes; and authoritarian regimes.

Free and fair elections and civil liberties are necessary conditions for democracy, but they are unlikely to be sufficient for a full and consolidated democracy if unaccompanied by transparent and at least minimally efficient government, sufficient political participation and a supportive democratic political culture. It is not easy to build a sturdy democracy. Even in long-established ones, democracy can corrode if not nurtured and protected.

### **A turbulent year**

2011 was an exceptionally turbulent year politically, characterised by sovereign debt crises and weak political leadership in the developed world, dramatic change and conflict in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and rising social unrest throughout much of the world. It featured important changes in democracy, both in the direction of unexpected democratisation and a continuation of decline in democracy in some parts of the world.

The momentous events in the Arab world have been extraordinary in several respects. The popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt a year ago were sudden and unexpected, occurring in seemingly infertile territory. These revolts were home-grown affairs that overturned a host of stereotypes about the MENA region and caught the outside world unaware.

Other key developments in 2011 include:

- Popular confidence in political institutions continues to decline in many countries.
- Mounting social unrest could pose a threat to democracy in some countries.
- US democracy has been adversely affected by a deepening of the polarisation of the political scene and political brinkmanship and paralysis.
- The US and the UK remain at the bottom end of the full democracy category. There has been a rise in protest movement. Problems in the functioning of government are more prominent.



- Although extremist political forces in Europe have not yet profited from economic dislocation as might have been feared, populism and anti-immigrant sentiment are on the rise.
- Eastern Europe experienced another decline in democracy in 2011. In 12 countries of the region the democracy score declined in 2011.
- Rampant crime in some countries—in particular, violence and drug-trafficking—continues to have a negative impact on democracy in Latin America.

The unprecedented rise of movements for democratic change across the Arab world a year ago led many to expect a new wave of democratisation. But it soon became apparent that the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt would not be repeated so easily elsewhere and that democracy remained a highly uncertain prospect. Many MENA autocracies resorted to a mix of repression and cosmetic changes.

### **Erosion of democracy in Europe**

Global backsliding in democracy has been evident for some time and strengthened in the wake of the 2008–09 global economic crisis. Between 2006 and 2008 there was stagnation; between 2008 and 2010 there was regression across the world. In 2011 the decline was concentrated in Europe.

Seven countries in western Europe had a decline in their democracy score in 2011; none had an increase. The main reason has been the erosion of sovereignty and democratic accountability associated with the effects of and responses to the euro zone crisis (five of the countries that experienced a decline in their scores are members of the euro zone—Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Ireland). Most dramatically, in two countries (Greece and Italy) democratically elected leaders have been replaced by technocrats. The near-term political outlook for Europe is disturbing. The European project is under serious threat and disputes within the EU are ever sharper. Harsh austerity, a new recession in 2012, high unemployment and little sign of renewed growth will test the resilience of Europe's political institutions.

### **Longer-term trends**

The global record in democratisation since the start of its so-called third wave in 1974, and acceleration after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, has been impressive. There has been a decline

**Table 1**  
**Democracy index, 2011, by regime type**

	No. of countries	% of countries	% of world population
Full democracies	25	15.0	11.3
Flawed democracies	53	31.7	37.1
Hybrid regimes	37	22.2	14.0
Authoritarian regimes	52	31.1	37.6

Note. "World" population refers to the total population of the 167 countries covered by the index. Since this excludes only micro states, this is nearly equal to the entire actual estimated world population.

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.



in democracy across the world in recent years. The decades-long global trend in democratisation has come to a halt in what Larry Diamond (2008) called a “democratic recession”.

The dominant pattern globally over the past five years has been backsliding on previously attained progress in democratisation. The global financial crisis that started in 2008 accentuated some existing negative trends in political development.

A political malaise in east-central Europe has led to disappointment and questioning of the strength of the region’s democratic transition. Media freedoms have been eroded across Latin America and populist forces with dubious democratic credentials have come to the fore in a few countries in the region. In the developed West, a precipitous decline in political participation, weaknesses in the functioning of government and security-related curbs on civil liberties are having a corrosive effect on some long-established democracies.

Although almost one-half of the world’s countries can be considered to be democracies, in our index the number of “full democracies” is low, at only 25 countries; 53 countries are rated as “flawed democracies”. Of the remaining 89 countries in our index, 52 are authoritarian and 37 are considered to be “hybrid regimes”. As could be expected, the developed OECD countries dominate among full democracies, although there are two Latin American countries, one east European country and one African country, which suggests that the level of development is not a binding constraint. Only two Asian countries are represented: Japan and South Korea.

Almost one-half of the world’s population lives in a democracy of some sort, although only 11% reside in full democracies. Some 2.6bn people, more than one-third of the world’s population, still lives under authoritarian rule (with a large share being, of course, in China).

**Table 2**  
**Democracy Index 2011**

Category scores							
	Rank	Overall score	I Electoral process and pluralism	II Functioning of government	III Political participation	IV Political culture	V Civil liberties
<b>Full democracies</b>							
Norway	1	9.80	10.00	9.64	10.00	9.38	10.00
Iceland	2	9.65	10.00	9.64	8.89	10.00	9.71
Denmark	3	9.52	10.00	9.64	8.89	9.38	9.71
Sweden	4	9.50	9.58	9.64	8.89	9.38	10.00
New Zealand	5	9.26	10.00	9.29	8.89	8.13	10.00
Australia	6	9.22	10.00	8.93	7.78	9.38	10.00
Switzerland	7	9.09	9.58	9.29	7.78	9.38	9.41
Canada	8	9.08	9.58	9.29	7.78	8.75	10.00
Finland	9	9.06	10.00	9.64	7.22	8.75	9.71
Netherlands	10	8.99	9.58	8.93	8.89	8.13	9.41
Luxembourg	11	8.88	10.00	9.29	6.67	8.75	9.71



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Ireland	12	8.56	9.58	7.86	7.22	8.13	10.00
Austria	13	8.49	9.58	7.86	7.78	8.13	9.12
Germany	14	8.34	9.58	8.21	6.67	8.13	9.12
Malta	15	8.28	9.17	8.21	5.56	8.75	9.71
Czech Republic	16	8.19	9.58	7.14	6.67	8.13	9.41
Uruguay	17	8.17	10.00	8.93	4.44	7.50	10.00
United Kingdom	18	8.16	9.58	7.86	6.11	8.13	9.12
United States	19	8.11	9.17	7.50	7.22	8.13	8.53
Costa Rica	20	8.10	9.58	8.21	6.11	6.88	9.71
Japan	21	8.08	9.17	8.21	6.11	7.50	9.41
South Korea	22	8.06	9.17	7.86	7.22	7.50	8.53
Belgium	23	8.05	9.58	8.21	5.56	7.50	9.41
Mauritius	24	8.04	9.17	8.21	5.00	8.13	9.71
Spain	25	8.02	9.58	7.50	6.11	7.50	9.41
Flawed democracies							
Cape Verde	26	7.92	9.17	7.86	7.22	6.25	9.12
Portugal	27	7.81	9.58	6.43	6.11	7.50	9.41
South Africa	28	7.79	8.75	8.21	7.22	6.25	8.53
France	29	7.77	9.58	7.14	6.11	7.50	8.53
Slovenia	30	7.76	9.58	7.50	6.67	6.25	8.82
Italy	31	7.74	9.58	6.43	6.67	7.50	8.53
Greece	32	7.65	9.58	5.71	6.67	6.88	9.41
Botswana	33	7.63	9.17	7.14	5.56	6.88	9.41
Estonia	34	7.61	9.58	7.14	5.00	7.50	8.82
Chile	35	7.54	9.58	8.57	3.89	6.25	9.41
Israel	36	7.53	8.75	7.50	8.33	7.50	5.59
Taiwan	37	7.46	9.58	7.14	5.56	5.63	9.41
Slovakia	38	7.35	9.58	7.50	5.56	5.00	9.12
India	39	7.30	9.58	7.50	5.00	5.00	9.41
Cyprus	40	7.29	9.17	6.43	6.11	5.63	9.12
Lithuania	41	7.24	9.58	5.71	5.56	6.25	9.12
Timor-Leste	42	7.22	8.67	6.79	5.56	6.88	8.24
Trinidad and Tobago	43	7.16	9.58	7.14	6.11	5.00	7.94



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	Rank	Overall score	I Electoral process and pluralism	II Functioning of government	III Political participation	IV Political culture	V Civil liberties
Jamaica	44	7.13	9.17	6.43	5.00	6.25	8.82
Poland	45	7.12	9.58	6.43	6.11	4.38	9.12
Brazil	=45	7.12	9.58	7.50	5.00	4.38	9.12
Panama	47	7.08	9.58	6.43	5.56	5.00	8.82
Latvia	48	7.05	9.58	5.36	5.56	5.63	9.12
Hungary	49	7.04	9.58	6.07	4.44	6.88	8.24
Mexico	50	6.93	8.75	7.14	6.11	5.00	7.65
Argentina	51	6.84	8.75	5.71	5.56	6.25	7.94
Bulgaria	52	6.78	9.17	5.71	6.11	4.38	8.53
Croatia	53	6.73	9.17	5.71	5.56	5.00	8.24
Suriname	54	6.65	9.17	6.43	4.44	5.00	8.24
Colombia	55	6.63	9.17	7.50	3.89	3.75	8.82
Peru	56	6.59	9.17	5.00	5.56	5.00	8.24
Sri Lanka	57	6.58	7.00	6.07	5.00	6.88	7.94
Thailand	58	6.55	7.83	6.07	5.56	6.25	7.06
Romania	59	6.54	9.58	6.07	4.44	4.38	8.24
Indonesia	60	6.53	6.92	7.50	5.56	5.63	7.06
El Salvador	61	6.47	9.17	6.07	3.89	5.00	8.24
Paraguay	62	6.40	8.33	6.07	5.00	4.38	8.24
Mali	63	6.36	8.25	6.43	4.44	5.63	7.06
Serbia	64	6.33	9.17	4.64	6.11	4.38	7.35
Lesotho	=64	6.33	7.42	5.71	6.11	5.63	6.76
Moldova	=64	6.33	8.75	5.00	5.56	4.38	7.94
Papua New Guinea	67	6.32	7.33	6.43	3.33	6.25	8.24
Namibia	68	6.24	5.67	5.00	6.67	5.63	8.24
Mongolia	69	6.23	8.33	5.71	3.89	5.00	8.24
Dominican Republic	70	6.20	8.75	5.00	2.78	6.25	8.24
Malaysia	71	6.19	6.50	6.79	5.56	6.25	5.88
Zambia	=71	6.19	7.92	5.00	4.44	6.25	7.35
Macedonia	73	6.16	7.75	4.64	6.11	4.38	7.94
Montenegro	74	6.15	8.75	5.00	5.56	4.38	7.06
Philippines	75	6.12	8.33	5.00	5.00	3.13	9.12
Benin	76	6.06	7.33	6.43	4.44	5.63	6.47
Guyana	77	6.05	7.92	5.36	5.56	4.38	7.06



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Ghana	78	6.02	8.33	5.00	5.00	5.00	6.76
Hybrid regimes							
Ukraine	79	5.94	8.33	4.64	5.00	4.38	7.35
Hong Kong	80	5.92	3.50	5.36	4.44	6.88	9.41
Singapore	81	5.89	4.33	7.50	2.78	7.50	7.35
Guatemala	82	5.88	7.92	6.43	3.33	4.38	7.35
Bangladesh	83	5.86	7.42	5.43	5.00	4.38	7.06
Bolivia	84	5.84	7.00	5.00	6.11	3.75	7.35
Honduras	=84	5.84	8.75	5.71	3.89	4.38	6.47
Malawi	=84	5.84	7.00	5.71	5.56	5.63	5.29
Albania	87	5.81	7.00	4.71	5.00	5.00	7.35
Turkey	88	5.73	7.92	7.14	3.89	5.00	4.71
Ecuador	89	5.72	7.83	4.64	5.00	3.75	7.35
Tanzania	90	5.64	7.42	4.29	5.56	5.63	5.29
Nicaragua	91	5.56	6.58	4.36	3.89	5.63	7.35
Tunisia	92	5.53	5.33	5.00	6.67	6.25	4.41
Senegal	93	5.51	7.00	4.29	4.44	5.63	6.18
Lebanon	94	5.32	6.67	2.14	7.22	5.00	5.59
Bosnia and Hercegovina	95	5.24	6.92	3.29	3.33	5.00	7.65
Uganda	96	5.13	5.67	2.86	5.00	6.25	5.88
Venezuela	97	5.08	5.67	3.93	5.56	4.38	5.88
Liberia	98	5.07	7.83	0.79	5.56	5.00	6.18
Palestine	99	4.97	6.00	2.86	7.78	4.38	3.82
Mozambique	100	4.90	4.83	4.64	5.56	5.63	3.82
Cambodia	101	4.87	6.08	6.07	2.78	5.00	4.41
Georgia	102	4.74	6.58	2.14	4.44	4.38	6.18
Kenya	103	4.71	3.92	4.29	4.44	5.63	5.29
Bhutan	104	4.57	6.25	5.36	3.33	4.38	3.53
Pakistan	105	4.55	5.17	5.71	2.22	4.38	5.29
Sierra Leone	106	4.51	7.00	1.86	2.78	5.63	5.29
Kyrgyz Republic	107	4.34	5.75	1.86	4.44	4.38	5.29
Nepal	108	4.24	1.83	4.29	3.89	5.63	5.59
Mauritania	109	4.17	3.42	4.29	5.00	3.13	5.00
Niger	110	4.16	7.50	1.14	2.78	4.38	5.00





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Armenia	111	4.09	4.33	3.21	3.89	3.13	5.88
Iraq	112	4.03	4.33	0.43	7.22	3.75	4.41
Burundi	113	4.01	3.42	3.29	3.89	5.63	3.82
Haiti	114	4.00	5.17	1.86	2.78	3.75	6.47
Egypt	115	3.95	2.08	3.21	5.00	5.63	3.82
Authoritarian regimes							
Madagascar	116	3.93	2.17	2.14	5.00	5.63	4.71
Russia	117	3.92	3.92	2.86	5.00	3.13	4.71
Jordan	118	3.89	3.17	4.29	4.44	3.75	3.82
Nigeria	119	3.83	5.67	3.21	3.33	3.13	3.82
Morocco	=119	3.83	3.50	4.64	2.22	4.38	4.41
Ethiopia	121	3.79	0.00	3.93	5.00	5.63	4.41
Kuwait	122	3.74	3.17	4.29	3.33	4.38	3.53
Fiji	123	3.67	0.42	2.86	3.89	5.00	6.18
Burkina Faso	124	3.59	4.00	3.57	2.22	3.75	4.41
Libya	125	3.55	0.00	2.86	3.33	6.25	5.29
Cuba	126	3.52	1.75	4.64	3.89	4.38	2.94
Comoros	=126	3.52	3.92	2.21	3.89	3.75	3.82
Gabon	128	3.48	2.17	2.21	3.89	5.00	4.12
Togo	129	3.45	4.00	0.79	3.33	5.00	4.12
Algeria	130	3.44	2.17	2.21	2.78	5.63	4.41
Cameroon	131	3.41	1.17	4.29	2.78	5.00	3.82
Gambia	132	3.38	2.17	4.29	2.22	5.00	3.24
Angola	133	3.32	1.33	3.21	4.44	4.38	3.24
Oman	134	3.26	0.00	3.93	3.89	4.38	4.12
Swaziland	=134	3.26	0.92	2.86	2.78	5.63	4.12
Rwanda	136	3.25	0.83	4.64	1.67	5.00	4.12
Kazakhstan	137	3.24	1.33	2.14	3.33	4.38	5.00
Qatar	138	3.18	0.00	3.93	2.22	5.63	4.12
Belarus	139	3.16	1.75	2.86	3.89	4.38	2.94
Azerbaijan	140	3.15	2.17	1.79	3.33	3.75	4.71
China	141	3.14	0.00	5.00	3.89	5.63	1.18
Côte d'Ivoire	142	3.08	0.00	1.79	4.44	5.63	3.53
Vietnam	143	2.96	0.00	4.29	2.78	6.25	1.47





**Table 2**  
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	Category scores						
	Rank	Overall score	I Electoral process and pluralism	II Functioning of government	III Political participation	IV Political culture	V Civil liberties
Bahrain	144	2.92	1.75	2.50	3.33	4.38	2.65
Congo (Brazzaville)	145	2.89	1.25	2.86	3.33	3.75	3.24
Guinea	146	2.79	3.50	0.43	3.33	3.75	2.94
Zimbabwe	147	2.68	0.00	1.29	3.89	5.00	3.24
Djibouti	=147	2.68	0.83	1.79	2.22	5.63	2.94
United Arab Emirates	149	2.58	0.00	3.57	1.11	5.00	3.24
Yemen	150	2.57	2.17	0.36	4.44	5.00	0.88
Tajikistan	151	2.51	1.83	0.79	2.22	6.25	1.47
Afghanistan	152	2.48	2.50	0.79	2.78	2.50	3.82
Sudan	153	2.38	0.00	1.79	3.33	5.00	1.76
Eritrea	154	2.34	0.00	2.86	1.11	6.25	1.47
Democratic Republic of Congo	155	2.15	2.58	1.07	2.22	3.13	1.76
Laos	156	2.10	0.00	3.21	1.11	5.00	1.18
Guinea-Bissau	157	1.99	2.08	0.00	2.78	1.88	3.24
Syria	=157	1.99	0.00	1.79	2.22	5.63	0.29
Iran	159	1.98	0.00	2.86	2.78	2.50	1.76
Central African Republic	160	1.82	1.75	1.07	1.11	2.50	2.65
Saudi Arabia	161	1.77	0.00	2.86	1.11	3.13	1.76
Equatorial Guinea	=161	1.77	0.00	0.79	2.22	4.38	1.47
Myanmar	=161	1.77	0.00	1.79	0.56	5.63	0.88
Uzbekistan	164	1.74	0.08	0.79	2.22	5.00	0.59
Turkmenistan	165	1.72	0.00	0.79	2.22	5.00	0.59
Chad	166	1.62	0.00	0.00	1.11	3.75	3.24
North Korea	167	1.08	0.00	2.50	1.67	1.25	0.00

Flawed democracies are concentrated in Latin America and eastern Europe, and to a lesser extent in Asia. Despite progress in Latin American democratisation in recent decades, many countries in the region remain fragile democracies. Levels of political participation are generally low and democratic cultures are weak. There has also been significant backsliding in recent years in some areas such as media freedoms.

Much of eastern Europe illustrates the difference between formal and substantive democracy. The new EU members from the region have pretty much equal level of political freedoms and civil liberties as the old developed EU, but lag significantly in political participation and political culture—a



reflection of widespread anomie and weaknesses of democratic development. Only one country from the region, the Czech Republic, is rated a full democracy.

### Changes in 2011

The results of the Economist Intelligence Unit's (EIU) Democracy Index 2011 show that democracy has been under pressure in many parts of the world. The democracy score declined in 2011 for 48 countries out of the 167 that are covered. The score increased in 41 countries and it stayed the same in 78. In most regions the average democracy score for 2011 is lower than in 2010, including the developed countries of North America and Western Europe. There was a decline in the average score for Eastern

**Table 3**  
**Democracy across the regions**

	No. of countries	Democracy index average	Full democracies	Flawed democracies	Hybrid regimes	Authoritarian regimes
<b>North America</b>						
2011	2	8.59	2	0	0	0
2010	2	8.63	2	0	0	0
<b>Western Europe</b>						
2011	21	8.40	15	5	1	0
2010	21	8.45	16	4	1	0
<b>Eastern Europe</b>						
2011	28	5.50	1	14	6	7
2010	28	5.55	1	15	6	6
<b>Latin America &amp; the Caribbean</b>						
2011	24	6.35	2	14	7	1
2010	24	6.37	2	15	6	1
<b>Asia &amp; Australasia</b>						
2011	28	5.51	4	10	7	7
2010	28	5.53	4	10	7	7
<b>Middle East &amp; North Africa</b>						
2011	20	3.62	0	1	4	15
2010	20	3.43	0	1	3	16
<b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>						
2011	44	4.32	1	9	11	23
2010	44	4.23	1	8	10	25
<b>Total</b>						
2011	167	5.49	25	53	36	53
2010	167	5.46	26	53	33	55

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.



Europe and small declines for both Asia and Latin America. These were offset by increases in average scores in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Eight countries had a change in regime type in 2011. In four there was a regression and four had an upgrade. Portugal deteriorated from a “full democracy” to a “flawed democracy”, a development that had already affected Greece, Italy and France in 2010. Ukraine and Guatemala regressed from flawed democracies to hybrid regimes, and in Russia a long process of regression culminated in a move from a hybrid to an authoritarian regime in light of the cynical decision by Vladimir Putin to return to the presidency and because of deeply flawed parliamentary elections.

Tunisia experienced the biggest increase of any country in its democracy score in 2011. It moved from an authoritarian to a hybrid regime. Two Sub-Saharan African countries also moved from authoritarian to hybrid regimes (Mauritania and Niger), and Zambia improved from a hybrid to a flawed democracy.

### **Decline in media freedoms**

A noticeable decline in media freedoms in recent years, affecting all regions to some extent, has accelerated since 2008. This has affected mainly electronic media, which is often under state control or heavy state influence—although repression and infringements of the freedom of expression have also extended to the print media and, most recently, the Internet.

In some 40 countries there has been a deterioration in scores for media freedom since 2008. This has included three countries in western Europe (France, Italy, Turkey), eight in eastern Europe (Albania, Azerbaijan, Hungary, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Russia and Serbia), nine in Latin America (Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Mexico, Honduras, Nicaragua and Peru), four in the Middle East and North Africa (Iran, Egypt, Palestinian Territories and Saudi Arabia), four in Asia & Australasia (Fiji, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Thailand), and eight in Sub-Saharan Africa (Angola, Burundi,

Cameroon, Congo Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar and Rwanda).

The reasons for this decline are complex and varied. Underlying negative trends were exacerbated by the 2008-09 global economic crisis. Many governments have felt increasingly vulnerable and threatened and have reacted by intensifying their efforts to control the media and impede free expression. Increasing unemployment and job insecurity have fostered a climate of fear and self-censorship among journalists in many countries. The concentration of media ownership has tended to increase, which has had a negative impact on the diversity of views and the freedom of expression. Advanced nations have become more inward-looking and hence less interested and capable of monitoring and pressurising emerging market governments to ensure freedom of the press. In authoritarian regimes, which have often become stronger and more confident, state control and repression of any independent media is a given and has if anything tended to get worse, with increasing attacks on independent journalists.



**Table 4**  
**Democracy Index 2010 and 2011**

	2011 Rank	2011 score	2010 Rank	2010 score
Norway	1	9.80	1	9.80
Iceland	2	9.65	2	9.65
Denmark	3	9.52	3	9.52
Sweden	4	9.50	4	9.50
New Zealand	5	9.26	5	9.26
Australia	6	9.22	6	9.22
Switzerland	7	9.09	8	9.09
Canada	8	9.08	9	9.08
Finland	9	9.06	7	9.19
Netherlands	10	8.99	10	8.99
Luxembourg	11	8.88	11	8.88
Ireland	12	8.56	12	8.79
Austria	13	8.49	13	8.49
Germany	14	8.34	14	8.38
Malta	15	8.28	15	8.28
Czech Republic	16	8.19	16	8.19
Uruguay	17	8.17	21	8.10
United Kingdom	18	8.16	19	8.16
United States	19	8.11	17	8.18
Costa Rica	20	8.10	25	8.04
Japan	21	8.08	22	8.08
South Korea	22	8.06	20	8.11
Belgium	23	8.05	23	8.05
Mauritius	24	8.04	24	8.04
Spain	25	8.02	18	8.16
Cape Verde	26	7.92	27	7.94
Portugal	27	7.81	26	8.02
South Africa	28	7.79	30	7.79
France	29	7.77	31	7.77
Slovenia	30	7.76	32	7.69
Italy	31	7.74	29	7.83
Greece	32	7.65	28	7.92
Botswana	33	7.63	35	7.63
Estonia	34	7.61	33	7.68
Chile	35	7.54	34	7.67
Israel	36	7.53	37	7.48



**Table 4**  
**Democracy Index 2010 and 2011**

	2011 Rank	2011 score	2010 Rank	2010 score
Taiwan	37	7.46	36	7.52
Slovakia	38	7.35	38	7.35
India	39	7.30	40	7.28
Cyprus	40	7.29	39	7.29
Lithuania	41	7.24	41	7.24
Timor-Leste	42	7.22	42	7.22
Trinidad and Tobago	43	7.16	45	7.16
Jamaica	44	7.13	44	7.21
Poland	45	7.12	48	7.05
Brazil	=45	7.12	47	7.12
Panama	47	7.08	46	7.15
Latvia	48	7.05	49	7.05
Hungary	49	7.04	43	7.21
Mexico	50	6.93	50	6.93
Argentina	51	6.84	51	6.84
Bulgaria	52	6.78	52	6.84
Croatia	53	6.73	53	6.81
Suriname	54	6.65	54	6.65
Colombia	55	6.63	57	6.55
Peru	56	6.59	63	6.40
Sri Lanka	57	6.58	55	6.64
Thailand	58	6.55	58	6.55
Romania	59	6.54	56	6.60
Indonesia	60	6.53	60	6.53
El Salvador	61	6.47	61	6.47
Paraguay	62	6.40	62	6.40
Mali	63	6.36	79	6.01
Serbia	64	6.33	65	6.33
Lesotho	=64	6.33	77	6.02
Moldova	=64	6.33	66	6.33
Papua New Guinea	67	6.32	59	6.54
Namibia	68	6.24	69	6.23
Mongolia	69	6.23	64	6.36
Dominican Republic	70	6.20	70	6.20
Malaysia	71	6.19	71	6.19
Zambia	=71	6.19	91	5.68



**Table 4**  
**Democracy Index 2010 and 2011**

	2011 Rank	2011 score	2010 Rank	2010 score
Macedonia	73	6.16	73	6.16
Montenegro	74	6.15	68	6.27
Philippines	75	6.12	74	6.12
Benin	76	6.06	72	6.17
Guyana	77	6.05	75	6.05
Ghana	78	6.02	78	6.02
Ukraine	79	5.94	67	6.30
Hong Kong	80	5.92	80	5.92
Singapore	81	5.89	82	5.89
Guatemala	82	5.88	76	6.05
Bangladesh	83	5.86	83	5.87
Bolivia	84	5.84	81	5.92
Honduras	=84	5.84	88	5.76
Malawi	=84	5.84	85	5.84
Albania	87	5.81	84	5.86
Turkey	88	5.73	89	5.73
Ecuador	89	5.72	87	5.77
Tanzania	90	5.64	92	5.64
Nicaragua	91	5.56	90	5.73
Tunisia	92	5.53	145	2.79
Senegal	93	5.51	95	5.27
Lebanon	94	5.32	86	5.82
Bosnia and Hercegovina	95	5.24	94	5.32
Uganda	96	5.13	98	5.05
Venezuela	97	5.08	96	5.18
Liberia	98	5.07	97	5.07
Palestine	99	4.97	93	5.44
Mozambique	100	4.90	99	4.90
Cambodia	101	4.87	100	4.87
Georgia	102	4.74	103	4.59
Kenya	103	4.71	101	4.71
Bhutan	104	4.57	102	4.68
Pakistan	105	4.55	104	4.55
Sierra Leone	106	4.51	105	4.51
Kyrgyz Republic	107	4.34	106	4.31
Nepal	108	4.24	108	4.24



**Democracy Index 2011**  
Democracy under stress

**Table 4**  
**Democracy Index 2010 and 2011**

	2011 Rank	2011 score	2010 Rank	2010 score
Mauritania	109	4.17	115	3.86
Niger	110	4.16	128	3.38
Armenia	111	4.09	109	4.09
Iraq	112	4.03	112	4.00
Burundi	113	4.01	110	4.01
Haiti	114	4.00	111	4.00
Egypt	115	3.95	138	3.07
Madagascar	116	3.93	113	3.94
Russia	117	3.92	107	4.26
Jordan	118	3.89	117	3.74
Nigeria	119	3.83	123	3.47
Morocco	=119	3.83	116	3.79
Ethiopia	121	3.79	118	3.68
Kuwait	122	3.74	114	3.88
Fiji	123	3.67	119	3.62
Burkina Faso	124	3.59	120	3.59
Libya	125	3.55	158	1.94
Cuba	126	3.52	121	3.52
Comoros	=126	3.52	127	3.41
Gabon	128	3.48	133	3.29
Togo	129	3.45	124	3.45
Algeria	130	3.44	125	3.44
Cameroon	131	3.41	126	3.41
Gambia	132	3.38	129	3.38
Angola	133	3.32	131	3.32
Oman	134	3.26	143	2.86
Swaziland	=134	3.26	141	2.90
Rwanda	136	3.25	134	3.25
Kazakhstan	137	3.24	132	3.30
Qatar	138	3.18	137	3.09
Belarus	139	3.16	130	3.34
Azerbaijan	140	3.15	135	3.15
China	141	3.14	136	3.14
Côte d'Ivoire	142	3.08	139	3.02
Vietnam	143	2.96	140	2.94
Bahrain	144	2.92	122	3.49





**Table 4**  
**Democracy Index 2010 and 2011**

	2011 Rank	2011 score	2010 Rank	2010 score
Congo (Brazzaville)	145	2.89	142	2.89
Guinea	146	2.79	144	2.79
Zimbabwe	147	2.68	146	2.64
Djibouti	148	2.68	154	2.20
United Arab Emirates	149	2.58	148	2.52
Yemen	150	2.57	147	2.64
Tajikistan	151	2.51	149	2.51
Afghanistan	152	2.48	150	2.48
Sudan	153	2.38	151	2.42
Eritrea	154	2.34	152	2.31
Democratic Republic of Congo	155	2.15	155	2.15
Laos	156	2.10	156	2.10
Guinea-Bissau	157	1.99	157	1.99
Syria	=157	1.99	153	2.31
Iran	159	1.98	159	1.94
Central African Republic	160	1.82	162	1.82
Saudi Arabia	161	1.77	161	1.84
Equatorial Guinea	=161	1.77	160	1.84
Myanmar	=161	1.77	163	1.77
Uzbekistan	164	1.74	164	1.74
Turkmenistan	165	1.72	165	1.72
Chad	166	1.62	166	1.52
North Korea	167	1.08	167	1.08

### **A new wave of democratisation?**

Following a period of global stagnation and decline in democracy, will the Arab spring political upheavals result in a new wave of democratisation?

Although the degree of vulnerability of authoritarian regimes differs significantly, the developments in MENA underline the possibilities for political change. Authoritarian regimes in MENA and elsewhere share similar characteristics, to a lesser or greater degree: human rights abuses and absence of basic freedoms; rampant corruption and nepotism; small elites control the bulk of the nation's assets; and governance and social provision are poor. Economic hardships in the form of stagnant or falling incomes, high unemployment and rising inflation have affected many countries. Some authoritarian regimes have young and restless populations. Long-serving, geriatric leaders are another common feature. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak had been in office for 29 years; former Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was in power for 23 years. Elsewhere in MENA, Ali Abdullah Saleh



has ruled Yemen since 1978, while Libya's Muammar al-Gaddafi had been in power for more than four decades.

In other regions such as the CIS, several autocrats have been in power for two decades or more. Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe has been in power for more than three decades, while the Castro brothers have held sway in Cuba for more than half a century. The longer ageing autocrats hang on to power, the more out-of-touch and corrupt their regimes tend to become, and the more of an anachronism and an affront they become to their peoples.

The extent of economic dynamism varies sharply across authoritarian states; it ranges from double-digit growth in China and rapid growth rates in the authoritarian states of the CIS to the long-running stagnation of Saudi Arabia and falling incomes in some Sub-Saharan African countries. Oil wealth is a double-edged sword. Some of the energy-rich states have been able to buy off the population and pre-empt unrest. On the other hand, minerals-based development magnifies all kinds of institutional pathologies, which can in turn provoke unrest. In terms of the level of development, countries must not be rich enough to be able to buy off restive populations, but they need to be rich enough to have a middle class, widespread internet access and sufficient numbers of educated young people who are able and willing to form the vanguard of a political revolution.

### ***Timing***

Why did the Arab uprisings occur after a long period in which authoritarian governments appeared to have been successfully consolidating their control? The interplay of a number of factors may provide an explanation: electoral fraud; succession crises; economic distress; increasing corruption; and neighbourhood effects.

An attempt by an authoritarian ruler to extend his rule or ensure that a hand-picked successor, usually an offspring, takes power is a catalyst for protest. Stealing elections has often galvanised opposition (for example, in Egypt or during the CIS "colour revolutions" in the middle of the previous decade). The blatant fraud in the parliamentary elections in Egypt held in November and December 2010 outraged and helped mobilise protesters, as did Mr Mubarak's plan to install his son Gamal as the country's next ruler. Cumulative effects can be important. Years of corruption and repression mean that with each passing year popular dissatisfaction with the regime increases. Neighbourhood demonstration effects have played a strong role in anti-regime protests; without Tunisia there would have been no Egypt. Finally, domestic political opposition is emboldened when external opposition or ambivalence towards ruling elites replaces previous support. An increased international focus constrains autocrats' room for manoeuvre.

Most authoritarian leaders have a large security apparatus at their disposal to suppress dissent and can mobilise supporters to counter challenges to their regime. Many do not fear international opprobrium if they crack down. These factors may be enough to ward off regime change, at least in the short term, and a number of MENA authoritarian regimes have resorted to brutal repression to remain in power. Despite this, authoritarianism in many countries is vulnerable.

An assessment of the degree of vulnerability of the world's authoritarian regimes to political revolt



shows that in regions other than MENA several Sub-Saharan African autocracies (including most of all, Zimbabwe) are in the high-risk category; most of the non-MENA authoritarian regimes—in Sub-Saharan Africa, the CIS and Asia—are in the medium and lower-risk groups. Most of Asia’s autocracies (Myanmar excepted) are in the lower-risk group, mainly because of good economic performance, a lower degree of inequality and weak opposition movements. The communist regimes in China and Cuba are rated the least vulnerable. However, this is only compared with other autocratic regimes. As noted, no authoritarian regime is safe. China’s stability is very dependent on the maintenance of very high growth rates and it is not difficult to envisage the eruption of serious political challenges in a post-Castro Cuba.

Our assessment is based on 14 indicators in all, measuring: economic factors (GDP per head at PPP, the unemployment rate and the inflation rate; the annual average growth rate in GDP per head in 2001-2010); communications (internet users per 100); demographics (median age); political attitudes and culture (survey evidence on satisfaction with freedom of choice and the degree of political engagement; a rating of the potential strength of the opposition); social provision (life expectancy and mean years of schooling); social inequality (based on the latest available income inequality data); governance (corruption ratings).

### **Democracy: from retreat to renewal**

During the 1970s and 1980s more than 30 countries shifted from authoritarian to democratic political systems. In recent years, the post-1970s wave of democratisation has slowed or been reversed. In some respects the trend was made worse by the post-2008 economic crisis. There has been a decline in some aspects of governance, political participation and media freedoms, and a clear deterioration in attitudes associated with, or that are conducive to, democracy in many countries. Many governments have felt increasingly vulnerable and threatened and have reacted by intensifying their efforts to control the media and impede free expression.

However, the events in MENA now raise the question of whether a new wave of democratisation might be upon us—like that in the 1970s or post-1989. The outlook is of course uncertain, but on balance looks positive as to the possibilities for democratisation, for a host of reasons.

#### *Discredited old regimes*

The old regimes are so discredited and lacking in legitimacy that, once overthrown, any chances of restoration or of some form of military dictatorship look slim. “Mubarakism without Mubarak” is not an option.

#### *Neighbourhood demonstration effects*

As in the case of popular revolts, a demonstration effect has played a big role in previous democratic transitions—in southern Europe in the 1970s, in Latin America in the 1980s and post-1989 eastern Europe.

#### *Economic distress*

Economic difficulties will on balance probably work to undermine authoritarian regimes. There is an



empirical link globally between economic crises and political upheaval. Historically, economic crises and difficulties have been associated with democratic breakthroughs, such as the sudden collapse of seemingly stable autocratic regimes.

### *The role of political culture*

Survey evidence suggests that the political culture in some countries is conducive to democratisation. In many others it is not. However, even in these countries it may be wrong to overplay this factor. A relatively small section of a population in an urban centre or centres, if sufficiently motivated and mobilised, can carry out nationwide change.

We expect that political upheavals will indeed affect other authoritarian regimes, with some regimes, mainly but not only in MENA, being especially vulnerable. These may not all be successful and not all may necessarily take the form of mass popular uprisings. However, prevailing conditions appear to suggest that there will be political challenges to autocrats in many of the world's authoritarian states.

The outlook for democratic transition is, however, more uncertain. As has been the case in recent years, major reversals in democratisation have taken place before. For example, a democratisation wave after the second world war ended with more than 20 countries subsequently sliding back to authoritarianism. That sort of rollback has not occurred recently. Democracy as a value retains strong universal appeal worldwide. Despite setbacks and overall stagnation, surveys show that most people in most places still want democracy. Trends such as globalisation, increasing education and expanding middle classes tend to favour the organic development of democracy.

But nobody would have predicted that a new trend would happen so soon and start in what looked like the most inhospitable environment possible, in a MENA state, or that even the short-term outlook for a new wave of democratisation could look so potentially promising. Democratisation in hitherto authoritarian states will of course not mean a transition to fully-fledged, consolidated democracies. Democracy means more than holding elections; it requires the development of a range of supportive institutions and attitudes. Such a transformation takes a very long time. But even imperfect or flawed democracies would be far better than authoritarianism.

### **Democracy and economic crisis**

Although economic crises can serve to undermine authoritarianism, there are also a number of ways in which democracy has been adversely affected by the economic and financial crisis. There has been a decline in some aspects of governance, political participation and media freedoms, and a clear deterioration in attitudes associated with, or conducive to, democracy in many countries, including in Europe.

Nations with a weak democratic tradition are by default vulnerable to setbacks. Many non-consolidated democracies are fragile and socioeconomic stress has led to backsliding on democracy in many countries. The underlying shallowness of democratic cultures—as revealed by disturbingly low scores for many countries in our index for political participation and political culture—has come to the fore.



The impact of the economic and financial crisis on political trends has been most marked in Europe, both east and west. Extremist political forces in Europe have not profited from the economic crisis as much as might have been feared, but populism and anti-immigrant sentiment has nevertheless been on the rise. Economic crises can threaten democracy, usually with a lag, through increased social unrest. So far, social unrest related to the financial and economic crisis has affected about two dozen countries.

The results of Gallup polls are largely mirrored in the findings of Eurobarometer surveys. Confidence in national public institutions in western Europe—already low before 2008 in many countries—has declined further since the onset of the crisis. Less than one fifth of west Europeans trust political parties and only about one third trust their governments and parliaments. Levels of public trust are exceptionally low in the eastern Europe-12 (the 10 new EU member states and EU candidate countries Croatia and Macedonia). Less than 10% of people in this subregion trust political parties and less than one fifth trust their governments and their parliaments. The proportion that is satisfied with the way democracy functions in their countries fell from 40% in 2007 to only 33% in 2009.

## Regional patterns

### Western Europe

Six out of the top ten countries in our index are in western Europe (significantly only one, Finland, is in the euro zone). However, there has been a significant erosion in democracy in the region in recent years. Seven countries had a decline in their score in 2011; none had an increase. The underlying trend for some time has been one of deterioration. A total of 15 countries out of 21 experienced a decline in their overall score in 2010 compared with 2008, in large part related to the various effects of the economic crisis. Three countries (Greece, Italy and France) dropped out of the category of full democracies between 2008 and 2010; Portugal joined them in 2011.

The main reason for the decline in democracy scores in 2011 in the region has been the erosion in sovereignty and democratic accountability associated with the effects of and responses to the euro zone crisis (five of seven countries that have experienced a decline in their scores—Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Ireland). Most dramatically, in two countries (Greece and Italy) democratically elected politicians have been replaced by technocrats at the head of governments.

Six euro zone governments collapsed in 2011 and there have been growing public protests and a proliferation of new political parties and movements. Policy in some countries is no longer being set by national legislatures and elected politicians, but is effectively set by official creditors, the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the IMF. The severity of austerity measures has tended to weaken social cohesion and diminish further trust in public institutions, which had already been declining since the 2008–09 economic crisis.

In many Western democracies, lack of public participation in the political process is a cause for concern, leading to a so-called democratic deficit. In Germany, for example, membership of the major parties is in decline and election turnout is decreasing at all levels. The UK's political participation



score is among the worst in the developed world.

## Eastern Europe

Eastern Europe experienced another decline in democracy in 2011. In 12 out of 28 countries of the region the democracy score declined in 2011. This followed a large decline in the average score for the region between 2008 and 2010, when 19 countries recorded a decline in their democracy scores.

Authoritarian trends have become entrenched in most members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). But the setbacks to democracy are by no means limited to that subregion. Democracy is also being eroded across east-central Europe. A common explanation for the emergence of political difficulties in this subregion is that the EU accession process had previously held together the fractious party-political systems of these countries, as mainstream parties united behind the reforms that were needed to gain EU membership. But once accession was achieved, and politics reverted to “natural” antagonistic patterns, the underlying fragility of east-central European political systems was exposed.

### Attitudes to democracy

The 2008–09 global economic crisis has had a disproportionately negative impact on eastern Europe compared with other emerging markets, such as developing Asia and Latin America. But it is not only in terms of national output that the crisis has left its mark on the region. It also seems to have reinforced a pre-existing mood of disappointment with the experience and results of the 20-year transition (Hoey 2011). A number of post-crisis surveys and reports point to a further decline in life satisfaction, support for markets and democracy and trust in institutions.

The Eurobarometer reports published between May 2008 and August 2011 reveal changes in public opinion in all 27 member states and in the five candidate countries (Croatia, Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro and Turkey) since the start of the crisis. Similar trends were revealed by Gallup polls taken before and after the crisis (2006 and 2009), and also by the Life in Transition Surveys (LiTS) carried out jointly by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank in 2006 and 2010.

The most striking findings of the LiTS 2010 was the decline in support for democracy in central

Europe and the Balkans. In 11 transition countries, 50% of respondents or fewer express a preference for democracy, with support being lowest in Serbia, Latvia, Russia, Lithuania, Ukraine and Bosnia & Hercegovina (BiH). The widespread disenchantment with democracy in the region, especially in the richer economies, does not necessarily reflect a hankering for authoritarianism or a return to the communist past. Rather, it seems to reflect the exhaustion of contemporary political systems and a general unfocused disillusion, apathy and disengagement.

In contrast to central Europe and the Balkans, support for democracy has held up well or even increased in many CIS countries. In a mirror image of the trend in central Europe and the Balkans, in Tajikistan, Armenia, Uzbekistan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Belarus, support for democracy has risen, in some cases significantly since the previous LiTS in 2006. It seems that in the CIS the lack of democracy colours people’s view, and predisposes them favourably towards democracy, while in east-central Europe disappointment with imperfect democracy and its functioning has led to a decline in support for democracy. The results suggest that there is a thirst for political freedom in the more authoritarian CIS states, and that the democratic struggles in the Middle East and North Africa could yet have an impact on the transition region.





There are a number of possible reasons for this fragility. Most important is that although democratic forms are in place in the region, much of the substance of democracy, including a political culture based on trust, is absent. This is manifested in low levels of political participation beyond voting (and even turnout at elections is low in many countries), and very low levels of public confidence in institutions. A key underlying factor is that transition has resulted in a large stratum of discontented voters who feel that they have lost out. Another problem in the region is that party politics is fragmented, primarily reflecting the shallow roots of many parties and low voter identification with parties.

Some negative trends have recently got worse. Hungary is perhaps the prime example among the EU's new member states in the region. In the April 2010 election, an extreme nationalist party, Jobbik, gathered almost as many votes as the former ruling Socialists. Since winning a two thirds parliamentary majority in the election, the centre-right Fidesz party has systematically been taking over the country's previously independent institutions: the presidency, the state audit office and the media council are now all run by party placemen. Electoral reforms have undermined the opposition and smaller parties.

Although the formal trappings of democracy remain in place, today's Russia has been called a "managed" (or "stage managed") democracy. All the main decisions are made by a small group of insiders. The Duma is now little more than a rubber-stamp parliament; regional governors are appointed directly; the main media are state-controlled; civil society organisations have come under pressure; and the state has increased its hold over the economy.

The announcement in September 2011 that the prime minister, Vladimir Putin, will seek to return to the presidency (a post that he occupied in 2000-08) was a retrograde and cynical step. It marked a decisive step in Russia's long-running slide towards outright authoritarianism. The decision has made a mockery of the institution of the presidency and the electoral process. It has exposed the Medvedev presidency as a charade used by Mr Putin to stay in power. Democracy is perhaps above all about the rotation of power. Weak institutions in Russia mean that Mr Putin's return to power marks a dangerous transformation of his rule into a highly personalistic regime. Mr Putin will be legally eligible for two six-year terms, ruling until 2024—almost a quarter of a century after he first became president, in 2000—when he will be 71 years old. The parliamentary election on December 4th 2011 was deeply flawed; it was neither free nor fair.

### ***The CIS and MENA***

There are a number of similarities between the authoritarian regimes in the CIS and in MENA. There is rampant corruption, small elites control the bulk of their nations' assets, institutions have been corroded by the effects of minerals-based development (the Belarusian regime depends on Russian subsidies), and governance and social provision are poor. The Arab world has a young and restless population; in the CIS, this applies to some Central Asian countries, especially Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

However, there are also differences, which reduce the chances of CIS authoritarian regimes being





subjected to similar challenges. Growth in real GDP per head in the CIS has been far faster over the past decade than in MENA. Although unemployment tends to be under-reported in much of the CIS, rates are generally lower than in the MENA countries suffering from unrest. In most CIS states, the incidence of absolute poverty and the degree of income disparities also tend to be lower. Although Internet access is relatively high, especially in urban areas, some CIS countries (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in particular) are so closed that the chances of political contagion from abroad are reduced significantly.

Many CIS countries are poor, and the median income per head in the CIS is much lower than the median income per head in MENA. However, some energy-rich CIS states have been able to buy off the population and pre-empt potential unrest by using some of their energy revenue to boost state salaries and benefits. In Turkmenistan, for example, the regime subsidises utilities and several basic foodstuffs. In a few countries, such as Kazakhstan, improving living standards seem to have created popular support for autocratic rulers.

The greatest risk to existing rulers and elite structures may be the issue of succession. Both the Kazakh president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, and the Uzbek president, Islam Karimov, are more than 70 years old and have been in power for more than two decades. No clear successors have been lined up, which increases the potential for intra-elite in-fighting, and possibly public unrest when the incumbent dies or becomes incapacitated.

Recent developments in Russia suggest that possible parallels between the “Arab Spring” and future developments in Russia will become even more apt. Although total unemployment in Russia is low, the jobless rate among people aged 16-25 is quite high, at 26%, comparable to that in the Arab world. In MENA periodic protests preceded an upsurge in anti-regime activity. Similarly, in Russia large protests followed the December 2011 parliamentary election.

However, there are also significant differences, which diminish the risks of a contagion effect in Russia. With the exception of the deep slump in 2009, over the past decade the Russian economy has been more dynamic than most in MENA. Generally higher levels of development in Russia provide scope for the authorities to buy off the population. The incidence of absolute poverty is lower. The Arab world has a young and restless population; the Russian population is ageing and in decline. Much may depend on the mood of the growing, but until now largely apolitical, middle class.

Despite the differences between MENA and the CIS, we cannot rule out the possibility of significant political change in the CIS over the next few years. The astonishing nature and speed of developments

**Comparative data for the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Middle East and North Africa**

(2010 data unless otherwise indicated)

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X
<b>CIS median</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>7.7</b>	<b>5.9</b>	<b>5,888</b>	<b>68.5</b>	<b>10.0</b>	<b>30.7</b>	<b>19.7</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>13</b>
Armenia	123	7.0	7.9	5,179	74.2	10.8	32.0	6.2	39	12
Azerbaijan	134	6.0	13.0	9,954	70.8	10.2	28.4	28.2	45	25
Belarus	127	0.9	8.0	13,865	69.6	9.3	38.2	32.1	56	11
Georgia	68	16.8	6.2	5,057	72.0	12.1	37.6	23.8	43	23



**Comparative data for the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Middle East and North Africa**  
(2010 data unless otherwise indicated)

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X
Kazakhstan	105	7.8	7.6	12,402	65.4	10.3	29.4	10.9	71	11
Kyrgyz Republic	164	5.6	2.7	2,162	68.4	9.3	25.1	16.1	63	12
Moldova	105	7.5	4.9	2,959	68.9	9.7	35.2	23.4	48	20
Russia	154	7.5	5.1	15,807	67.2	8.8	38.1	31.9	50	13
Tajikistan	154	8.0	5.6	1,907	56.9	5.1	20.7	8.8	54	32
Turkmenistan	172	8.0	11.2	6,597	65.3	9.9	24.7	1.5	n/a	n/a
Ukraine	134	8.8	4.9	6,656	68.6	11.3	39.5	76.0	38	13
Uzbekistan	172	8.0	5.5	3,022	68.2	10.0	24.5	9.0	76	23
<b>MENA median</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>10.0</b>	<b>2.3</b>	<b>12,183</b>	<b>74.4</b>	<b>7.2</b>	<b>26.2</b>	<b>27.3</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>16</b>
Algeria	105	10.0	2.2	7,104	74.0	7.2	26.2	11.9	50	16
Bahrain	48	10.0	0.7	26,808	76.0	9.4	28.1	51.9	n/a	n/a
Egypt	98	10.0	2.7	6,367	70.5	6.5	23.9	16.6	60	12
Jordan	50	13.0	3.7	5,659	73.1	8.6	22.8	27.4	75	14
Kuwait	54	1.6	0.4	38,293	77.9	6.1	30.6	36.7	80	24
Libya	146	30.0	2.5	14,878	74.5	7.3	26.2	5.1	n/a	n/a
Morocco	85	9.6	3.8	4,773	71.8	4.4	26.2	33.0	71	6
Oman	41	10.0	2.6	26,198	76.1	n/a	24.3	20.0	na	n/a
Qatar	19	0.5	2.4	88,233	76.0	7.3	30.1	34.0	77	24
Saudi Arabia	50	10.5	0.8	23,743	73.3	7.8	24.6	31.3	60	22
Syria	127	12.0	1.8	5,108	74.6	4.9	22.5	17.3	72	10
Tunisia	59	13.2	3.5	9,489	74.3	6.5	29.1	27.1	70	16
UAE	28	3.0	-0.1	36,973	77.7	9.2	31.7	65.2	83	16
Yemen	146	35.0	1.1	2,596	63.9	2.5	17.8	1.6	62	9

Note. I = Corruption rank; out of 178 countries in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index 2010 (highest is most corrupt). II = Unemployment rate (%). III = % growth of GDP per head, 2001-20. IV = GDP per head (US\$ at PPP). V = Life expectancy (years). VI = Mean years of schooling. VII = Median age. VIII = Internet users per 100 people, 2008. IX = % satisfaction with freedom of choice, according to a Gallup survey in 2009. X = % who voiced opinions to officials, according to a Gallup survey in 2008.

Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit; Transparency International; IMF; UN Development Programme; World Bank.

in MENA underscores the chance of political change.

In Ukraine the democratic gains of the Orange Revolution are being undermined, including the conduct of elections, media freedoms and treatment of the opposition. Few are convinced that the sentencing of former prime minister Yuliya Tymoshenko to seven years in jail is not an example of gross abuse of the judicial system for political ends.

Ms Tymoshenko was convicted under a communist-era law that criminalised actions hurting the country even if the individual did not profit. She was found guilty of exceeding her authority in 2009



by agreeing to a big hike in the cost of gas imported from Russia, ending a dispute that saw Russia briefly cut off supplies to western Europe (which are transported through Ukraine). As well as being jailed for seven years, Ms Tymoshenko was ordered to repay the US\$190m that the judge said her deal had cost the state energy company. In addition to Ms Tymoshenko, other high-ranking officials from her government face prosecution, in what amounts to a deliberate targeting of the opposition. In other signs of backsliding on democracy, the president can now determine the candidacy of the prime minister independently of parliament, appoint and dismiss cabinet members, and dismiss the government without parliament's consent.

### **Asia and Australasia**

The wide disparities in democratic development across Asia are captured in the results of our democracy index. The picture is exemplified by the Korean peninsula: South Korea is a full democracy, ranked 22nd. By contrast, North Korea props up the global listings, coming last of the 167 countries covered by the index. The average score for the region was only slightly lower in 2011 than in 2010. No country underwent a change in regime type in 2011.

Although parts of the region—from Myanmar and North Korea to Laos, Vietnam and China—are still entrenched authoritarian regimes, the past couple of decades have seen the spread of democracy in the region overall. Over the past decade, some 20 Asian countries have held elections, and many have undergone peaceful transitions in government. Despite its problems, India remains the world's most populous democracy. Yet even in the democratic countries, there are often significant problems in the functioning of political systems.

Democratic political cultures in Asia are often underdeveloped and shallow, even in the countries that have democratised. In only nine countries in the region do we rate elections as being both free and fair. Even in parts of the region that are not authoritarian there is often pressure on the independent media. In many countries, Asian Barometer polls show that more citizens believe that the nations' recent democratic transitions had brought no improvement to their lives than believe that the changes have been positive.

Although the Asian Barometer Project found that the majority of Asians say they support democratic ideals, their commitment to limits on a leader's power is far lower than in most other regions.

### **Latin America**

There was little change in this region between 2010 and 2011. The average score for the region declined slightly in 2011 as rampant crime in some countries—in particular, violence and drug-trafficking—continues to have a negative impact.

In most countries free and fair elections are now well established. The recent evidence from surveys on attitudes towards democracy is mixed. In some countries, surveys indicate a slow shift in public attitudes on many issues in a direction that is conducive to democracy. However, a recent UNDP report (UNDP 2011) found that the sustainability of democracy in Latin America is being endangered by the concentration of power, the world's highest social and economic inequalities, and mounting insecurity and violence.



While most Latin American countries (14 out of 24) fall within the flawed democracy category, there is wide diversity across the region. For example, Uruguay is a full democracy with an index score of 8.17 (out of 10) and a global ranking of 17th, while Cuba, an authoritarian regime, ranks 126th.

Although the region was adversely affected by the 2008-09 recession—with the US-dependent Central American and Caribbean subregions hit particularly badly—most countries avoided social unrest and a rolling back of democracy. However, a key issue that is undermining democracy in much of the region is an upsurge in violent crime, linked in large part with the drug trade. The corrupting influence of organised crime and its ability to undermine the effectiveness of the security forces and the judicial authorities are a serious problem.

Electoral democracy, for the most part, remains firmly entrenched in Latin America, but media freedoms have been eroded in recent years in several countries. Aside from Cuba (the only state in the region without any independent media), Venezuela has been the worst offender. The failure to uphold press freedom in some countries in the region in part reflects inadequate oversight bodies—a symptom of broader institutional weaknesses in Latin America. The executive remains very strong in many countries, the legislature is comparatively weak in many cases and most judiciaries suffer from some degree of politicisation.

### **The Middle East and North Africa**

Despite the pro-democracy upheavals in the region and improvement in the region's average democracy score in 2011, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) remains the most repressive region in the world—15 out of 20 countries in the region are categorised as authoritarian. Only in Tunisia has the Arab spring thus far resulted in significant democratisation, although some progress has been recorded in Egypt, Libya and a few Gulf states. Elsewhere there has even been regression in reaction to popular protests—notably in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen.

Almost all governments in the region continue to restrict political freedoms. Prior to the Arab spring there was some limited political reform in the region in recent years, including the establishment of representative assemblies in several Gulf states. But these reforms have certainly not changed fundamentally the political system in these states, in which the executive branch still dominates and is unaccountable.

Enormous oil rents are the means by which governments in the region have entrenched autocratic rule. Rulers can finance far-reaching patronage networks and security apparatuses. Oil revenue removes the need to levy taxes, thereby reducing accountability. Civil society is very weak throughout most of the region.

In Egypt the continuing protests reflect dissatisfaction with the political dividends of the overthrow of the regime of Hosni Mubarak, respectively; suspicion about the intentions of the military, Islamist groups and surviving former regime elements; and deepening concern about economic conditions. The Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) has performed a remarkable feat (with significant external help) in ousting Colonel Muammar Qadhafi and setting up an interim government, but faces a monumental task in building new state structures on treacherous foundations. Elsewhere, the uprising



in Bahrain has been smothered, and both Yemen and Syria face the risk of prolonged violence as the regimes of Ali Abdullah Saleh and Bashar al-Assad attempt to cling on to power at any cost.

Tunisia was the pioneer of this year's Arab revolutions, and has made the most progress. The election on October 23rd for a 218-member constituent assembly, was successful. The Egyptian revolution has been a much more turbulent affair than its Tunisian counterpart, and one of the main differences between the two experiences has been in the nature of Islamist politics. Whereas Hizb al-Nahda faces hardly any significant challenges to its dominance of the Islamist political scene in Tunisia, the Muslim Brotherhood has to deal with a resurgent Salafi movement pushing a radical Islamist agenda. The Salafis' unambiguous and uncompromising approach to sensitive issues gives it a strong appeal among a significant portion of the electorate. Another crucial difference is the hands-on role of the army, through the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which assumed sovereign powers after Hosni Mubarak stepped down as president on February 11th. One of the salient themes of the ongoing Egyptian revolution has been the failure of the radical groups that inspired the mass protests in Tahrir Square in January and February to sustain that political momentum.

### **Sub-Saharan Africa**

Elections have become a normal occurrence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Since the late 1990s the number of coups has fallen sharply, whereas the number of elections has increased. However, many elections are rigged and defeated incumbents often still refuse to accept defeat. Only in six countries in the region are the elections judged to be both free and fair (Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Mauritius, South Africa and Zambia). Together with MENA, Sub-Saharan Africa was the only region in the world that had an improvement in its average democracy score in 2011.

Progress in democracy in the region has been slow and uneven, but nevertheless continues. The number of elections held annually in recent years has increased; since 2000 between 15 and 20 elections have been held each year. Although the holding of elections has become commonplace, not all ballots pass the test of being "free and fair" and many have been charades held by regimes clinging on to power.

The number of successful coups averaged about 20 per decade in 1960-2000. The number dropped to just six in the 2000s: in the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania (twice), Guinea and Madagascar. Although coups have become more infrequent, conflict, failed governments and human-rights abuses remain widespread.

Only one state in the region (of the 44 assessed) remains a full democracy: the Indian Ocean island of Mauritius, which has maintained a strong democratic tradition since the country gained independence in 1968. The region has several flawed democracies, headed by South Africa, which just falls short of being a full democracy because of weaknesses in political participation and political culture. The other flawed democracies are Cape Verde, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, Ghana, Mali, Benin and since this year Zambia. However, hybrid regimes (11 countries) and authoritarian regimes (23; over one-half of the total assessed) continue to predominate. In 2011 two countries also moved from authoritarian to hybrid regimes (Mauritania and Niger), and Zambia improved from a hybrid to a



flawed democracy..

## Defining and measuring democracy

There is no consensus on how to measure democracy, definitions of democracy are contested and there is an ongoing lively debate on the subject. The issue is not only of academic interest. For example, although democracy-promotion is high on the list of US foreign policy priorities, there is no consensus within the US government on what constitutes a democracy. As one observer recently put it, “the world’s only superpower is rhetorically and militarily promoting a political system that remains undefined—and it is staking its credibility and treasure on that pursuit” (Horowitz, 2006, p 114).

Although the terms freedom and democracy are often used interchangeably, the two are not synonymous. Democracy can be seen as a set of practices and principles that institutionalise and thus ultimately protect freedom. Even if a consensus on precise definitions has proved elusive, most observers today would agree that, at a minimum, the fundamental features of a democracy include government based on majority rule and the consent of the governed, the existence of free and fair elections, the protection of minority rights and respect for basic human rights. Democracy presupposes equality before the law, due process and political pluralism. A question arises whether reference to these basic features is sufficient for a satisfactory concept of democracy. As discussed below, there is a question of how far the definition may need to be widened.

Some insist that democracy is necessarily a dichotomous concept—a state is either democratic or not. But most measures now appear to adhere to a continuous concept, with the possibility of varying degrees of democracy. At present, the best-known measure is produced by the US-based Freedom House organisation. The average of their indexes, on a 1 to 7 scale, of political freedom (based on 10 indicators) and of civil liberties (based on 15 indicators) is often taken to be a measure of democracy.

The index is available for all countries, and stretches back to the early 1970s. It has been used heavily in empirical investigations of the relationship between democracy and various economic and social variables. The so-called Polity Project provides, for a smaller number of countries, measures of democracy and regime types, based on rather minimalist definitions, stretching back to the 19th century. These have also been used in empirical work.

Freedom House also measures a narrower concept, that of “electoral democracy”. Democracies in this minimal sense share at least one common, essential characteristic. Positions of political power are filled through regular, free, and fair elections between competing parties, and it is possible for an incumbent government to be turned out of office through elections. Freedom House criteria for an electoral democracy include:

- 1) A competitive, multiparty political system
- 2) Universal adult suffrage
- 3) Regularly contested elections conducted on the basis of secret ballots, reasonable ballot security and the absence of massive voter fraud
- 4) Significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through the media and through





generally open political campaigning

The Freedom House definition of political freedom is somewhat (though not much) more demanding than its criteria for electoral democracy—that is, it classifies more countries as electoral democracies than as “free” (some “partly free” countries are also categorised as “electoral democracies”). At the end of 2007, 121 out of 193 states were classified as “electoral democracies; of these, on a more stringent criterion, 90 states were classified as “free”. The Freedom House political freedom measure covers the electoral process and political pluralism and, to a lesser extent the functioning of government and a few aspects of participation.

A key difference in measures is between “thin”, or minimalist, and “thick”, or wider concepts of democracy (Coppedge, 2005). The thin concepts correspond closely to an immensely influential academic definition of democracy, that of Dahl’s concept of polyarchy (Dahl, 1970). Polyarchy has eight components, or institutional requirements: almost all adult citizens have the right to vote; almost all adult citizens are eligible for public office; political leaders have the right to compete for votes; elections are free and fair; all citizens are free to form and join political parties and other organisations; all citizens are free to express themselves on all political issues; diverse sources of information about politics exist and are protected by law; and government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.

The Freedom House electoral democracy measure is a thin concept. Their measure of democracy based on political rights and civil liberties is “thicker” than the measure of “electoral democracy”. Other definitions of democracy have broadened to include aspects of society and political culture in democratic societies.

### **The Economist Intelligence Unit measure**

The Economist Intelligence Unit’s index is based on the view that measures of democracy that reflect the state of political freedoms and civil liberties are not “thick” enough. They do not encompass sufficiently or at all some features that determine how substantive democracy is or its quality. Freedom is an essential component of democracy, but not sufficient. In existing measures, the elements of political participation and functioning of government are taken into account only in a marginal and formal way.

The Economist Intelligence Unit’s democracy index is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. The five categories are inter-related and form a coherent conceptual whole. The condition of having free and fair competitive elections, and satisfying related aspects of political freedom, is clearly the sine quo none of all definitions.

All modern definitions, except the most minimalist, also consider civil liberties to be a vital component of what is often called “liberal democracy”. The principle of the protection of basic human rights is widely accepted. It is embodied in constitutions throughout the world as well as in the UN Charter and international agreements such as the Helsinki Final Act (the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe). Basic human rights include the freedom of speech, expression and the press;





freedom of religion; freedom of assembly and association; and the right to due judicial process. All democracies are systems in which citizens freely make political decisions by majority rule. But rule by the majority is not necessarily democratic. In a democracy majority rule must be combined with guarantees of individual human rights and the rights of minorities.

Most measures also include aspects of the minimum quality of functioning of government. If democratically-based decisions cannot or are not implemented then the concept of democracy is not very meaningful or it becomes an empty shell.

Democracy is more than the sum of its institutions. A democratic political culture is also crucial for the legitimacy, smooth functioning and ultimately the sustainability of democracy. A culture of passivity and apathy, an obedient and docile citizenry, are not consistent with democracy. The electoral process periodically divides the population into winners and losers. A successful democratic political culture implies that the losing parties and their supporters accept the judgment of the voters, and allow for the peaceful transfer of power.

Participation is also a necessary component, as apathy and abstention are enemies of democracy. Even measures that focus predominantly on the processes of representative, liberal democracy include (although inadequately or insufficiently) some aspects of participation. In a democracy, government is only one element in a social fabric of many and varied institutions, political organisations, and associations. Citizens cannot be required to take part in the political process, and they are free to express their dissatisfaction by not participating. However, a healthy democracy requires the active, freely chosen participation of citizens in public life. Democracies flourish when citizens are willing to participate in public debate, elect representatives and join political parties. Without this broad, sustaining participation, democracy begins to wither and become the preserve of small, select groups.

At the same time, even our “thicker”, more inclusive and wider measure of democracy does not include other aspects--which some authors argue are also crucial components of democracy--such as levels of economic and social well being. Thus our Index respects the dominant tradition that holds that a variety of social and economic outcomes can be consistent with political democracy, which is a separate concept.

## **Methodology**

The Economist Intelligence Unit’s index of democracy, on a 0 to 10 scale, is based on the ratings for 60 indicators grouped in five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. Each category has a rating on a 0 to 10 scale, and the overall index of democracy is the simple average of the five category indexes.

The category indexes are based on the sum of the indicator scores in the category, converted to a 0 to 10 scale. Adjustments to the category scores are made if countries do not score a 1 in the following critical areas for democracy:

1. whether national elections are free and fair
2. the security of voters



3. the influence of foreign powers on government
4. the capability of the civil service to implement policies.

If the scores for the first three questions are 0 (or 0.5), one point (0.5 point) is deducted from the index in the relevant category (either the electoral process and pluralism or the functioning of government). If the score for 4 is 0, one point is deducted from the functioning of government category index.

The index values are used to place countries within one of four types of regimes:

1. Full democracies--scores of 8-10
2. Flawed democracies--score of 6 to 7.9
3. Hybrid regimes--scores of 4 to 5.9
- 4 Authoritarian regimes--scores below 4

Threshold points for regime types depend on overall scores that are rounded to one decimal point.

**Full democracies:** Countries in which not only basic political freedoms and civil liberties are respected, but these will also tend to be underpinned by a political culture conducive to the flourishing of democracy. The functioning of government is satisfactory. Media are independent and diverse. There is an effective system of checks and balances. The judiciary is independent and judicial decisions are enforced. There are only limited problems in the functioning of democracies.

**Flawed democracies:** These countries also have free and fair elections and even if there are problems (such as infringements on media freedom), basic civil liberties will be respected. However, there are significant weaknesses in other aspects of democracy, including problems in governance, an underdeveloped political culture and low levels of political participation.

**Hybrid regimes:** Elections have substantial irregularities that often prevent them from being both free and fair. Government pressure on opposition parties and candidates may be common. Serious weaknesses are more prevalent than in flawed democracies--in political culture, functioning of government and political participation. Corruption tends to be widespread and the rule of law is weak. Civil society is weak. Typically there is harassment of and pressure on journalists, and the judiciary is not independent.

**Authoritarian regimes:** In these states state political pluralism is absent or heavily circumscribed. Many countries in this category are outright dictatorships. Some formal institutions of democracy may exist, but these have little substance. Elections, if they do occur, are not free and fair. There is disregard for abuses and infringements of civil liberties. Media are typically state-owned or controlled by groups connected to the ruling regime. There is repression of criticism of the government and pervasive censorship. There is no independent judiciary.

### The scoring system

We use a combination of a dichotomous and a three-point scoring system for the 60 indicators. A dichotomous 1-0 scoring system (1 for a yes and 0 for a no answer) is not without problems, but it has



several distinct advantages over more refined scoring scales (such as the often-used 1-5 or 1-7). For many indicators, the possibility of a 0.5 score is introduced, to capture 'grey areas' where a simple yes (1) or no (0) is problematic, with guidelines as to when that should be used. Thus for many indicators there is a three-point scoring system, which represents a compromise between simple dichotomous scoring and the use of finer scales.

The problems of 1-5 or 1-7 scoring scales are numerous. For most indicators under such a system, it is extremely difficult to define meaningful and comparable criteria or guidelines for each score. This can lead to arbitrary, spurious and non-comparable scorings. For example, a score of 2 for one country may be scored a 3 in another and so on. Or one expert might score an indicator for a particular country in a different way to another expert. This contravenes a basic principle of measurement, that of so-called reliability—the degree to which a measurement procedure produces the same measurements every time, regardless of who is performing it. Two- and three-point systems do not guarantee reliability, but make it more likely.

Second, comparability between indicator scores and aggregation into a multi-dimensional index appears more valid with a two or three-point scale for each indicator (the dimensions being aggregated are similar across indicators). By contrast, with a 1-5 system, the scores are more likely to mean different things across the indicators (for example a 2 for one indicator may be more comparable to a 3 or 4 for another indicator, rather than a 2 for that indicator). The problems of a 1-5 or 1-7 system are magnified when attempting to extend the index to many regions and countries.

## **Features of the Economist Intelligence Unit index**

### *Public opinion surveys*

A crucial, differentiating aspect of our measure is that in addition to experts' assessments we use, where available, public opinion surveys—mainly the World Values Survey. Indicators based on the surveys predominate heavily in the political participation and political culture categories, and a few are used in the civil liberties and functioning of government categories.

In addition to the World Values Survey, other sources that can be leveraged include the Eurobarometer surveys, Gallup polls, Asian Barometer, Latin American Barometer, Afrobarometer and national surveys. In the case of countries for which survey results are missing, survey results for similar countries and expert assessment are used to fill in gaps.

### *Participation and voter turnout*

After increasing for many decades, there has been a trend of decreasing voter turnout in most established democracies since the 1960s. Low turnout may be due to disenchantment, but it can also be a sign of contentment. Many, however, see low turnout as undesirable, and there is much debate over the factors that affect turnout and how to increase it.

A high turnout is generally seen as evidence of the legitimacy of the current system. Contrary to widespread belief, there is in fact a close correlation between turnout and overall measures of democracy—that is, developed, consolidated democracies have, with very few exceptions, higher



turnout (generally above 70%) than less established democracies.

### *The legislative and executive branches*

The appropriate balance between these is much-disputed in political theory. In our model the clear predominance of the legislature is rated positively as there is a very strong correlation between legislative dominance and measures of overall democracy.

## **The model**

### **I Electoral process and pluralism**

1. Are elections for the national legislature and head of government free?

Consider whether elections are competitive in that electors are free to vote and are offered a range of choices.

1: Essentially unrestricted conditions for the presentation of candidates (for example, no bans on major parties)

0.5: There are some restrictions on the electoral process

0: A single-party system or major impediments exist (for example, bans on a major party or candidate)

2. Are elections for the national legislature and head of government fair?

1: No major irregularities in the voting process

0.5: Significant irregularities occur (intimidation, fraud), but do not affect significantly the overall outcome

0: Major irregularities occur and affect the outcome

Score 0 if score for question 1 is 0.

3. Are municipal elections both free and fair?

1: Are free and fair

0.5: Are free but not fair

0: Are neither free nor fair

4. Is there universal suffrage for all adults?

Bar generally accepted exclusions (for example, non-nationals; criminals; members of armed forces in some countries)

1: Yes

0: No

5. Can citizens cast their vote free of significant threats to their security from state or non-state bodies?

1: Yes

0: No

6. Do laws provide for broadly equal campaigning opportunities?

1: Yes

0.5: Yes formally, but in practice opportunities are limited for some candidates

0: No



7. Is the process of financing political parties transparent and generally accepted?
- 1: Yes
  - 0.5: Not fully transparent
  - 0: No
8. Following elections, are the constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power from one government to another clear, established and accepted?
- 1: All three criteria are fulfilled
  - 0.5: Two of the three criteria are fulfilled
  - 0: Only one or none of the criteria is satisfied
9. Are citizens free to form political parties that are independent of the government?
- 1: Yes
  - 0.5: There are some restrictions
  - 0: No
10. Do opposition parties have a realistic prospect of achieving government?
- 1: Yes
  - 0.5: There is a dominant two-party system in which other political forces never have any effective chance of taking part in national government
  - 0: No
11. Is potential access to public office open to all citizens?
- 1: Yes
  - 0.5: Formally unrestricted, but in practice restricted for some groups, or for citizens from some parts of the country
  - 0: No
12. Are citizens free to form political and civic organisations, free of state interference and surveillance?
- 1: Yes
  - 0.5: Officially free, but subject to some restrictions or interference
  - 0: No

## **II Functioning of government**

13. Do freely elected representatives determine government policy?
- 1: Yes
  - 0.5: Exercise some meaningful influence
  - 0: No
14. Is the legislature the supreme political body, with a clear supremacy over other branches of government?
- 1: Yes
  - 0: No
15. Is there an effective system of checks and balances on the exercise of government authority?



- 1: Yes
  - 0.5: Yes, but there are some serious flaws
  - 0: No
16. Government is free of undue influence by the military or the security services
- 1: Yes
  - 0.5: Influence is low, but the defence minister is not a civilian. If the current risk of a military coup is extremely low, but the country has a recent history of military rule or coups
  - 0: No
17. Foreign powers and organisations do not determine important government functions or policies
- 1: Yes
  - 0.5: Some features of a protectorate
  - 0: No (significant presence of foreign troops; important decisions taken by foreign power; country is a protectorate)
18. Special economic, religious or other powerful domestic groups do not exercise significant political power, parallel to democratic institutions?
- 1: Yes
  - 0.5: Exercise some meaningful influence
  - 0: No
19. Are sufficient mechanisms and institutions in place for assuring government accountability to the electorate in between elections?
- 1: Yes
  - 0.5. Yes, but serious flaws exist
  - 0: No
20. Does the government's authority extend over the full territory of the country?
- 1: Yes
  - 0: No
21. Is the functioning of government open and transparent, with sufficient public access to information?
- 1: Yes
  - 0.5: Yes, but serious flaws exist
  - 0: No
22. How pervasive is corruption?
- 1: Corruption is not a major problem
  - 0.5: Corruption is a significant issue
  - 0: Pervasive corruption exists
23. Is the civil service willing and capable of implementing government policy?
- 1: Yes
  - 0.5. Yes, but serious flaws exist
  - 0: No



24. Popular perceptions of the extent to which they have free choice and control over their lives

1: High

0.5: Moderate

0: Low

If available, from World Values Survey

% of people who think that they have a great deal of choice/control

1 if more than 70%

0.5 if 50-70%

0 if less than 50%

25. Public confidence in government

1: High

0.5: Moderate

0: Low

If available, from World Values Survey, Gallup polls, Eurobarometer, Latinobarometer

% of people who have a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in government

1 if more than 40%

0.5 if 25-40%

0 if less than 25%

26. Public confidence in political parties

1: High

0.5: Moderate

0: Low

If available, from World Values Survey

% of people who have a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence

1 if more than 40%

0.5 if 25-40%

0 if less than 25%

### **III Political participation**

27. Voter participation/turn-out for national elections.

(average turnout in parliamentary elections since 2000. Turnout as proportion of population of voting age).

1 if consistently above 70%

0.5 if between 50% and 70%

0 if below 50%

If voting is obligatory, score 0. Score 0 if scores for questions 1 or 2 is 0.

28. Do ethnic, religious and other minorities have a reasonable degree of autonomy and voice in the political process?

1: Yes



0.5: Yes, but serious flaws exist

0: No

29. Women in parliament

% of members of parliament who are women

1 if more than 20% of seats

0.5 if 10-20%

0 if less than 10%

30. Extent of political participation. Membership of political parties and political non-governmental organisations.

Score 1 if over 7% of population for either

Score 0.5 if 4% to 7%

Score 0 if under 4%.

If participation is forced, score 0.

31. Citizens' engagement with politics

1: High

0.5: Moderate

0: Low

If available, from World Values Survey

% of people who are very or somewhat interested in politics

1 if over 60%

0.5 if 40% to 60%

0 if less than 40%

32. The preparedness of population to take part in lawful demonstrations.

1: High

0.5: Moderate

0: Low

If available, from World Values Survey

% of people who have taken part in or would consider attending lawful demonstrations

1 if over 40%

0.5 if 30% to 40%

0 if less than 30%

33. Adult literacy

1 if over 90%

0.5 if 70% to 90%

0 if less than 70%

34. Extent to which adult population shows an interest in and follows politics in the news.

1: High

0.5: Moderate





0: Low

If available, from World Values Survey

% of population that follows politics in the news media (print, TV or radio) every day

1 if over 50%

0.5 if 30% to 50%

0 if less than 30%

35. The authorities make a serious effort to promote political participation.

1: Yes

0.5: Some attempts

0: No

Consider the role of the education system, and other promotional efforts Consider measures to facilitate voting by members of the diaspora.

If participation is forced, score 0.

IV Democratic political culture

36. Is there a sufficient degree of societal consensus and cohesion to underpin a stable, functioning democracy?

1: Yes

0.5: Yes, but some serious doubts and risks

0: No

37. Perceptions of leadership; proportion of the population that desires a strong leader who bypasses parliament and elections.

1: Low

0.5: Moderate

0: High

If available, from World Values Survey

% of people who think it would be good or fairly good to have a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections

1 if less than 30%

0.5 if 30% to 50%

0 if more than 50%

38. Perceptions of military rule; proportion of the population that would prefer military

1: Low

0.5: Moderate

0: High

If available, from World Values Survey

% of people who think it would be very or fairly good to have army rule

1 if less than 10%

0.5 if 10% to 30%



0 if more than 30%

39. Perceptions of rule by experts or technocratic government; proportion of the population that would prefer rule by experts or technocrats.

1: Low

0.5: Moderate

0: High

If available, from World Values Survey

% of people who think it would be very or fairly good to have experts, not government, make decisions for the country

1 if less than 50%

0.5 if 50% to 70%

0 if more than 70%

40. Perception of democracy and public order; proportion of the population that believes that democracies are not good at maintaining public order.

1: Low

0.5: Moderate

0: High

If available, from World Values Survey

% of people who disagree with the view that democracies are not good at maintaining order

1 if more than 70%

0.5 if 50% to 70%

0 if less than 50%

Alternatively, % of people who think that punishing criminals is an essential characteristic of democracy

1 if more than 80%

0.5 if 60% to 80%

0 if less than 60%

41. Perception of democracy and the economic system; proportion of the population that believes that democracy benefits economic performance

If available, from World Values Survey

% of people who disagree with the view that the economic system runs badly in democracies

1 if more than 80%

0.5 if 60% to 80%

0 if less than 60%

42. Degree of popular support for democracy

1: High

0.5: Moderate

0: Low



If available, from World Values Survey

% of people who agree or strongly agree that democracy is better than any other form of government

1 if more than 90%

0.5 if 75% to 90%

0 if less than 75%

43. There is a strong tradition of the separation of church and state

1: Yes

0.5: Some residual influence of church on state

0: No

### **V Civil liberties**

44. Is there a free electronic media?

1: Yes

0.5: Pluralistic, but state-controlled media are heavily favoured. One or two private owners dominate the media

0: No

45. Is there a free print media?

1: Yes

0.5: Pluralistic, but state-controlled media are heavily favoured. There is high degree of concentration of private ownership of national newspapers

0: No

46. Is there freedom of expression and protest (bar only generally accepted restrictions such as banning advocacy of violence)?

1: Yes

0.5: Minority view points are subject to some official harassment. Libel laws restrict heavily scope for free expression

0: No

47. Is media coverage robust? Is there open and free discussion of public issues, with a reasonable diversity of opinions?

1: Yes

0.5: There is formal freedom, but high degree of conformity of opinion, including through self-censorship, or discouragement of minority or marginal views

0: No

48. Are there political restrictions on access to the Internet?

1: No

0.5: Some moderate restrictions

0: Yes

49. Are citizens free to form professional organisations and trade unions?

1: Yes



- 0.5: Officially free, but subject to some restrictions  
0: No
50. Do institutions provide citizens with the opportunity to successfully petition government to redress grievances?  
1: Yes  
0.5: Some opportunities  
0: No
51. The use of torture by the state  
1: Torture is not used  
0: Torture is used
52. The degree to which the judiciary is independent of government influence. Consider the views of international legal and judicial watchdogs. Have the courts ever issued an important judgement against the government, or a senior government official?  
1: High  
0.5: Moderate  
0: Low
53. The degree of religious tolerance and freedom of religious expression. Are all religions permitted to operate freely, or are some restricted? Is the right to worship permitted both publicly and privately? Do some religious groups feel intimidated by others, even if the law requires equality and protection?  
1: High  
0.5: Moderate  
0: Low
54. The degree to which citizens are treated equally under the law. Consider whether favoured members of groups are spared prosecution under the law.  
1: High  
0.5: Moderate  
0: Low
55. Do citizens enjoy basic security?  
1: Yes  
0.5: Crime is so pervasive as to endanger security for large segments  
0: No
56. Extent to which private property rights protected and private business is free from undue government influence  
1: High  
0.5: Moderate  
0: Low
57. Extent to which citizens enjoy personal freedoms



Consider gender equality, right to travel, choice of work and study.

1: High

0.5: Moderate

0: Low

58. Popular perceptions on human rights protection; proportion of the population that think that basic human rights are well-protected.

1: High

0.5: Moderate

0: Low

If available, from World Values Survey:

% of people who think that human rights are respected in their country

1 if more than 70%

0.5 if 50% to 70%

0 if less than 50%

59. There is no significant discrimination on the basis of people's race, colour or creed.

1: Yes

0.5: Yes, but some significant exceptions

0: No

60. Extent to which the government invokes new risks and threats as an excuse for curbing civil liberties

1: Low

0.5: Moderate

0: High

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