Some of those attempting not to pay tax believe that they have discovered interpretations of the law that show that they are not subject to being taxed: these individuals and groups are sometimes called tax protesters. An unsuccessful tax protestor has been attempting openly to evade tax, while a successful one avoids tax. Tax resistance is the declared refusal to pay a tax for conscientious reasons (because the resister does not want to support the government or some of its activities). Tax resisters typically do not take the position that the tax laws are themselves illegal or do not apply to them (as tax protesters do) and they are more concerned with not paying for particular government policies that they oppose.
The United States is unlike many other countries in that its citizens and permanent residents are subject to U.S. federal income tax on their worldwide income even if they reside temporarily or permanently outside the United States. U.S. citizens therefore cannot avoid U.S. taxes simply by emigrating from the U.S. According to Forbes magazine some nationals choose to give up their United States citizenship rather than be subject to the U.S. tax system; however, U.S. citizens who reside (or spend long periods of time) outside the U.S. may be able to exclude some salaried income earned overseas (but not other types of income unless specified in a bilateral tax treaty) from income in computing the U.S. federal income tax. The 2010 limit on the amount that can be excluded was US$91,500. See .
The company/trust/foundation may also be able to avoid corporate taxation if incorporated in an offshore jurisdiction (see offshore company, offshore trust or private foundation). Although income tax would still be due on any salary or dividend drawn from the legal entity. For a settlor (creator of a trust) to avoid tax there may be restrictions on the type, purpose and beneficiaries of the trust. For example, the settlor of the trust may not be allowed to be a trustee or even a beneficiary and may thus lose control of the assets transferred and/or may be unable to benefit from them.
In addition, most jurisdictions which levy a VAT or sales tax also legally require their residents to report and pay the tax on items purchased in another jurisdiction. This means that those consumers who purchase something in a lower-taxed or untaxed jurisdiction with the intention of avoiding VAT or sales tax in their home jurisdiction are in fact breaking the law in most cases. Such evasion is, especially, prevalent in federal states like the Nigeria, US and Canada where sub-national jurisdictions have the constitutional power to charge varying rates of VAT or sales tax. In Nigeria for example, some local states enforce VAT on each goods sold by trader. The price must be clearly stated and the VAT distinct from the price of the good purchased. Any act by the trader contrary to this (like including VAT in the price of the goods) is punishable as attempting to syphoning the VAT.
Borders between tax districts in the same nation usually lack the resources to enforce tax collection on goods carried in private vehicles from one district to another, so states only pursue sales and use tax collection on high-value items such as cars.
Abuse by private tax collectors (see tax farming below) has led to revolutionary overthrow of governments which have outsourced tax administration.
Governments have historically turned to tax farming for quick cash. A "tax farmer" buys a "franchise" by making pre-payment to the government. The "tax-farmer," then invested with the authority of the government, goes into the "farm" and begins extracting "taxes" from citizens. This is a system destined to be abusive as the "tax-farmers" seek back their investment, plus profit, and are themselves unrestrained by "politics." Abuses by "tax farmers" (together with a tax system that exempted the aristocracy) were a primary reason for the French Revolution that toppled Louis XVI.
By contrast, the term "tax avoidance" describes lawful conduct, the purpose of which is to avoid the creation of a tax liability in the first place. Whereas an evaded tax remains a tax legally owed, an avoided tax is a tax liability that has never existed.
For example, consider two businesses, each of which have a particular asset (in this case, a piece of real estate) that is worth far more than its purchase price.
In the above example, tax may eventually be due when the second property is sold. Whether and how much tax will be due will depend on circumstances and the state of the law at the time. This is true of many tax avoidance strategies.
The clear articulation of the concept of an avoidance/mitigation distinction goes back only to the 1970s. The concept originated from economists, not lawyers. The use of the terminology avoidance/mitigation to express this distinction was an innovation in 1986: IRC v Challenge.
In practice the distinction is sometimes clear, but often difficult to draw. Relevant factors to decide whether conduct is avoidance or mitigation include: whether there is a specific tax regime applicable; whether transactions have economic consequences; confidentiality; tax linked fees. Important indicia are familiarity and use. Once a tax avoidance arrangement becomes common, it is almost always stopped by legislation within a few years. If something commonly done is contrary to the intention of Parliament, it is only to be expected that Parliament will stop it. So that which is commonly done and not stopped is not likely to be contrary to the intention of Parliament. It follows that tax reduction arrangements which have been carried on for a long time are unlikely to constitute tax avoidance. Judges have a strong intuitive sense that that which everyone does, and has long done, should not be stigmatised with the pejorative term of “avoidance”. Thus UK courts refused to regard sales and repurchases (known as bed-and-breakfast transactions) or back-to-back loans as tax avoidance.
Other approaches in distinguishing tax avoidance and tax mitigation are to seek to identify “the spirit of the statute” or “misusing” a provision. But this is the same as the “evident intention of Parliament” properly understood. Another approach is to seek to identify “artificial” transactions. However, a transaction is not well described as ‘artificial’ if it has valid legal consequences, unless some standard can be set up to establish what is ‘natural’ for the same purpose. Such standards are not readily discernible. The same objection applies to the term ‘device’.
It may be that a concept of “tax avoidance” based on what is contrary to “the intention of Parliament” is not coherent. The object of construction of any statute is expressed as finding “the intention of Parliament”. In any successful tax avoidance scheme a Court must have concluded that the intention of Parliament was not to impose a tax charge in the circumstances which the tax avoiders had placed themselves. The answer is that the expression “intention of Parliament” is being used in two senses. It is perfectly consistent to say that a tax avoidance scheme escapes tax (there being no provision to impose a tax charge) and yet constitutes the avoidance of tax. One is seeking the intention of Parliament at a higher, more generalised level. A statute may fail to impose a tax charge, leaving a gap that a court cannot fill even by purposive construction, but nevertheless one can conclude that there would have been a tax charge had the point been considered. An example is the notorious UK case Ayrshire Employers Mutual Insurance Association v IRC, where the House of Lords held that Parliament had “missed fire”.
In the judiciary, different judges have taken different attitudes. As a generalization, for example, judges in the United Kingdom before the 1970s regarded tax avoidance with neutrality; but nowadays they may regard aggressive tax avoidance with increasing hostility. See the quotes below for examples.
To allow prompter response to tax avoidance schemes, the US Tax Disclosure Regulations (2003) require prompter and fuller disclosure than previously required, a tactic which was applied in the UK in 2004.
Some countries such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand have introduced a statutory General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR). Canada also uses Foreign Accrual Property Income rules to obviate certain types of tax avoidance. In the United Kingdom, there is no GAAR, but many provisions of the tax legislation (known as "anti-avoidance" provisions) apply to prevent tax avoidance where the main object (or purpose), or one of the main objects (or purposes), of a transaction is to enable tax advantages to be obtained.
In the United States, the Internal Revenue Service distinguishes some schemes as "abusive" and therefore illegal.
In the UK, judicial doctrines to prevent tax avoidance began in IRC v Ramsay (1981) followed by Furniss v. Dawson (1984). This approach has been rejected in most commonwealth jurisdictions even in those where UK cases are generally regarded as persuasive. After two decades, there have been numerous decisions, with inconsistent approaches, and both the Revenue authorities and professional advisors remain quite unable to predict outcomes. For this reason this approach can be seen as a failure or at best only partly successful.
In the UK in 2004, the Labour government announced that it would use retrospective legislation to counteract some tax avoidance schemes, and it has subsequently done so on a few occasions, notably BN66. Initiatives announced in 2010 suggest an increasing willingness on the part of HMRC to use retrospective action to counter avoidance schemes, even when no warning has been given.
In 2008, the charity Christian Aid published a report, Death and taxes: the true toll of tax dodging, which criticised tax exiles and tax avoidance by some of the world's largest companies, linking tax evasion to the deaths of millions of children in developing countries. However the research behind these calculations has been questioned in a 2009 paper prepared for the UK Department for International Development. According to the Financial Times there is a growing trend for charities to prioritise tax avoidance as a key campaigning issue, with policy makers across the world considering changes to make tax evasion more difficult.
In 2010 tax avoidence became a big issue in the UK when UK Uncut started to encourage people to protest at local high street shops that were thought to be avoiding tax Including Vodafone, Topshop and the rest of the Arcadia Group. UK Uncut aims to highlight the fact that many big businesses and rich businesses men are avoiding paying tax whilst there are huge public sector cuts. It uses social networking websites to quickly organise protests in many different places around the country for days of mass action.
In 2011, HMRC stated they are ratcheting up its crack down on people who try to avoid paying tax, with a goal of recovering £18 billion in lost revenue over the next four years. A voluntary amnesty program HMRC begun in 2010 that targeted middle-class profressional has brought in £500 million and they are planning on substantially increasing prosecutions as part of their efforts against tax evasion.
Tax resistance is the refusal to pay a tax for conscientious reasons (because the resister does not want to support the government or some of its activities). They typically do not take the position that the tax laws are themselves illegal or do not apply to them, and they are more concerned with not paying for what they oppose than they are motivated by the desire to keep more of their money.
In the UK case of Cheney v. Conn, an individual objected to paying tax that, in part, would be used to procure nuclear arms in unlawful contravention, he contended, of the Geneva Convention. His claim was dismissed, the judge ruling that "What the [taxation] statute itself enacts cannot be unlawful, because what the statute says and provides is itself the law, and the highest form of law that is known to this country."
:Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
Under this statute and related case law, the prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, each of the following three elements:
# the "attendant circumstance" of the existence of a tax deficiency — an unpaid tax liability; and # the "actus reus" (i.e., guilty conduct) — an affirmative act (and not merely an omission or failure to act) in any manner constituting evasion or an attempt to evade either: ## the assessment of a tax, or ## the payment of a tax. # the "mens rea" or "mental" element of willfulness — the specific intent to violate an actually known legal duty;
An affirmative act "in any manner" is sufficient to satisfy the third element of the offense. That is, an act which would otherwise be perfectly legal (such as moving funds from one bank account to another) could be grounds for a tax evasion conviction (possibly an attempt to evade "payment"), provided the other two elements are also met. Intentionally filing a false tax return (a separate crime in itself) could constitute an attempt to evade the "assessment" of the tax, as the Internal Revenue Service bases initial assessments (i.e., the formal recordation of the tax on the books of the U.S. Treasury) on the tax amount shown on the return.
A further stumbling block for tax protesters is found in the Cheek Doctrine with respect to arguments about "constitutionality." Under the Doctrine, the belief that the Sixteenth Amendment was not properly ratified and the belief that the federal income tax is otherwise unconstitutional are not treated as beliefs that one is not violating the "tax law" — i.e., these errors are not treated as being caused by the "complexity of the tax law."
In the Cheek case the Court stated:
:Claims that some of the provisions of the tax code are unconstitutional are submissions of a different order. They do not arise from innocent mistakes caused by the complexity of the Internal Revenue Code. Rather, they reveal full knowledge of the provisions at issue and a studied conclusion, however wrong, that those provisions are invalid and unenforceable. Thus, in this case, Cheek paid his taxes for years, but after attending various seminars and based on his own study, he concluded that the income tax laws could not constitutionally require him to pay a tax.
The Court continued:
:We do not believe that Congress contemplated that such a taxpayer, without risking criminal prosecution, could ignore the duties imposed upon him by the Internal Revenue Code and refuse to utilize the mechanisms provided by Congress to present his claims of invalidity to the courts and to abide by their decisions. There is no doubt that Cheek, from year to year, was free to pay the tax that the law purported to require, file for a refund and, if denied, present his claims of invalidity, constitutional or otherwise, to the courts. See 26 U.S.C. 7422. Also, without paying the tax, he could have challenged claims of tax deficiencies in the Tax Court, 6213, with the right to appeal to a higher court if unsuccessful. 7482(a)(1). Cheek took neither course in some years, and, when he did, was unwilling to accept the outcome. As we see it, he is in no position to claim that his good-faith belief about the validity of the Internal Revenue Code negates willfulness or provides a defense to criminal prosecution under 7201 and 7203. Of course, Cheek was free in this very case to present his claims of invalidity and have them adjudicated, but, like defendants in criminal cases in other contexts who "willfully" refuse to comply with the duties placed upon them by the law, he must take the risk of being wrong.
The Court ruled that such beliefs — even if held in good faith — are not a defense to a charge of willfulness. By pointing out that arguments about constitutionality of federal income tax laws "reveal full knowledge of the provisions at issue and a studied conclusion, however wrong, that those provisions are invalid and unenforceable," the Supreme Court may have been impliedly warning that asserting such "constitutional" arguments (in open court or otherwise) might actually help the prosecutor prove willfulness. Daniel B. Evans, a tax lawyer who has written about tax protester arguments, has stated that:
::[ . . . ] if you plan ahead to use it [the Cheek defense], then it is almost certain to fail, because your efforts to establish your “good faith belief” are going to be used by the government as evidence that you knew that what you were doing was wrong when you did it, which is why you worked to set up a defense in advance. Planning not to file tax returns and avoid prosecution using a “good faith belief” is kind of like planning to kill someone using a claim of “self-defense.” If you’ve planned in advance, then it shouldn’t work.
In cases where a taxpayer does not have enough money to pay the entire tax bill, the IRS can work out a payment plan with taxpayers.
For years for which no return has been filed, there is no statute of limitations on civil actions—that is, on how long the IRS can seek taxpayers and demand payment of taxes owed.
For each year a taxpayer willfully fails to timely file an income tax return, the taxpayer can be sentenced to one year in prison. In general, there is a six-year statute of limitations on federal tax crimes.
The Internal Revenue Service and the United States Department of Justice have recently teamed up to crack down on abusive tax shelters. In 2003 the Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations held hearings about tax shelters which are entitled U.S. TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY: THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTANTS, LAWYERS, AND FINANCIAL PROFESSIONALS. Many of these tax shelters were designed and provided by accountants at the large American accounting firms.
Examples of U.S. tax shelters include: Foreign Leveraged Investment Program (FLIP) and Offshore Portfolio Investment Strategy (OPIS). Both were devised by partners at the accounting firm, KPMG. These tax shelters were also known as "basis shifts" or "defective redemptions."
Prior to 1987, passive investors in certain limited partnerships (such as oil exploration or real estate investment ventures) were allowed to use the passive losses (if any) of the partnership (i.e., losses generated by partnership operations in which the investor took no material active part) to offset the investors' income, lowering the amount of income tax that otherwise would be owed by the investor. These partnerships could be structured so that an investor in a high tax bracket could obtain a net economic benefit from partnership-generated passive losses.
In the Tax Reform Act of 1986 the U.S. Congress introduced the limitation (under ) on the deduction of passive losses and the use of passive activity tax credits. The 1986 Act also changed the "at risk" loss rules of . Coupled with the hobby loss rules (), the changes greatly reduced tax avoidance by taxpayers engaged in activities only to generate deductible losses.
Category:Tax resistance Category:Commercial crimes
cs:Daňový únik cy:Osgoi treth de:Steuerhinterziehung el:Φοροαποφυγή es:Evasión fiscal fr:Évasion fiscale ko:탈세 hr:Evazija io:Fiskala eludo ed eskapo id:Penghindaran pajak it:Evasione ed elusione fiscale he:תכנון מס lt:Mokesčių optimizavimas hu:Adócsalás nl:Belastingfraude ja:脱税 pl:Uchylanie się od podatków pt:Elisão e evasão fiscal sv:Skattebrott uk:Ухилення від сплати податків vi:Trốn lậu thuế zh:避稅及逃稅This text is licensed under the Creative Commons CC-BY-SA License. This text was originally published on Wikipedia and was developed by the Wikipedia community.
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