Amid all the argument and misinformation flying round about the agreement and disagreement at the European summit, here is a summary of what was actually at stake.

The member states of the eurozone wanted a new treaty to establish closer integration among them, particular regarding fiscal matters, as part of a programme to save the euro.  There are short term measures also needed, but the treaty is intended to play a medium-term role of putting the euro on a new institutional footing.

Assuming that there was no possibility of the UK agreeing to be subject to the provisions of this new treaty, there were two options on the table: (1) a treaty agreed by all 27 but applying to fewer than that number (i.e. not the UK and possibly not others); or (2) a treaty agreed only by those countries that will be subject to it.

From the perspective of the eurozone countries, the advantages of option (1) were:

(a) being able to use the existing EU institutions rather than having to create new ones – the risk is that the unwieldy pillar structure introduced in the Maastricht treaty and finally abolished by Lisbon will have to be brought back; do they want to have a second and separate set of elections for a second and separate Eurozone Parliament?

(b) the involvement, even a small way, of the UK – yes, they don’t always hate us; different countries in different ways for different reasons welcome British influence on the EU

The disadvantage of option (1) is that the UK would be obliged to ratify the treaty in order for it to come into force, even though it would not apply in the UK.  The advantage of option (2), therefore, is that British ratification would not be needed, which, given the fervent and ridiculous state of British politics, might well be a blessing.

The reason why option (2) has been chosen despite the disadvantages that it brings with it is that David Cameron wanted it that way.  The arguments about financial services regulation are irrelevant: they relate to the existing Lisbon treaty which applies to all 27 and will continue to apply to all 27, regardless of what might have been agreed about the legal form of the successor treaty.  By the way, if there was a serious and credible case for any of the changes proposed, it could have been raised by the British representative in the coming negotiations of the new treaty.  Given that Britain has decided not to send a representative to those negotiations, it has also decided not to seek those changes that it claimed, on Thursday evening, were necessary to protect the City of London.

The overall result of the British insistence that the treaty is among 26 and not 27 is not that Britain is unaffected by the new treaty – neither option would have implicated the UK – but that Britain has no say in the new treaty.  Fifty years of British foreign policy has aimed for a role in the discussions about the future of Europe, learning the lessons from the 1950s when we were invited but refused to take part and quickly regretted our refusal.  Those fifty years now appear to be over.

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A question is raised as to whether Britain will really be excluded from anything.  Will the new treaty actually be agreed?  This is of course the question with which the British comforted themselves in the 1950s – the Treaty of Rome will never amount to anything, they said – and there is an element of denial present in those people asking that question today.

But only an element; there is also some truth.  The treaty might also fail because agreement cannot be reached among the 26, noting that the failure of the treaty would damage the European economy severely and thus damage the British economy as well.  This is not an outcome to be welcomed.  And, moreover, it can be said that the novel legal circumstances of creating a new treaty of 26 alongside the existing treaty of 27 actually makes failure more likely.  The familiar procedure of amending the treaty of 27 would be much easier: working out how the new 26-strong institutions are going to mesh with the existing 27-strong set is going to be fraught with difficulty.

If the British government was sincere in its call for the countries of the eurozone to agree some form of fiscal union and sort out their problems, a strategy that makes it noticeably harder for those eurozone countries to agree that union and fix those problems is a mighty strange way of showing it.

At the risk of being accused of jumping on the Leveson enquiry bandwagon (to which I would have to plead guilty), the European Movement has had its own skirmish with press regulation, with rather unsatisfactory results.

The cause of the complaint was an article about Europol on page 1 of the Daily Express on 26 March 2010, bearing the headline “New EU Gestapo spies on Britons”.  The article proceeded to denounce Europol as having “frightening powers to pry into our lives”, with an editorial in the middle of the paper repeating the allegations.  We referred this to the Press Complaints Commission.

While it is morally despicable to compare the European Union with Nazi Germany (don’t anti-Semitism and genocide count for anything any more?), our complaint was based on Clause 1 of the Code of Practice, Accuracy, which reads:

(i) “The Press must take care not to publish inaccurate, misleading or distorted information, including pictures.”

and

(iii) “The Press, whilst free to be partisan, must distinguish clearly between comment, conjecture and fact.”

The complaint explained that Europol and the Gestapo were very different organisations, in that the establishment and the actions of Europol are restricted by law, accountable in parliament, and subject to the considerations of human rights, while the Gestapo was not.  The use of the word “Gestapo” invokes the spectre of an organisation that acted, and was authorised to act, outside the law, and that used brutality and terror as a means of pursuing totalitarian goals.

We pointed out that, had a simple shorthand for the concept of an intelligence service been required, alternative comparisons such as MI5 or Special Branch could have been used.  However, the choice was made to use the comparison of an organisation with a notorious and distinctive place in European history.

The complaint was about the front page story and not the editorial.  Sub-clause (iii) permits a partisan press, as long as comment is distinguished from fact.  In an editorial, this is clearly the case: in a front page story, it is not.

The complaint was rejected.  The Press Complaints Commission was of the view that the front page story was clearly comment and not fact, comment which a newspaper is permitted to make.  I asked specifically what it was about the story that would “distinguish clearly between comment, conjecture and fact” and received the following, priceless answer:

“This part of the Code does not mean there has to be an explicit reference in the article or headline to the fact that something is a comment rather than a fact (although sometimes this does occur).  In this case, the nature of the term itself was sufficiently suggestive of the fact that it must [author’s emphasis] be a comment:”

This means that, despite what the Code says, a newspaper need not in fact “distinguish clearly between comment, conjecture and fact”: if its claims are outrageous enough, the PCC will assume that everyone knows not to believe them.  Judging by the way in which Fourth Reich terminology is being thrown around at the moment (here, for example), I don’t think that assumption is correct.

The truth is that Europol is a police organisation with Germans in it, and as far as the PCC is concerned – it is a self-regulatory body for the press, so newspapers are judged by the standards of other newspapers – that is enough.  Think of the case of the case of Max Mosley and the News of the World, when the latter’s allegation that the former had engaged in Nazi role play was comprehensively dismissed.  One of the reasons advanced by the newspaper to think what was enacted was a Nazi scene was that Mr Mosley spoke in German, but the judge, Mr Justice Eady, noted in his judgment that:

“Although Mr Thurlbeck thought the use of German highly significant as one of the Nazi indicia, it is noteworthy that neither he nor anyone else thought it appropriate to obtain a translation before evaluating the material for publication.”

In the words of the judge,

it rather suggests that “German” may have simply been glossed into “Nazi”.

So it is not only the Daily Express.  Large parts of Fleet Street are still mentally fighting the last war, with combat taking place in acres of newsprint every day.  The Leveson enquiry reveals that there have been some serious ethical failures among some of the people who run our media, and until those failures are addressed, the national discussion of important and controversial issues will continue to be polluted.

It is ironic, is it not, that those people who are most fervently demanding a referendum on British membership of the EU are at the same time doing their best to make it impossible for a fair one to be held.

A Daily Express headline claimed last week that “EU says water is not healthy” on the front page in letters 42 mm high.  This is a perfect example of a euromyth.  Perfect, because it is not true; perfect, because it damns the European Union; and perfect, because everything we need to know to debunk it is available on the public record.

The origin of the story is the rejection by the European Commission of a proposal that the register of approved disease risk claims for food and drink should include the claim that “Regular consumption of significant amounts of water can reduce the risk of development of dehydration and of concomitant decrease of performance.”  At first sight, that decision is barmy and deserves the worst that headlines can throw at it.  But a look at the facts reveals a rather different story.

The register of approved disease risk claims was created by a European regulation on nutrition and health claims made on foods (1924/2006), which requires prior approval before food and drink manufacturers can make such claims about their products.  No longer will the claim that eating X is good for you be permitted on the say-so of scientists employed by the manufacturers of X.  In future, all such claims have to be approved by an independent panel of scientists convened by European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), and then confirmed by the European Commission.  This system is intended to protect consumers from false or misleading claims, and will also ensure a level playing field for companies in the X industry.  It may be bureaucracy, but isn’t that what bureaucracy is for?

In the case of the dehydration claim, the proposal was rejected by the EFSA scientific panel not because dehydration cannot be prevented by drinking water but because it is not a disease risk claim.  A disease risk claim “states, suggests or implies that the consumption of a food category, a food or one of its constituents significantly reduces a risk factor in the development of a human disease” (article 2(6)); the proposal sent to EFSA asserted not that dehydration was a risk factor but that it was the disease itself.

There is in fact a separate register of “Health claims describing or referring to the role of a nutrient or other substance in growth, development and the functions of the body” (article 13(1)), which is where a claim about water and dehydration belongs.  The application to EFSA was rejected not because it was unfounded scientifically but because it was submitted under the wrong regulatory heading.

So, this Commission decision is not at all a “scarcely believable ruling”, not at all “new madness from Brussels”, not at all “at odds with both science and common sense”.  It is following correctly the rules that have been laid down to prevent consumers from being misled.  What if the Commission were to bend the rules, or not follow the correct procedures in the law?  What would the newspapers say then?

But we can go further.  This euromyth has not arisen from a misunderstanding.   The facts, when inconvenient, are simply ignored.

And the fact is that the EFSA panel has approved other claims about the beneficial effects of drinking water.  Two health claims regarding the “maintenance of normal physical and cognitive functions” and the “maintenance of normal thermoregulation” have been approved, with an EFSA scientific opinion reading:

“The Panel concludes that a cause and effect relationship has been established between the dietary intake of water and maintenance of normal physical and cognitive functions.”

and

“The Panel concludes that a cause and effect relationship has been established between the dietary intake of water and maintenance of normal thermoregulation.”

In each case, “The Panel considers that, in order to obtain the claimed effect, at least 2.0 L of water should be consumed per day.”

The support for these health claims by EFSA directly refutes the headline that “EU says water is not healthy”.  The Daily Express knew about these other claims before going to print, but printed the inaccurate headline anyway.  That is where euromyths come from.

What is the state of British public opinion on Europe?  A recent survey by YouGov for Vote UK out of the EU gave us the headline that a majority of people would vote in a referendum against membership of the EU, but looking behind the headline provides a rather more interesting picture.

Positive about membership?

The question “do you think EU membership has been positive or negative for the United Kingdom?” produced 50 per cent negative as opposed to 29 per cent positive (net -21).  This overall negative sentiment is widely but not universally shared.

Political party: Conservative voters are more Eurosceptic (-29) than Labour (-2), with Lib Dem voters actually +21 in favour.

Gender: men were less negative than women: -13 as opposed to -28.  Interestingly, throughout the survey, women were twice as likely as men to say “don’t know” (16 per cent, on average, compared with 9 per cent), for reasons I will not speculate on but which everyone reading this will recognise.

Age: voters over the age of 40 are negative about the EU (-36), while those under that age are actually in favour (+6).  Is this because younger people have had different experiences and education than the previous generation, or it is simply because they have not become Eurosceptic yet?

Social grade: negative feelings are less prevalent among ABC1s (-10) than among C2DE voters (-26).

Geography: every region of the country is negative, but London (-6) is less negative than elsewhere.  Recall that six of the 10 districts that voted Yes in the referendum on electoral reform were also in the capital: London is different.

Economically prosperous

A separate question asked whether Britain is economically stronger in the EU or would be more prosperous outside it.  The overall finding was 22 per cent in favour of the EU and 48 per cent against (net -26), with a much higher don’t know score of 15 per cent (as against 6 per cent for overall benefits).  Every single breakdown of the voters was negative – political party, gender, age, social grade and geography – with the sole exception of Liberal Democrat voters.

Not even Liberal Democrats could find a majority in favour of further UK participation of bailouts of eurozone countries (-29, compared with -52 for the country as a whole).  The notion that, as a non-member of the eurozone, Britain can stay out of its troubles seems to be widely shared.

Should there be a referendum?

Lastly, the survey asked a series of questions about referendums, both on EU membership and on any future treaty, asking whether they should be held and which way one might vote.  The headline figures are that, on EU membership, 62 per cent think that their political party should commit to holding such a referendum (27 per cent against) and 51 per cent would vote against membership (27 per cent in favour) were one held.  On a new treaty, 59 per cent think there should be a referendum (26 per cent against) and 49 per cent would vote No (13 per cent would vote Yes, 32 per cent don’t know).

The figures show that there is strong support for a public vote on the future of Britain in Europe.  Examining the numbers more closely, however, shows that there is a very strong correlation between support for holding a referendum (on EU membership or on a new treaty) and voting No in that referendum.  What this suggests is not simply dissatisfaction with the way in which decisions about Britain and Europe have been taken, but rather dissatisfaction with the result of those decisions.  A referendum on Europe is the means to reverse the decision of parliament rather than an end in itself.

What this means is that if pro-Europeans wish to win the argument, they have to put the case for Europe and not merely against referendums.  If confidence in Britain’s EU membership returns, demands for a referendum against it will diminish.

At a debate on EU membership organised by the Spectator on 20 September (read a report here), leading eurosceptic Daniel Hannan MEP compared the UK unfavourably with Switzerland.  The Swiss experience of non-membership of the EU, he said, has been more beneficial than the UK experience of membership.  We are poorer, both in economic terms and in the health of our democratic life.

That is what the MEP says: what about the facts?

Switzerland is undeniably richer than the UK (GDP per capita currently around $63,000 as opposed to $35,000) but is that because of the EU?  The chart below shows the ratio of Swiss per capita GDP to that of the UK, since 1960 (the blue line) (data from the World Bank).

Ratios of GDP per capita (data from the World Bank)

Switzerland is richer now, but it was richer then, too.  The gap between the two has widened, notably in the mid-1970s, which was a particularly bad time for the British economy, and since the economic crisis started in 2008.  There have been periods of time when it has narrowed, too, during the late 1980s during the completion of the single market and during the long boom of the last decade.  The ratio is now about where it was when Britain first joined the EEC in 1973.

Compare also the experience of Germany (the pink line).  Again, Switzerland is richer than Germany, but consistently so.  If it was membership of the EU that was dragging a country down, we would see the gap between Swiss and German wealth grow.  In fact, that gap does not grow, which implies that membership of the EU is perfectly compatible with a successful economy.  The fact that Britain has, relatively speaking, declined is due to failings in British economic policy and not due to membership of the EU.

So, if the contention that the EU is harming the British economy is proven to be false, what about the harm allegedly done to British democracy?

The chart below depicts election turnouts since 1979, showing Switzerland, the UK and the European Parliament (percentages from International IDEA).

Election turnouts (data from International IDEA)

The lowest turnouts are the Swiss.  So much for the contention of a nation of politically engaged independent citizens, as opposed to the democracy-denied British.  Swiss turnouts are even generally lower than those of the European Parliament!  Daniel Hannan doesn’t like to tell us that.

Of course, Switzerland is a federal country, so there are elections at other levels of government to take into account.  The latest elections in the canton of Bern saw a turnout of 43.48 per cent, in Luzern it was 43.5 per cent, and in Zürich, it was only 35 per cent, i.e. lower than the federal turnout.

There is also the culture of direct democracy, in which issues of public controversy can be put to referendums, but turnout in these referendums is normally less than 50 per cent.  A study of Swiss democracy by the University of Zurich and the Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) reported that:

“A large part of the Swiss population does not engage in politics and those who do are primarily educated, well-off, older and disproportionately male.”

Looking out at the audience at the Spectator debate, we can see why the Swiss model might be attractive to them.  But to the rest of us, maybe not so much.

Swiss democracy and the Swiss economy have many admirable features, but membership of the European Union does not prevent Britain from emulating them.  If there are failings in our own political system, giving us bad decisions and mistaken policies, we should recognise them for what they are and not be content simply to blame them on others.

To leave the EU in the hope that this would make us more like Switzerland is a fantasy.  If we want to be more like the Swiss, we can, and we don’t have to give up the benefits of EU membership in order to do so.

The sale of 60 watt incandescent light bulbs is banned in the UK from today, as part of an EU-wide strategy.  A report on the BBC website was accompanied by a comment from a shopkeeper:

“This is not a democracy, it’s becoming like a dictatorship, ordering you to do this, do that. You should have a choice.”

To which the only answer can be, no it’s not like a dictatorship.  Here’s why not.

The intention to ban incandescent light bulbs was agreed, unanimously, by the European Council (composed of the heads of the national governments of the member states) in March 2007, as part of a strategic plan to reduce the environmental impact of lighting.  The new light bulbs are much more efficient users of energy and so will lead to a reduction in the emissions of carbon dioxide, a major contributor to climate change.

That strategic decision was enacted in a regulation drafted by the European Commission with the formal involvement of stakeholders such as consumer and environmental NGOs, approved by a committee of experts nominated by the member states, and then approved by the European Parliament.  It is hard to think of a process less like that of a dictatorship.

As to the issue of choice, let us remember what the regulation will do.  Carbon dioxide is in effect a pollutant, and this regulation will reduce the amount that is emitted.  The primacy of “choice” here would mean that people have the choice whether to cause more pollution.  It would undermine democracy if a majority against pollution was unable to take effective action against it because a minority was free to carry on polluting.

Incidentally, let us imagine that the wishes of the anti-Europeans were granted.  The EU institutions are reduced to a forum for cooperation among the national governments and nothing more.  How would this issue be dealt with?

There would be an agreement among the national governments to phase out these polluting light bulbs (this is a single market matter to be dealt with at European level because otherwise a company in one country could sell them to consumers in another country undermining that second country’s own ban), followed by a meeting of the national government technical experts to sort out the detail.  At which point, that would be it.  The possible role of the directly-elected European Parliament in scrutinising the new law would be eliminated, because all political power rests in the hands of the national governments and none in the hands of the European institutions.  Is that a better system?

Ah, but there are national parliaments: they would have a role instead.  But what kind of role could that be?  If a national parliament is entitled to reject the European decision, then the single market falls apart.  And if a national parliament is not entitled to reject the European decision, then it is reduced merely to a rubber stamp.  Neither of those outcomes is acceptable.

The pro-European case is that the parliamentary debates on European decisions should take place at European level.  The role for national parliaments on these issues is to scrutinise and hold to account the actions of their respective national governments, in the European Council and in those committees of national experts.  It is on the work of those latter committees that more light needs to be shed.

The People’s Pledge campaign claims to be in favour of a referendum on EU membership.  The European Movement does not support this campaign: while it is not necessarily against a referendum on further developments in the EU – should Britain join the euro, for example – the European Movement does not believe that a referendum is required to confirm British membership of the EU. However, that isn’t really what the campaign is about.

It is motivated not by a belief that constitutional questions should be settled by referendums, but because such a referendum is the means by which Britain might leave the EU.  By all means campaign against EU membership if you wish, but don’t dress your campaign up as something it isn’t.

Five reasons are put forward in favour of a referendum on EU membership (full text here): they are the usual eurosceptic arguments and here are our replies:

1. “No one under the age of 54 has had the chance to vote on our relationship with Brussels”

There are many constitutional issues that have not been put to a referendum even as recently as 1975.  The retention of the monarchy, for example, or independence for Scotland.  Do the supporters of the People’s Pledge also want referendums on those questions, too?

Kelvin Hopkins MP, a leading supporter of the People’s Pledge, opposed his own government’s proposal to hold a referendum on electoral reform in February 2010, so he has zero credibility in arguing that constitutional questions should be put to referendums.

It is true that the EU has changed considerably since the referendum in 1975, but every one of those changes has been approved by parliament.  They have the same “democratic, moral legitimacy” as anything else parliament has done.  Strange that people who claim that the House of Commons is losing its powers also deny the right of the House of Commons to use the powers that it has.

2. “The EU now makes a majority of the laws we must obey”

It is simply untrue that a majority of British laws originate in the EU.  Each year, the EU agrees only around 490 laws, whereas Westminster produces around 3,500 annually.

And it is also untrue that the EU is obliging Britain to privatise industries such as the railway system and the postal service.  The decision whether or not to do this is entirely national.  After all, in France, there are no moves to privatise SNCF or La Poste.

3. “The UK has less than 10% of the votes in the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament”

To be part of a political community is to accept that other people also have a say in shared decisions.  If the UK has about 10 per cent of the population of the EU, what ought its percentage of the votes to be?

As far as referendums are concerned, there have in fact been 32 referendums in 19 of the current EU member states on membership of the EU or on new treaties: the results were 27 in favour and 5 against.

4. “The EU is costing Britain more and more money”

Fraud in the EU budget, while too high, is no higher than in the UK budget.  The accounts for government departments such as Work and Pensions and the Ministry of Defence are regularly qualified by the National Audit Office.

The UK was not forced to contribute to the loan to Greece: it chose to.  And since then, has chosen not to do so again.  Because the UK is not in the eurozone, it is not part of the eurozone’s financial provisions; however, it is a member of the IMF and thus contributes to the IMF’s activities.  If people think that the UK should withdraw from the IMF, they should say so.

5. “The EU wants to give itself new powers of ‘economic governance’”

Every European treaty has to be agreed unanimously by all the member states.  The UK is not a member of the eurozone and can protect that status in any future treaty; it can also ensure if it wishes that it is not subject to any new obligations.  If other European countries wish to agree a new treaty among themselves without involving the UK, they should be free to do so, but that does not mean that they will apply to Britain.

Not only do these five reasons not stand up to scrutiny, there are two further reasons why a referendum on the status quo would not be a good idea.

First, let us think about a Yes vote in favour of membership (this would be the outcome for which party leaders David Cameron, Ed Miliband, Nick Clegg, Alex Salmond, Ieuan Wyn Jones, and Caroline Lucas would be working; against them would be Nigel Farage and Nick Griffin).

It would settle no argument.  The eurosceptics would surely carry on campaigning against the EU.  After the referendum in 1975, the campaign against membership was relaunched as soon as 1976.

Secondly, any debate needs to be honest.  If a candidate knowingly makes false allegations about his opponent in a general election, there is redress available afterwards, as Phil Woolas discovered.  But we saw that, in the behaviour of the campaigns for and against the Alternative Vote, a referendum campaign makes adherence to the facts much harder to enforce.  A referendum on Europe conducted under a cloud of lies and misinformation would not serve its ostensible purpose of empowering the British people, and we can see from the false claims made by the eurosceptics already how they would intend to fight such a campaign.

The European Movement supports British membership of the European Union and argues the case for more democracy, effectiveness and accountability.  A substantial set of reforms to the existing EU treaties might well merit a referendum.  But until then, we should work to make the European Union work better, rather than setting a course for the exit door.

The government has launched a new website where people can post petitions for signature.  If a petition gets at least 100,000 signatures, it will may be debated in the House of Commons.  The petitions website is here http://epetitions.direct.gov.uk/index.html.

One of the first campaigns to be launched is the so-called Restore Justice campaign, arguing for the restoration of the death penalty for murderers of police officers and children.  (There is also a rival petition, defending the status quo.)  If the restoration petition gets its 100,000 signatures, which is not impossible, the issues that it raises are more complex than just those of law and order.  The petition itself asks:

“the government to review all treaties and international commitments which may inhibit the ability of Parliament to restore capital punishment.”

Those treaties include the Lisbon treaty, which gave legal effect to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in which Article 2, “Right to life”, reads:

1. Everyone has the right to life.

2. No one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed.

To reintroduce the death penalty in the UK would require withdrawal from this part of the Charter.  How that could be done, nobody knows.  The Lisbon treaty does not make provision for a member state to pick and choose some bits of the treaty and not others, but rather for a member state to withdraw altogether.

The proponents of the petition are themselves aware of the complications.  Paul Staines, a well-known blogger, who launched the idea, tweeted that “restoring the death penalty has profoundly eurosceptic implications”.  Perhaps this is what they want.

The European Movement itself does not have a formal view of whether or not the death penalty should be brought back, but its members and supporters may well have views of their own.  Here are the rival petitions, if you wish to sign one or other of them:

In favour of death penalty  http://epetitions.direct.gov.uk/petitions/138

Against  http://epetitions.direct.gov.uk/petitions/1090

By Petros Fassoulas

Perhaps the flightless African bird does not deserve the reputation it has acquired but in terms of symbolism at least the British government’s reaction to the eurozone crisis resembles a lot the ostrich’s alleged tendency to bury its head in the ground when confronted with danger.

Because there is no other way one can describe how Mr Cameron and Mr Osborne have reacted as financial and stock markets seem to implode around them. Even though they have acknowledged the severity of the situation, even though they have admitted that what happens in the eurozone has a direct impact on the UK economy, even though they have gone as far as encouraging their EU partners to adopt the measures necessary to contain the crisis, they have declared, with immense but ill-founded pride, that they are keeping themselves, and the country, away from the decision-making process that aims to resolve the present crisis and put in place the mechanisms that will strengthen the eurozone and safeguard the European economy.

This is where the truly dangerous surrender of national sovereignty lies. When the growth of the British economy depends to such a big degree to the well-being of the eurozone, when billions are wiped off the value of British assets in the London Stock Exchange because of the uncertainty the debt crisis has caused in the financial markets, the British government cannot afford to just stand by idly, inviting others to make decisions that affect the country so profoundly. Whether Mr Cameron and his eurosceptic backbenchers like it or not, the UK is by default part of the eurozone. The British economy is integrated with those of our European partners through the Single Market. The ability of our export sector to generate growth at home depends on the ability of our European partners to purchase our goods and services. The European financial services sector, with London at its heart, is interconnected through a complex web that links the banks and other financial institutions with something that resembles a stranglehold. Even the cost of our holidays depends on economic conditions in the rest of Europe. Sticking our heads in the ground, like senior Conservatives – in and outside the government – are calling for, pretending that it is up to ‘those Europeans’ to sort this one out, like we have nothing to do with it, is frankly a clear case of biting one’s nose to spite one’s face.

But there is a pattern in their madness. Their intention is to present the process of European integration as a speeding train, one that charges towards a certain direction, a train that the UK cannot and should not board. They in fact prefer to encourage members of the eurozone to move forward towards closer economic and fiscal union in the belief that the British electorate will be put off once and for all by the prospect of the European project. Then the government will pursue some kind of marginal role at the periphery of the EU, limited on trade and a couple of other things but staying clear of anything as big as economic, monetary and fiscal union. In effect create a two-speed Europe and relegate Britain to the second tier.

Those two Europes that the Conservatives envision are the Eurozone on one side and the non-Eurozone EU member states on the other. But of the 10 remaining EU countries that have not joined the single currency yet only the UK and Denmark have an opt-out. All the other member states have declared their wish to eventually join (once they are ready). Even Denmark is in a process of revisiting its opt outs, including euro membership. So sooner than later the UK will find itself all alone, at the outer rim of the EU, a small island, adrift in the Atlantic, squeezed between two global currencies, the dollar and the euro (not to mention the renminbi). Alienated, without a seat around the table, unable to influence the decisions that affect its economy.

There were two Europes before, during the days when the European Economic Community (that eventually became the European Union) co-existed with the European Free Trade Association. What happened then is what will happen with this two-speed Europe. EFTA states, including the UK, quickly realised which was the organisation worth belonging to and eventually drifted into it, in many cases too late to have any influence in the formation of its fundamental structures. What is left of EFTA these days is a tiny grouping, made up of Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and in some way and form Switzerland. These remaining EFTA states, reluctant to join the EU but keen to participate in the Single Market, Schengen and other EU policies have to abide to the rules decided by EU member states without having a say in the way those rules are agreed and adopted (while at the same time contributing to the EU budget). Is this the fate the UK would like to reserve for itself? Is this the future the current government is happy to relegate the UK to? One of marginalised insignificance on the sidelines, having to accept the consequences of decisions that affect us but are taken without us?

The eurozone will survive and will continue its successful course through history. Its leaders have demonstrated their commitment and they will do whatever it takes, albeit at a pace different to that the markets, the press and many ambitious integrationists (like yours truly) might desire. It will survive because it possesses the necessary strength, its collective economic fundamentals are solid, it enjoys the confidence of world powers like the US and China and it has at its heart some of the most dynamic and global economies in the world. The question is whether the UK will be part of it or not.

Historians will one day look at what took place at this particular moment of European history. Whether they will acknowledge the UK as a strong and confident nation, at the heart of decisions that formed the future of our continent (and the world) or as a nation that turned inwards, closed itself up and resigned itself to a life of irrelevance in the sidelines will depend on what role Cameron and Co will decide to play from now on. Will they put their chips down, sit around the table and have a say in the hand the EU will play? Or will they leave through the back door while the rest of Europe moves forward?

I guess we will know soon.

As the sun rises over central Athens those that have engulfed the Parliament building ponder their situation. They have been driven here by disappointment, desperation, even anger and the stark realisation that this is truly as bad as it gets. Their disenchantment has made them think the unthinkable and all of the sudden

While their elected representatives prepare to make one of the most important decisions of their lives, those gathering around Syntagma Square argue that they are the victims, they have been robbed by a corrupt political elite, an inefficient bureaucracy, a clientalistc system which dictates that it’s who you know, not what you know, that really matters. They are the working and the middle classes, the pensioners and the unemployed graduates that are asked to shoulder the burden of the austerity measures necessary to put in order Greece ‘s finances. But as far as they are concerned they are not the ones that caused the crisis. They accept the notion of collective responsibility, they are aware that they are complicit to the crimes committed over the past 30 years but they are not the ones who engaged in vast corruption in the public and private sector, they are not the ones that evaded taxes massively and they are not the ones that spent investors’ capital to buy risky sovereign bonds. So they do not understand why they have to stand by and watch their taxes rise, their wages shrink and their public services disappear when those that brought the country to the brink of collapse escape prosecution or avoid having to accept the consequences of their own actions.

Whatever one thinks of these arguments it probably matters little to those that are charged with helping Greece out of its current predicament. The IMF, the EU governments, the financial markets and above all taxpayers across the eurozone want to see the Greeks earn their bail-out. They do not care much about who in the country carries the bigger share of responsibility. As far as they are concerned the austerity measures imposed by the IMF-EC-ECB programme are the bare minimum the country needs to do if it is to put its finances in order (and redeem itself in the process). They want to make sure that the Greeks will pay them back but the way they go about will likely produce the opposite result.

The loans that form the bail-out, especially the EU part, are offered at an interest rate above 5%, which is substantially higher than the average rate eurozone and EU states borrow at. So when Greeks pay back those loans its EU partners stand to make a hefty profit. But the kind of conditions attached put that prospect in grave risk. Because asking an economy that is going through a devastating contraction to adopt punitive austerity measures, at the same time as it is trying to adopt and apply structural reforms, compromises its chances of growth. Economic development cannot be achieved by cutting public spending, while imposing crippling tax rises, which take money out of the economy, and cutting – already low by EU average standards – wages, reducing the population’s purchasing power. Such policies undermine the country’s ability to generate income and pay back its dues, hurting at the same time indirectly and unintentionally its own partners. If that’s not shooting ones self on the foot, what is?

Many argue that there is a way out of this unpleasant situation. Greece should default and leave the eurozone. Devalue the drachma and run its own monetary policy. But that is a narrow minded and myopic view. Going back to the drachma, not a simple procedure by any stretch of the imagination, will have devastating effects on the economy, the banking sector and the wider population. It will condemn the country to poverty, cut it off capital markets (and EU assistance) and make it even more dependant on IMF assistance, and the austerity conditions that come with it. At the same time a devaluation, no matter how steep, is unlikely to bare any fruit, considering that, unless massively restructured, the Greek economy is unable to produce competitive internationally products and services. No matter how cheap they are. As for running an independent monetary policy, how independent can it be when conducted from a small corner of Europe , with sadly a history of incompetent handling of monetary affairs?

Not to mention the effect a Greek default will have on the markets. The problem does not lie exclusively on the level of exposure some European banks have to Greek sovereign debt. It also resides in the level of exposure they have to each other and the limited amount of confidence they have on their own health. Most European banks still carry the scars of the credit crunch, one of them manifested in the lack of trust they have in their peers, and this fragility makes them panicky and likely to over-react. So even though Greece is no Lehman Brothers in terms of size and exposure, a fragile, paranoid and over-sensitive financial services sector is bound to over-react, run for the heals and in the process cause a huge stumpy, crashing on its way countries like Portugal, Ireland, even Spain, which, especially in the case of the latter two, are objectively nowhere near the precarious state of their Greek partner. But they might find themselves in the Greeks’ shows just because of the degree of mistrust and the lack of confidence the European financial services sector has in itself.

So what is the solution? First of all we have to acknowledge that we are devoting far too much attention to the bush, ignoring completely the forest. For whatever reason Greece has become the focus of attention, maybe to take the spotlight away from other bigger and equally indebted EU member states. But the future of the eurozone will not be fought and lost on the streets of Athens . Here is a country equivalent to less than 2% of EU GDP, in the periphery of the eurozone, literally and metaphorically. If enough (but not comparatively much) political and financial capital is invested the Greek debt crisis can be (and should have already been) resolved.

Secondly, we need to take a step back and remind ourselves of the state of the eurozone as a whole, which is full of successful, dynamic economies. These economies could certainly be in a better state if the process of economic integration was more complete but we should not discount the way the eurozone as a whole has weathered the crisis just because of debt and structural problems in a couple of its member states. The single currency itself is holding, albeit with some, understandable, fluctuations, its value – a significant vote of confidence from the markets and its partners. Furthermore, international actors, not least the Chinese, are happy to continue purchasing European paper, recognizing the long term positive prospects of the eurozone. Many others, including oil-rich states in the Middle East , have been, for a while now, diverging their foreign currency holdings in favour of the euro, a further sign of support for the single currency.

But above all we need to allow the Greeks enough time to put their economy in order. That means first and foremost reconsidering the kind of remedy (or punishment) we ask the Greeks (as well as the Irish and the Portuguese) to take for the mistakes they committed. The IMF inspired bail-out terms are full of neo-liberal ideology and are running the risk of causing more trouble than offer solutions. Greece needs time to restructure its economy. While it is undertaking the necessary, and painful, reforms it must be allowed to extend the repayment of its current debts. Private investors have a role to play and a voluntary roll-over of debt repayments is in their long term interest as well. Also privatization should not be rushed, a fire sale won’t help the Greeks much. Giving up now on state assets that have the potential to generate better returns when sold at a more benign environment is counter productive, to put it mildly.

Furthermore, the terms of the EU-EC-ECB bail-out should be revisited, there is no reason for interest rates to be so high and repayment to be demanded so soon. As argued above these terms limit, not enhance, Greece ’s ability to pay back its partners. In addition it is imperative that the notion of Eurobonds is reconsidered. Such a move might implicitly mean that Eurozone taxpayers underwrite Greek debt but it is cheaper than the bail-outs currently considered and will allow Greece to return, indirectly at least, to the markets. Going down that route will of course set the process of fiscal integration in motion and while the EU’s political leaders need to have an honest discussion with their electorate of what that will entail there is no other alternative than allowing our economic and monetary union to grow into a fiscal and political union. Because without adding those two pillars the architecture of the euro will never be complete.

At the same time a bad assets bank should be set up, aimed to rid the banks of the bad loans that are hiding beneath the surface. For that to happen light must be shed to some dark corners of the financial sector, not a particularly pleasant process, but the eurozone will not secure itself a healthy future unless its banking sector is cleansed once and for all from past sins.

Last but not least, a serious and proper development plan must be set up for Greece . Call it Marshal, or even better, Merkel Plan, but for the country to generate growth it requires investment that can only be provided at a scale similar to the one Americans offered to Europe after the 2nd World War.

So, as the whole of Europe (and perhaps the world) is holding its breath in anticipation of the vote inside the Greek Parliament later today, the leaders of the EU should spare a thought for those gathering outside the building. Irrespective of the outcome of the vote, this is a time for hard choices, not just for the Greeks but the eurozone as a whole. Political bravery and economic long term thinking is needed. Otherwise the people of Greece might start believing that a salto mortale is the only option they have left.

Petros Fassoulas, European Movement