Al-Qaida advises the Arab Spring: Syria

Posted: 19th November 2011 by Joas Wagemakers in AQ Central, AQ Leadership, Jihadi media, Syria, Zawahiri

With the Arab Spring going strong in several countries, al-Qaida (in a broad sense, so including ideologues and scholars supportive of the organisation) still finds it necessary to comment on what is happening. In a series of posts, I will deal with the advice al-Qaida is giving the people of several countries, starting with Syria.

Praise

One of the men “advising” the Syrians currently revolting against the regime of President al-Asad is Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current leader of al-Qaida. In an epistle meant solely to greet, encourage and heap praise on the people he is addressing, al-Zawahiri spends one of the first paragraphs of his letter saying “salamun ‘alaykum” to his audience no fewer than eight times. He addresses them as “the mujahidun who command good and forbid evil”. This seems to be an attempt to claim that al-Qaida-like people are the ones trying to overthrow the Syrian regime, which is a good thing from his point of view because it allows him to create the idea that his organisation is alive and kicking and busy overthrowing “infidel” rulers, as it should be. From the Syrian people’s point of view, however, it is doubtful whether this is going to do them any good. As radical scholar Abu l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti pointed out in a fatwa that I wrote about in a previous post, it may actually be more advisable for Syrian jihadis to lay low, not giving the regime any extra excuse to crack down on them with the argument that the demonstrators are, in fact, terrorists. Al-Zawahiri doesn’t seem to realise this, urging his audience to tell President al-Asad that he is “a partner in the war on Islam in the name of terrorism and a protector of the borders of Israel”. Even more explicitly – in a phrase that sounds better in Arabic than it does in English – he tells them to say to al-Asad: “We have broken the shackles of fear and smashed the prison of weakness. The free [men] of Syria and its mujahidun have decided that they will live as honourable people and die as martyrs (ya’ishu a’izza’ wa-yamutu shuhada’).”

Al-Zawahiri also keeps going on about the supposedly strong American ties to the Syrian regime. He states that “America, which has co-operated with Bashar al-Asad throughout his reign, now claims that it is on your side”. He advises the Syrian protestors to say to the U.S. and President Obama that “we are the sons of the conquerors, the offspring of the mujahidun and the heirs of the murabitun (fighters operating from garrison cities).” The battle fought against the Syrian regime, al-Zawahiri claims, will obviously continue until “we raise the banners of victorious jihad” over Jerusalem. How exactly this is to be achieved in the face of a brutal regime that is not afraid to kill thousands of its own people is not entirely clear.

Syrian sectarianism

A more rational and level-headed approach is taken in another document, this one by Abu Basir al-Tartusi, a scholar living in London who is in no way part of the core leadership of al-Qaida but is one of the major thinkers reponsible for the organisation’s ideology. The originally-Syrian Abu Basir is churning out writings on Syria faster than you can say “the people want to topple the regime”, which may force me to dedicate another post to this country. In any case, Abu Basir wouldn’t be a true Salafi if he didn’t start by criticising the sect of the al-Asad family, the ‘Alawites, which Salafis (and, to a lesser extent, Sunnis in general) view as deviant or even infidel. He claims that they – among other things – are batinis (i.e. people who believe the Qur’an has an inner, esoteric meaning apart from its outer, exoteric meaning), idol worshippers and people who claim that caliph ‘Ali b. Abi Talib is God.

These ‘Alawites, Abu Basir claims, do not care about their homeland, or about its citizens. They have never amounted to anything and have never given any thought to what the people need. Abu Basir claims that the Syrian sectarian system is largely to blame for this, probably because the large number of sects and the differences between them encourage their members to act only on behalf of their own group, at the expense of loyalty to the country and the people as a whole. As a result, this regime has only brought awful things such as destruction, division and poverty. Surprisingly, however, given Abu Basir’s views of ‘Alawites in general, his approach is nuanced enough to distinguish between ‘Alawites who are part of the governing circle of President al-Asad and the majority of ‘Alawites, who suffer from poverty just like other Syrians. His wrath is therefore directed towards the regime and he thus advises the Syrian people to unite and express only one demand: the fall of the regime. Raising any other demand, Abu Basir claims, would be quite unwise, presumably because he realises that Syrians are not united enough to form a coalition on the basis of any demand other than the fall of the regime.

Practical advice

In two other writings (here and here), Abu Basir continues about the situation in Syria and stresses the need for peaceful resistance but also the legitimacy of self-defence. The regime, he says, has killed or wounded tens of thousands of people and the latter should therefore learn how to protect themselves by setting up security committees that can defend the protestors. These committees, he states, should not participate in demonstrations or in any peaceful activities, so as not to give the regime an extra reason to crack down on protestors. Abu Basir also wants “the noble free officers” (i.e. the ones that abandoned the regime’s army) to increase in number, expand their military activities and co-ordinate them with the aforementioned security committees.

Apart from advising the Syrian people on using non-peaceful methods, he tries to convince them that violence is justified. While he keeps stressing that peaceful resistance is good and commendable, he fails to see its use after so much bloodshed and scolds Syrians for refusing even to take violent means into consideration after it has become clear that sit-ins and other peaceful means have proved useless. He encourages the people to obtain arms and even quotes a verse from the Qur’an about military preparedness to underline the legitimacy of the use of violence. After having compared the Syrian regime with the French colonialism of the past, he wonders what the difference between the two of them really is and calls on the remnants of the army to fear God and take their responsibility towards Syria and its people by defending them and their honour “against the imperialism of the sectarian regime of al-Asad”.

If and how this advice is accepted by Syrians in general and jihadis in particular is unclear. What is clear from Abu Basir’s writings, however, is that he obviously cares about Syria. The tone of his work here is not one of fighting against “infidel” rulers who fail to apply the shari’a but much more one of concern for his native land, which he even refers to as “the beloved Syria”. Whether this is also the case with other commentators “advising” demonstrators in other countries is something I intend to explore in future posts.

The Allure of Parliamentary Politics

Posted: 20th October 2011 by Will McCants in democracy, Strategy

The Sharia Council of the Minbar al-Tawhid website has issued a new fatwa today by Abu Mundhir al-Shinqiti. The fatwa rules on the permissibility of Muslims electing representatives to parliaments and serving in those bodies. Since the Minbar’s Sharia Council has become the jihadis’ go-to resource for religious opinions, its fatwas on the Arab Spring matter in jihadi circles (see Joas’ and Brynjar’s earlier posts on the council’s output). This may become even more true in the months ahead if al-Qaeda continues to fade as the vanguard of the jihadi movement.

Unsurprisingly, the council rules that it is forbidden for Muslims to participate in a parliamentary system, even if it is to make the constitution more Islamic (the reasons are the same as those outlined in my Foreign Affairs article). It also enjoins Muslims to focus on fighting in “lands of jihad,” which is somewhat at odds with al-Shinqiti’s earlier ruling that mujahids should stay and fight in Egypt.

Of more interest than the council’s ruling is the question to which it responds. It gives a sense of the misgivings some jihadis have about their leaderships’ hard-line stance when there are real opportunities to advance their agenda to create an Islamic state. It is also an astute take on the political maneuverings of some Salafis in Egypt. Finally, it shows how the loyalties of some jihadis are split between Salafi and jihadi scholars:

Some of our noble shaykhs who have educated us have conducted ijtihad on this issue and sanctioned participation in the Egyptian legislative council (parliament) for a single term. That will be the term in which the new positive constitution for the country will be written for the coming period. They have sanctioned this for the sake of drafting legal material that is closer to Islam than secularism, although they recognize that participating here [Egypt] means the entry of some monotheists into elections and not just voting (although some differ on this matter).

What is your opinion? Do we agree or disagree with their ijtihad?

What is your opinion on the question of participating in the new political parties that they are presently establishing in the country, especially the Light Party and the Virtue Party, which are aligned with the well-known salafi mission in this country and are famous throughout the land?

What is your opinion on how we participate in the political movement after the election, knowing that the former regime used to imprison for years anyone it suspected of loving or supporting the mujahids or those who held their pure beliefs?

Or do we limit our goals to only seeking a way to go to the land of jihad?

I urge you to reply quickly since events are developing rapidly.

 

According to U.S. and Yemeni officials, Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan have been killed in an airstrike. Awlaki was the spiritual leader of the English-speaking jihadi community and Samir Khan was its chief propagandist. Both men joined al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula over the past few years and have been responsible for producing al-Qaeda’s English-language magazine, Inspire. Awlaki also had an operational role directing AQAP’s external attacks and the current head of AQAP reportedly asked Bin Laden to make Awlaki the group’s leader. This is yet another major blow against al-Qaeda and seriously damages its ability to recruit and attack in the West.

Update: For background on AQAP and its ties to Yemeni tribes, there’s a brand new report from CTC.

As is the case for many others, the tenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks has made me reflect on their impact over the past decade. To this end, Michelle Shephard‘s Decade of Fear has been indispensable. A very personal account of her journalistic efforts to chronicle the war on terrorism over the past decade, Michelle weaves the weft of her narrative over the warp of New York just after 9/11; Somalia after the rise of the Islamic Courts Union and, later, the emergence of al-Shabab; Pakistan after the rebound of the Taliban and al-Qaeda; and Yemen at the formation of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the retreat of President Saleh.

Michelle’s account puts a human face on the knotty legal, ethical, and political problems the United States and its allies have grappled with as they tried to stop al-Qaeda and its supporters: torture for information, overthrowing stable governments who might align with terrorist groups, rendition, entrapment, collateral damage, and indefinite detention. There are also the less “kinetic” but  no-less-knotty problems like countering radicalization online in multi-cultural societies that value free speech.

What struck me most about Michelle’s account was her juxtaposition of violence and inanity. Hassan Aweys, the head of a group allied with al-Shabab in Somalia, covets Michelle’s boots. Hamid Gul, the former head of Pakistan’s ISI and sponsor of some of the United States’ worst enemies in the region, does not know who Tony Soprano is but, upon being told, empathizes with his bifurcated psyche. The white-polo-and-khaki-wearing Abu Jandal, UBL’s chief bodygaurd, is gracious to Western journalists while explaining that Bin Laden didn’t target the civilians in September. “He simply hit targets, and civilians happened to be around.” Kitch and karaoke permeate Guantanamo, along with euphemisms to describe poor detainee treatment.

Wisely, Michelle does not try to resolve the contradictions or unravel the knots. But she is hopeful that the Arab Spring and the death of bin Laden will take the wind out of the sails of the global jihadi movement and help the United States and its allies put the threat in perspective so they can abandon some of their worst counterterrorism tools. Me too.

Defending Failure in Gaza (Part 2)

Posted: 9th September 2011 by Joas Wagemakers in Hamas, Israel, Palestinian Territories

As we saw in the previous installment of this short series on jihadis in the Gaza Strip, the leader of the Jama’at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad, Abu al-Walid al-Maqdisi, was pretty defensive about his organization’s actions in his answers to questions from visitors of the Shumukh al-Islam forum. The rest of his answers indicate that the group may have grandiose plans and plenty of enemies against whom these may be applied but that in the end they are not really capable of living up to their own rhetoric.

Interestingly, one of the things Abu al-Walid mentions as – unfortunately – being an impossibility is expanding his activities to the Sinai desert in order to give his organization more strategic depth. This is the case because of “the heavy security oppression on everyone who is thought to have even the slightest link to Jihadi-Salafism” (question no. 16). Recent attacks on Israel possibly coming from this area suggest that this situation may have changed. The revolution in Egypt has made the security situation in the Sinai desert less strict, perhaps allowing groups such as Abu al-Walid’s to obtain the breathing space they so desperately need. When answering his readers’ questions in late 2010, however, none of this had occurred yet. Nevertheless, they provide context for the group’s actions today:

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Al-Qaeda’s Past and Present

Posted: 23rd August 2011 by Will McCants in AQ Central, AQ Leadership, Strategy

The newest issue of Foreign Affairs on the ten-year anniversary of 9/11 includes an essay by me (free registration required) on the history of al-Qaeda and its prospects after the Arab Spring. The essay covers the reasons for al-Qaeda’s founding, its targeting of the United States, its strategic thinking under Zawahiri’s leadership, its concept of an Islamic state, and its enduring problem with Islamist parliamentary politics.

Regular readers of Jihadica will find much that is familiar but the essay makes one point I have not seen elsewhere: al-Qaeda is not against democratic elections, just parliamentary politics. The misperception that it is against democratic elections arises from a general ignorance of al-Qaeda’s thought on Islamic states and statecraft, a subject I also treat in the essay. Islamic states, not the caliphate, are central to al-Qaeda’s strategic planning and its interpretation of the aftermath of the Arab Spring.

I look forward to your comments. Original Arabic for the passages I translated in the article are below the fold.

  • Update 1: My postscript for Foreign Affairs on the death of Atiyya.
  • Update 2: I give some As to the Qs of Foreign Affairs.
  • Update 3: Foreign Affairs has published “Al Qaeda’s Challenge” in its 9/11 Ten Year Anniversary ebook. Brynjar’s article on Bin Laden’s death is in there too.

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Defending Failure in Gaza (Part 1)

Posted: 18th August 2011 by Joas Wagemakers in Hamas, Israel, Palestinian Territories

Will’s latest post suggested that at least one jihadi is quite critical of what al-Qa’ida is doing regarding the Palestinian question. Well, he’s not the only one. Late last year, the Shumukh al-Islam forum published a book of its Q&A sessions with a jihadi leader from Gaza, namely Abu l-Walid al-Maqdisi, the amir of the Jama’at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad and a member of the Shari’a Council of the Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad. While most questioners praised Abu l-Walid and wished him well, many also asked critical questions that forced Abu l-Walid to defend what essentially boils down to his group’s failure to achieve any substantial successes. In a short series of posts, I intend to work my way through this book, thereby providing insight into the problems that jihadis in the Gaza Strip face.

Unity

The book has about 160 pages (there’s no pagination) and contains 292 questions. What is interesting is that a large number of them refer to the unity (or, rather, the lack thereof) among jihadi groups in the Gaza Strip; in fact, the very first question deals with this. Abu l-Walid doesn’t really get much further than saying there are efforts to unify groups from Gaza and that this has been discussed a lot. He stresses that jihadis in Gaza are suffering from a difficult security environment – presumably because of both Hamas and Israel – and that this hampers efforts to unify the groups.  Abu l-Walid might be right that the “servants of God” are weak because of the repression by “the enemies of God from among the Jews, the lords of secularism and the propagandists of democracy” (response to question no. 9), but it does not explain why jihadi groups are still working separately. Abu l-Walid later adds (in response to question no. 7) that the reasons for this lack of unity among jihadi groups in Gaza has nothing to do with major differences in ideology, and he even admits that there is no real Islamic legal obstacle that prevents them from uniting. They just have legitimate differences that keep them separate.

The fact that this question is repeated so often – with Abu l-Walid repeatedly referring back to his previous two answers – indicates that many questioners have strong feelings about it and are perhaps frustrated that the different groups have not united. One can hardly blame them. Apart from general factors, such as belonging to the same people and speaking the same language, the different jihadi groups operate in a relatively small piece of territory that they necessarily have to share; they have two common enemies (Israel and Hamas); and they share the same ideology. Given these circumstances, it is easy to see why many questioners are apparently frustrated at the lack of unity among them.

Hamas

Things are not looking up vis-à-vis Hamas, the ruling power in the Gaza Strip, either. Abu l-Walid states that cooperation between Hamas and Fatah can only increase the security pressure on jihadi groups since Fatah is experienced in cracking down on organizations and has the power and the means to do it (question no. 11).

Considering the jihadis’ apparent lack of fighting against Israel (see Will’s post again), one might assume that Abu l-Walid is a strong advocate of fighting Hamas, but he’s not. In response to a questioner asking why there are no military operations against the Hamas government, “knowing that most Salafi movements excommunicate this government,” Abu l-Walid states that the time is not ripe for that yet, given the weakness of the jihadi groups at the moment (question 14).

Beyond Gaza

The weakness argument is used often by Abu l-Walid, including to defend his group’s decision not to engage in activities beyond the Gaza Strip. He describes his group as “small” (question no. 18) and states that the security situation on the West Bank is difficult because of the “coalition” between “the [Palestinian] Authority and the Jews” (question no. 19).

One reader nevertheless advises Abu l-Walid to leave Gaza altogether: “Don’t you agree with me”, this questioner asks, “that Palestine has never been liberated throughout history except from the outside and not from within?” Abu l-Walid retorts that it is indeed difficult but not impossible and that patience, preparation, education, mobilizing people’s efforts, and setting up cadres are needed to make it work (question no. 35).

Whether these defensive answers are enough to satisfy Abu l-Walid’s readers is what we will see in the next installment of this series.

To be continued…

In an essay provocatively titled, ”Reasons for the Utter Strategic Failure of al-Qaeda to Threaten the Security of the Zionist Entity,” Ansar forum member Qandil al-Bahr is at pains to explain why al-Qaeda is advancing the Palestinian cause by focusing its attention in the United States:

There is no doubt that al-Qaeda is incapable of undertaking a single operation in the land controlled by the Israeli enemy. The mujahids of al-Qaeda are not even able to pay for a single shot or assassinate a single Jewish person in the land of Palestine. What is the reason for this utter failure? The reality is there is no reason behind it worth mentioning other than that the premise is faulty. It is not possible to defend a faulty premise other than by first critiquing it and moderating it then base it upon reality.

Qandil says he has heard this faulty premise over and over but has not felt safe enough to respond to it in public or private. He believes he is safe enough to respond on the forums.

The reality, Qandil argues, is that al-Qaeda wants to carry out operations in Palestine but the circumstances aren’t right. The Salafi-Jihadi movements are weak and fragmented, so al-Qaeda is taking its time to study and plan. The key is to end Western support for Israel, which will make the state vulnerable to a local challenge. Reducing American support is particularly vital. Until then, any terrorist attacks on Israel will be futile.

Can this be done? Qandil says yes:

The Great Powrs do not have enemies or friends. They only have interests. If the United States of America comes to believe that the Zionist Entity is becoming a dangerous and strategic burden to its interests and its existence, it will abandon this “Zionist leech” without the least hesitation.

Qandil believes it is only a matter of time before this happens. The key is to continue to bleed the United States economically.

There is a strong realist streak in jihadi thinking, which is what Qandil is drawing on to explain why al-Qaeda has chosen to focus on the far enemy of the United States rather than the near enemy of Israel. But as his frustration suggests, it is a tough sell.

Three days ago, Abu Hafs al-Sunni al-Sunni, a member of the Atahadi forum, posted an article he titled, “The Strategic Theory of the Second Generation of Jihadis: Propagandistic Foundations and Operational Methods.” Despite the title, it is less about strategy and operations and more about the public relations problems plaguing the jihadis. Here are his main points:

  • The first generation of jihadis did not do an adequate job of winning over ordinary Muslims. This left the field open to the quietist Salafis. Jihadis need to engage commoners by showing them videos of the suffering of Muslims and gauging their interest in doing something about it. However, one has to be careful so as not to be accused of inciting terrorism.
  • Jihadis need to avoid actions that alienate the masses, like beheadings, and demonstrate how much more ethical they are in waging war than the Americans.
  • The second generation of jihadis is woefully ignorant of Islamic scripture and law, which makes it easy for quietist Salafis to discredit them.
  • Be polite when disagreeing with non-jihadi Salafis and the clerics they follow. Many of these clerics agree with the jihadis on most things, like the Egyptian Salafi cleric Abu Ishaq al-Huwayni.
  • Focus on destroying the economy of the infidel. Burn their forests and damage their power grids.

Sayf al-`Adl a Nobody

Posted: 26th July 2011 by Will McCants in AQ Leadership, Western Analysts

Shmukh forum user Amal wa-Alam complains that the brothers are disparaging Sayf al-`Adl, the operational leader of al-Qaeda.  ”They are beginning to talk about him as if he is a nobody.” Amal strongly disagrees and adduces as evidence West Point’s study of his handiwork in Africa that Clint Watts, Jake Shapiro, and Vahid Brown had a hand in. “It’s strange that the Americans know” and the brothers do not.

It’s not clear who these naysaying brothers are, and another Shmukh user disagrees with Amal, saying that he has heard no disparaging remarks. But if it is true that Sayf is being criticized in some jihadi circles as irrelevant, it is quite a change from the rumors two months ago that he was the acting head of al-Qaeda after Bin Laden’s death.

This isn’t the first time that jihadi leaders have referenced the studies of American and European analysts to bolster their authority. This latest post underlines once again that jihadism is not a static phenomenon but one influenced by those who study it and vice versa.