One of the most fascinating developments in modern Middle East politics has been the emergence and continuity of Syria and Iran’s alliance. Beginning in 1979, the Tehran-Damascus axis has endured for over three decades despite many challenges and periodic strains in the relationship. Overall, the longstanding ties and cooperation between the two states have had a major impact on Middle East politics. However, with the eruption of the Arab Spring and the subsequent upheaval in Syria over the past nine months, the Syrian-Iranian alliance is facing the greatest challenge to its existence in decades.
The Power of the Tehran-Damascus Alliance
Over the past thirty-two years, Syria and Iran have had noticeable success in frustrating the designs and policies of Iraq, Israel, and the United States in the Middle East. Through their continuous collaboration, they have played a critical role in stemming Iraq’s invasion of Iran in 1980, and ensuring that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq did not become the predominant power in the Middle East. Following Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon and its occupation of nearly half the country, Iran and Syria thwarted Menachem Begin’s strategy to bring Lebanon into Israel’s orbit. Through the use of Lebanese proxies – most notably Hezbollah – Iran and Syria were able to expose the limits of Israeli military power, forcing Tel Aviv to withdraw from Lebanese territory.
Despite America’s post-Cold War predominance on both the regional and world stage, the imposition of economic sanctions, and the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, Iran and Syria have been able to wield considerable power and influence in the Middle East. This was particularly evident during the 2006 Lebanon war, during which both countries steadfastly supported Hezbollah’s successful drive against Israel.
Iran, Syria, and the Arab Spring
The Arab uprisings, which began in Tunisia in December 2010, spread to Syria in the early Spring. The Syrian government responded to demonstrations with a heavy-hand, including arresting and killing protestors. While demonstrators initially sought only political reforms, liberalization and an end to corruption, the regime’s violent response has caused many to lose faith in the government and its ability to reform. In what has become the greatest challenge to Bashar Assad’s eleven-year rule and the survival of the forty-one-year-old Ba’thist regime, many are now calling for the outright overthrow of the Ba’thist regime.
Throughout the uprising, Iran has assisted the embattled Syrian regime in its suppression of popular protests. As a result of this cooperation, many have speculated that the Iranian security apparatus, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), police and intelligence, maintains an on the ground presence inside Syria. There have even been reports that some Iranians and members of Hezbollah have served as snipers targeting anti-government demonstrators. These rumors contains both fact and fiction. On the one hand, it is plausible that the Iranians have been providing advice and equipment to the Syrian security forces to help them contain and disperse the protests, as well as guidance and technical assistance to monitor and curtail the opposition’s use of the internet and mobile phones. In the wake of the crackdown against protestors after the 2009 Iranian Presidential elections, Iran’s security forces have gained plenty of experience and learned valuable lessons in quashing popular uprisings.
It seems, however, highly unlikely that Iranian security personnel have been directly involved in quelling demonstrations. Although it is difficult to confirm the veracity of these accounts, the use of limited numbers of non-Syrian personnel for specific duties is perfectly plausible. Reports that the Iranian security personnel, including members of the IRGC’s Qods Force, are running Syria’s entire security operations should, however, be taken with a grain of salt. Although such speculation has been popular among the Syrian opposition and mainstream Arab news media, it seems highly doubtful that the Syrian regime would cede control over its domestic affairs to the Iranians. While Tehran currently stands as the more powerful partner, Damascus has not become an appendage of the Islamic Republic. The Syrian Ba’thist regime calls the shots in its domestic affairs and will use any means necessary, including limited assistance from the Iranians, to ride out the current crises.
Iranian Calculations
Over the past 32 years, Syria has been Iran’s only stalwart Arab supporter. Syria also continues to serve as a major conduit for Iranian arms shipments and material support for Hezbollah in Lebanon. If the Assad government were overthrown, it would be a major setback for Iran and the greatest strategic, regional loss for the country since its establishment in 1979. It would also constitute a major blow to Iran’s ideological and foreign policy objectives.
The overthrow of the Assad regime could transform the regional situation overnight. In addition to losing its most important Arab ally, Iran’s ability to provide support for Hezbollah and to influence the situation in the Arab-Israeli arena would be severely curtailed. Reportedly, as the unrest in Syria has continued, Hezbollah and Iran, with the assistance of Damascus, have accelerated efforts to transfer weapons from Syria to storage facilities in Lebanon. In the event of the Assad regime’s collapse, both Tehran and its Lebanese allies are concerned with ensuring that Hezbollah will have adequate arms for any future military confrontations with Israel.
Over the past several months, Iranian officials have repeatedly expressed concern about the ongoing crisis in Syria. At the same time, Tehran has also emphasized that the situation in Syria is an internal affair that should be resolved by the Syrians through dialogue and peaceful negotiations. Iran has condemned Western and Arab League actions against Syria, denouncing them as foreign interference in the country’s internal affairs. While Iran continues to play this double game, Damascus is clearly ill-at-ease with the situation. Iran’s dilemma is whether to continue supporting the Assad regime or to desist from backing its long-time ally should all signs point to its downfall.
For Iran, the nightmare scenario would be for the Assad regime to be replaced by a Sunni fundamentalist government that is staunchly anti-Iran and anti-Shia, and allied with Tehran’s regional rival Saudi Arabia. There have been reports that, since the summer, Iranian officials have secretly met with some Syrian opposition factions, a motley crew of political groups, in order to assess their stance towards Iran, Israel, Lebanon and the United States.
There is little doubt that, should the Syrian Ba’th be overthrown, Syria’s relations with Iran would cool to some degree. One cannot definitively conclude, however, that Syria would sever all ties with Tehran. Any Syrian government that aims to uphold Syrian national interests would likely find it impossible to normalize relations with Israel and the United States and therefore necessary to maintain an alliance with Tehran. The Israeli-occupied Golan Heights is at the center of this strategic calculation. Unless Israel voluntarily returns this territory to Syria or the United States and the West undertake serious efforts to mediate and resolve the issue, the new government in Damascus would find it difficult to conclude peace with Israel and fully normalize relations with Washington and its allies. Hence, in order to strengthen its bargaining position vis-à-vis Israel and its Western backers, a successor government in Syria may deem it necessary to maintain some ties with Tehran and to continue supporting Hezbollah.
At the same time, Iran would likely be able to weather the loss of Syrian ally. In many respects, Iran’s regional situation has greatly improved in recent years. In Afghanistan, the Taliban has lost much of its power, much to Tehran’s relief. In Iraq, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein has paved the way for the emergence of a majority-Shia government that is friendly to Tehran and has greatly allayed Iran’s security concerns. As a result, the alliance with Syria has lost some of its utility for Tehran. In fact, should countries like Egypt assume a more favorable stance towards Tehran, Iran may achieve a net gain in allies as a result of the Arab Spring.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that the alliance between Syria and Iran is at a critical crossroads, and that developments on the ground will affect the future of the alliance and its prospects for survival. Whither the Tehran-Damascus nexus? Only time will tell…
*Jubin Goodarzi is a professor and researcher in the International Relations Department at Webster University Geneva, and has been a consultant on Middle Eastern affairs with the United Nations since 1996. He has worked with a number of US and UK research institutes and foundations, including the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC, the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) in London, and the Ford Foundation in New York. Dr. Goodarzi is author of Syria and Iran: Diplomatic Alliance and Power Politics in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), and numerous articles and book reviews on the international relations of the Middle East. He holds a B.A. in International Studies from the American University, a M.A. in Arab Studies from Georgetown University, and a doctorate in International Relations from the London School of Economics (LSE).
