The tactic of terrorism (used by terrorists) is available to insurgents and governments. Not all insurgents use terror as a tactic, and some choose not to use it because other tactics work better for them in a particular context. Individuals, such as Timothy McVeigh, may also engage in terrorist acts such as the Oklahoma City bombing.
If the terrorism is part of a broader insurgency, counter-terrorism may also form a part of a counter-insurgency doctrine, but political, economic, and other measures may focus more on the insurgency than the specific acts of terror. Foreign internal defense (FID) is a term used by several countries for programs either to suppress insurgency, or reduce the conditions under which insurgency could develop.
Counter-terrorism includes both the detection of potential acts and the response to related events.
Counter-terrorism refers to offensive strategies intended to prevent a belligerent, in a broader conflict, from successfully using the tactic of terrorism. The US military definition, compatible with the definitions used by NATO and many other militaries, is "Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism." In other words, counter-terrorism is a set of techniques for denying an opponent the use of terrorism-based tactics, just as counter-air is a set of techniques for denying the opponent the use of attack aircraft.
Anti-terrorism is defensive, intended to reduce the chance of an attack using terrorist tactics at specific points, or to reduce the vulnerability of possible targets to such tactics. "Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces."
To continue the analogy between air and terrorist capability, offensive anti-air missions attack the airfields of the opponent, while defensive anti-air uses anti-aircraft missiles to protect a point on one's own territory. The ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Sri Lankan Civil War, and Colombian Civil War are examples of conflicts where terrorism is present, along with other tactics, so that participants use counter- and anti-terrorism to limit the opponent's use of terror tactics. The only unit's that are counter-terrorism, are the Us Navy Seals and Delta force they work along side with NATO.
See the series of articles beginning with intelligence cycle management, and, in particular, intelligence analysis. HUMINT presents techniques of describing the social networks that make up terrorist groups. Also relevant are the motivations of the individual terrorist and the structure of cell systems used by recent non-national terrorist groups.
Most counter-terrorism strategies involve an increase in standard police and domestic intelligence. The central activities are traditional: interception of communications, and the tracing of persons. New technology has, however, expanded the range of military and law enforcement operations.
Domestic intelligence is often directed at specific groups, defined on the basis of origin or religion, which is a source of political controversy. Mass surveillance of an entire population raises objections on civil liberties grounds. homegrown terrorists, especially lone wolves are often harder to detect because of their citizenship or legal alien status and better ability to stay under the radar.
To select the effective action when terrorism appears to be more of an isolated event, the appropriate government organizations need to understand the source, motivation, methods of preparation, and tactics of terrorist groups. Good intelligence is at the heart of such preparation, as well as political and social understanding of any grievances that might be solved. Ideally, one gets information from inside the group, a very difficult challenge for HUMINT because operational terrorist cells are often small, with all members known to one another, perhaps even related.
Counterintelligence is a great challenge with the security of cell-based systems, since the ideal, but nearly impossible, goal is to obtain a clandestine source within the cell. Financial tracking can play a role, as can communications intercept, but both of these approaches need to be balanced against legitimate expectations of privacy.
Examples of these problems can include prolonged, incommunicado detention without judicial review; risk of subjecting to torture during the transfer, return and extradition of people between or within countries; and the adoption of security measures that restrain the rights or freedoms of citizens and breach principles of non-discrimination. Examples include: In November 2003 Malaysia passed new counter-terrorism laws that were widely criticized by local human rights groups for being vague and overbroad. Critics claim that the laws put the basic rights of free expression, association, and assembly at risk. Malaysia persisted in holding around 100 alleged militants without trial, including five Malaysian students detained for alleged terrorist activity while studying in Karachi, Pakistan. In November 2003 a Canadian-Syrian national, Maher Arar, alleged publicly that he had been tortured in a Syrian prison after being handed over to the Syrian authorities by U.S. In December 2003 Colombia's congress approved legislation that would give the military the power to arrest, tap telephones and carry out searches without warrants or any previous judicial order. Images of unpopular treatment of detainees in US custody in Iraq and other locations have encouraged international scrutiny of US operations in the war on terror. Hundreds of foreign nationals remain in prolonged indefinite detention without charge or trial in Guantánamo Bay, despite international and US constitutional standards some groups believe outlaw such practices. Hundreds of people suspected of connections with the Taliban or al Qa'eda remain in long-term detention in Pakistan or in US-controlled centers in Afghanistan. China has used the "war on terror" to justify its policies in the predominantly Muslim Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region to stifle Uighur identity. In Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Yemen and other countries, scores of people have been arrested and arbitrarily detained in connection with suspected terrorist acts or links to opposition armed groups. Until 2005 eleven men remained in high security detention in the UK under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.
Many would argue that such violations exacerbate rather than counter the terrorist threat. Human rights advocates argue for the crucial role of human rights protection as an intrinsic part to fight against terrorism. This suggests, as proponents of human security have long argued, that respecting human rights may indeed help us to incur security. Amnesty International included a section on confronting terrorism in the recommendations in the Madrid Agenda arising from the Madrid Summit on Democracy and Terrorism (Madrid 8–11 March 2005):
:"Democratic principles and values are essential tools in the fight against terrorism. Any successful strategy for dealing with terrorism requires terrorists to be isolated. Consequently, the preference must be to treat terrorism as criminal acts to be handled through existing systems of law enforcement and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law. We recommend: (1) taking effective measures to make impunity impossible either for acts of terrorism or for the abuse of human rights in counter-terrorism measures. (2) the incorporation of human rights laws in all anti-terrorism programmes and policies of national governments as well as international bodies."
While international efforts to combat terrorism have focused on the need to enhance cooperation between states, proponents of human rights (as well as human security) have suggested that more effort needs to be given to the effective inclusion of human rights protection as a crucial element in that cooperation. They argue that international human rights obligations do not stop at borders and a failure to respect human rights in one state may undermine its effectiveness in the international effort to cooperate to combat terrorism.
Another major method of preemptive neutralization is interrogation of known or suspected terrorists to obtain information about specific plots, targets, the identity of other terrorists, whether or not the interrogation subjects himself is guilty of terrorist involvement. Sometimes more extreme methods are used to increase suggestibility, such as sleep deprivation or drugs. Such methods may lead captives to offer false information in an attempt to stop the treatment, or due to the confusion brought on by it. These methods are not tolerated by European powers. In 1978 the European Court of Human Rights ruled in the Ireland v. United Kingdom case that such methods amounted to a practice of inhuman and degrading treatment, and that such practices were in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights Article 3 (art. 3).
This can take many forms including the provision of clean drinking water, education, vaccination programs, provision of food and shelter and protection from violence, military or otherwise. Successful human security campaigns have been characterized by the participation of a diverse group of actors including governments, NGOs, and citizens.
Foreign internal defense programs provide outside expert assistance to a threatened government. FID can involve both non-military and military aspects of counter-terrorism.
Another preventative action that has been used is the threat of and use of pork and pork products against radical religious groups that feel that contact with pork will render them unclean. The bodies of killed terrorists are daubed with lard and buried wrapped in pigskin.
History has shown that military intervention has rarely been successful in stopping or preventing terrorism. Although military action can disrupt a terrorist group's operations temporarily, it rarely ends the threat.
Thus repression by the military in itself (particularly if it is not accompanied by other measures) usually leads to short term victories, but tend to be unsuccessful in the long run (e.g. the French's doctrine described in Roger Trinquier's book Modern War used in Indochina and Algeria). However, new methods (see the new Counterinsurgency Field Manual) such as those taken in Iraq have yet to be seen as beneficial or ineffectual.
Aircraft cockpits are kept locked during flights, and have reinforced doors, which only the pilots in the cabin are capable of opening. English train stations removed their garbage cans in response to the Provisional IRA threat, as convenient locations for depositing bombs.
Scottish stations removed theirs after the 7th of July bombing of London as a precautionary measure. The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority purchased bomb-resistant barriers after the September 11 terrorist attacks.
A more sophisticated target-hardening approach must consider industrial and other critical industrial infrastructure that could be attacked. Terrorists need not import chemical weapons if they can cause a major industrial accident such as the Bhopal disaster or the Halifax explosion. Industrial chemicals in manufacturing, shipping, and storage need greater protection, and some efforts are in progress. To put this risk into perspective, the first major lethal chemical attack in WWI used 160 tons of chlorine. Industrial shipments of chlorine, widely used in water purification and the chemical industry, travel in 90 or 55 ton tank cars.
To give one more example, the North American electrical grid has already demonstrated, in the Northeast Blackout of 2003, its vulnerability to natural disasters coupled with inadequate, possibly insecure, SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) networks. Part of the vulnerability is due to deregulation leading to much more interconnection in a grid designed for only occasional power-selling between utilities. A very few terrorists, attacking key power facilities when one or more engineers have infiltrated the power control centers, could wreak havoc.
Equipping likely targets with containers (i.e., bags) of pig lard has been utilized to discourage attacks by Islamist suicide bombers. The technique was apparently used on a limited scale by British authorities in the 1940s. The approach stems from the idea that Muslims perpetrating the attack would not want to be "soiled" by the lard in the moment prior to dying. The idea has been suggested more recently as a deterrent to suicide bombings in Israel. However, the actual effectiveness of this tactic is probably limited as it is possible that a sympathetic Islamic scholar could issue a fatwa proclaiming that a suicide bomber would not be polluted by the swine products.
Public health agencies, from local to national level, may be designated to deal with identification, and sometimes mitigation, of possible biological attacks, and sometimes chemical or radiologic contamination.
Such units perform both in preventive actions, hostage rescue and responding to on-going attacks. Countries of all sizes can have highly trained counter-terrorist teams. Tactics, techniques and procedures for manhunting are under constant development.
Most of these measures deal with terrorist attacks that affect an area, or threaten to do so. It is far harder to deal with assassination, or even reprisals on individuals, due to the short (if any) warning time and the quick exfiltration of the assassins.
These units are specially trained in tactics and are very well equipped for CQB with emphasis on stealth and performing the mission with minimal casualties. The units include take-over force (assault teams), snipers, EOD experts, dog handlers and intelligence officers. See Counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism organizations for national command, intelligence, and incident mitigation.
The majority of counter-terrorism operations at the tactical level, are conducted by state, federal and national law enforcement agencies or intelligence agencies. In some countries, the military may be called in as a last resort. Obviously, for countries whose military are legally permitted to conduct police operations, this is a non-issue, and such counter-terrorism operations are conducted by their military.
See Counter-intelligence for command, intelligence and warning, and incident mitigation aspects of counter-terror.
colspan=2 | Incident | ! Main locale | ! Hostage nationality | ! Kidnappers/hijackers | ! Counter-terrorist force | ! Results | ||||
1972 | Munich Massacre | Munich Olympics, Germany | Israeli | All hostages murdered, 5 kidnappers killed. 3 kidnappers captured and released. | ||||||
1975 | 1975 AIA building hostage crisis>AIA Hostage Incident | AIA building, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia | US, Swedish Embassies. Mixed | Japanese Red Army | Malaysian police | All hostages rescued, all kidnappers flew up to Libya. | ||||
1976 | Operation Entebbe>Entebbe raid | Entebbe, Uganda | Mixed. Israelis and Jews separated into a different room, non-Jewish hostages were released shortly after capture. | PFLP | Sayeret Matkal, Sayeret Tzanhanim, Sayeret Golani | All 6 hijackers, 45 Ugandan troops, 3 hostages and 1 Israeli soldier dead. 100 hostages rescued | ||||
1977 | Hijacking of Lufthansa Flight 181 | Spanish airspace and Mogadishu, Somalia | Mixed | PFLP | GSG 9, Special Air Service consultants | 1 hostage, 3 hijackers dead, 1 captured. 90 hostages rescued. | ||||
1980 | Iranian Embassy Siege | London, UK | Mostly Iranian but some British | Democratic Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Arabistan | Special Air Service | 1 hostage, 5 kidnappers dead, 1 captured. 24 hostages rescued. 1 SAS operative received minor burns. | ||||
1981 | Hijacking of "Woyla" Garuda Indonesia | Don Muang International Airport, Thailand | Indonesian | Jihad Commandos | Kopassus, Thailand military mixed forces | 1 hijacker killed himself, 4 hijackers and 1 Kopassus operative dead, 1 pilot wounded, all hostages rescued. | ||||
1983 | 1983 Turkish embassy attack in Lisbon>Turkish embassy attack | Lisbon, Portugal | Turkish | Armenian Revolutionary Army | 5 hijackers, 1 hostage and 1 policeman dead, 1 hostage and 1 policeman wounded. | |||||
1985 | Capture of Achille Lauro hijackers | International airspace and Italy | Mixed | PLO | US military, turned over to Italy | 1 dead in hijacking, 4 hijackers convicted in Italy | ||||
1993 | Operation Ashwamedh | Amritsar,India | 141 passengers | Islamic terrorist(Mohammed Yousuf Shah) | 1 hijacker killed,all hostages rescued | |||||
1996 | Japanese embassy hostage crisis | Lima, Peru | Japanese and guests (800+) | Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement | Peruvian military & police mixed forces | 1 hostage, 2 rescuers, all 14 kidnappers dead. | ||||
2000 | Sauk Arms Heist | Perak, Malaysia | 2 policemens, 1 army and 1 civilian | Al-Ma'unah | Grup Gerak Khas and 20 police Pasukan Gerakan Khas mixed forces | 2 hostages dead, 2 rescuers, 1 kidnapper dead and all 28 kidnappers captured. | ||||
2002 | Moscow theater hostage crisis | Moscow | Mixed, mostly Russian (900+) | Chechen | Russian spetsnaz | 129-204 hostages dead, all 39 kidnappers dead. 600-700 hostages freed. | ||||
2004 | Beslan school hostage crisis | Beslan, North Ossetia-Alania, (an autonomous republic in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation). | Russian | Chechen | Mixed Russian | 334 hostages dead and hundreds wounded. 10-21 rescuers dead. 31 kidnappers killed, 1 captured. | ||||
2007 | Lal Masjid siege | Islamabad, Pakistan | Pakistani students | Lal Masjid students and militants | Pakistani Army and Rangers SSG commandos | 61 militants killed, 50 militants captured, 23 students killed, 11 SSG killed,1 Ranger killed,33 SSG wounded,8 soldiers wounded,3 Rangers wounded, 14 civilians killed | ||||
2007 | Kirkuk Hostage Rescue | Kirkuk, Iraqi-Kurdistan | Turkman Child Rescued by PUK's Kurdistan Regional Government's CTG Counter Terrorism Group in Kirkuk from Arab kidnappers | Islamic State of Iraq Al Qaeda | 5 kidnappers arrested, 1 hostage rescued | |||||
2008 | Operation Jaque | Colombia | Mixed | Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia | 15 hostages released. 2 kidnappers captured | |||||
2008 | Operations Dawn | Gulf of Aden, Somalia | Mixed | Somalian piracy and militants | Negotiation finished. 80 hostages released. RMN including PASKAL navy commandos with international mixed forces patrolling the Gulf of Aden during this festive period. | |||||
2008 | 2008 Mumbai attacks | Multiple locations in Mumbai city | Indian Nationals, Foreign tourists | 300 NSG commandos, 36-100 Marine commandos and 400 army Para Commandos | 141 Indian civilians, 30 foreigners, 15 policemen and two NSG commandos were killed. | 9 attackers killed,1 attacker captured and | 293 injured | |||
2009 | 2009 Lahore Attacks | Multiple locations in Lahore city | Pakistan |
|
30 March 2009, the Manawan Police Academy in Lahore, Pakistan attacked by an estimated 12 gunmen. The perpetrators were armed with automatic weapons and grenades or rockets and some were dressed as policemen. During the course of the attack and siege eight police personnel, two civilians and eight gunmen killed and 95 people injured.[1] At least four of the gunmen captured alive by the security forces. | The terrorist attacks took place at the offices of Rescue-15 and the (ISI) as well as the official residences of police officers at the Plaza Cinema Chowk at around 10:10am. At least three terrorists, Toyota Hiace van laden with high quality explosives. The toll of the explosion was heavy. No less than 70 vehicles and motorcycles and dozens of adjacent and nearby buildings, mostly used for shops and offices, were damaged. Among the dead were 16 policemen, an army officer and many civilians including a 12-year-old boy. More than 251 others were injured. |
A particular design problem for this system is that it will face many uncertainties in the future. The threat of terrorism may increase, decrease or remain the same, the type of terrorism and location are difficult to predict, and there are technological uncertainties. Yet we want to design a terrorism system conceived and designed today in order to prevent acts of terrorism for a decade or more. A potential solution is to incorporate flexibility into system design for the reason that the flexibility embedded can be exercised in future as uncertainty unfolds and updated information arrives. And the design and valuation of a protection system should not be based on a single scenario, but an array of scenarios. Flexibility can be incorporated in the design of the terrorism system in the form of options that can be exercised in the future when new information is available. Using these ‘real options’ will create a flexible Anti-terrorism system that is able to cope with new requirements that may arise.
Examples include:
In some cases the legal framework within which they operate prohibits military units conducting operations in the domestic arena; United States Department of Defense policy, based on the Posse Comitatus Act, forbids domestic counter-terrorism operations by the US military. Units allocated some operational counter-terrorism task are frequently Special Forces or similar assets.
In cases where military organisations do operate in the domestic context some form of formal handover from the law enforcement community is regularly required, to ensure adherence to the legislative framework and limitations. such as the Iranian Embassy Siege, the British police formally turned responsibility over to the Special Air Service when the situation went beyond police capabilities.
Category:Law enforcement Category:Terrorism Category:Security Category:National security Category:Public safety
ar:مكافحة الإرهاب bg:Контратероризъм ca:Contraterrorisme de:Terrorismusbekämpfung es:Contraterrorismo fr:Antiterrorisme it:Lista di unità antiterrorismo he:מלחמה בטרור ja:対テロ作戦 no:Kontraterrorisme pl:Antyterroryzm pt:Antiterrorismo ru:Контртерроризм sk:Špeciálne protiteroristické jednotky sl:Protiteroristično bojevanje yi:קאנטערטעראריזם zh:反恐This text is licensed under the Creative Commons CC-BY-SA License. This text was originally published on Wikipedia and was developed by the Wikipedia community.
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