Coordinates	34°26′″N35°51′″N
name	Ion Victor Antonescu
honorific-prefix	Marshal
order	Conducător of Romania
term start	September 6, 1940
term end	August 23, 1944
predecessor	Carol II (''as King of Romania'')
successor	none
order2	Prime Minister of Romania
term start2	September 5, 1940
term end2	August 23, 1944
monarch2	Carol IIMichael I
predecessor2	Ion Gigurtu
successor2	Constantin Sănătescu
birth date	June 15, 1882
birth place	Piteşti
death date	June 01, 1946
death place	Jilava
nationality	Romanian
party	none*
spouse	Maria Antonescu
profession	soldier
religion	Romanian Orthodox
nickname	''Câinele Roşu'' ("Red Dog")
allegiance	Kingdom of Romania
branch	Romanian Land Forces
serviceyears	1904–1944
rank	Marshal of Romania
commands	Commander-in-Chief, Romanian Armed Forces
battles	Second Balkan WarWorld War IWorld War II
awards	Order of Michael the Brave
footnotes	*formally allied with the Iron Guard (1940-1941) }}

Ion Victor Antonescu (; June 15, 1882 – June 1, 1946) was a Romanian soldier, authoritarian politician and convicted war criminal. The Prime Minister and ''Conducător'' during most of World War II, he presided over two successive wartime dictatorships. A Romanian Army career officer who made his name during the 1907 peasants' revolt and the World War I Romanian Campaign, the antisemitic Antonescu sympathized with the far right and fascist National Christian and Iron Guard groups for much of the interwar period. He was a military attaché to France and later Chief of the General Staff, briefly serving as Defense Minister in the National Christian cabinet of Octavian Goga. During the late 1930s, his political stance brought him into conflict with King Carol II and led to his detainment. Antonescu nevertheless rose to political prominence during the political crisis of 1940, and established the National Legionary State, an uneasy partnership with the Iron Guard's leader Horia Sima. After entering Romania into an alliance with Nazi Germany and the Axis and ensuring Adolf Hitler's confidence, he eliminated the Guard during the Legionary Rebellion of 1941. In addition to leadership of the executive, he assumed the offices of Foreign Affairs and Defense Minister. Soon after Romania joined the Axis in Operation Barbarossa, recovering Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, Antonescu also became Marshal of Romania.

An atypical figure among Holocaust perpetrators, Antonescu enforced policies independently responsible for the deaths of as many as 400,000 people, most of them Bessarabian, Ukrainian and Romanian Jews, as well as Romani Romanians. The regime's complicity in the Holocaust combined pogroms and mass murders such as the Odessa massacre with ethnic cleansing, systematic deportations to occupied Transnistria and widespread criminal negligence. The system in place was nevertheless characterized by singular inconsistencies, prioritizing plunder over killing, showing leniency toward most Jews in the Old Kingdom, and ultimately refusing to adopt the Final Solution as applied throughout Nazi-occupied Europe.

Confronted with heavy losses on the Eastern Front, Antonescu embarked on inconclusive negotiations with the Allies, just before a political coalition, formed around the young monarch Michael I, toppled him during the August 23, 1944 Coup. After a brief detention in the Soviet Union, the deposed ''Conducător'' was handed back to Romania, where he was tried by a special People's Tribunal and executed. This was part of a series of trials that also passed sentences on his various associates, as well as his wife Maria. The judicial procedures earned much criticism for responding to the Romanian Communist Party's ideological priorities, a matter that fueled nationalist and far right attempts to have Antonescu posthumously exonerated. While these groups elevated Antonescu to the status of hero, his involvement in the Holocaust was officially reasserted and condemned following the 2003 Wiesel Commission report.

Biography

Early life and career

Born in the town of Piteşti, north-west of the capital Bucharest, Antonescu was the scion of an upper-middle class Romanian Orthodox family with some military tradition. He was especially close to his mother, Liţa Baranga, who survived his death. His father, an army officer, wanted Ion to follow in his footsteps, and as such, he sent him to attend the Infantry and Cavalry School in Craiova. According to one account, Ion Antonescu was briefly a classmate of Wilhelm Filderman, the future Romanian Jewish community activist whose interventions with ''Conducător'' Antonescu helped save a number of his coreligionists. After graduation, in 1904, Antonescu joined the Romanian Army with the rank of Second Lieutenant. He spent the following two years attending courses at the Special Cavalry Section in Târgovişte. Reportedly, he was a zealous and goal-setting student, upset by the slow pace of promotions, and compensating for his diminutive stature through toughness. In time, the reputation of being a tough and ruthless commander, together with his reddish hair earned him the nickname ''Câinele Roşu'' ("The Red Dog"). Antonescu also developed a reputation for questioning his commanders, and for appealing over their heads whenever he felt they were wrong.

During the repression of the 1907 peasants' revolt, he was the head of a cavalry unit in Covurlui County. Opinions on his role in the events diverge: while some historians believe Antonescu was a particularly violent participant in quelling the revolt, others equate his participation with that of regular officers or view it as outstandingly tactful. In addition to restricting peasant protests, Antonescu's unit subdued socialist activities in Galaţi port. His handling of the situation earned him praise from King Carol I, who sent Crown Prince (future monarch) Ferdinand to congratulate him in front of the whole garrison. The following year, Antonescu was promoted to Lieutenant, and, between 1911 and 1913, he attended the Advanced War School, receiving the rank of Captain upon graduation. In 1913, during the Second Balkan War against Bulgaria, Antonescu served as a staff officer in the First Cavalry Division in Dobruja.

World War I

After 1916, when the Kingdom of Romania entered World War I on the Entente side, Ion Antonescu acted as chief of staff for General Constantin Prezan. In August 1916, upon the start of the Romanian campaign, Romanian troops crossed the Carpathian Mountains, marching into the Austro-Hungarian-ruled region of Transylvania, but their effort was halted when the Central Powers opened new fronts. Bulgarian and Imperial German armies decisively defeated their ill-equipped and poorly defended Romanian adversaries in the Battle of Turtucaia (August 24), and advanced into Dobruja. When enemy troops crossed the mountains from Transylvania into Wallachia, Antonescu was ordered to design a defense plan for Bucharest.

The Romanian royal court, army and administration were subsequently forced to retreat into Moldavia, the last portion of territory still under Romanian control. Henceforth, Antonescu took part in any important decision involving defensive efforts, an unusual promotion which probably stoked his ambitions. In December, as Prezan became the Chief of the General Staff, Antonescu, who was by now a major, was named the head of operations, being involved in the defense of Moldavia. He contributed to the tactics used during the Battle of Mărăşeşti (July–August 1917), when Romanians under General Alexandru Averescu managed to stop the advance of German forces under the command of Field Marshal August von Mackensen. Antonescu lived in Prezan's proximity for the remainder of the war, and influenced his decisions.

That autumn, the October Revolution in Russia removed Romania's main ally, the Russian Provisional Government, from the conflict. Its successor, Bolshevik Russia, made peace with the Central Powers under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, leaving Romania the only enemy of the Central Powers on the Eastern Front. In these conditions, the Romanian government signed, and the Parliament ratified, Romania's own peace treaty with the Central Powers. Romania broke the treaty later in the year, on the grounds that King Ferdinand I had not signed it. During the interval, Antonescu, who viewed the separate peace as "the most rational solution", was assigned command over a cavalry regiment. The renewed offensive played a part in ensuring the union of Transylvania with Romania. After the war, Antonescu's merits as an operations officer were noticed by, among others, politician Ion G. Duca, who wrote that "his intelligence, skill and activity, brought credit on himself and invaluable service to the country". Another event occurring late in the war is also credited with having played a major part in Antonescu's life: in 1918, Crown Prince Carol (the future King Carol II) eloped and technically deserted his army posting, to marry the commoner Zizi Lambrino. This outraged Antonescu, who developed enduring contempt for the future king.

Diplomatic assignments and General Staff positions

Lieutenant Colonel Ion Antonescu retained his visibility in the public eye during the interwar period. He participated in the political campaign to earn recognition at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 for Romania's gains in Transylvania. His nationalist argument about a future state of the Romanians was published as the essay ''Românii. Origina, trecutul, sacrificiile şi drepturile lor'' ("The Romanians. Their Origin, Their Past, Their Sacrifices and Their Rights"). The booklet advocated extension of Romanian rule beyond the confines of Greater Romania, and recommended, at the risk of war with the emerging Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the annexation of all Banat areas and the Timok Valley. In March 1920, Antonescu was one of three people nominated by the new Averescu executive to be a military attaché of Romania in France, but a report issued by the French military observer in Romania, General Victor Pétin, was negative enough to make the French side choose a certain Colonel Şuţu instead (the text referred to Antonescu as "extremely vain", "chauvinistic" and "xenophobic", while acknowledging his "great military worth").

Nevertheless, Şuţu had to leave Paris in 1922, and when the Romanian government nominated Antonescu again, the French government felt obliged to accept his nomination, despite renewed criticism from Pétin's part. At the moment of his reassignment, Antonescu was handling military instruction in the Transylvanian city of Sibiu, where his rebellious attitude was causing irritation among his commanders. From 1923, Antonescu was also the Romanian attaché in the United Kingdom and Belgium. After embarking on his mission, he negotiated a credit worth 100 million French francs to for Romania to purchase French weaponry, and worked together with Romanian League of Nations diplomat Nicolae Titulescu; the two became personal friends. According to one account, he was also in contact with the Romanian-born conservative aristocrat and writer Marthe Bibesco, who is reported to have introduced Antonescu to the ideas of Gustave Le Bon, a researcher of crowd psychology who had an influence on fascist leaders. The same story has it that Bibesco saw the Romanian officer as a new version of 19th century nationalist rebel Georges Boulanger, introducing him as such to Le Bon. In 1923, he made the acquaintance of lawyer Mihai Antonescu, who was to become his close friend, legal representative and political associate.

After returning to Romania in 1926, Antonescu returned to his teaching position in Sibiu, and, in autumn 1928, was Secretary-General of the Defense Ministry in the Vintilă Brătianu cabinet. He married Maria Niculescu, for long a resident of France, who had been married twice before: to a Romanian Police officer, with whom she had a son, Gheorghe (died 1944), and to Frenchman of Jewish origin. After a period as Deputy Chief of the General Staff, he was appointed its Chief (1933–1934). These assignments coincided with the rule of Carol's underage son Michael I and his regents, and with Carol's seizure of power in 1930. During this period Antonescu first grew interested in the Iron Guard, an antisemitic and fascist-related movement headed by Corneliu Zelea Codreanu. In his capacity as Deputy Chief of Staff, he ordered the Army's intelligence unit to compile a report on the faction, and made a series of critical notes on Codreanu's various statements.

As Chief of Staff, Antonescu reportedly had his first confrontation with the political class and the monarch. His projects for weapon modernization were questioned by Defense Minister Paul Angelescu, leading Antonescu to present his resignation. According to another account, he completed an official report on the embezzlement of Army funds, which indirectly implicated Carol and his ''camarilla'' (''see Škoda Affair''). The king consequently ordered him out of office, provoking indignation among sections of the political mainstream. On Carol's orders, Antonescu was placed under surveillance by the ''Siguranţa Statului'' intelligence service, and closely monitored by the Interior Ministry Undersecretary Armand Călinescu. The officer's political credentials were on the rise, and he had contacts with all sides of the political spectrum, while support for Carol plummeted. Antonescu maintained contacts with the two main democratic groups, the National Liberal and the National Peasants' parties (known respectively as PNL and PNŢ). He was also engaged in discussions with the rising far right, antisemitic and fascist movements: although in competition with each other, both the National Christian Party (PNC) of Octavian Goga and the Iron Guard sought to attract Antonescu to their side. In 1936, to the authorities' alarm, Army General and Iron Guard member Gheorghe Cantacuzino-Grănicerul arranged a meeting between Ion Antonescu and the movement's leader: Antonescu is reported to have found Codreanu arrogant, but to have welcomed his revolutionizing approach to politics.

Defense portfolio and the Codreanu trials

In late 1937, after the December general election came to an inconclusive result, Carol appointed Goga Prime Minister over a far right cabinet that was the first executive to impose racial discrimination in its treatment of the Jewish community. Goga's appointment was meant to curb the rise of the more popular and even more radical Codreanu. Initially given the Communications portfolio by his former rival, Interior Minister Armand Călinescu, Antonescu repeatedly demanded the office of Defense Minister, which he was eventually granted. His mandate coincided with a troubled period, and saw Romania having to chose between its traditional alliance with France, Britain, the crumbling Little Entente and the League of Nations or moving closer to Nazi Germany and its Anti-Comintern Pact. Antonescu's own contribution is disputed by historians, who variously see him as either a supporter of the Anglo-French alliance or, like the PNC itself, more favorable to cooperation with Adolf Hitler's Germany. At the time, Antonescu viewed Romania's alliance with the Entente as insurance against Hungarian and Soviet revanchism, but, as an anti-communist, he was suspicious of the Franco-Soviet rapprochement. Particularly concerned about Hungarian demands in Transylvania, he ordered the General Staff to prepare for a western attack. However, his major contribution in office was in relation to an internal crisis: as a response to violent clashes between the Iron Guard and the PNC's own fascist militia, the ''Lăncieri'', Antonescu extended the already imposed martial law.

The Goga cabinet ended when the tentative rapprochement between Goga and Codreanu prompted Carol to overthrow the democratic system and proclaim his own authoritarian regime (''see 1938 Constitution of Romania, National Renaissance Front''). The deposed Premier died in 1938, and Antonescu remained close friend of his widow, Veturia Goga. By that time, revising his earlier stance, Antonescu had also built a close relationship with Codreanu, and was even said to have become his confidant. On Carol's request, he had earlier asked the Guard's leader to consider an alliance with the king, which Codreanu promptly refused in favor of negotiations with Goga, coupled with claims that he was not interested in political battles (an attitude supposedly induced by Antonescu himself).

Soon afterward, Călinescu, acting on indications from the monarch, arrested Codreanu and prosecuted him in two successive trials. Antonescu, whose mandate of Defense Minister had been prolonged under the premiership of Miron Cristea, resigned in protest to Codreanu's arrest. He was a celebrity defense witness at the latter's first and second trials. During the latter, which saw Codreanu's conviction for treason, Antonescu vouched for his friend's honesty while shaking his hand in front of the jury. Upon the end of procedures, the king ordered his former minister interned at Predeal, before assigning him to command the Third Army in the remote eastern region of Bessarabia (and later removing him after Antonescu expressed sympathy for Guardists imprisoned in Chişinău). Attempting to discredit his rival, Carol also ordered Antonescu's wife to be tried for bigamy, based on a false claim that her divorce had not been finalized. Defended by Mihai Antonescu, the officer was able to prove his detractors wrong. Codreanu himself was taken into custody and discreetly killed by the Gendarmes acting on Carol's orders (November 1938).

Carol's regime slowly dissolved into crisis, the process being enhanced after the start of World War II, when the military success of the core Axis Powers and the non-aggression pact signed by Germany and the Soviet Union saw Romania isolated and threatened (''see Romania during World War II''). In 1940, two of Romania's regions, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, were lost to a Soviet occupation consented to by the king. This came as Romania, exposed by the Fall of France, was seeking to align its policies with those of Germany. Ion Antonescu himself had come to value a pro-Axis alternative after the 1938 Munich Agreement, when Germany imposed demands on Czechoslovakia with the acquiescence of France and the United Kingdom, leaving locals to fear that, unless reoriented, Romania would follow. Angered by the territorial losses of 1940, General Antonescu sent Carol a general note of protest, and, as a result, was arrested and interned at Bistriţa Monastery. While there, he commissioned Mihai Antonescu to establish contacts with Nazi German officials, promising to advance German economic interest, particularly in respect to the local oil industry, in exchange for endorsement. Commenting on Ion Antonescu's ambivalent stance, Hitler's Ambassador to Romania, Wilhelm Fabricius, wrote to his superiors: "I am not convinced that he is a safe man."

Rise to power

His internment ended in August, during which interval, under Axis pressure, Romania had ceded Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria (''see Treaty of Craiova'') and Northern Transylvania to Hungary (''see Second Vienna Award''). The latter grant caused consternation among large sections of Romania's population, causing Carol's popularity to fall to a record low and provoking large-scale protests in Bucharest, the capital. These movements were organized competitively by the pro-Allied PNŢ, headed by Iuliu Maniu, and the pro-Nazi Iron Guard. The latter group had been revived under the leadership of Horia Sima, and was organizing a ''coup d'état''. In this troubled context, Antonescu simply left his assigned residence. He may have been secretly helped in this by German intercession, but was more directly aided to escape by socialite Alice Sturdza, who was acting on Maniu's request. Antonescu subsequently met with Maniu in Ploieşti, where they discussed how best to manage the political situation. While these negotiations were carried out, the monarch himself was being advised by his entourage to recover legitimacy by governing in tandem with the increasingly popular Antonescu, while creating a new political majority from the existing forces. Carol and Antonescu accepted the proposal, Antonescu being mandated to approach political party leaders Maniu of the PNŢ and Dinu Brătianu of the PNL. They all called for Carol's abdication as a preliminary measure, while Sima, another leader sought after for negotiations, could not be found in time to express his opinion. Antonescu partly complied with the request but also asked Carol to bestow upon him the reserve powers for Romanian heads of state. Carol yielded and, on September 5, 1940, the general became Prime Minister with full powers as head of state. The latter's first measure was to curtail potential resistance within the Army by relieving Bucharest Garrison chief Gheorghe Argeşanu of his position and replacing him with Dumitru Coroamă. Shortly afterward, Antonescu heard rumors that two of Carol's loyalist generals, Gheorghe Mihail and Paul Teodorescu, were planning to have him killed. In reaction, he imposed formal abdication on the monarch, while General Coroamă was refusing to carry out the royal order of shooting down Iron Guardist protesters.

The king eventually left the throne and Michael I inaugurated his second rule, while Antonescu's effective powers as dictatorial Premier were confirmed and extended. He was formally declared ''Conducător'' of the state on September 6, by a royal decree which consecrated a ceremonial role for the monarch. Among his subsequent measures was ensuring the safe departure into self-exile of Carol and his mistress Elena Lupescu, granting protection to the royal train when it was attacked by armed members of the Iron Guard. Horia Sima's subsequent cooperation with Antonescu was endorsed by high-ranking Nazi German officials, many of whom feared the Iron Guard was too weak to rule on its own. Antonescu therefore received the approval of Ambassador Fabricius. Despite early promises, Antonescu abandoned projects for the creation of a national government, and opted instead for a coalition between a military dictatorship lobby and the Iron Guard. He later justified his choice by stating that the Iron Guard "represented the political base of the country at the time."

Antonescu-Sima partnership

The resulting regime, deemed the ''National Legionary State'' and officially proclaimed on September 14, had Antonescu as Premier and ''Conducător'', with Sima as Deputy Premier and leader of the Iron Guard, the latter being remodeled into a single official party. Antonescu subsequently ordered Carol's Iron Guardist prisoners to be set free. On October 6, he presided over the Iron Guard's mass rally in Bucharest, one in a series of major celebratory and commemorative events organized by the movement during the late months of 1940. However, he tolerated the PNŢ and PNL's informal existence, allowing them to preserve much of their political support.

There followed a short-lived and always uneasy partnership between Antonescu and Sima. In late September, the new regime denounced all pacts, accords and diplomatic agreements signed under Carol, bringing the country into Germany's orbit while subverting its relationship with a former Balkan ally, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Germans troops entered the country in stages, in order to defend the local oil industry and help instruct their Romanian counterparts on ''Blitzkrieg'' tactics. On November 23, Antonescu was in Berlin, where his signature sealed Romania's commitment to the main Axis instrument, the Tripartite Pact. Two days later, the country also adhered to the Nazi-led Anti-Comintern Pact. Other than these generic commitments, Romania had no treaty binding it to Germany, and the Romanian-German alliance functioned informally. Speaking in 1946, Antonescu claimed to have followed the pro-German path in continuation of earlier policies, and for fear of a Nazi protectorate in Romania.

During the National Legionary State period, earlier antisemitic legislation was upheld and strengthened, while the "Romanianization" of Jewish-owned enterprises became standard official practice. Immediately after coming into office, Antonescu himself expanded the anti-Jewish and Nuremberg law-inspired legislation passed by his predecessors Goga and Ion Gigurtu, while tens of new anti-Jewish regulations were passed in 1941–1942. This was done despite his formal pledge to Wilhelm Filderman and the Jewish Communities Federation that, unless engaged in "sabotage", "the Jewish population will not suffer." Antonescu did not reject the application of Legionary policies, but was offended by Sima's advocacy of paramilitarism and the Guard's frequent recourse to street violence. He drew much hostility from his partners by extending some protection to former dignitaries whom the Iron Guard had arrested. One early incident opposed Antonescu to the Guard's magazine ''Buna Vestire'', which accused him of leniency and was subsequently forced to change its editorial board. By then, the Legionary press was routinely claiming that he was obstructing revolution and aiming to take control of the Iron Guard, and that he had been transformed into a tool of the Freemasonry (''see Anti-Masonry''). The political conflict coincided with major social challenges, including the influx of refugees from areas lost earlier in the year and a large-scale earthquake affecting Bucharest.

Disorder peaked in the last days of November 1940, when, after uncovering the circumstances of Codreanu's death, the fascist movement ordered retaliations against political figures previously associated with Carol, carrying out the Jilava Massacre, the assassinations of Nicolae Iorga and Virgil Madgearu, and several other acts of violence. As retaliation for this insubordination, Antonescu ordered the Army to resume control of the streets, unsuccessfully pressured Sima to have the assassins detained, ousted the Iron Guardist prefect of Bucharest Police Ştefan Zăvoianu, and ordered Legionary ministers to swear an oath to the ''Conducător''. His condemnation of the killings was nevertheless limited and discreet, and, the same month, he joined Sima at a burial ceremony for Codreanu's newly discovered remains. The widening gap between the dictator and Sima's party resonated in Berlin. When, in December, Legionary Foreign Minister Mihail R. Sturdza obtained the replacement of Fabricius with Manfred Freiherr von Killinger, perceived as more sympathetic to the Iron Guard, Antonescu promptly took over leadership of the ministry, with the compliant diplomat Constantin Greceanu as his right hand. In Germany, such leaders of the Nazi Party as Heinrich Himmler, Baldur von Schirach and Joseph Goebbels threw their support behind the Legionaries, whereas Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and the Wehrmacht stood by Antonescu. The latter group was concerned that any internal conflict would threaten Romania's oil industry, vital to the German war effort. The German leadership was by then secretly organizing ''Operation Barbarossa'', the attack on the Soviet Union.

Legionary Rebellion and Operation Barbarossa

Antonescu's plan to act against his coalition partners in the event of further disorder hinged on Hitler's approval, a vague signal of which had been given during ceremonies confirming Romania's adherence to the Tripartite Pact. A decisive turn occurred when Hitler invited Antonescu and Sima both over for discussions: whereas Antonescu agreed, Sima stayed behind in Romania, probably plotting a ''coup d'état''. While Hitler did not produce a clear endorsement for clamping down on Sima's party, he made remarks interpreted by their recipient as oblique blessings.

The Antonescu-Sima dispute erupted into violence in January 1941, when the Iron Guard instigated a series of attacks on public institutions and a pogrom, incidents collectively known as the "Legionary Rebellion". This came after the mysterious assassination of Major Döring, a German agent in Bucharest, which was used by the Iron Guard as a pretext to accuse the ''Conducător'' of having a secret anti-German agenda, and made Antonescu oust the Legionary Interior Minister, Constantin Petrovicescu, while closing down all of the Legionary-controlled "Romanianization" offices. Various other clashes prompted him to demand the resignation of all Police commanders who sympathized with the movement. After two days of widespread violence, during which Guardists killed some 120 Bucharest Jews, Antonescu sent in the Army, under the command of General Constantin Sănătescu. German officials acting on Hitler's orders, including the new Ambassador Manfred Freiherr von Killinger, helped Antonescu eliminate the Iron Guardists, but several of their lower-level colleagues actively aided Sima's subordinates. Goebbels was especially upset by the decision to support Antonescu, believing it to have been advantageous to "the Freemasons".

After the events, Hitler kept his options open by granting political asylum to Sima—whom Antonescu's courts sentenced to death—and to other Legionaries in similar situations. The Guardists were detained in special conditions at Buchenwald and Dachau concentration camps. In parallel, Antonescu publicly obtained the cooperation of ''Codrenists'', members of an Iron Guardist wing which had virulently opposed Sima, and whose leader was Codreanu's father Ion Zelea Codreanu. Antonescu again sought backing from the PNŢ and PNL to form a national cabinet, but his rejection of parliamentarism made the two groups refuse him.

Antonescu traveled to Germany and met Hitler on eight more occasions between June 1941 and August 1944. Such close contacts helped cement an enduring relationship between the two dictators, and Hitler reportedly came to see Antonescu as the only trustworthy person in Romania, and the only foreigner to consult on military matters. In later statements, he offered praise to Antonescu's "breadth of vision" and "real personality." The German military presence increased significantly in early 1941, when, using Romania as a base, Hitler invaded the rebellious Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Kingdom of Greece (''see Balkans Campaign''). In parallel, Romania's relationship with the United Kingdom (at the time the only major adversary of Nazi Germany) aggravated into conflict: on February 10, 1941, British Premier Winston Churchill recalled His Majesty's Ambassador Reginald Hoare, and approved the blockade of Romanian ships in British-controlled ports.

In June of that year, Romania joined the attack on the Soviet Union, led by Germany in coalition with Hungary, Finland, the State of Slovakia, the Kingdom of Italy and the Independent State of Croatia. Antonescu had been made aware of the plan by German envoys, and supported it enthusiastically even before Hitler extended Romania an offer to participate. The Romanian force engaged formed a ''General Antonescu Army Group'' under the effective command of German general Eugen Ritter von Schobert. Romania's campaign on the Eastern Front began without a formal declaration of war, and was consecrated by Antonescu's statement: "Soldiers, I order you, cross the Prut River" (in reference to the Bessarabian border between Romania and post-1940 Soviet territory). A few days after this, a large-scale pogrom was carried out in Iaşi with Antonescu's agreement; thousands of Jews were killed (''see Iaşi pogrom'').

After becoming the first Romanian to be granted the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross, which he received from Hitler at their August 6 meeting in the Ukrainian city of Berdychiv, Ion Antonescu was promoted to Marshal of Romania by royal decree on August 22, in recognition for his role in restoring the eastern frontiers of Greater Romania. He took one of his most debated decisions when, with Bessarabia's conquest almost complete, he committed Romania to Hitler's war effort beyond the Dniester—that is, beyond territory that had been part of Romania between the wars—and thrust deeper into Soviet territory, thus waging a war of aggression. On August 30, Romania occupied a territory it deemed "Transnistria", formerly a part of the Ukrainian SSR (including the entire Moldavian ASSR and further territories). Like the decision to continue the war beyond Bessarabia, this earned Antonescu much criticism from the semi-clandestine PNL and PNŢ. Soon after the takeover, the area was assigned to a civil administration apparatus headed by Gheorghe Alexianu and became the site for the main component of the Holocaust in Romania: a mass deportation of the Bessarabian and Ukrainian Jews, followed later by transports of Romani Romanians and Jews from Moldavia proper (that is, the portions of Moldavia west of the Prut). The accord over Transnistria's administration, signed in Tighina, also placed areas between the Dniester and the Dnieper under Romanian military occupation, while granting control over all resources to Germany.

Reversal of fortunes

The Romanian Army's inferior arms, insufficient armor and lack of training had been major concerns for the German commanders since before the start of the operation. One of the earliest major obstacles Antonescu encountered on the Eastern Front was the resistance of Odessa, a Soviet port on the Black Sea. Refusing any German assistance, he ordered the Romanian Army to maintain a two-month siege on heavily fortified and well-defended positions. The ill-equipped 4th Army suffered losses of some 100,000 men. Antonescu's popularity again rose in October, when the fall of Odessa was celebrated triumphantly with a parade through Bucharest's ''Arcul de Triumf'', and when many Romanians reportedly believed the war was as good as won. In Odessa itself, the aftermath included a large-scale massacre of the Jewish population, ordered by the Marshal as retaliation for a bombing which killed a number of Romanian officers and soldiers (General Ioan Glogojeanu among them). The city subsequently became the administrative capital of Transnistria. According to one account, the Romanian administration planned to change Odessa's name to ''Antonescu''.

As the Soviet Union recovered from the initial shock and slowed down the Axis offensive at the Battle of Moscow (October 1941 – January 1942), Romania was asked by its allies to contribute a larger number of troops. A decisive factor in Antonescu's compliance with the request appears to have been a special visit to Bucharest by Wehrmacht commander Wilhelm Keitel, who introduced the ''Conducător'' to Hitler's plan for attacking the Caucasus (''see Battle of the Caucasus''). The Romanian force engaged in the war reportedly exceeded German demands. It came to around 500,000 troops and thirty actively involved divisions. As a sign of his satisfaction, Hitler presented his Romanian counterpart with a luxury car. On December 7, 1941, after reflecting on the possibility for Romania, Hungary and Finland to change their stance, the British government responded to repeated Soviet requests and declared war on all three countries. Following Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and in compliance with its Axis commitment, Romania declared war on the United States within five days. These developments contrasted with Antonescu's own statement of December 7: "I am an ally of the [German] Reich against [the Soviet Union], I am neutral in the conflict between Great Britain and Germany. I am for America against the Japanese."

A crucial change in the war came with the Battle of Stalingrad in June 1942 – February 1943, a major defeat for the Axis. Romania's armies alone lost some 150,000 men (either dead, wounded or captured) and more than half of the country's divisions were wiped out. For part of that interval, the Marshal had withdrawn from public life, owing to an unknown affliction, which is variously rumored to have been a mental breakdown, a foodborne illness or a symptom of the syphilis he had allegedly contracted earlier in life. He is known to have been suffering from digestive problems, treating himself with food prepared by Marlene von Exner, an Austrian-born dietitian who moved into Hitler's service after 1943.

Upon his return, Antonescu blamed the Romanian losses on German overseer Arthur Hauffe, whom Hitler agreed to replace. In parallel with the military losses, Romania was confronted with large-scale economic problems. While Germany monopolized Romania's exports, it defaulted on most of its payments. Like all countries whose exports to Germany, particularly in oil, exceeded imports from that country, Romania's economy suffered from Nazi control of the exchange rate (''see Economy of Nazi Germany''). On the German side, those directly involved in harnessing Romania's economic output for German goals were economic planners Hermann Göring and Walther Funk, together with Hermann Neubacher, the Special Representative for Economic Problems. The situation was further aggravated in 1942, as USAAF and RAF were able to bomb the oil fields in Prahova County (''see Bombing of Romania in World War II, Operation Tidal Wave''). Official sources from the following period amalgamate military and civilian losses of all kinds, which produces a total of 554,000 victims of the war.

In this context, the Romanian leader acknowledged that Germany was losing the war, and he therefore authorized his Deputy Premier and new Foreign Minister Mihai Antonescu to set up contacts with the Allies. In parallel, he allowed the PNŢ and the PNL to engage in parallel talks with the Allies at various locations in neutral countries. The discussions were strained by the Western Allies' call for an unconditional surrender, over which the Romanian envoys bargained with Allied diplomats in Sweden and Egypt (among them the Soviet representatives Nikolai Vasilevich Novikov and Alexandra Kollontai). Antonescu was also alarmed by the possibility of war being carried on Romanian territory, as had happened in Italy after Operation Avalanche. The events also prompted hostile negotiations aimed at toppling Antonescu, and involving the two political parties, the young monarch, diplomats and soldiers. A major clash between Michael and Antonescu took place during the first days of 1943, when the 21-year old monarch used his New Year's address on national radio to part with the Axis war effort.

Ouster and arrest

In March 1944, the Soviet Red Army broke the Southern Bug and Dniester fronts, advancing on Bessarabia. This came just as Henry Maitland Wilson, Allied commander of the Mediterranean theater, presented Antonescu with an ultimatum. After a new visit to Germany and a meeting with Hitler, Antonescu opted to continue fighting alongside the remaining Axis states, a decision which he later claimed was motivated by Hitler's promise to allow Romania possession of Northern Transylvania in the event of an Axis victory. Upon his return, the ''Conducător'' oversaw a counteroffensive which stabilized the front on a line between Iaşi and Chişinău to the north and the lower Dniester to the east. This normalized his relations with Nazi German officials, whose alarm over the possible loss of an ally had resulted in the ''Margarethe II'' plan, an adapted version of the Nazi takeover in Hungary.

However, Antonescu's non-compliance with the terms of Wilson's ultimatum also had drastic effects on Romania's ability to exit the war. By then, Antonescu was conceiving of a separate peace with the Western Allies, while maintaining contacts with the Soviets. In parallel, the mainstream opposition movement came to establish contacts with the Romanian Communist Party (PCR), which, although minor numerically, gained importance for being the only political group to be favored by Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. On the PCR side, the discussions involved Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu and later Emil Bodnăraş. Another participating group at this stage was the old Romanian Social Democratic Party.

Large-scale Allied bombings of Bucharest took place in spring 1944, while the Soviet Red Army approached Romanian borders. The Battle for Romania began in late summer: while German commanders Johannes Frießner and Otto Wöhler of the Army Group South Ukraine attempted to hold Bukovina, Soviet Steppe Front leader Rodion Malinovsky stormed into the areas of Moldavia defended by Petre Dumitrescu's troops. In reaction, Antonescu attempted to stabilize the front on a line between Focşani, Nămoloasa and Brăila, deep inside Romanian territory. On August 5, he visited Hitler one final time in Kętrzyn. On this occasion, the German leader reportedly explained that his people had betrayed the Nazi cause, and asked him if Romania would go on fighting (to which Antonescu reportedly answered in vague terms). After Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov more than once stated that the Soviet Union was not going to require Romanian subservience, the factions opposing Antonescu agreed that the moment had come to overthrow him, by carrying out the Royal Coup of August 23. On that day, the sovereign asked Antonescu to meet him in the royal palace building, where he presented him with a request to take Romania out of its Axis alliance. The ''Conducător'' refused, and was promptly arrested by soldiers of the guard, being replaced as Premier with General Constantin Sănătescu, who presided over a national government.

The new Romanian authorities declared peace with the Allies and advised the population to greet Soviet troops. On August 25, as Bucharest was successfully defending itself against German retaliations, Romania declared war on Nazi Germany. The events disrupted German domination in the Balkans, putting a stop to the ''Maibaum'' offensive against Yugoslav Partisans. The coup was nevertheless a unilateral move, and, until the signature of an armistice on September 12, the country was still perceived as an enemy by the Soviets, who continued to take Romanian soldiers as prisoners of war. In parallel, Hitler reactivated the Iron Guardist exile, creating a Sima-led government in exile that did not survive the war's end in Europe.

Placed in the custody of PCR militants, Ion Antonescu spent the interval at a house in Bucharest's Vatra Luminoasă quarter. He was afterward handed to the Soviet occupation forces, who transported him to Moscow, together with his deputy Mihai Antonescu, Governor of Transnistria Gheorghe Alexianu, Defense Minister Constantin Pantazi, Gendarmerie commander Constantin Vasiliu and Bucharest Police chief Mircea Elefterescu. They were subsequently kept in luxurious detention at a mansion nearby the city, and guarded by SMERSH, a special counter-intelligence body answering directly to Stalin. Shortly after Germany surrendered in May 1945, the group was moved to Lubyanka prison. There, Antonescu was interrogated and reputedly pressured by SMERSH operatives, among them Viktor Semyonovich Abakumov, but transcripts of their conversations were never sent back to Romania by the Soviet authorities. Later research noted that the main issues discussed were the German-Romanian alliance, the war on the Soviet Union, the economic toll on both countries, and Romania's participation in the Holocaust (defined specifically as crimes against "peaceful Soviet citizens"). At some point during this period, Antonescu attempted suicide in his quarters. He was returned to Bucharest in spring 1946 and held in Jilava prison. He was subsequently interrogated by prosecutor Avram Bunaciu, to whom he complained about the conditions of his detainment, contrasting them with those in Moscow, while explaining that he was a vegetarian and demanding a special diet.

Trial and execution

In May 1946, Ion Antonescu was prosecuted at the first in a series of People's Tribunals, on charges of war crimes, crimes against the peace and treason. The tribunals had first been proposed by the PNŢ, and was compatible with the Nuremberg Trials in Allied-occupied Germany. The Romanian legislative framework was drafted by coup participant Pătrăşcanu, a PCR member who had been granted leadership of the Justice Ministry. Despite the idea having earned support from several sides of the political spectrum, the procedures were politicized in a sense favorable to the PCR and the Soviet Union, and posed a legal problem for being based on ''ex post facto'' decisions. The first such local trial took place in 1945, resulting in the sentencing of Iosif Iacobici, Nicolae Macici, Constantin Trestioreanu and other military commanders directly involved in planning or carrying out the Odessa massacre.

Antonescu was represented by Constantin Paraschivescu-Bălăceanu and Titus Stoica, two public defenders whom he had first consulted with a day before the procedures were initiated. The prosecution team, led by Vasile Stoican, and the panel of judges, presided over by Alexandru Voitinovici, were infiltrated by PCR supporters. Both consistently failed to admit that Antonescu's foreign policies were overall dictated by Romania's positioning between Germany and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, and although references to the mass murders formed just 23% of the indictment and corpus of evidence (ranking below charges of anti-Soviet aggression), the procedures also included Antonescu's admission of and self-exculpating take on war crimes, including the deportations to Transnistria. They also evidence his awareness of the Odessa massacre, accompanied by his claim that few of the deaths were his direct responsibility. One notable event at the trial was a testimony by PNŢ leader Iuliu Maniu. Reacting against the aggressive tone of other accusers, Maniu went on record saying: "We [Maniu and Antonescu] were political adversaries, not cannibals." Upon leaving the bench, Maniu walked toward Antonescu and shook his hand.

Ion Antonescu was found guilty of the charges. This verdict was followed by two sets of appeals, which claimed that the restored and amended 1923 Constitution did not offer a framework for the People's Tribunals and prevented capital punishment during peacetime, while noting that, contrary to the armistice agreement, only one power represented within the Allied Commission had supervised the tribunal. King Michael subsequently received pleas for clemency from Antonescu's lawyer and his mother, and reputedly considered asking the Allies to reassess the case as part of the actual Nuremberg Trials, taking Romanian war criminals into foreign custody. Subjected to pressures by the new Soviet-backed Petru Groza executive, he issued a decree in favor of execution. Together with his co-defendants Mihai Antonescu, Alexianu and Vasiliu, the former ''Conducător'' was executed by a military firing squad on June 1, 1946. Ion Antonescu's supporters circulated false rumors that regular soldiers had refused to fire at their commander, and that the squad was mostly composed of Jewish policemen. Another apologetic claim insists that he himself ordered the squad to shoot, but footage of the event has proven it false. It is however attested that he refused a blindfold and raised his hat in salute once the order was given. The execution site, some distance away from the locality of Jilava and the prison fort, was known as ''Valea Piersicilor'' ("Valley of the Peach Trees"). His final written statement was a letter to his wife, urging her to withdraw into a convent, while stating the belief that posterity would reconsider his deeds and accusing Romanians of being "ungrateful".

Ideology

Ethnic nationalism and expansionism

Antonescu's policies were motivated, in large part, by ethnic nationalism. A firm believer in the restoration of Greater Romania as the union of lands inhabited by Romanian ethnics, he never reconciled himself to Hungary's incorporation of Northern Transylvania. Although Hungary and Romania were technically allied through the Axis system, their relationship was always tense, and marked by serious diplomatic incidents. The Romanian leader kept contacts with representatives of ethnic Romanian communities directly affected by the Second Vienna Award, including Transylvanian Greek-Catholic clergy. Another aspect of Antonescu's nationalist policies was evidenced after the Balkans Campaign. Antonescu's Romania did not partake in the military action, but laid a claim to the territories in eastern Vojvodina (western Banat) and the Timok Valley, home to a sizable Romanian community. Reportedly, Germany's initial designs of granting Vojvodina to Hungary enhanced the tensions between Antonescu and Miklós Horthy to the point where war between the two countries became a possibility. Such incidents made Germany indefinitely prolong its occupation of the region. The Romanian authorities issued projects for an independent Macedonia with autonomy for its Aromanian communities, while an official memorandum on the Timok region, approved by Antonescu, made mention of "Romanian" areas "from Timok [...] to Salonika". The ''Conducător'' also maintained contacts with Aromanian fascists in Axis-occupied Greece, awarding refuge to Principality of Pindus leaders Alchiviad Diamandi di Samarina and Nicola Matushi, whose pro-Romanian policies had brought them into conflict with other Macedonian factions.

''Conducător'' Antonescu thought Hitler willing to revise his stance on Northern Transylvania, and claimed to have obtained the German leader's agreement, using it to justify participation on the Eastern Front after the recovery of Bessarabia. However, transcripts of the Hitler-Antonescu conversations do not validate his interpretation. Another version has it that Hitler sent Antonescu a letter informing him that Bessarabia's political status still ultimately depended on German decisions. In one of his letters to Hitler, Antonescu himself stated his anti-communist ideological motivation: "I confirm that I will pursue operations in the east to the end against that great enemy of civilization, of Europe, and of my country: Russian Bolshevism [...] I will not be swayed by anyone not to extend this military cooperation into new territory." Antonescu's ideological perspective blended national sentiment with generically Christian and particularly Romanian Orthodox traits. British historian Arnold D. Harvey writes that while this ideology seems a poor match with Nazi doctrine, especially its anti-religious elements, "It seems that Hitler was not even perturbed by the militant Christian orientation of the Antonescu regime".

It is also possible that, contrary to Antonescu's own will, Hitler viewed the transfer of Transnistria as compensation for the Transylvanian areas, and that he therefore considered the matter closed. According to the Romanian representative in Berlin, Raoul Bossy, various German and Hungarian officials recommended the extension of permanent Romanian rule into Transnistria, as well as into Podolia, Galicia and Pokuttya, in exchange for delivering the whole of Transylvania to Hungary (and relocating its ethnic Romanian majority to the new provinces). American political scientist Charles King writes: "There was never any attempt to annex the occupied territory [of Transnistria], for it was generally considered by the Romanian government to be a temporary buffer zone between Greater Romania and the Soviet front line." At his 1946 trial, Antonescu claimed that Transnistria had been occupied to prevent Romania being caught in a "pincer" between Germany's ''Drang nach Osten'' and the ''Volksdeutsch'' communities to the east, while denying charges of having exploited the region for Romania's benefit.

Romanian historian Lucian Boia believes that Ion Antonescu may have nevertheless had expansionist goals to the east, and that he implicitly understood Operation Barbarossa as a tool for containing Slavic peoples. Similar verdicts are provided by other researchers. Another Romanian historian, Ottmar Traşcă, argues that Antonescu did not wish to annex the region "at least until the end of the war", but notes that Antonescu's own statements make reference to its incorporation in the event of a victory. In addition to early annexation plans to the Southern Bug (reportedly confessed to Bossy in June 1941), the ''Conducător'' is known to have presented his ministers with designs for the region's colonization. The motivation he cited was alleged malnutrition among Romanian peasants, to which he added: "I'll take this population, I'll lead it into Transnistria, where I shall give it all the land it requires". Several nationalists sympathetic to Antonescu acclaimed the extension of Romanian rule into Transnistria, which they understood as permanent.

Antisemitism and antiziganism

A recurring element in Antonescu's doctrines is racism, and in particular antisemitism. This was linked to his sympathy for ethnocratic ideals, and complemented by his statements in favor of "integral nationalism" and "Romanianism". Like other far right Romanians, he saw a Jewish presence behind liberal democracy, and believed in the existence of Judeo-Masonry. His earliest thoughts on Codreanu's ideology criticize the Legionary leader for advocating "brutal measures" in dealing with the "invasion of Jews", and instead propose "the organization of Romanian classes" as a method for reaching the same objective. Politician Aureliu Weiss, who met General Antonescu during that interval, recalled that, although antisemitic "to the core", he was capable of restraint in public. According to historian Mihail Ionescu, the ''Conducător'' was not averse to the Iron Guard's "Legionary principles", but wanted antisemitism to be "applied in an orderly fashion", as opposed to Horia Sima's revolutionary ways. Historian Ioan Scurtu believes that, during the Legionary Rebellion, Antonescu deliberately waited before stepping in, in order for the Guard to be "profoundly discredited" and for himself to be perceived as a "savior". In April 1941, he let his ministers know that he was considering letting "the mob" deal with the Jews, "and after the slaughter, I will restore order." Lucian Boia notes that the Romanian leader was indeed motivated by antisemitic beliefs, but that these need to be contextualized in order to understand what separates Antonescu from Hitler in terms of radicalism. However, various other researchers assess that, by aligning himself with Hitler before and during Operation Barbarossa, Antonescu implicitly agreed with his thoughts on the "Jewish Question", choosing racial over religious antisemitism. According to Harvey, the Iaşi pogrom made the Germans "evidently willing to accept that organized Christianity in Romania was very different from what it was in Germany".

Antonescu was a firm believer in the conspiracy theory of "Jewish Bolshevism", according to which all Jews were supporters of communism and the Soviet Union. His arguments on the matter involved a spurious claim that, during the 1940 retreat from Bessarabia, the Jews had organized themselves and attacked Romanian soldiers. In part, this notion exaggerated unilateral reports of enthusiasm among the marginalized Jews upon the arrival of Red Army troops. In a summer 1941 address to his ministers, Antonescu stated: "The Satan is the Jew. [Ours] is a battle of life and death. Either we win and the world will be purified, either they win and we will become their slaves." At around the same time, he envisaged the ethnic cleansing ("cleaning out") of Jews from the eastern Romanian-held territories. However, as early as February 1941, Antonescu was also contemplating the ghettoization of all Jewish Romanians, as an early step toward their expulsion. In this context, Antonescu frequently depicted Jews as a disease or a poison. After the Battle of Stalingrad, he encouraged the army commanders to resist the counteroffensive, as otherwise the Soviets "will bring Bolshevism to the country, wipe out the entire leadership stratum, impose the Jews on us, and deport masses of our people."

Ion Antonescu's antiziganism manifested itself as the claim that some or all Romani people, specifically nomadic ones, were given to criminal behavior. The regime did not act consistently on this belief: in various cases, those deported had close relatives drafted into the Romanian Army. Although racist slogans targeting Romani people had been popularized by the Iron Guard, it was only under Antonescu's unchallenged rule that solving the "Gypsy problem" became official policy and antiziganist measures were enforced. After a February 1941 inspection, Antonescu singled out Bucharest's Romani community for alleged offenses committed during the blackout, and called on his ministers to present him with solutions. Initially, he contemplated sending all Romani people he considered undesirable to the inhospitable Bărăgan Plain, to join the ranks of a local community of manual laborers. In 1942, he commissioned the Romanian Central Institute for Statistics to compile a report on Romani demography, which, in its edited form, provided scientifically racist conclusions, warning the ''Conducător'' about alleged Romani-Romanian miscegenation in rural Romania. In doing so, Antonescu offered some credit to a marginal and pseudoscientific trend in Romanian sociology, which, basing itself on eugenic theories, recommended the marginalization, deportation or compulsory sterilization of the Romani people, whose numeric presence it usually exaggerated. Among those who signed the report was demographer Sabin Manuilă, who saw the Romani presence as a major racial problem. The exact effect of the report's claims on Antonescu is uncertain.

Fascism and conservatism

There is a historiographic dispute about whether Ion Antonescu's regime was fascist or more generically right-wing authoritarian, itself integrated within a larger debate about the aspects and limits of fascism. Israeli historian of fascism Zeev Sternhell describes Antonescu, alongside his European counterparts Pierre-Étienne Flandin, Francisco Franco, Miklós Horthy, François de La Rocque, Philippe Pétain and Italian King Victor Emmanuel III, as a "conservative", noting that all of them "were not deceived by a [fascist] propaganda trying to place them in the same category [as the fascist movements]." A similar verdict is provided by German historian of Europe Hagen Schulze, who views Horthy, Franco and the Romanian leader alongside Portugal's ''Estado Novo'' theorist António de Oliveira Salazar and Second Polish Republic founder Józef Piłsudski, as rulers of "either purely military dictatorships, or else authoritarian governments run by civilian politicians", and thus a category apart from the leaders of "Fascist states." For Schulze, the defining elements of such governments is the presence of a "conservative establishment" which ensured "social stability" by extending the control of a "traditional state" (thus effectively blocking "revolutionary suggestions" from the far left and the far right alike). The term "conservative autocrat" is used in relation to the ''Conducător'' by British political theorist Roger Griffin, who attributes to the Iron Guard the position of a subservient fascist movement, while others identify Antonescu's post-1941 rule as a military rather than a fascist dictatorship. Several other scholars prefer "conservative" as a defining term for Antonescu's policies. Antonescu described himself as "by fate a dictator", and explained that his policies were "militaristic" or, on one occasion, "national-totalitarian".

Nevertheless, other historians theorize a synthesis of fascist and conservative elements, performed by Antonescu and other European leaders of his day. Routledge's 2002 ''Companion to Fascism and the Far Right'' uses the terms "para-fascist" to define Antonescu, adding: "generally regarded as an authoritarian conservative [Antonescu] incorporated fascism into his regime, in the shape of the Iron Guard, rather than embodying fascism himself." "Para-fascist" is also used by Griffin, to denote both Antonescu and Carol II. American historian of fascism Robert Paxton notes that, like Salazar, Romania's dictator crushed a competing fascist movement, "after copying some of [its] techniques of popular mobilization." Political scientists John Gledhill and Charles King discuss the Iron Guard as Romania's "indigenous fascist movement", remark that Antonescu "adopted much of the ideology of the Guardists", and conclude that the regime he led was "openly fascist". References to the fascist traits of Antonescu's dictatorship are also made by other researchers.

The synthetic aspect of Antonescu's rule is discussed in detail by various authors. British historian Dennis Deletant, who notes that the fascist label relies on both Antonescu's adoption of some fascist "trappings" and the "dichotomy of wartime and postwar evaluation" of his regime, also notes that post-1960 interpretations "do more to explain his behaviour than the preceding orthodoxy." Deletant contrasts the lack of "mass political party or ideology" with the type of rule associated with Nazism or Italian fascism. British-born sociologist and political analyst Michael Mann writes: "The authoritarian regimes of Antonescu [...] and Franco [...] purported to be 'traditional', but actually their fascist-derived corporatism was a new immanent ideology of the right." Another distinct view is held by Romanian-born historian of ideas Juliana Geran Pilon, who describes Romania's "military fascist regime" as a successor to Iron Guardist "mystical nationalism", while mentioning that Antonescu's "national ideology was rather more traditionally militaristic and conservative."

Power base, administration and propaganda

In theory, Antonescu's policies had at least one revolutionary aspect. The leader himself claimed: "I want to introduce a patriotic, heroic, military-typed education, because economic education and all the others follow from it." According to Boia, his arrival in power was explicitly meant to "regenerate" Romania, and his popularity hinged on his being perceived as a "totalitarian model" and a "savior" figure, like Corneliu Zelea Codreanu and Carol II before him. The "providential" and "savior" themes are also emphasized by historian Adrian Majuru, who notes that Antonescu both adopted such ideals and criticized Carol for failing to live up to them. Seeing his rule as legitimized by the national interest, the general is also known to have referred to political pluralism as ''poltronerie'' ("poltroonishness"). Accordingly, Antonescu formally outlawed all political forces in February 1941, codifying penal labor as punishment for most public forms of political expression. In Deletant's assessment, his regenerative program was more declarative than factual, and contradicted by Antonescu's own decision to allow the informal existence of some opposition forces. At the same time, some historians believe his monopolizing of power in the name of a German alliance turned Romania into either a "puppet state" of Hitler or one of Germany's "satellite" governments. However, Deletant notes: "Romania retained her sovereignty throughout the period of the alliance [with Nazi Germany]. [...] Antonescu had, of course, his own country's interests uppermost in his mind, but in following Hitler, he served the Nazi cause." He describes Romania's contribution to the war as that of "a principal ally of Germany", as opposed to a "minor Axis satellite."

Although he assigned an unimportant role to King Michael, Antonescu took steps to increase the monarchy's prestige, personally inviting Carol's estranged wife, Queen Mother Helen, to return home. However, his preferred military structures functioned in cooperation with a bureaucracy inherited from the National Renaissance Front. According to historian of fascism Philip Morgan: "Antonescu probably wanted to create, or perpetuate, something like Carol's front organization." Much of his permanent support base comprised former National Christian Party members, to the point where he was seen as successor to Octavian Goga. While maintaining a decorative replacement for Parliament—known as ''Adunarea Obştească Plebiscitară a Naţiunii Române'' ("The General Plebiscitary Assembly of the Romanian Nation") and convoked only twice— he took charge of hierarchical appointments, and personally drafted new administrative projects. In 1941, he disestablished participative government in localities and counties, replacing it with a corporatist structure appointed by prefects whom he named. In stages between August and October 1941, he instituted civilian administration of Transnistria under Governor Gheorghe Alexianu, whose status he made equivalent to that of a cabinet minister. Similar measures were taken in Bukovina and Bessarabia (under Governors Corneliu Calotescu and Gheorghe Voiculescu, respectively). Antonescu strictly relied on the chain of command, and his direct orders to the Army overrode civilian hierarchies. This system allowed room for endemic political corruption and administrative confusion. The Romanian leader also tolerated a gradual loss of authority over the German communities in Romania, in particular the Transylvanian Saxon and Banat Swabian groups, in agreement with Hitler's views on the ''Volksdeutsche''. This trend was initiated by Saxon Nazi activist Andreas Schmidt in cooperation with the ''Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle'', resulting in ''de facto'' self-governance under a Nazi system which was also replicated among the 130,000 Black Sea Germans of Transnistria. Many young German Romanian men opted to join the ''Schutzstaffel'' as early as 1940 and, in 1943, an accord between Antonescu and Hitler automatically sent ethnic Germans of recruitable age into the Wehrmacht.

The regime was characterized by the leader's attempts to regulate even remote aspects of public life, including relations between the sexes. He imposed drastic penalties for misdemeanors, and the legal use of capital punishment was extended to an unprecedented level. He personally set standards for nightclub programs, for the length of skirts and for women's use of bicycles, while forcing all men to wear coats in public. His wife Maria was a patron of state-approved charitable organizations, initially designed to compete with successful Iron Guardist ventures such as ''Ajutorul Legionar''. According to Romanian-born gender studies academic Maria Bucur, although the regime allowed women "to participate in the war effort on the front in a more regularized, if still marginal, fashion", the general tone was sexist.

The administrative apparatus included official press and propaganda sectors, which moved rapidly from constructing Carol's personality cult to doing the same for the new military leader: journals ''Universul'' and ''Timpul'', as well as Camil Petrescu's ''România'' magazine, were particularly active in this process. Some other such venues were ''Porunca Vremii'', Nichifor Crainic's ''Sfarmă-Piatră'', as well as all the seemingly independent newspapers and some ten new periodicals the government founded for this purpose. Among the individual journalists involved in propaganda were Crainic, Petrescu, Stelian Popescu, and ''Curentul'' editor Pamfil Şeicaru (the ''Conducător'' purposefully ignored support from Carol's former adviser, corporatist economist and newspaperman Mihail Manoilescu, whom he reportedly despised). Much of the propaganda produced during the Antonescu era supported the antisemitic theses put forth by the ''Conducător''. Antisemitism was notable and virulent at the level of Romanian Army units addressing former Soviet citizens in occupied lands, and reflected the regime's preference for the ethnic slur ''jidani'' ("kikes"). The religious aspect of anti-communism surfaced in such venues, which frequently equated Operation Barbarossa with a holy war or a crusade. Romania's other enemies were generally treated differently: Antonescu himself issued objections to the anti-British propaganda of explicitly pro-Nazi papers such as ''Porunca Vremii''. A special segment of Antonescu's post-1941 propaganda was ''Codrenist'': it revisited the Iron Guard's history to minimize Sima's contributions and to depict him as radically different from Codreanu.

Antonescu and the Holocaust

Iaşi pogrom

Three weeks after gaining power and inaugurating the National Legionary regime, Ion Antonescu declared to Italian interviewers at ''La Stampa'' that solving the "Jewish Question" was his pressing concern, and that he considered himself "haunted" by the large Jewish presence in Moldavian towns. Antonescu's crimes against the Jewish population were inaugurated by new racial discrimination laws: urban Jewish property was expropriated, Jews were banned from performing a wide range of occupations and forced to provide community work for the state (''muncă de interes obştesc'') instead of the inaccessible military service, mixed Romanian-Jewish marriages were forbidden and many Jews, primarily those from strategic areas such as Ploieşti, were confined to internment camps. The expulsion of Jewish professionals from all walks of life was also carried out in the National Legionary period, and enforced after the Legionary Rebellion. After a post-Legionary hiatus, "Romanianization" commissions resumed their work under the supervision of a National Center, and their scope was extended.

Often discussed as a prelude to the Holocaust in Romania and in connection with Antonescu's views on "Jewish Bolshevism", the Iaşi pogrom occurred just days after the start of Operation Barbarossa, and was partly instigated, partly tolerated by the authorities in Bucharest. For a while before the massacre, these issued propaganda claiming that the Jews in Iaşi, whose numbers had been increased by forced evictions from smaller localities, were actively helping Soviet bombers find their targets through the blackout and plotting against the authorities, with Antonescu himself ordering that the entire community be expelled from the city on such grounds. The discourse appealed to local antisemites, whose murderous rampage, carried out with the officials' complicity, resulted in several thousand deaths among Jewish men, women and children.

In the aftermath of the pogrom, thousands of survivors were loaded into the so-called "death trains". These overcrowded and sealed Romanian Railways stock cars circled the countryside in the extreme heat of the summer, and periodically stopped to unload the dead. At least 4,000 people died during the initial massacre and the subsequent transports. Varied estimates of the Iaşi massacre and related killings place the total number of Jews killed at 8,000, 10,000, 12,000 or 14,000. Some assistance in their murder was provided by units of the German XXXth Army Corps, a matter which later allowed the authorities to shift blame from themselves and from Antonescu—who was nonetheless implicated by the special orders he had released. The complicity of the Special Intelligence Service and its director Eugen Cristescu was also advanced as a possibility. The subsequent attempts at a cover-up included omissive explanations given by the central authorities to foreign diplomats and rewriting official records.

Transnistria

Right upon setting up camp in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, Romanian troops joined the Wehrmacht and the Schutzstaffel-organized ''Einsatzgruppen'' in mass shootings of Bessarabian and Ukrainian Jews, resulting in the deaths of 10,000 to 20,000 people. Scholar Christopher R. Browning compares these killings with similar atrocities perpetrated by locals in ''Reichskommissariat Ukraine'', Lithuania and Latvia (''see Holocaust in Latvia, Holocaust in Lithuania, Holocaust in Ukraine''). From then on, as the fighting troops progressed over the Dniester, the local administration deported large numbers of Jews into the fighting zone, in hopes that they would be exterminated by the Germans. Antonescu himself stated: "I am in favor of expelling the Jews from Bessarabia and [Northern] Bukovina to the other side of the border [...]. There is nothing for them to do here and I don't mind if we appear in history as barbarians [...]. There has never been a time more suitable in our history to get rid of the Jews, and if necessary, you are to make use of machine guns against them." He also explained that his aim was: "the policy of purification of the Romanian race, and I will not give way before any obstacle in achieving this historical goal of our nation. If we do not take advantage of the situation which presents itself today [...] we shall miss the last chance that history offers to us. And I do not wish to miss it, because if I do so further generations will blame me." He made a contradictory statement about the murder of Jews in Chişinău, claiming that their perpetrators were "bastards" who "stained" his regime's reputation.

Many deaths followed, as the direct results of starvation and exhaustion, while the local German troops carried out selective shootings. The survivors were sent back over the river, and the German commanders expressed irritation over the methods applied by their counterparts. Romanian authorities subsequently introduced ghettos or transit camps. After the annexation of Transnistria, there ensued a systematic deportation of Jews from Bessarabia, with additional transports of Jews from the Old Kingdom (especially Moldavia-proper). Based on an assignment Antonescu handed down to General Ioan Topor, the decision involved specific quotas, and the transports, most of which were carried out by foot, involved random murders. In conjunction with Antonescu's expansionist ambitions, it is possible that the ultimate destination for the survivors, once circumstances permitted it, was further east than the Southern Bug. The deportees' remaining property was nationalized, confiscated or left available for plunder. With its own Jewish population confined and subjected to extermination, Transnistria became infamous in short time, especially so for its three main concentration camps: Peciora, Akhmechetka, Bogdanovka, Domanovka and Obodovka. Manned by Romanian Gendarmes and local Ukrainian auxiliaries who acted with the consent of central authorities, Transnistrian localities became the sites of mass executions, particularly after the administrators became worried about the spread of typhus from the camps and into the surrounding region. The last wave of Jewish deportations, occurring in June 1942, came mainly from the Cernăuţi area in Northern Bukovina.

Also in summer 1942, Ion Antonescu became a perpetrator of the ''Porajmos'', or Holocaust-related crimes against the Romani people, when he ordered the Transnistrian deportation of Romani Romanians from the Old Kingdom, transited through camps and resettled in inhumane conditions near the Southern Bug. They were joined there by 2,000 conscientious objectors of the Inochentist church, a millennialist denomination. As Antonescu admitted during his trial, he personally supervised these operations, giving special orders to the Gendarmerie commanders. In theory, the measures taken against Romani people were supposed to affect only nomads and those with a criminal record created or updated recently, but arbitrary exceptions were immediately made to this rule, in particular by using the vague notion of "undesirable" to define some members of sedentary communities. The central authorities noted differences in the criteria applied locally, and intervened to prevent or sanction under-deportation and, in some cases, over-deportation. Antonescu and Constantin Vasiliu had been made aware of the problems Transnistria faced in feeding its own population, but ignored them when deciding in favor of expulsion. With most of their property confiscated, the Romani men, women and children were only allowed to carry hand luggage, on which they were supposed to survive winter. Famine and disease ensued from criminal negligence, Romani survival being largely dependent on occasional government handouts, the locals' charity, stealing and an underground economy. Once caught, escapees who made their way back into Romania were returned by the central authorities, even as local authorities were objecting.

Odessa massacre

The Odessa massacre, an act of collective punishment carried out by the Romanian Army and Gendarmes, took the lives of a minimum of between 15,000 and 25,000 to as many as 40,000 or even more than 50,000 Jewish people of all ages. The measure came as the enforcement of Antonescu's own orders, as retaliation for an explosion that killed 67 people at Romanian headquarters on that city. Antonescu believed that the original explosion was a terrorist act, rejecting the possibility of the building in question having been fitted with land mines by the retreating Soviets. In addition, Antonescu blamed the Jews, specifically "Jewish commissars" in the Red Army, for the losses suffered by his 4th Army throughout the siege, although both an inquiry he had ordered and German assessments pointed to the ill-preparedness of Romanian soldiers. While the local command took the initiative for the first executions, Antonescu's personal intervention amplified the number of victims required, and included specific quotas (200 civilians for every dead officer, 100 for every dead soldier). By the time of the explosion, the Jewish population was already rounded up into makeshift ghettos, being made subject to violence and selective murders.

Purportedly the largest single massacre of Jews in the war's history, it involved mass shootings, hangings, acts of immolation and a mass detonation. Antonescu is quoted saying that the Romanian Army's criminal acts were "reprisals, not massacres". Survivors were deported to the nearby settlement of Slobidka, and kept in inhumane conditions. Alexianu himself intervened with Antonescu for a solution to their problems, but the Romanian leader decided he wanted them out of the Odessa area, citing the nearby resistance of Soviet troops in the Siege of Sevastopol as a ferment for similar Jewish activities. His order to Alexianu specified: "Pack them into the catacombs, throw them into the Black Sea, but get them out of Odessa. I don't want to know. A hundred can die, a thousand can die, all of them can die, but I don't want a single Romanian official or officer to die." Defining the presence of Jews in occupied Odessa as "a crime", Antonescu added: "I don't want to stain my activity with such lack of foresight." As a result of this, around 35,000–40,000 Jewish people were deported out of Odessa area and into other sectors of Transnistria. Several thousands were purposefully driven into Berezivka and other areas inhabited by the Black Sea Germans, where ''Selbstschutz'' organizations massacred them.

Overall death toll and particularities

A common assessment ranks Antonescu's Romania as second only to Nazi Germany in its antisemitic extermination policies. According to separate works by historians Dennis Deletant and Adrian Cioroianu, the flaws of Antonescu's 1946 trial notwithstanding, his responsibility for war crimes signifies was such that he would have been equally likely to be found guilty and executed in a Western Allied jurisdiction. The often singular brutality of Romanian-organized massacres was a special topic of reflection for Jewish Holocaust escapee and American political theorist Hannah Arendt, as discussed in her 1963 work ''Eichmann in Jerusalem''. Official Romanian estimates made in 2003 by the Wiesel Commission mention that between 280,000 and 380,000 Jews were killed by Romanian authorities under Antonescu's rule. The Transnistria deportations account for 150,000 to 170,000 individual expulsions of Jews from Romania proper, of whom some 90,000–120,000 never returned. According to Romanian-born Israeli historian Jean Ancel, the Transnistria deportations from other areas account for around 145,000 deaths, while the number of local Transnistrian Jews killed could be as high as 280,000. More conservative estimates for the latter number mention some 130,000–180,000 victims. Other overall estimates speak of 200,000 to over 300,000 Jews purposefully killed as a result of Romania's action. According to historians Antony Polonsky and Joanna B. Michlic: "none of these massacres was carried out by the Germans, although [the latter] certainly encouraged such actions and, in some cases, may have coordinated them." The Romani deportations affected some 25,000 people, at least 11,000 of whom died in Transnistria.

The Jewish population in the Old Kingdom, numbering between 300,000 and 400,000 people, survived the Holocaust almost intact. Reflecting on this fact, Lucian Boia noted that Antonescu could not "decently" be viewed as a rescuer of Jews, but that there still is a fundamental difference between the effects of his rule and those of Hitler's, concluding that the overall picture is not "completely dark." For Dennis Deletant, this situation is a "major paradox" of Antonescu's time in power: "more Jews survived under [Antonescu's] rule than in any other country within Axis Europe." American historian of Romania William O. Oldson views Antonescu's policies as characterized by "violence, inconsistency and inanity", but places them in the wider context of local antisemitism, noting some ideological exceptions from their respective European counterparts. These traits, he argues, became "providential" for the more assimilated Jewish communities of the Old Romanian Kingdom, while exposing Jews perceived as foreign. Discussing Antonescu's policy of ethnic cleansing, Polonksy and Mihlic note: "[it] raises important questions about the thin line between the desire to expel an unwanted minority and a small-scale genocidal project under sanctioned conditions." American military historian Gerhard L. Weinberg made reference to the Antonescu regime's "slaughter of large number of Jews in the areas ceded to the Soviet Union in 1940 when those areas were retaken in 1941 as well as in [...] Transnistria", but commented: "the government of Marshal Ion Antonescu preferred to rob and persecute Jews [from Romania]; the government would not turn them over to the Germans for killing."

Alongside the noticeable change in fortunes on the Eastern Front, a main motivator for all post-1943 changes, noted by various historians, was the manifold financial opportunity of Jewish survival. Wealthier Jews were financially extorted in order to avoid community work and deportation, and the work of some professionals was harnessed by the public sector, and even by the Army. From the beginning, the regime had excepted from deportations some Jews who were experts in fields such as forestry and chemistry, and some others were even allowed to return despite antisemitic protests in their home provinces. Economic exploitation was institutionalized in late 1941-early 1942, with the creation of a Central Jewish Office. Supervised by Commissioner Radu Lecca and formally led by the Jewish intellectuals Nandor Gingold and Henric Streitman, it collected funds which were in part redirected toward Maria Antonescu's charities. Small numbers of Romanian Jews left independently for the Palestine as early as 1941, but British opposition to Zionist plans made their transfer perilous (one notorious example of this being the ship ''Struma''). On a personal level, Antonescu's encouragement of crimes alternated with periods when he gave in to the pleas of Jewish community leader Wilhelm Filderman. In one such instance, he reversed his own 1942 decision to impose the wearing of yellow badges, which nevertheless remained in use everywhere outside the Old Kingdom and, in theory, to any Romanian Jews elsewhere in Axis-controlled Europe. Assessing these contradictions, commentators also mention the effect of Allied promises to prosecute those responsible for genocide throughout Europe. In the late stages of the war, Antonescu was attempting to shift all blame for crimes from his regime while accusing Jews of "bring[ing] destruction upon themselves".

The regime permitted non-deported Romanian Jews and American charities to send humanitarian aid into Transnistrian camps, a measure it took an interest in enforcing in late 1942. Deportations of Jews ceased altogether in October of the same year. A common explanation historians propose for this reassessment of policies is the change in Germany's fortunes on the Eastern Front, with mention that Antonescu was considering using the Jewish population as an asset in his dealings with the Western Allies. It nevertheless took the regime more than a year to allow more selective Jewish returns from Transnistria, including some 2,000 orphans. After Transnistria's 1944 evacuation, Antonescu himself advocated the creation of new camps in Bessarabia. In conversations with his cabinet, the ''Conducător'' angrily maintained that surviving Jews were better off than Romanian soldiers.

The policies applied in respect to the Romani population were ambivalent: while ordering the deportation of those he considered criminals, Ion Antonescu was taking some interest in improving the lives of Romani laborers of the Bărăgan Plain. According to Romanian historian Viorel Achim, although it had claimed the existence of a "Gypsy problem", the Antonescu regime "did not count it among its priorities." By 1943, Antonescu was gradually allowing those deported to return home. Initially, Constantin Vasiliu allowed the families of soldiers to appeal their deportation on a selective basis. Romanian authorities also appear to have been influenced by the objections of Nazi administrators in the ''Reichskommissariat Ukraine'', who feared that the newly arrived population would outnumber local Germans. By January 1944, the central authorities ordered local ones not to send back apprehended fugitives, instructed them to provide these with some food and clothing, and suggested corporal punishment for Romani people who did not adhere to a behavioral code. As the Romanian administrators abandoned Transnistria, most survivors from the group returned on their own in summer 1944.

Antonescu and the Final Solution projects

Ion Antonescu and his subordinates were for long divided on the issue of the Final Solution, as applied in territories under direct Nazi control from 1941. At an early stage, German attempts to impose the RSHA's direct control over Old Kingdom Jews drew some objections from Mihai Antonescu, but the two sides agreed to a common policy with reference to Soviet Jews. In various of his early 1940s statements, Ion Antonescu favorably mentions the Axis goal of eliminating the Jewish presence in the event of victory. The unrestrained character of some Romanian actions toward Jews alarmed Nazi officials, who demanded a methodical form of extermination. When confronted with German decisions to push back Jews he had expelled before the occupation of Transnistria, Antonescu protested, arguing that he had conformed with Hitler's decisions regarding "eastern Jews". In August 1941, in preparation for the Final Solution's universal application, Hitler remarked: "As for the Jewish question, today in any case one could say that a man like Antonescu, for example, proceeds much more radically in this manner than we have done until now. But I will not rest or be idle until we too have gone all the way with the Jews."

By summer 1942, German representatives in Romania obtained Antonescu's approval to deport the remaining Jewish population to extermination camps in occupied Poland. Among those involved on the German side were mass murderer Adolf Eichmann and his aide Gustav Richter, while the Romanian side was represented by Jewish Affairs Commissioner Lecca (reporting to Antonescu himself). Richter directed Lecca in setting up the Central Jewish Office, which he assumed would function as a ''Judenrat'' to streamline extermination policies. According to such plans, only some 17,000 Jews, labeled useful to Romania's economy, were to be exempt. The transports had already been announced to the Romanian Railways by autumn 1942, but the government eventually decided to postpone these measures indefinitely as was done with most other deportations to Transnistria. Antonescu's new orders on the matter were brought up in his conversations with Hitler at Schloss Klessheim, where both leaders show themselves aware of the fate awaiting Jewish deportees to Poland. By then, German authorities charged with applying the Final Solution in Eastern Europe completely abandoned their plans with respect to Romania.

According to Oldson, by the final stage of the war Romania rejected "all extreme measures against Jews who could not be proven to be communists." The planned transports to Palestine, the prospect of which irritated Nazi German observers, implied a hope that the Allies' focus would shift away from the regime's previous guilt and, at the same time, looked forward to payments to be made in exchange for each person saved. The contrary implications of Romanian nationalism, manifested as reluctance to obey German commands and discomfort with drastic change in general, are occasionally offered as further explanations of the phenomenon. While reflecting upon the issue of emigration to Palestine, Antonescu also yielded to pleas of Jewish community leaders, and allowed safe passage through Romania for various Northern Transylvanian Jews fleeing the Holocaust in Hungary. He was doing the same for certain Northern Transylvanian Romani communities who had escaped southwards. In that context, Nazi German ideologues began objecting to Antonescu's supposed leniency. Antonescu nevertheless alternated tolerance of illegal immigration with drastic measures. In early 1944, he issued an order to shoot illegal immigrants, which was probably never enforced by the Border Police (who occasionally turned in Jewish refugees to the German authorities). The Antonescu regime allowed the extermination of the Romanian Jewish diaspora in other parts of Europe, formally opposing their deportation in some cases where it appeared Germany was impinging upon Romania's sovereignty.

Opposition and political persecution

Political mainstream

The circumstances of wartime accounted for cautious and ambivalent approaches to Antonescu's rule from among the Romanian political mainstream, which grouped advocates of liberal democracy and anti-fascism. According to Gledhill and King: "Romanian liberals had been critical of their government's warm relationship with Hitler, which had been developing throughout the 1930s, but the [1940] Soviet attack on Romanian territory left them with little chance but to support Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union." Other authors also cite the Greater Romanian agenda of the Antonescu executive as a reason behind the widespread acquiescence. The tendency was illustrated by Dinu Brătianu, who, in late January 1941, told his National Liberal colleagues that the new "government of generals" was "the best solution possible to the current crisis", urging the group to provide Antonescu with "all the support we can give him." An early point of contention between Antonescu and the National Peasants' Party came in spring 1941, when Antonescu's support for the Balkans Campaign and Romania's claim to parts of Vojvodina were met with a letter of protest from Iuliu Maniu, which Antonescu dismissed. Maniu and Brătianu also issued several condemnations of Antonescu's decision to continue the war beyond the Dniester. One such letter, signed by both, claimed that, while earlier steps had been "legitimized by the entire soul of the nation, the Romanian people will never consent to the continuation of the struggle beyond our national borders." Maniu specifically mentioned the possibility of Allied victory, accused Antonescu of diverting attention from the goal of Greater Romania (Northern Transylvania included), and stressed that Romania's ongoing participation in the Axis was "troubling enough".

Antonescu is known to have publicly admonished opposition leaders for their disobedience, which he equated with obstruction, and to have monitored their activities through the Special Intelligence Service. However, some early communiques he addressed to Brătianu also feature offers of resignation, which their recipient reluctantly rejected. The Germans objected to such ambiguities, and Hitler once advised Antonescu to have Maniu killed, an option which the ''Conducător'' rejected because of the PNŢ leader's popularity with the peasants. While tolerating contacts between Maniu and the Allies, Antonescu arrested the clandestine British envoys to Romania, thus putting a stop to the 1943 ''Operation Autonomous''. In parallel, his relationship with Queen Mother Helen and Michael rapidly deteriorated after he began advising the royal family on how to conduct its affairs. Dissent from Antonescu's policies sometimes came from inside his own camp. Both the officer corps and the General Staff were divided on the issue of war beyond the Dniester, although it is possible that the majority agreed it would bring Northern Transylvania back to Romania. A prominent case was that of Iosif Iacobici, the Chief of the Romanian General Staff, whose objection to the massive transfer of Romanian troops to the Eastern Front resulted in his demotion and replacement with Ilie Şteflea (January 1942). Şteflea issued similar calls, and Antonescu's eventually agreed to preserve a home army just before the Battle of Stalingrad. Various other military men extended their protection to persecuted Jews. Overall, Antonescu met significant challenges in exercising control over the politicized sectors in the armed forces.

Antonescu's racial discrimination laws and Romania's participation in the Holocaust earned significant objections from various individuals and groups in Romanian society. One noted opponent was Queen Mother Helen, who actively intervened to save Jews from being deported. The Mayor of Cernăuţi, Traian Popovici, publicly objected to the deportation of Jews, as did Gherman Pântea, his counterpart in Odessa. The appeals of Queen Helen, King Michael, the Orthodox Metropolitan of Transylvania Nicolae Bălan, Apostolic Nuncio Andrea Cassulo and Swiss Ambassador René de Weck are credited with having helped avert the full application of the Final Solution in Antonescu's Romania. Cassulo and Bălan together pleaded for the fate of certain Jews, including all who had converted to Christianity, and the former publicly protested against deportations. While Romania and the United States were still at peace, American Minister Plenipotentiary Franklin Mott Gunther repeatedly attempted to make his superiors aware of Romanian actions against the Jews, and Turkish diplomats unsuccessfully sought American approval for transferring Romanian Jews to safe passage through Anatolia and into Palestine. Dinu Brătianu also condemned antisemitic measures, prompting Antonescu to accuse him of being an ally of "the Yid in London". Together with Maniu and Ion Mihalache, Brătianu signed statements condemning the isolation, persecution and expulsion of Jews, which prompted Antonescu to threaten to clamp down on them. However, both parties were occasionally ambiguous on racial issues, and themselves produced antisemitic messages. Brătianu is also known for publicly defending the cause of Romani people, opposing their deportation on grounds that it would "turn back the clock on several centuries of history", a stance which drew support from his civilian peers. In parallel, some regular Romanians such as nurse Viorica Agarici intervened to save Jewish lives, while, from inside the Jewish community, Chief Rabbi Alexandru Şafran and activist Mişu Benvenisti rallied with Wilhelm Filderman in public protests against Antonescu's decisions, being occasionally joined by A. I. Zissu. In 1943, Filderman himself was deported to Mohyliv-Podilskyi, but eventually allowed to return.

Political underground

Organized resistance movements in Antonescu's Romania were comparatively small-scale and marginal. In addition to a Zionist underground which aided Jews to pass through or flee the country, the regime was confronted with local political movements of contrasting shades. One of them comprised far left and left-wing elements, which Antonescu's rise to power had caught in an unusual position. The minor Romanian Communist Party, outlawed since the rule of Ferdinand I for its Cominternist national policies, had been rendered virtually inactive by the German-Soviet non-aggression pact. Once reanimated by Operation Barbarossa, the PCR was unable to create an actual armed resistance movement, although it was able to coordinate the policies of several other small leftist groups. Speaking shortly before the invasion of the Soviet Union, and adopting the "Jewish Bolshevism" position, Antonescu ordered authorities to compile lists comprising "the names of all Jewish and communist agents", who were to be kept under close surveillance. Among people arrested on suspicion of communism, Jews were sent to Transnistrian sites such as Vapniarka and Rîbniţa, while others were interned in regular facilities such as those in Caransebeş and Târgu Jiu. In all, some 2,000 Jewish Romanian deportees to the region had been accused of political crimes (the category also included those who had tried to escape forced labor). According to one estimate, people held on charges of being communists accounted for just under 2,000 people, of whom some 1,200 were jailed in Romania proper. Capital punishment was used against various partisan-like activists, while the vast majority of communist prisoners in Rîbniţa were massacred in March 1944. At the other end of the political spectrum, after the Legionary Rebellion and the Iron Guard's decapitation, many Legionaries who opposed the regime, and whom Antonescu himself believed were "communists in [Legionary] green shirts", were killed or imprisoned. An Iron Guardist underground was nevertheless formed locally, and probably numbered in thousands. Some of Antonescu's political prisoners from both camps were given a chance to redeem themselves by joining units on the Eastern Front.

Although repressed, divided and weak, the PCR capitalized on the Soviet victories, being integrated into the mainstream opposition. At the same time, a "prison faction" emerged around Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, opposing both the formal leadership and the so-called "Muscovite" communists who had taken refuge in the Soviet Union before the war. While maneuvering for control within the PCR during and after 1944, "prison" communists destroyed a third group, formed around the PCR's nominal leader Ştefan Foriş (whom they kidnapped and eventually killed). The PCR leadership was still suffering from a crisis of legitimacy after beginning talks with the larger parties. The Soviets and "Muscovite" communists campaigned among Romanian prisoners of war in order to have them switch sides in the war, and eventually managed to set up the Tudor Vladimirescu Division.

Cultural circles

Measures enforced by the Ion Antonescu regime had contradictory effects on the Romanian cultural scene. According to Romanian literary historians Letiţia Guran and Alexandru Ştefan, "the Antonescu regime [...] did not affect negatively cultural modernity. The Romanian cultural elite regarded Antonescu's policies for the most part with sympathy." Nevertheless, other researchers record the dissent of several cultural environments: the classic liberalism and cosmopolitanism of aging literary theorist Eugen Lovinescu, the "Lovinescian" Sibiu Literary Circle, and the rebellious counterculture of young avant-garde writers (Ion Caraion, Geo Dumitrescu, Dimitrie Stelaru, Constant Tonegaru). Prominent left-wing writers Tudor Arghezi, Victor Eftimiu and Zaharia Stancu were political prisoners during the Antonescu years. Author George Călinescu also stood out against the official guidelines, and, in 1941, took a risk by publishing a synthesis of Romanian literature which emphasized Jewish contributions, while composer George Enescu pleaded with Antonescu personally for the fate of Romani musicians. Similar acts of solidarity were performed by various prominent intellectuals and artists. In August 1942, King Michael received a manifesto endorsed by intellectuals from various fields, deploring the murders in Transnistria, and calling for a realignment of policies. Another such document of April 1944 called for an immediate peace with the Soviet Union. On a more intimate level, a diary kept by philosopher and art critic Alice Voinescu expresses her indignation over the antisemitic measures and massacres.

A special aspect of political repression and cultural hegemony was Antonescu's persecution of Evangelical or Restorationist Christian denominations, first outlawed under the National Legionary regime. Several thousand adherents of the Pentecostal Union and the Baptist Union were reportedly jailed in compliance with his orders. Persecution targeted groups of religiously motivated conscientious objectors. In addition to the Inochentist movement, these groups included the Pentecostal Union, the Seventh-day Adventist Conference and the Jehovah's Witnesses Association. Antonescu himself recounted having contemplated using the death penalty against "sects" who would not allow military service, and ultimately deciding in favor of deporting "recalcitrant" ones.

Legacy

Consequences of the Antonescu trial

The period following Antonescu's fall returned Romania to a democratic regime and the 1923 Constitution, as well as its participation in the war alongside the Allies. However, it also saw the early stages of a communist takeover—which culminated with King Michael's forced abdication on December 30, 1947 and the subsequent establishment of Communist Romania. The Antonescu trial thus fit into a long series of similar procedures and political purges on charges of collaborationism, instrumented by the Romanian People's Tribunals and various other institutions. During the rigged general election of 1946 and for years after Ion Antonescu's execution, the Romanian Communist Party and its allies began using the implications of his trial as an abusive means of compromising some of their political opponents. One such early example was Iuliu Maniu, by then one of the country's prominent anti-communists, who was accused of being a fascist and an Antonescu sympathizer, mainly for having shaken his hand during the trial. The enlistment of ethnic Germans into Nazi German units, as approved by Antonescu, was used as a pretext for a Soviet-led expulsion of Germans from Romania. On similar grounds, the Soviet occupation forces organized the capture of certain Romanian citizens, as well as the return of war refugees from Romania proper into Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Both the arrestees and the returnees were often deported deeper into the Soviet Union. As part of its deteriorating relationship with Romanian Roman Catholics, and urged on by the Soviets, the communist cabinet of Petru Groza also deemed Apostolic Nuncio Andrea Cassulo a collaborator of Antonescu and a ''persona non grata'', based on transcripts of the Cassulo-Antonescu conversations. It also used such allegations to pressure several Greek-Catholic clergymen into accepting union with the Romanian Orthodox Church.

Nevertheless, Romanian-born Holocaust historian Radu Ioanid notes, few Romanians involved in organizing the Holocaust were prosecuted, and, of those, none were executed after the Antonescu trial. He attributes this to nationalist resistance within the administrative and judicial apparatus, to communist fears of alienating a too large number of people, to the emigration of Zionist survivors, and to the open hostility of some communists toward liberal Jewish community leaders. Jews also faced conflict with the new authorities and with the majority population, as described by other researchers. There were, nonetheless, sporadic trials for Holocaust-related crimes, including one of Maria Antonescu. Arrested in September 1944 and held 1945–1946 in Soviet custody, she was re-arrested at home in 1950, tried and ultimately found guilty of economic crimes for her collaboration with the Central Jewish Office. Five years later, she was sent into internal exile, and died of heart problems in 1964. After 1950, a large number of convicted war criminals, even some sentenced to life imprisonment, were deemed fit for "social cohabitation" (that is, fit to live amongst the general population) and released, while some suspects were never prosecuted.

In communist historiography

Although the Marxist analytical works of the increasingly marginalized communist figure Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu make isolated mentions of the Holocaust, the heavily politicized official discourse inspired by Soviet historiography interpreted Romania's wartime evolution exclusively based on the Marxist-Leninist idea of class conflict. In this context, the main effort to document and expose the Antonescu-era massacres came from Jewish Romanians. This began in 1945, when Jewish journalists Marius Mircu and Maier Rudrich contributed first-hand testimonies. In 1946–1948, the Jewish community leader Matatias Carp published ''Cartea neagră'' ("The Black Book"), a voluminous and detailed account of all stages of the Holocaust. After forming a secondary element in Antonescu's indictment, the deportation of Romani people was largely ignored in official discourse.

The communist regime overemphasized the part played by the PCR in King Michael's Coup, while commemorating its August 23 date as a national holiday. The Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej faction emerged as the winner of the interior PCR struggles and incorporated nationalist discourse. That faction claimed a decisive role in toppling Antonescu, even though a majority of its members had been jailed for most of the period. In accordance with Stalinist principles, censorship produced historical revisionism that excluded focus on such negative aspects of Romanian behavior during the war as antisemitism and the Holocaust, and obscured Romania's participation on the Eastern Front. Beginning in the mid-1960s, when Nicolae Ceauşescu took power and embarked on a national communist course, the celebration of August 23 as the inception of the communist regime was accompanied by a contradictory tendency, which implied a gradual rehabilitation of Antonescu and his regime. Historians who focused on this period believe that the revival of nationalist tenets and the relative distance taken from Soviet policies contributed to the rehabilitation process. After a period of liberalization, the increasingly authoritarian Ceauşescu regime revived the established patterns of personalized rule, and even made informal use of the title ''Conducător''. Beginning in the early 1970s, when the new policies were consecrated by the ''July Theses'', Ceauşescu tolerated a nationalist, antisemitic and Holocaust denialist intellectual faction, illustrated foremost by ''Săptămîna'' and ''Luceafărul'' magazines of Eugen Barbu and Corneliu Vadim Tudor, by poet Adrian Păunescu and his ''Flacăra'' journal, and by novelist Ion Lăncrănjan. The regime also came to cultivate a relationship with exiled tycoon Iosif Constantin Drăgan, a former Iron Guard member who had come to endorse both Antonescu's rehabilitation and the national communist version of Protochronism. In contrast, much of dissident culture and the Romanian diaspora embraced the image of Michael I as its counterpart to the increasingly official Antonescu myth. Lucian Boia described this as "the spectacular confrontation between the two contradictory myths [transposing] into historical and mythological terms a fundamental fissure which divides the Romanian society of today."

Topics relating to the Holocaust in Romania were distorted during the national communist stage. Ceauşescu himself mentioned the number of survivors of the deportations (some 50,000 people) as a total number of victims, failed to mention the victims' ethnic background, and presented most of them as "communists and antifascists." The regime also placed emphasis on the Holocaust in Northern Transylvania (where the Final Solution had been applied by the Germans and the local Arrow Cross Party). Earlier accounts of the massacres, which had already been placed under restricted use, were completely removed from public libraries. While a special politicized literature dealt with the Holocaust in Hungary, the entire Ceauşescu period produced only one work entirely dedicated to Romania's participation. Centered on the Iaşi pogrom, it shifted the blame from Romanian authorities and advanced a drastically reduced death toll. In its preface, official historian Nicolae Minei claimed that Romania was not responsible for any deaths among Jews. Other official texts made more radical claims, openly denying that Antonescu's regime was antisemitic, and that all those killed were victims of Germany or of circumstance.

Debates of the 1990s

Romanians' image of Antonescu shifted several times after the 1989 Revolution toppled communism. Polls carried out in the 1990s show the ''Conducător'' was well liked by portions of the general public. This tendency, Lucian Boia argues, was similar to a parallel trend favoring Wallachia's 15th century Prince Vlad III the Impaler, indicating a preference for "authoritarian solutions" and reflecting "a pantheon that was largely set in place in the 'Ceauşescu era' ". It was also popular at the time to see the 1944 Coup exclusively as the onset of communization in Romania, while certain sections of the public opinion revived the notion of "Jewish Bolshevism", accusing Jews of having brought communism to Romania. British historian Tony Judt connected such reflexes to growing anti-Russian sentiment and Holocaust denial in various countries of the former Eastern Bloc, and termed them collectively "mis-memory of anti-communism". Vladimir Tismăneanu, a prominent Romanian-born political scientist, referred to Antonescu's "pseudo-sacred" image with the post-1989 public, and to the phenomenon as "fantasies of persecution." The wartime dictator's image appealed to many politicians of the post-1989 period, and sporadic calls for his rehabilitation were issued at the highest levels of authority. Far right groups issued calls for his canonization by the Romanian Orthodox Church (together with a similar request to canonize Corneliu Zelea Codreanu). Certain neofascist groups claim to represent a legacy of ''Codrenism'' from which Sima was a deviationist, and these have also become Antonescu apologists.

A particular case in this process was that of forces gathered around the Greater Romania Party, a group often characterized as merging xenophobic or neofascist messages and the legacy of Ceauşescu's national communism. Founded by party leader and former ''Săptămîna'' contributor Corneliu Vadim Tudor, ''România Mare'' magazine is known to have equated Antonescu and Ceauşescu, presenting them both as "apostles of the Romanian people". In his bid for the office of President during the 1996 election, Vadim Tudor vowed to be a new Antonescu. Boia remarks that this meeting of extremes offers an "extraordinary paradox". Drăgan also openly resumed his activities in Romania, often in collaboration with Vadim Tudor's group, founding three organizations tasked with campaigning for Antonescu's rehabilitation: the media outlet Europa Nova, the Ion Antonescu Foundation and the Ion Antonescu League. His colleague Radu Theodoru endorsed such projects while accusing Jews of being "a long-term noxious factor" and claiming that it was actually ethnic Romanians who were victims of a communist Holocaust. Ion Coja and Paul Goma notably produced radical claims relying on fabricated evidence and deflecting blame for the crimes onto the Jews themselves. Several journals edited by Ion Cristoiu repeatedly argued in favor of Antonescu's rehabilitation, also making xenophobic claims; similar views were sporadically present in national dailies of various hues, such as ''Ziua'', ''România Liberă'' and ''Adevărul''.

Various researchers argue that the overall tendency to exculpate Antonescu was endorsed by the ruling National Salvation Front and its successor group, later known as Social Democratic Party, who complemented an emerging pro-authoritarian lobby while depicting their common opponent King Michael and his supporters as traitors. Sections of both governing and opposition groups contemplated the idea of rehabilitating the wartime leader, and, in May 1991, Parliament observed a moment of silence in his memory. The perceived governmental tolerance of Antonescu's rehabilitation raised international concern and protests. In 1997, Romanian President Emil Constantinescu, a representative of the Democratic Convention, became the first Romanian officeholder to recognize Antonescu's complicity. Nevertheless, during the same period, Attorney General Sorin Moisescu followed a since-deprecated special appeal procedure to overturn sentences passed against Antonescu and other 1946 defendants, which he eventually withdrew.

To a certain degree, such pro-Antonescu sentiments were also present in post-1989 historiography. Reflecting back on this phenomenon in 2004, Maria Bucur wrote: "the perverse image of Antonescu is not the product of a propaganda campaign led by right-wing extremists, but a pervasive myth fed by historical debates and political contests, and which the public seems indifferent to or accepts unproblematically." After the Revolution, archival sources concerning Antonescu, including those in the National Archives of Romania, were made more available to researchers, but documents confiscated or compiled by Soviet officials, kept in Russia, remained largely inaccessible. Although confronted with more evidence from the newly opened archives, several historians, including some employed by official institutions, continued to deny the Holocaust in Romania, and attributed the death toll exclusively to German units. In parallel, some continued an exclusive focus on Northern Transylvanian massacres. Local authors who have actively promoted Antonescu's image as a hero and wrote apologetic accounts of his politics include historians Gheorghe Buzatu and Mihai Pelin, and researcher Alex Mihai Stoenescu. Larry L. Watts published a similarly controversial monograph in the United States. Although criticized for denying the uniqueness of the Holocaust and downplaying Antonescu's complicity, Dinu C. Giurescu was recognized as the first post-communist Romanian historian to openly acknowledge his country's participation, while his colleagues Şerban Papacostea and Andrei Pippidi were noted as early critics of attempts to exculpate Antonescu. The matter of crimes in Transnistria and elsewhere was first included within the Romanian curriculum with a 1999 state-approved alternative textbook edited by Sorin Mitu.

Wiesel Commission and aftermath

In 2003, after a period in which his own equivocal stance on the matter had drawn controversy, Constantinescu's successor Ion Iliescu established the Wiesel Commission, an international group of expert historians whose mission was the study of the Holocaust in Romania, later succeeded by the Elie Wiesel National Institute. The ''Final Report'' compiled by the Commission brought the official recognition of Ion Antonescu's participation in the Holocaust. After that moment, public displays of support for Antonescu became illegal. Antonescu's SMERSH interrogations were recovered from the Russian archives and published in 2006. Despite the renewed condemnation and exposure, Antonescu remained a popular figure: as a result of the 2006 ''Mari Români'' series of polls conducted by the national station TVR 1, viewers nominated Antonescu as the 6th greatest Romanian ever. The vote's knockout phase included televised profiles of the ten most popular figures, and saw historian Adrian Cioroianu using the portion dedicated to Antonescu to expose and condemn him, giving voters reasons not to see the dictator as a great Romanian. The approach resulted in notable controversy after ''Ziua'' newspaper criticized Cioroianu, who defended himself by stating he had an obligation to tell the truth.

The same year, on December 5, the Bucharest Court of Appeals overturned Antonescu's conviction for certain crimes against peace, on the grounds that the objective conditions of 1940 justified a preventive war against the Soviet Union, which would make Article 3 of the 1933 Convention for the Definition of Aggression inapplicable in his case (as well as in those of Alexianu, Constantin Pantazi, Constantin Vasiliu, Sima and various Iron Guard politicians). This act raised official protests in Moldova, the independent state formed in Bessarabia upon the breakup of the Soviet Union, and in Russia, the Soviet successor state, as well as criticism by historians of the Holocaust. The Court of Appeals decision was overturned by the Romanian Supreme Court in May 2008. The same year, Maria Antonescu's collateral inheritors advanced a claim on a Predeal villa belonging to the couple, but a Braşov tribunal rejected their request, citing laws which confiscated the property of war criminals.

Cultural legacy, portrayals and landmarks

Beyond their propaganda and censorship efforts, Antonescu and his regime had a sizable impact on Romanian culture, art and literature. Owing to austere guidelines on culture and to the circumstances of wartime, this period's direct imprint is less than that of other periods in the country's history. Few large large heroes' memorials were built during the war years. Memorials produced at the time were mainly roadside triptychs (''troiţe''). The Heroes' Cult organization received expropriation rights to Bucharest's Jewish cemetery in 1942, and proposed to replace it with a major monument of this category, but that plan was eventually abandoned. Antonescu and his wife preferred donating to Orthodox churches, and were ''ktitors'' of churches in three separate Bucharest areas: Mărgeanului Church in Rahova, one in Dămăroaia, and the Saints Constantine and Helena Church in Muncii, where both the Marshal and his wife are depicted in a mural. After floods took a toll on his native Argeş County, the Marshal himself established ''Antoneşti'', a model village in Corbeni (partly built by Ukrainian prisoners of war, and later passed into state property), while ordering hydroelectric exploitation of the Argeş River. He also had sporadic contacts with the artistic and literary environment, including an interview he awarded to his supporter, writer Ioan Alexandru Brătescu-Voineşti. His 1946 trial was notably attended and documented by George Călinescu in a series of articles for ''Naţiunea'' journal. Political humor of the 1940s preserved distinct images of the Romanian leader. Romanian jokes circulated under Antonescu's rule ridiculed his adoption of the title ''Marshal of Romania'', viewing it as a self-promotion and dubbing him the "Auto-Marshal". During the war, Soviet agitprop portrayed Antonescu and the other secondary Axis leaders as villains and servile dog-like creatures, representations notably present in musical theater and puppetry shows, as well as in press cartoons.

Marin Preda's 1975 novel ''Delirul'' displays the Ceauşescu regime's ambiguous relationship with Antonescu. Critics John Neubauer and Marcel Cornis-Pope remark that the novel is "admittedly not [Preda's] best work", and discuss his "complex representation" of Antonescu as "an essentially flawed but active leader who tried to negotiate some maneuvering room between the demands of Germany and the threats of the Soviet Union [and whose failure] led to the dismantling of Romania's fragile democratic system." The book sought Antonescu's rehabilitation for his attitudes on the Bessarabia-Northern Bukovina issue, but did not include any mention of his antisemitic policies, of which Preda himself may have been ignorant. An international scandal followed, once negative comments on the book were published by the Soviet magazine ''Literaturnaya Gazeta''. Although an outspoken nationalist, Eugen Barbu produced a satirical image of Antonescu in his own 1975 novel, ''Incognito'', which was described by Deletant as "character assassination".

During the 1990s, monuments to Antonescu were raised and streets were named after him in Bucharest and several other cities. Among those directly involved in this process were Iosif Constantin Drăgan, the nationalist Mayor of Cluj-Napoca, Gheorghe Funar, and General Mircea Chelaru, whose resignation from the Army was subsequently requested and obtained. Also during that interval, in 1993, filmmaker and Social Democratic politician Sergiu Nicolaescu produced ''Oglinda'', which depicts Antonescu (played by Ion Siminie) apologetically. The rehabilitation trend was also represented at an October 1994 commemorative exhibit at the National Military Museum. The same year, a denialist documentary film, ''Destinul mareşalului'' ("The Marshal's Destiny"), was distributed by state-owned companies, a matter which raised concern. After the Wiesel Commission presented its findings and such public endorsement was outlawed, statues in Antonescu's likeness were torn down or otherwise made unavailable for public viewing. An unusual case is that of his Saints Constantine and Helena Church, where, after lengthy debates, his bust was sealed inside a metal box. Outside of this context, the publicized display of Antonescu's portraits and racist slogans by football hooligans during Liga I's 2005–2006 season prompted UEFA intervention (''see Racism Breaks the Game'').

Awards and decorations

Antonescu received a number of awards and decorations throughout his military career, most notable being the Order of Michael the Brave, which was personally awarded to him by King Ferdinand I during the Hungarian–Romanian War of 1919. He also received several decorations from foreign countries. He was the first Romanian to receive the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross, being awarded it by Hitler himself. |- | | Order of Michael the Brave (3rd, 2nd, and 1st Class received) | | 1919 | Tisza River, Hungary | align="left"|Romania's highest military decoration. Upon crossing the River Tisza, King Ferdinand took the Order of Michael the Brave from his own uniform and presented it to Antonescu, saying "Antonescu, no one in this country knows better than the King how much they owe you." | |- | | Combined Pilots-Observation Badge in Gold with Diamonds | | June 1941 | | align="left"|Bestowed to honor exceptional success, presented to Antonescu by ''Reichsmarschall'' Hermann Göring. | |- | | Iron Cross (2nd, and 1st Class received) | | August 6, 1941 | Berdychiv | align="left"|Awarded for bravery in battle as well as other military contributions in a battlefield environment. | |}

Notes

References

August 23, 1944}} |- August 23, 1944}}

Category:Heads of state of Romania Category:Prime Ministers of Romania Category:Romanian Ministers of Defense Category:Romanian Ministers of Foreign Affairs Category:Chiefs of the General Staff of Romania Category:Field Marshals of Romania Category:Romanian military personnel of the Second Balkan War Category:Romanian military personnel of World War I Category:Romanian diplomats Category:Romanian essayists Category:Romanian fascists Category:Romanian people of World War II Category:World War II political leaders Category:People from Piteşti Category:Eastern Orthodox Christians from Romania Category:Romanian Orthodox Christians Category:Romanian vegetarians Category:Recipients of the Knight's Cross Category:Military personnel referenced in the Wehrmachtbericht Category:Executed Romanian Nazi collaborators Category:Holocaust perpetrators Category:The Holocaust in Romania Category:Anti-Masonry Category:Romanian people convicted of war crimes Category:Romanian people convicted of the international crime of aggression Category:Romanian prisoners of war Category:World War II prisoners of war held by the Soviet Union Category:Leaders ousted by a coup Category:People convicted by the Romanian People's Tribunals Category:People executed by firing squad Category:Executed politicians Category:People executed by the Kingdom of Romania Category:Deaths by firearm in Romania Category:Filmed executions Category:1882 births Category:1946 deaths

ar:يون أنتونيسكو bg:Йон Антонеску ca:Ion Antonescu cs:Ion Antonescu da:Ion Antonescu de:Ion Antonescu et:Ion Antonescu es:Ion Antonescu fr:Ion Antonescu gl:Ion Antonescu ko:이온 안토네스쿠 hr:Ion Antonescu io:Ion Antonescu id:Ion Antonescu it:Ion Antonescu he:יון אנטונסקו la:Ioannes Antonescu lt:Ion Antonescu hu:Ion Antonescu mk:Јон Антонеску nl:Ion Antonescu ja:イオン・アントネスク no:Ion Antonescu pl:Ion Antonescu pt:Ion Antonescu ro:Ion Antonescu ru:Антонеску, Йон simple:Ion Antonescu sl:Ion Antonescu sr:Јон Антонеску sh:Ion Antonescu fi:Ion Antonescu sv:Ion Antonescu tr:Ion Antonescu uk:Антонеску Йон yi:יאן אנטאנעסקו zh:扬·安东内斯库

Marius Tucă (born 29 July 1966, Caracal, Olt County, Romania) is a Romanian journalist and TV host.

He distinguished himself in the 1990s as a political analyst and a TV host. He also contributed to the transformation of the ''Jurnalul Naţional'' newspaper into the best selling broadsheet in Romania. In 1997–1999, he hosted ''Milionarii de la miezul nopţii'' on Antena 1. After 1999, the show was named ''Marius Tucă Show''. The TV show ceased in 2005. A short spell of the TV talk show in fall 2007 flopped and, as of 2008, he is again working exclusively only the newspaper.

References

Category:1966 births Category:Living people Category:People from Caracal, Romania Category:Political analysts Category:Romanian television personalities Category:Romanian newspaper editors Category:Romanian newspaper founders

ro:Marius Tucă

Coordinates	34°26′″N35°51′″N
Name	Adolf Hitler
Nationality	Austrian citizen until 7 April 1925German citizen after 25 February 1932
Birth date	April 20, 1889
Birth place	Braunau am Inn, Austria–Hungary
Death date	April 30, 1945
Death place	Berlin, Germany
Death cause	Suicide
Party	National Socialist German Workers' Party (1921–1945)
Otherparty	German Workers' Party (1920–1921)
Religion	See Adolf Hitler's religious views
Spouse	Eva Braun(29–30 April 1945)
Occupation	Politician, soldier, artist, writer
Order	Führer of Germany
Term start	2 August 1934
Term end	30 April 1945
Chancellor	Himself
Predecessor	Paul von Hindenburg(as President)
Successor	Karl Dönitz(as President)
Order2	Chancellor of Germany
Term start2	30 January 1933
Term end2	30 April 1945
President2	Paul von HindenburgHimself (''Führer'')
Deputy2	Franz von PapenVacant
Predecessor2	Kurt von Schleicher
Successor2	Joseph Goebbels
Signature	Hitler Signature2.svg
Allegiance
Branch	''Reichsheer''
Unit	16th Bavarian Reserve Regiment
Serviceyears	1914–1918
Rank	''Gefreiter''
Battles	World War I
Awards	Iron Cross First ClassWound Badge }}

Adolf Hitler (; 20 April 1889 – 30 April 1945) was an Austrian-born German politician and the leader of the National Socialist German Workers Party (, abbreviated NSDAP, commonly referred to as the Nazi Party). He was Chancellor of Germany from 1933 to 1945, and head of state (as ''Führer und Reichskanzler'') from 1934 to 1945. Hitler is most commonly associated with the rise of fascism in Europe, World War II and the Holocaust.

A decorated veteran of World War I, Hitler joined the precursor of the Nazi Party (DAP) in 1919, and became leader of the NSDAP in 1921. In 1923, Hitler attempted a coup d'état, known as the Beer Hall Putsch, at the Bürgerbräukeller beer hall in Munich. The failed coup resulted in Hitler's imprisonment, during which time he wrote his memoir, ''Mein Kampf'' (''My Struggle''). After his release in 1924, Hitler gained support by promoting Pan-Germanism, antisemitism and anti-communism with charismatic oratory and propaganda. He was appointed chancellor in 1933, and transformed the Weimar Republic into the Third Reich, a single-party dictatorship based on the totalitarian and autocratic ideology of Nazism.

Hitler's avowed aim was to establish a New Order of absolute Nazi German hegemony in continental Europe. His foreign and domestic policies had the goal of seizing ''Lebensraum'' (''living space'') for the Germanic people. This included the rearmament of Germany, resulting in the invasion of Poland by the ''Wehrmacht'' in September 1939, leading to the outbreak of World War II in Europe.

Under Hitler's direction, German forces and their European allies at one point occupied most of Europe and North Africa, reversed in 1945 when the Allied armies defeated the German army. Hitler's racially motivated policies resulted in the systematic annihilation of as many as 17 million civilians, including an estimated six million Jews targeted in the Holocaust and between 500,000 and 1,500,000 Roma.

In the final days of the war, during the Battle of Berlin in 1945, Hitler married his long-time mistress, Eva Braun. To avoid capture by the Red Army, the two committed suicide less than two days later on 30 April 1945 and their corpses were burned.

Early years

Ancestry

Hitler's father, Alois Hitler, was an illegitimate child of Maria Anna Schicklgruber. Therefore, the name of Alois' father was not listed on Alois' birth certificate, and he bore his mother's surname. In 1842, Johann Georg Hiedler married Maria, and in 1876 Alois testified before a notary and three witnesses that Johann was his father. Despite his testimony, the question of Alois' paternity remained unresolved. Hans Frank claimed—after receiving an extortionary letter from Hitler's nephew William Patrick Hitler threatening to reveal embarrassing information about Hitler's family tree—to have uncovered letters revealing that Alois' mother was employed as a housekeeper for a Jewish family in Graz and that the family's 19-year-old son, Leopold Frankenberger, had fathered Alois. However, Frank's claim remained unsupported, and Frank himself did not believe that Hitler had Jewish ancestry. Claims of Alois' father being Jewish were doubted by historians in the 1990s. Ian Kershaw dismissed the Frankenberger story as a "smear" by Hitler's enemies, noting that all Jews had been expelled from Graz in the 15th century and were not allowed to return until after Alois' birth.

At age 39, Alois assumed the surname ''Hitler'', variously spelled also as ''Hiedler'', ''Hüttler'', or ''Huettler'', and was probably regularized to its final spelling by a clerk. The origin of the name is either "one who lives in a hut" (Standard German ''Hütte''), "shepherd" (Standard German ''hüten'' "to guard", English ''heed''), or is from the Slavic word ''Hidlar'' and ''Hidlarcek''.

Childhood

Adolf Hitler was born on 20 April 1889 at around 6:30 pm at the Gasthof zum Pommer, an inn in Ranshofen, a village annexed to the municipality of Braunau am Inn, Upper Austria in 1938. He was the fourth of six children to Alois Hitler and Klara Pölzl. All of Adolf's older siblings  – Gustav, Ida, and Otto – died before reaching three years of age.

At the age of three, his family moved to Kapuzinerstrasse 5 in Passau, Germany. There, Hitler would acquire a Bavarian dialect of Austro-Bavarian rather than an Austrian dialect. In 1894, the family relocated to Leonding near Linz, and in June 1895, Alois retired to a small landholding at Hafeld near Lambach, where he tried his hand at farming and beekeeping. Adolf attended school in nearby Fischlham, and in his free time, he played "Cowboys and Indians". Hitler became fixated on warfare after finding a picture book about the Franco-Prussian War among his father's belongings.

Alois Hitler's farming efforts at Hafeld ended in failure, and in 1897 the family moved to Lambach. Hitler attended a Catholic school in an 11th-century Benedictine cloister, the walls of which bore engravings and crests that contained the symbol of the swastika. In Lambach the eight-year-old Hitler also sang in the church choir, took singing lessons, and even entertained thoughts of one day becoming a priest. In 1898, the family returned permanently to Leonding.

On 2 February 1900 Hitler's younger brother, Edmund, died of measles, deeply affecting Hitler, whose character changed from being confident and outgoing and an excellent student, to a morose, detached, and sullen boy who constantly fought his father and his teachers.

Hitler was attached to his mother, but he had a troubled relationship with his father, who frequently beat him, especially in the years after Alois' retirement and failed farming efforts. Alois was a Austrian customs official who wanted his son to follow in his footsteps, which caused much conflict between them. Ignoring his son's wishes to attend a classical high school and become an artist, in September 1900 his father sent Adolf to the Realschule in Linz, a technical high school of about 300 students. Hitler rebelled against this decision, and in ''Mein Kampf'' revealed that he failed his first year, hoping that once his father saw "what little progress I was making at the technical school he would let me devote myself to the happiness I dreamed of."

German Nationalism became an obsession for Hitler, and a way to rebel against his father, who proudly served the Austrian government. Most residents living along the German-Austrian border considered themselves German-Austrians, whereas Hitler expressed loyalty only to Germany. In defiance of the Austrian monarchy, and his father who continually expressed loyalty to it, Hitler and his friends used the German greeting "Heil", and sang the German anthem "Deutschland Über Alles" instead of the Austrian Imperial anthem.

After Alois' sudden death on 3 January 1903, Hitler's behaviour at the technical school became even more disruptive, and he was asked to leave in 1904. He enrolled at the ''Realschule'' in Steyr in September 1904, but upon completing his second year, he and his friends went out for a night of celebration and drinking. While drunk, Hitler tore up his school certificate and used its pieces as toilet paper. The stained certificate was brought to the attention of the school's principal who "... gave him such a dressing-down that the boy was reduced to shivering jelly. It was probably the most painful and humiliating experience of his life." Hitler was expelled, never to return to school again.

Aged 15, Hitler took part in his First Communion on Whitsunday, 22 May 1904, at the Linz Cathedral. His sponsor was Emanuel Lugert, a friend of his late father.

Early adulthood in Vienna and Munich

From 1905, Hitler lived a bohemian life in Vienna with financial support from orphan's benefits and his mother. He was rejected twice by the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna (1907–1908), because of his "unfitness for painting", and was recommended to study architecture. Following this recommendation, he intended to pursue architectural studies, yet he lacked the academic credentials required for architecture school:

In a few days I myself knew that I should some day become an architect. To be sure, it was an incredibly hard road; for the studies I had neglected out of spite at the Realschule were sorely needed. One could not attend the Academy's architectural school without having attended the building school at the Technic, and the latter required a high-school degree. I had none of all this. The fulfillment of my artistic dream seemed physically impossible.

On 21 December 1907, Hitler's mother died of breast cancer at age 47; Hitler was devastated, and carried the grief from her death with him for the rest of his life. Ordered by a court in Linz, Hitler gave his share of the orphan's benefits to his sister Paula, and at the age of 21, he inherited money from an aunt. He struggled as a painter in Vienna, copying scenes from postcards and selling his paintings to merchants and tourists. After being rejected a second time by the Academy of Arts, Hitler ran out of money. In 1909, he lived in a shelter for the homeless, and by 1910, he had settled into a house for poor working men on Meldemannstraße. Another resident of the shelter, Reinhold Hanisch, sold Hitler's paintings until the two men had a bitter falling-out.

Hitler stated that he first became an antisemite in Vienna, which had a large Jewish community, including Orthodox Jews who had fled the pogroms in Russia. According to childhood friend August Kubizek, however, Hitler was a "confirmed antisemite" before he left Linz. Brigitte Hamann wrote that “of all those early witnesses who can be taken seriously Kubizek is the only one to portray young Hitler as an anti-Semite and precisely in this respect he is not trustworthy.” Vienna at that time was a hotbed of traditional religious prejudice and 19th century racism. Hitler may have been influenced by the occult writings of the antisemite Lanz von Liebenfels in his magazine ''Ostara''; he probably read the publication, although it is uncertain to what degree he was influenced by von Liebenfels' writings.

{{bquote|There were very few Jews in Linz. In the course of centuries the Jews who lived there had become Europeanised in external appearance and were so much like other human beings that I even looked upon them as Germans. The reason why I did not then perceive the absurdity of such an illusion was that the only external mark which I recognized as distinguishing them from us was the practice of their strange religion. As I thought that they were persecuted on account of their faith my aversion to hearing remarks against them grew almost into a feeling of abhorrence. I did not in the least suspect that there could be such a thing as a systematic antisemitism.

Once, when passing through the inner City, I suddenly encountered a phenomenon in a long caftan and wearing black side-locks. My first thought was: Is this a Jew? They certainly did not have this appearance in Linz. I carefully watched the man stealthily and cautiously but the longer I gazed at the strange countenance and examined it feature by feature, the more the question shaped itself in my brain: Is this a German?}}

Martin Luther's ''On the Jews and Their Lies'' may have also shaped Hitler's views. In ''Mein Kampf'', he refers to Martin Luther as a great warrior, a true statesman, and a great reformer, alongside Richard Wagner and Frederick the Great. Wilhelm Röpke concluded that "without any question, Lutheranism influenced the political, spiritual and social history of Germany in a way that, after careful consideration of everything, can be described only as fateful."

However, at the time Hitler apparently did not act on his views. He was a frequent dinner guest in a wealthy Jewish house, and he interacted well with Jewish merchants who tried to sell his paintings.

Hitler received the final part of his father's estate in May 1913 and moved to Munich. He wrote in ''Mein Kampf'' that he had always longed to live in a "real" German city. In Munich, he further pursued his interest in architecture and the writings of Houston Stewart Chamberlain. Moving to Munich also helped him avoid military service in Austria, but the Munich police in cooperation with the Austrian authorities eventually arrested him for dodging the draft. After a physical exam and a contrite plea, he was deemed unfit for service and allowed to return to Munich. However, when Germany entered World War I in August 1914, he successfully petitioned King Ludwig III of Bavaria for permission to serve in a Bavarian regiment, and enlisted in the Bavarian army.

World War I

Hitler served as a runner on the Western Front in France and Belgium in the Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 16. He experienced major combat, including the First Battle of Ypres, the Battle of the Somme, the Battle of Arras and the Battle of Passchendaele.

Hitler was twice decorated for bravery, receiving the Iron Cross, Second Class, in 1914 and Iron Cross, First Class on 4 August 1918. He also received the Wound Badge. Hitler's First Class Iron Cross was recommended by Hugo Gutmann, and although the latter decoration was rarely awarded to a ''Gefreiter'', it may be explained by Hitler's post at regimental headquarters where he had more frequent interactions with senior officers than other soldiers of similar rank. The regimental staff, however, thought Hitler lacked leadership skills, and he was never promoted.

While serving at regimental headquarters Hitler pursued his artwork, drawing cartoons and instructions for an army newspaper. In October 1916, he was wounded either in the groin area or the left thigh when a shell exploded in the dispatch runners' dug-out during the Battle of the Somme. Hitler spent almost two months in the Red Cross hospital at Beelitz. He returned to his regiment on 5 March 1917.

On 15 October 1918, Hitler and several comrades were temporarily blinded by a mustard gas attack, but it has also been suggested that he suffered from conversion disorder, then known as "hysteria". He was hospitalized in Pasewalk. Hitler became embittered over the collapse of the war effort. It was during this time that Hitler's ideological development began to firmly take shape. Some scholars, notably Lucy Dawidowicz, argue that Hitler's intention to exterminate Europe's Jews was fully formed at this time.

Hitler described the war as "the greatest of all experiences" and he was praised by his commanding officers for his bravery. The experience made Hitler a passionate German patriot, and he was shocked by Germany's capitulation in November 1918. Like many other German nationalists, Hitler believed in the ''Dolchstoßlegende'' (Stab-in-the-back legend), which claimed that the army, "undefeated in the field," had been "stabbed in the back" by civilian leaders and Marxists back on the home front, later dubbed the ''November Criminals''.

The Treaty of Versailles, citing Germany's responsibility for the war, stipulated that Germany relinquish several of its territories, demilitarisation of the Rhineland, and imposed economic sanctions and levied reparations on the country. Many Germans perceived the treaty, especially Article 231 on the German responsibility for the war, as a humiliation, and its economic effects on the social and political conditions in Germany were later exploited by Hitler.

Entry into politics

After World War I, Hitler remained in the army and returned to Munich, where he attended the funeral march for the murdered Bavarian prime minister Kurt Eisner. After the suppression of the Bavarian Soviet Republic, he took part in "national thinking" courses organized by the ''Education and Propaganda Department'' of the Bavarian ''Reichswehr'' under Captain Karl Mayr.

In July 1919, Hitler was appointed ''Verbindungsmann'' (intelligence agent) of an ''Aufklärungskommando'' (reconnaissance commando) of the ''Reichswehr'', both to influence other soldiers and to infiltrate the German Workers' Party (DAP). While he studied the activities of the DAP, Hitler became impressed with founder Anton Drexler's antisemitic, nationalist, anti-capitalist and anti-Marxist ideas. Drexler favoured a strong active government, a "non-Jewish" version of socialism and solidarity among all members of society. Drexler was impressed with Hitler's oratory skills and invited him to join the DAP, which Hitler accepted on 12 September 1919, becoming its 55th member.

At the DAP, Hitler met Dietrich Eckart, one of its early founders and member of the occult Thule Society. Eckart became Hitler's mentor, exchanging ideas with him and introducing Hitler to a wide range of people in Munich's society. Hitler thanked Eckart and paid tribute to him in the second volume of ''Mein Kampf''. To increase the party's appeal, the party changed its name to the ''Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei'' (National Socialist German Workers Party - NSDAP). Hitler also designed the party's banner of a swastika in a white circle on a red background to make a visual impact.

Hitler was discharged from the army in March 1920 and began participating full time in the party's activities. By early 1921, Hitler had become highly effective at speaking in front of large crowds. In February 1921, Hitler spoke to a crowd of over six thousand in Munich. To publicize the meeting, two truckloads of party supporters drove around waving swastikas and throwing leaflets. Hitler soon gained notoriety for his rowdy, polemic speeches against the Treaty of Versailles, rival politicians, and especially directed against Marxists and Jews. At the time, the NSDAP was centred in Munich, a major hotbed of anti-government German nationalists which was determined to crush Marxism and undermine the Weimar Republic.

In June 1921, while Hitler was on a trip to Berlin (with Eckart) for a fund-raising mission, there was a mutiny among the DAP in Munich, most notably within the executive committee whose members who wanted to merge with the rival German Socialist Party (DSP) and considered Hitler to be too overbearing. Hitler returned to Munich and in anger tendered his resignation from the party on 11 July 1921. However, committee members realized that Hitler's resignation would mean the end of the party. Hitler announced he would only return on the conditions that he replace Drexler as party chairman and the party headquarters would remain in Munich. The committee agreed to his demands and Hitler rejoined the party as member 3,680. However, the conflict was not over. Hermann Esser and his allies printed 3,000 copies of an anonymous pamphlet attacking Hitler as a traitor to the party. In the days which followed, Hitler spoke to a several packed houses and defended himself to thunderous applause. At the general membership meeting which followed, only one no vote was cast in relation to granting Hitler dictatorial powers with his chairmanship being officially and unanimously accepted.

Hitler's vitriolic beer hall speeches began attracting regular audiences. Early followers included Rudolf Hess, the former air force pilot Hermann Göring, and the army captain Ernst Röhm. The latter became head of the Nazis' paramilitary organization the ''Sturmabteilung'' (SA, "Storm Division"), which protected meetings and frequently attacked political opponents. A critical influence on his thinking at this period was the Aufbau Vereinigung, a conspiratorial group formed of White Russian exiles and early National Socialists. The group, financed with funds channeled from wealthy industrialists like Henry Ford, introduced him to the idea of a Jewish conspiracy, linking international finance with Bolshevism. Hitler also attracted the attention of local business interests, was accepted into influential circles of Munich society, and became associated with wartime General Erich Ludendorff during this time.

Beer Hall ''Putsch''

Encouraged by his new support, Hitler recruited Ludendorff for an attempted coup known as the "Beer Hall ''Putsch''" (also known as the "Hitler ''Putsch''" or "Munich ''Putsch''"). The Nazi Party had used Italy's fascists as an example for its appearance and policies, and in 1923, Hitler wanted to emulate Benito Mussolini's "March on Rome" by staging his own "Campaign in Berlin". Hitler and Ludendorff sought support of ''Staatskommissar'' (state commissioner) Gustav von Kahr, Bavaria's ''de facto'' ruler. However, Kahr along with Police Chief Hans Ritter von Seisser (Seißer) and Reichswehr General Otto von Lossow wanted to install a nationalist dictatorship without Hitler.

Hitler wanted to seize a critical moment for successful popular agitation and support. So on 8 November 1923, Hitler and the SA stormed a public meeting of 3,000 people, organized by Kahr in the Bürgerbräukeller, a large beer hall in Munich. Hitler interrupted Kahr's speech and announced that the national revolution had begun, declaring the formation of a new government with Ludendorff. With his hand gun drawn, Hitler demanded the support of Kahr, Seisser and Lossow. Hitler's forces initially succeeded at occupying the local Reichswehr and police headquarters; however, neither the army nor the state police joined forces with Hitler. Kahr and his consorts quickly withdrew their support and fled to join the opposition to Hitler. The following day, Hitler and his followers marched from the beer hall to the Bavarian War Ministry to overthrow the Bavarian government on their "March on Berlin", but the police dispersed them. Sixteen NSDAP members and four police officers were killed in the failed coup.

Hitler fled to the home of Ernst Hanfstaengl where he contemplated suicide, but Hanfstaengl's wife Helene talked him out of it. He was soon arrested for high treason and tried before the special People's Court in Munich, and Alfred Rosenberg became temporary leader of the NSDAP. During his trial, Hitler was given almost unlimited time to speak, and his popularity soared as he voiced nationalistic sentiments in his defence speech. His trial began on 26 February 1924 and on 1 April 1924 Hitler was sentenced to five years' imprisonment at Landsberg Prison. Hitler received friendly treatment from the guards and received a lot of mail from supporters. The Bavarian Supreme Court soon issued a pardon and he was released from jail on 20 December 1924, against the state prosecutor's objections. Including time on remand, Hitler had been imprisoned for just over one year for the attempted coup.

''Mein Kampf''

While at Landsberg, he dictated most of the first volume of ''Mein Kampf'' (''My Struggle'', originally entitled ''Four and a Half Years of Struggle against Lies, Stupidity, and Cowardice'') to his deputy Rudolf Hess. The book, dedicated to Thule Society member Dietrich Eckart, was an autobiography and an exposition of his ideology. ''Mein Kampf'' was influenced by ''The Passing of the Great Race'' by Madison Grant, which Hitler called "my Bible". ''Mein Kampf'' was published in two volumes in 1925 and 1926, selling about 240,000 copies between 1925 and 1934. By the end of the war, about 10 million copies had been sold or distributed. The copyright of ''Mein Kampf'' in Europe is claimed by the Free State of Bavaria and will end on 31 December 2015. In Germany, only heavily commented editions of ''Mein Kampf'' are available solely for academic studies.

Rebuilding of the NSDAP

At the time of Hitler's release from prison, politics in Germany had become less combative, and the economy had improved. This limited Hitler's opportunities for political agitation. As a result of the failed ''Beer Hall Putsch'', the NSDAP and its affiliated organisations were banned in Bavaria. However, Hitler—now claiming to seek political power only through the democratic process—succeeded in persuading Heinrich Held, Prime Minister of Bavaria, to lift the ban. The ban on the NSDAP was lifted on 16 February 1925, but Hitler was barred from public speaking. To be able to advance his political ambitions in spite of the ban, Hitler appointed Gregor Strasser along with his brother Otto and Joseph Goebbels to organize and grow the NSDAP in northern Germany. Strasser, however, steered a more independent political course, emphasizing the socialist element in the party's programme.

Hitler went on to establish a more autocratic rule of the NSDAP and asserted the ''Führerprinzip'' ("Leader principle"). Offices in the party were not determined by elections, but rather filled by appointment by higher ranks who demanded unquestioning obedience from the lower ranks they had appointed.

A key element of Hitler's appeal was his ability to evoke a sense of violated national pride as a result of the Treaty of Versailles. Many Germans strongly resented the terms of the treaty, especially the economic burden of having to pay large reparations to other countries affected by World War I. Nonetheless, attempts by Hitler to win popular support by blaming the demands and assertions in the treaty on "international Jewry" were largely unsuccessful with the electorate. Therefore, Hitler and his party began employing more subtle propaganda methods, combining antisemitism with an attack on the failures of the "Weimar system" and the parties supporting it.

Having failed in overthrowing the republic and gaining power by a coup, Hitler changed tactics and pursued a strategy of formally adhering to the rules of the Weimar Republic until he had gained political power through regular elections. His vision was to then use the institutions of the Weimar Republic to destroy it and establish himself as autocratic leader.

Rise to power

{|class="wikitable sortable" |- |+ Nazi Party election results |- !Date !Votes,total !Votes,percentage !Seats,Reichstag !class=unsortable|Background |- |May 1924 |style="text-align:right;"| |style="text-align:right;"| |style="text-align:right;"| |Hitler in prison |- |December 1924 |style="text-align:right;"| |style="text-align:right;"| |style="text-align:right;"| |Hitler is released from prison |- |May 1928 |style="text-align:right;"| |style="text-align:right;"| |style="text-align:right;"| |  |- |September 1930 |style="text-align:right;"| |style="text-align:right;"| |style="text-align:right;"| |After the financial crisis |- |July 1932 |style="text-align:right;"| |style="text-align:right;"| |style="text-align:right;"| |After Hitler was candidate for presidency |- |November 1932 |style="text-align:right;"| |style="text-align:right;"| |style="text-align:right;"| |  |- |March 1933 |style="text-align:right;"| |style="text-align:right;"| |style="text-align:right;"| |During Hitler's term as Chancellor of Germany |}

Brüning Administration

Hitler's political turning point came with the Great Depression in Germany in 1930. The Weimar Republic had difficulties taking firm roots in German society and faced strong challenges from right- and left-wing extremists. The moderate political parties committed to the democratic parliamentary republic were increasingly unable to stem the tide of extremism, and the German referendum of 1929 had helped to elevate the profile and prominence of Nazi ideology. In early elections in September 1930, the moderates lost their majority, leading to the break-up of a grand coalition and its replacement by a minority cabinet. Its leader, chancellor Heinrich Brüning of the Centre Party, governed through emergency decrees from the president of state, Paul von Hindenburg. Tolerated by most parties, governance by decree would become the new norm and paved the way for authoritarian forms of government. Notably the NSDAP rose from relative obscurity to win 18.3% of the vote and 107 parliamentary seats in the 1930 election, growing from ninth- to second-largest party in the German parliament.

The increasing political clout of Hitler was also felt at the trial of two ''Reichswehr'' officers, ''Leutnants'' Richard Scheringer and Hans Ludin, in the autumn of 1930. Both were charged with membership of the NSDAP, which at that time was illegal for ''Reichswehr'' personnel. The prosecution argued that the NSDAP was a dangerous extremist party, prompting defence lawyer Hans Frank to call on Hitler to testify at the court. During his testimony on 25 September 1930, Hitler stated that his party was aiming to come to power solely through democratic elections and that the NSDAP was a friend of the ''Reichswehr''. Hitler's testimony won him many supporters in the officer corps.

Brüning's budgetary and financial austerity measures brought little economic improvement and were extremely unpopular. Hitler exploited this weakness by targeting his political messages specifically to the segments of the population that had been hard hit by the inflation of the 1920s and the unemployment of the Depression, such as farmers, war veterans, and the middle class.

Hitler formally renounced his Austrian citizenship on 7 April 1925, but at the time did not acquire German citizenship. For almost seven years Hitler was stateless, so he was unable to run for public office and even faced the risk of deportation. Therefore, on 25 February 1932, the interior minister of Brunswick who was a member of the NSDAP appointed Hitler as administrator for the state's delegation to the Reichsrat in Berlin, making Hitler a citizen of Brunswick, and thus of Germany as well.

In 1932, Hitler ran against the aging President Paul von Hindenburg in the presidential elections. The viability of his candidacy was underscored by a 27 January 1932 speech to the Industry Club in Düsseldorf, which won him support from a broad swath of Germany's most powerful industrialists. However, Hindenburg had broad support of various nationalist, monarchist, Catholic, and republican parties and even some social democrats. Hitler used the campaign slogan "''Hitler über Deutschland''" (Hitler over Germany), a reference to his political ambitions, and to his campaigning by aircraft. Hitler came in second in both rounds of the election, garnering more than 35% of the vote in the final election. Although he lost to Hindenburg, this election established Hitler as a credible force in German politics.

In September 1931, Hitler's niece Geli Raubal committed suicide with Hitler's gun in his Munich apartment. Geli was believed to be in a romantic relationship with Hitler, and it is believed that her death was a source of deep, lasting pain for him.

Appointment as Chancellor

Because of the difficulties of forming a stable and effective government, two influential politicians, Franz von Papen and Alfred Hugenberg, as well as a number of industrialists and businessmen, including Hjalmar Schacht and Fritz Thyssen wrote to Hindenburg, urging him to appoint Hitler as leader of a government "independent from parliamentary parties" which could turn into a movement that would "enrapture millions of people."

After two parliament elections—in July and November 1932—had failed to result in a majority government, President Hindenburg eventually and reluctantly agreed to appoint Hitler chancellor of a coalition government formed by the NSDAP and Hugenberg's party, the DNVP. The influence of the NSDAP in parliament was thought to be limited by an alliance of conservative cabinet ministers, most notably by von Papen as Vice-Chancellor and by Hugenberg as Minister of the Economy. The only other NSDAP member besides Hitler, Wilhelm Frick, was given the relatively powerless interior ministry. However, as a concession to the NSDAP, Göring, who was head of the Prussian police at the time, was named minister without portfolio. So although von Papen intended to install Hitler merely as a figurehead, the NSDAP gained key political positions.

On 30 January 1933, Adolf Hitler was sworn in as Chancellor during a brief and simple ceremony in Hindenburg's office. Hitler's first speech as Chancellor took place on 10 February. The Nazis' seizure of power subsequently became known as the ''Machtergreifung'' or ''Machtübernahme''.

Reichstag fire and March elections

As chancellor, Hitler worked against attempts by his political opponents to build a majority government. Because of the political stalemate, Hitler asked President Hindenburg to dissolve the ''Reichstag'' again, and elections were scheduled for early March. On 27 February 1933, the ''Reichstag'' building was set on fire, and since a Dutch independent communist was found in the burning building, a communist plot was blamed for the fire. The central government responded with the ''Reichstag'' Fire Decree of 28 February, which suspended basic rights, including ''habeas corpus''. In particular, activities of the German Communist Party were suppressed, and communist party members were arrested, forced to flee, or murdered.

Besides political campaigning, the NSDAP used paramilitary violence and spread of anti-communist propaganda on the days preceding the election. On election day, 6 March 1933, the NSDAP increased its result to 43.9% of the vote, gaining the largest number of seats in parliament. However, Hitler's party failed to secure an absolute majority, thus again necessitating a coalition with the DNVP.

Day of Potsdam and the Enabling Act

On 21 March 1933, the new ''Reichstag'' was constituted with an opening ceremony held at Potsdam's garrison church. This ''Day of Potsdam'' was staged to demonstrate reconciliation and unity between the revolutionary Nazi movement and ''Old Prussia'' with its elites and perceived virtues. Hitler appeared in a tail coat and humbly greeted the aged President Hindenburg.

In the Nazis' quest for full political control and because they had failed to gain an absolute majority in the prior parliamentary election, Hitler's government brought the ''Ermächtigungsgesetz'' (Enabling Act) to a vote in the newly elected ''Reichstag''. The aim of this move was to give Hitler's cabinet full legislative powers for a period of four years. Although such a bill was not unprecedented, this act was different since it allowed for deviations from the constitution. Since the bill required a ⅔ majority to pass, the government needed the support of other parties. The position of the Centre Party, the third largest party in the ''Reichstag'', turned out to be decisive: under the leadership of Ludwig Kaas, the party decided to vote for the Enabling Act. It did so in return for the government's oral guarantees of the Church's liberty, the concordats signed by German states, and the continued existence of the Centre Party.

On 23 March, the ''Reichstag'' assembled in a replacement building under extremely turbulent circumstances. Several SA men served as guards inside, while large groups outside the building shouted slogans and threats toward the arriving members of parliament. Kaas announced that the Centre Party would support the bill with "concerns put aside", while Social Democrat Otto Wels denounced the act in his speech. At the end of the day, all parties except Social Democrats voted in favour of the bill—the Communists, as well as several Social Democrats, were barred from attending the vote. The Enabling Act, along with the ''Reichstag'' Fire Decree, transformed Hitler's government into a ''de facto'' dictatorship.

Removal of remaining limits

Having achieved full control over the legislative and executive branches of government, Hitler and his political allies embarked on systematic suppression of the remaining political opposition. After the dissolution of the Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) was also banned and all its assets seized. The Steel Helmets were placed under Hitler's leadership with some autonomy as an auxiliary police force. On 1 May, demonstrations were held, and the SA stormtroopers demolished trade union offices. On 2 May 1933, all trade unions in the country were forced to dissolve, and were replaced with a new organisation of "trade unions", uniting workers, administrators, and company owners. This new trade union reflected the concept of ''national socialism'' in the spirit of Hitler's "Volksgemeinschaft" (community of all German people).

Also the Catholic Church, to which roughly 50 % of the German people belonged, was forced to support Hitler: there was an early "Concordat" with the Vatican, but nonetheless the large Centre Party of the catholics was dissolved, as most other ones. On 14 July 1933, Hitler's Nazi Party was declared the only legal party in Germany. Hitler used the SA to pressure Hugenberg into resigning, and proceeded to politically isolate Vice-Chancellor von Papen. The demands of the SA for more political and military power caused much anxiety among military, industrial and political leaders. Hitler was prompted to purge the entire SA leadership, including Ernst Röhm, and other political adversaries (such as, Gregor Strasser and former Chancellor Kurt von Schleicher). These actions took place from 30 June to 2 July 1934, in what became known as the Night of the Long Knives. While some Germans were shocked by the killing, many others saw Hitler as the one who restored "order" to the country.

On 2 August 1934, President von Hindenburg died. In contravention to the Weimar Constitution, calling for presidential elections, and following a law passed the previous day in anticipation of Hindenburg's imminent death, Hitler's cabinet declared the presidency vacant and transferred the powers of the head of state to Hitler as ''Führer und Reichskanzler'' (leader and chancellor). This removed the last legal remedy by which Hitler could be dismissed, and nearly all institutional checks and balances on his power. Hitler's move also violated the Enabling Act, which had barred tampering with the office of the presidency.

On 19 August, the merger of the presidency with the chancellorship was approved by a plebiscite with support from 84.6% of the electorate.

As head of state, Hitler now became Supreme Commander of the armed forces. The traditional loyalty oath of soldiers and sailors was altered to affirm loyalty directly to Hitler rather than to the office of commander-in-chief.

In 1938, in the wake of two scandals Hitler brought the armed forces under his direct control by forcing the resignation of his War Minister (formerly Defence Minister), Werner von Blomberg on evidence that Blomberg's new wife had a criminal past. Hitler and his allies also removed army commander Werner von Fritsch on suspicion of homosexuality. Hitler replaced the Ministry of War with the ''Oberkommando der Wehrmacht'' (High Command of the Armed Forces, or OKW), headed by the pliant General Wilhelm Keitel.

Third Reich

Having consolidated and concentrated his political powers, Hitler proceeded to suppress or eliminate his opposition by a process termed ''Gleichschaltung'' ("bringing into line"). He also tried to gain additional public support by vowing to reverse the effects of the Depression and the Versailles treaty.

Economy and culture

Increased economic activities were enabled largely by debt flotation (refinancing long term debts into cheaper short term debts) and expansion of the military. For example, Hitler's reconstruction and rearmament were financed with currency manipulations by Hjalmar Schacht, including credits through the Mefo bills.

Nazi policies strongly encouraged women to bear children and stay at home. In a September 1934 speech to the National Socialist Women's Organization, Hitler argued that for the German woman her "world is her husband, her family, her children, and her home." The Cross of Honor of the German Mother was bestowed on women bearing four or more children. The unemployment rate fell substantially, mostly through arms production and women leaving the workforce.

Hitler oversaw one of the largest infrastructure-improvement campaigns in German history, leading to the construction of dams, autobahns, railroads, and other civil works. However, these programmes lowered the overall standard of living of workers who earlier had been unaffected by the chronic unemployment of the later Weimar Republic; wages were slightly reduced in pre–World War II years, while the cost of living was increased by 25%.

Hitler's government sponsored architecture on an immense scale, with Albert Speer becoming the first architect of the Reich, instrumental in implementing Hitler's classicist reinterpretation of German culture. In 1936, Hitler opened the summer Olympic games in Berlin. Hitler also made some contributions to the design of the Volkswagen Beetle and charged Ferdinand Porsche with its design and construction.

On 20 April 1939, a lavish celebration was held for Hitler's 50th birthday, featuring military parades, visits from foreign dignitaries, thousands of flaming torches and Nazi banners.

One question concerns the aspect of modernization in Hitler's economic policies. Historians such as David Schoenbaum and Henry Ashby Turner argue that Hitler's social and economic policies were modernization that had anti-modern goals. Others, including Rainer Zitelmann, have contended that Hitler had the deliberate strategy of pursuing a revolutionary modernization of German society.

Rearmament and new alliances

On 3 February 1933, in a meeting with German military leaders, Hitler spoke of "conquest for ''Lebensraum'' in the East and its ruthless Germanisation" as his ultimate foreign policy objectives. In March 1933, a major statement by the State Secretary at the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' (Foreign Office), Prince Bernhard Wilhelm von Bülow, of German foreign policy aims was issued. It advocated ''Anschluss'' with Austria, the restoration of Germany's national borders of 1914, rejection of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles, the return of the former German colonies in Africa, and a German zone of influence in Eastern Europe. Hitler found the goals in Bülow's memo to be too modest.

In his "peace speeches" in the mid-1930s, Hitler stressed the peaceful goals of his policies and willingness to work within international agreements. At the first meeting of his Cabinet in 1933, however, Hitler prioritised military spending over unemployment relief. In October 1933, Hitler withdrew Germany from the League of Nations and the World Disarmament Conference, and his Foreign Minister Baron Konstantin von Neurath stated that the French demand for ''sécurité'' was a principal stumbling block. In March 1935, Hitler rejected Part V of the Versailles treaty by announcing an expansion of the German army to 600,000 members (six times the number stipulated in the Treaty of Versailles), including development of an Air Force (''Luftwaffe'') and increasing the size of the Navy (''Kriegsmarine''). Although Britain, France, Italy and the League of Nations condemned these plans, no country took actions to stop them.

On 18 June 1935, the Anglo-German Naval Agreement (AGNA) was signed, allowing German tonnage to increase to 35% of that of the British navy. Hitler called the signing of the AGNA "the happiest day of his life" as he believed the agreement marked the beginning of the Anglo-German alliance he had predicted in ''Mein Kampf''. France or Italy were not consulted before the signing, directly undermining the League of Nations and putting the Treaty of Versailles on the path towards irrelevance.

On 13 September 1935, Hitler ordered two civil servants, Dr. Bernhard Lösener and Franz Albrecht Medicus of the Interior Ministry to start drafting antisemitic laws for Hitler to bring to the floor of the ''Reichstag''. On 15 September, Hitler presented two laws—known as the Nuremberg Laws—before the ''Reichstag''. The laws banned marriage between non-Jewish and Jewish Germans and the employment of non-Jewish women under the age of 45 in Jewish households. The laws also deprived so-called "non-Aryans" of the benefits of German citizenship. In March 1936, Hitler reoccupied the demilitarized zone in the Rhineland, thus again violating the Versailles treaty. In addition, Hitler sent troops to Spain to support General Franco after receiving an appeal for help from Franco in July 1936. At the same time, Hitler continued with his efforts to create an Anglo-German alliance.

In August 1936, in response to a growing economic crisis caused by his rearmament efforts, Hitler issued the "Four-Year Plan Memorandum", ordering Hermann Göring to carry out the Four Year Plan to have Germany ready for war within the next four years. Hitler's "Four-Year Plan Memorandum" laid out an imminent all-out struggle between "Judeo-Bolshevism" and German National Socialism, which in Hitler's view required a committed effort of rearmament regardless of the economic costs.

On 25 October 1936, Count Galeazzo Ciano foreign minister of Benito Mussolini's government declared an axis between Germany and Italy, and on 25 November, Germany signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan. Britain, China, Italy and Poland were also invited to join the Anti-Comintern Pact, but only Italy signed in 1937. By late 1937, Hitler had abandoned his dream of an Anglo-German alliance, blaming "inadequate" British leadership.

On 5 November 1937, Hitler held a secret meeting at the Reich Chancellery with his war and foreign ministers and military chiefs. As recorded in the Hossbach Memorandum, Hitler stated his intention of acquiring ''Lebensraum'' ("living space") for the German people, and ordered to make preparations for war in the east no later than 1943. Hitler further stated that the conference minutes were to be regarded as his "political testament" in the event of his death. Hitler was also recorded as saying that the crisis of the German economy had reached a point that a severe decline in living standards in Germany could only be stopped by a policy of military aggression and seizing Austria and Czechoslovakia. Moreover, Hitler urged for quick action before Britain and France obtained a permanent lead in the arms race.

In early 1938, Hitler asserted his control of the military-foreign policy apparatus through the Blomberg-Fritsch Affair and the abolition of the War Ministry and its replacement by the OKW. He also dismissed Neurath as Foreign Minister on 4 February 1938, and assumed the role and title of the ''Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht'' (supreme commander of the armed forces). It has been argued that from early 1938 onwards, Hitler was not carrying out a foreign policy that increased the risk of war, but that he was carrying out a foreign policy that had war as its ultimate aim.

The Holocaust

One of Hitler's central and most controversial ideologies was the concept of so-called racial hygiene. Hitler's eugenic policies initially targeted children with physical and developmental disabilities in a programme dubbed Action T4.

Hitler's idea of ''Lebensraum'' espoused in ''Mein Kampf'', focused on acquiring new territory for German settlement in Eastern Europe. The ''Generalplan Ost'' ("General Plan for the East") provided that the population of occupied Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was to be partially deported to West Siberia, used as slave labour and eventually murdered; the conquered territories were to be colonized by German or "Germanized" settlers.

Between 1939 and 1945, the SS, assisted by collaborationist governments and recruits from occupied countries, systematically killed 11–14 million people, including about six million Jews representing two-thirds of the Jewish population in Europe. These killings took place, for example, in concentration camps, ghettos, and through mass executions. Many victims of the Holocaust were gassed to death, whereas others died of starvation or disease while working as slave labourers.

Hitler's policies also resulted in the systematic killings of Poles and Soviet prisoners of war, communists and other political opponents, homosexuals, Roma, the physically and mentally disabled, Jehovah's Witnesses, Adventists, and trade unionists. One of the largest centres of mass-killing was the extermination camp complex of Auschwitz-Birkenau. Hitler never appeared to have visited the concentration camps and did not speak publicly about the killings.

The Holocaust (the "''Endlösung der jüdischen Frage''" or "Final Solution of the Jewish Question") was organised and executed by Heinrich Himmler and Reinhard Heydrich. The records of the Wannsee Conference—held on 20 January 1942 and led by Reinhard Heydrich with fifteen senior Nazi officials (including Adolf Eichmann) participating—provide the clearest evidence of the systematic planning for the Holocaust. On 22 February, Hitler was recorded saying to his associates, "we shall regain our health only by eliminating the Jews".

Although no specific order from Hitler authorising the mass killings has surfaced, he approved the ''Einsatzgruppen'', killing squads that followed the German army through Poland and Russia, and he was well informed about their activities. Evidence also suggests that in the fall of 1941, Himmler and Hitler decided to use gassing for the mass killings. During interrogations by Soviet intelligence officers declassified over fifty years later, Hitler's valet, Heinz Linge, and his military aide, Otto Günsche, had stated that Hitler had a direct interest in the development of gas chambers."

World War II

Early diplomatic successes

Alliance with Japan

In February 1938, upon advice from his newly appointed Foreign Minister, the strongly pro-Japanese Joachim von Ribbentrop, Hitler ended the Sino-German alliance with the Republic of China to enter instead into an alliance with the more modern and powerful Japan. Hitler announced German recognition of Manchukuo, the Japanese-occupied state in Manchuria, and renounced German claims to the former colonies in the Pacific held by Japan. Hitler also ordered an end to arms shipments to China, and recalled all German officers working with the Chinese Army. In retaliation, Chinese General Chiang Kai-shek cancelled all Sino-German economic agreements, depriving the Germans of Chinese raw materials such as tungsten and limiting the efforts of German rearmament.

Austria and Czechoslovakia

On 12 March 1938, Hitler declared unification of Austria with Germany in the ''Anschluss''. Hitler then turned his attention to the ethnic Germans population of Sudetenland districts of Czechoslovakia.

On 28–29 March 1938, Hitler held a series of secret meetings in Berlin with Konrad Henlein of the Sudeten ''Heimfront'' (Home Front), the largest of the ethnic German parties of the Sudetenland. Both men agreed that Henlein would demand increased autonomy for Sudeten Germans from the Czechoslovakian government, thus providing a pretext for German military action against Czechoslovakia. In April 1938, Henlein told the foreign minister of Hungary that "whatever the Czech government might offer, he would always raise still higher demands ... he wanted to sabotage an understanding by all means because this was the only method to blow up Czechoslovakia quickly". In private, Hitler considered the Sudeten issue unimportant; his real intention was a war of conquest against Czechoslovakia. In April 1938, Hitler ordered the OKW to prepare for ''Fall Grün'' (Case Green), the codename for an invasion of Czechoslovakia. As a result of intense French and British diplomatic pressure, Czechoslovakian President Edvard Beneš unveiled on 5 September 1938, the "Fourth Plan" for constitutional reorganization of his country, which agreed to most of Henlein's demands for Sudeten autonomy. Henlein's ''Heimfront'' responded to Beneš' offer with a series of violent clashes with the Czechoslovakian police that led to the declaration of martial law in certain Sudeten districts.

In light of Germany's dependence on imported oil, and that a confrontation with Britain over the Czechoslovakian dispute could curtail Germany's oil supplies, Hitler called off ''Fall Grün'', originally planned for 1 October 1938. On 29 September 1938, a one-day conference was held in Munich attended by Hitler, Chamberlain, Daladier and Mussolini that led to the Munich Agreement, which gave in to Hitler's ostensible demands by handing over the Sudetenland districts to Germany.

Chamberlain was satisfied with the Munich conference, calling the outcome "peace for our time", while Hitler was angered about his missed opportunity for war in 1938. Hitler expressed his disappointment over the Munich Agreement in a speech on 9 October 1938 in Saarbrücken. In Hitler's view, the British-brokered peace, although favourable to ostensible German demands, was a diplomatic defeat for him, which spurred Hitler's intent of limiting British power to pave the way for the eastern expansion of Germany. However, as a result of the summit, Hitler was selected ''Time'' magazine's Man of the Year for 1938.

In late 1938 and early 1939, the continuing economic crisis caused by the rearmament efforts forced Hitler to make major defence cuts. On 30 January 1939, Hitler made an "Export or die" speech, calling for a German economic offensive, to increase German foreign exchange holdings to pay for raw materials such as high-grade iron needed for military weapons.

"One thing I should like to say on this day which may be memorable for others as well for us Germans: In the course of my life I have very often been a prophet, and I have usually been ridiculed for it. During the time of my struggle for power it was in the first instance the Jewish race which only received my prophecies with laughter when I said I would one day take over the leadership of the State, and that of the whole nation, and that I would then among many other things settle the Jewish problem. Their laughter was uproarious, but I think that for some time now they have been laughing on the other side of the face. Today I will be once more the prophet. If the international Jewish financiers outside Europe should succeed in plunging the nations once more into a world war, then the result will not be the bolshevisation of the earth, and thus the victory of Jewry, but the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe!"

On 15 March 1939, in violation of the Munich accord and possibly as a result of the deepening economic crisis requiring additional assets, Hitler eventually ordered the ''Wehrmacht'' to invade Prague, and from Prague Castle proclaimed Bohemia and Moravia a German protectorate.

Start of World War II

In private discussions in 1939, Hitler described Britain as the main enemy that had to be defeated. In his view, Poland's obliteration as a sovereign nation was the necessary prelude to that goal by securing the eastern flank and also adding to Germany's ''Lebensraum''. As part of his anti-British stance, Hitler wanted Poland to be either a German satellite state or otherwise neutralized to secure the ''Reich''s eastern flank and to evade the effects of a possible British blockade. Initially, Hitler favoured the idea of a satellite state, which was however rejected by the Polish government. Therefore, Hitler decided to invade and destroy Polish sovereignty and independence, and he made this the main German foreign policy goal of 1939. Hitler was offended by the British "guarantee" of Polish independence issued on 31 March 1939, and told his associates that "I shall brew them a devil's drink". In a speech in Wilhelmshaven for the launch of the battleship ''Tirpitz'' on 1 April 1939, Hitler first threatened to denounce the Anglo-German Naval Agreement if the British persisted with their "encirclement" policy he perceived by the British guarantee of Polish independence. On 3 April 1939, Hitler ordered the military to start preparing for ''Fall Weiss'' (Case White), the plan for a German invasion on 25 August 1939. This was followed by a speech before the ''Reichstag'' on 28 April 1939, in which Hitler renounced both the Anglo-German Naval Agreement and the German–Polish Non-Aggression Pact. In August 1939, Hitler spoke to his generals that his original plan for 1939 had to "... establish an acceptable relationship with Poland in order to fight against the West" but since Poland refused to become a German satellite, Hitler believed he had no choice other than wiping Poland off the map.

Hitler was initially concerned that a military attack against Poland could result in a premature war with Britain. However, Hitler's foreign minister—and former Ambassador to London—Joachim von Ribbentrop assured him that neither Britain nor France would honour their commitments to Poland, and that a German–Polish war would only be a limited regional war. Ribbentrop claimed that in December 1938 the French foreign minister, Georges Bonnet, had stated that France considered Eastern Europe as Germany's exclusive sphere of influence, and Ribbentrop also showed Hitler diplomatic cables that supported his analysis. The German Ambassador in London, Herbert von Dirksen, supported Ribbentrop's analysis with a dispatch in August 1939, reporting that British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain knew "the social structure of Britain, even the conception of the British Empire, would not survive the chaos of even a victorious war", and so would back down. Accordingly, on 21 August 1939 Hitler ordered a military mobilization solely against Poland.

Hitler's plans for a military campaign in Poland in late August or early September required Soviet tacit support, resulting in the Munich agreement on 23 August 1939. The non-aggression pact (the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) between Germany and the Soviet Union led by Joseph Stalin, included secret protocols with an agreement to partition Poland between the two countries. In response to the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact—and contrary to the prediction of Ribbentrop that the newly formed pact would severe Anglo-Polish ties—Britain and Poland signed the Anglo-Polish alliance on 25 August 1939. This, along with news from Italy that Mussolini would not honour the Pact of Steel, caused Hitler to postpone the attack on Poland from 25 August to 1 September. In the days before the start of the war, Hitler tried to manoeuvre the British into neutrality by offering a non-aggression guarantee to the British Empire on 25 August 1939 and by having Ribbentrop present a last-minute peace plan with an impossibly short time limit in an effort to then blame the war on British and Polish inaction.

As a pretext for a military aggression against Poland, Hitler claimed the Free City of Danzig and the right for extra-territorial roads across the Polish Corridor, which Germany formerly had ceded under the Versailles treaty. Despite his concerns over a possible British intervention, Hitler was ultimately not deterred from his aim of invading Poland, and on 1 September 1939, Germany invaded western Poland. In response, Britain and France declared war on Germany on 3 September. This surprised Hitler, prompting him to turn to Ribbentrop and angrily ask "Now what?" However, France and Britain did not act on their declarations immediately, and on 17 September, Soviet forces invaded eastern Poland.

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The fall of Poland was followed by what contemporary journalists dubbed the "Phoney War," or ''Sitzkrieg'' ("sitting war"). Hitler meanwhile instructed the two newly appointed ''Gauleiters'' of north-western Poland, Albert Forster and Arthur Greiser, to "Germanize" the area, and promised them "There would be no questions asked" about how this "Germanization" was accomplished. Forster and Greiser held different views on how to interpret Hitler's orders. Whereas Forster had local Poles sign forms, stating that they had German blood with no further documentation, Greiser carried out a brutal ethnic cleansing campaign on the Polish population in his purview. Greiser then complained to Hitler that Forster was allowing thousands of Poles to be accepted as "racial" Germans thus, in Greiser's view, endangering German "racial purity". However, Hitler merely told Himmler and Greiser to take up their difficulties with Forster, and not to involve him. Hitler's handling of the Forster–Greiser dispute has been advanced as an example of Ian Kershaw's theory of "Working Towards the Führer", namely that Hitler issued vague instructions, and allowed his subordinates to work out policies on their own.

Another dispute broke out between different factions, with one represented by ''Reichsführer'' SS Heinrich Himmler and Arthur Greiser championing and carrying out ethnic cleansing in Poland, and another representing Hermann Göring and Hans Frank, calling for turning Poland into the "granary" of the ''Reich''. The dispute was initially settled in favour of the Göring-Frank view of economic exploitation, which ended economically disruptive mass expulsions, at a conference held at Göring's Karinhall estate on 12 February 1940. On 15 May 1940, however, Himmler presented Hitler with a memo entitled "Some Thoughts on the Treatment of Alien Population in the East", which called for expulsion of the entire Jewish population of Europe into Africa and reducing the remainder of the Polish population to a "leaderless class of labourers". Hitler called Himmler's memo "good and correct", scuttling the so-called Karinhall agreement and implementing the Himmler–Greiser viewpoint as German policy for the Polish population.

Hitler commenced building up military forces on Germany's western border, and in April 1940, German forces invaded Denmark and Norway. In May 1940, Hitler's forces attacked France, and also conquered Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Belgium. These victories prompted Benito Mussolini to have Italy join forces with Hitler on 10 June 1940. France surrendered on 22 June 1940.

Britain, whose forces were forced to leave France by sea from Dunkirk, continued to fight alongside other British dominions in the Battle of the Atlantic. Hitler made overtures for peace to the British, now led by Winston Churchill, and when these were rejected Hitler ordered bombing raids on the United Kingdom. Hitler's prelude to a planned invasion of the UK were widespread aerial attacks in the Battle of Britain on Royal Air Force airbases and radar stations in South-East England. However, the German ''Luftwaffe'' failed to defeat the Royal Air Force.

On 27 September 1940, the Tripartite Pact was signed in Berlin by Saburō Kurusu of Imperial Japan, Hitler, and Ciano, and was later expanded to include Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. They were collectively known as the Axis powers. The purpose of the pact was to deter the United States from supporting the British. By the end of October 1940, air superiority for the invasion Operation Sea Lion could not be achieved, and Hitler ordered the nightly air raids of British cities, including London, Plymouth, and Coventry.

In the Spring of 1941, Hitler was distracted from his plans for the East by military activities in North Africa, the Balkans, and the Middle East. In February, German forces arrived in Libya to bolster Italian presence. In April, Hitler launched the invasion of Yugoslavia, quickly followed by the invasion of Greece. In May, German forces were sent to support Iraqi rebel forces fighting against the British and to invade Crete. On 23 May, Hitler released Führer Directive No. 30.

A major historical debate about Hitler's foreign policy preceding the war in 1939 centred on two contrasting explanations: one, by the Marxist historian Timothy Mason, suggested that a structural economic crisis drove Hitler into a "flight into war", while another, by economic historian Richard Overy, explained Hitler's actions with non-economic motives. Historians such as William Carr, Gerhard Weinberg and Ian Kershaw have argued that a non-economic reason for Hitler's rush to war was Hitler's morbid and obsessive fear of an early death, and hence his feeling that he did not have long to accomplish his work.

Path to defeat

On 22 June 1941, contravening the Hitler-Stalin non-aggression pact of 1939, three million German troops attacked the Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa. The invasion seized a huge area, including the Baltic states, Belarus, and Ukraine. However, the German advance was stopped barely short of Moscow in December 1941 by the Russian Winter and fierce Soviet resistance. The invasion failed to achieve the quick success Hitler had wanted.

Some historians, such as Andreas Hillgruber, have argued that ''Operation Barbarossa'' was merely one stage of Hitler's ''Stufenplan'' (stepwise plan) for world conquest, which Hitler may have formulated in the 1920s. Others, such as John Lukacs, suggest that Hitler did not have a ''Stufenplan'', and that the invasion of the Soviet Union was an ''ad hoc'' move in response to Britain's refusal to surrender. Lukacs has argued that Winston Churchill had hoped that the Soviet Union might enter the war on the Allied side, and so to dash this hope and force a British surrender, Hitler had started Operation Barbarossa. On the other hand, Klaus Hildebrand has maintained that both Stalin and Hitler had planned to attack each other in 1941. Soviet troop concentrations on its western border in the spring of 1941 may have prompted Hitler to engage in a ''Flucht nach vorn'' ("flight forward", to get in front of an inevitable conflict). Viktor Suvorov, Ernst Topitsch, Joachim Hoffmann, Ernst Nolte, and David Irving have argued that the official reason for ''Barbarossa'' given by the German military was the real reason, i.e., a preventive war to avert an impending Soviet attack scheduled for July 1941. This theory, however, has been faulted; the American historian Gerhard Weinberg once compared the advocates of the preventive war theory to believers in "fairy tales".

The Wehrmacht invasion of the Soviet Union reached its peak on 2 December 1941 when the 258th Infantry Division advanced to within of Moscow, close enough to see the spires of the Kremlin. However, they were not prepared for the harsh conditions brought on by the first blizzards of winter, and Soviet forces drove German troops back over 320 kilometres (200 miles).

On 7 December 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Four days later, Hitler's formal declaration of war against the United States officially engaged him in war against a coalition that included the world's largest empire (the British Empire), the world's greatest industrial and financial power (the United States), and the world's largest army (the Soviet Union).

On 18 December 1941, the ''Reichsführer-SS'' Heinrich Himmler met with Hitler, and in response to Himmler's question "''What to do with the Jews of Russia?''", Hitler's replied "''als Partisanen auszurotten''" ("exterminate them as partisans"). The Israeli historian Yehuda Bauer has commented that the remark is probably as close as historians will ever get to a definitive order from Hitler for the genocide carried out during the Holocaust.

In late 1942, German forces were defeated in the second battle of El Alamein, thwarting Hitler's plans to seize the Suez Canal and the Middle East. In February 1943, the Battle of Stalingrad ended with the destruction of the German 6th Army. Thereafter came the Battle of Kursk. Hitler's military judgment became increasingly erratic, and Germany's military and economic position deteriorated along with Hitler's health. Ian Kershaw and others believe that Hitler may have suffered from Parkinson's disease. Syphilis has also been suspected as a cause of at least some of his symptoms.

Following the allied invasion of Sicily (Operation Husky) in 1943, Mussolini was deposed by Pietro Badoglio, who surrendered to the Allies. Throughout 1943 and 1944, the Soviet Union steadily forced Hitler's armies into retreat along the Eastern Front. On 6 June 1944, the Western Allied armies landed in northern France in what was one of the largest amphibious operations in history, Operation Overlord. Objective observers in the German army then knew that defeat was inevitable, and some plotted to remove Hitler from power.

Attempted assassination

There were seventeen planned attempts or plans to assassinate Hitler from 1939–1945, some which proceeded to significant degrees. The most famous assassination attempt on Hitler's life came from within Germany during World War II and was at least partly driven by the prospect of an increasingly imminent defeat of Germany in the war.

In July 1944, as part of Operation Valkyrie or 20 July plot, Claus von Stauffenberg planted a bomb in Hitler's headquarters, the Wolfsschanze (Wolf's Lair) at Rastenburg. Hitler narrowly survived because someone had unknowingly moved the briefcase that contained the bomb by pushing it behind a leg of the heavy conference table. When the bomb exploded, the table deflected much of the blast away from Hitler. Later, Hitler ordered savage reprisals, resulting in the executions of more than 4,900 people.

Defeat and death

By late 1944, the Red Army had driven the German army back into Western Europe, and the Western Allies were advancing into Germany. After being informed of the twin defeats in his Ardennes Offensive at his Adlerhorst command complex – Operation ''Wacht am Rhein'' and Operation ''Nordwind'' – Hitler realized that Germany was about to lose the war, but he did not permit an orderly retreat of his armies. His hope was to negotiate peace with America and Britain, buoyed by the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt on 12 April 1945. Hitler ordered the destruction of all German industrial infrastructure before it could fall into Allied hands; he also acted on his view that Germany's military failures had forfeited its right to survive as a nation. Execution of this scorched earth plan was entrusted to arms minister Albert Speer, who, however, quietly disobeyed the order.

On 20 April 1945, Hitler celebrated his 56th birthday in the ''Führerbunker'' ("Führer's shelter") below the ''Reichskanzlei'' (Reich Chancellery). The garrison commander of the besieged ''Festung Breslau'' ("fortress Breslau"), General Hermann Niehoff, had chocolates distributed to his troops in honour of Hitler's birthday.

By 21 April, Georgi Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front had broken through the last defences of German General Gotthard Heinrici's Army Group Vistula during the Battle of the Seelow Heights. Facing little resistance, the Soviets advanced into the outskirts of Berlin. In denial of his increasingly dire situation, Hitler placed his hopes on the units commanded by Waffen SS General Felix Steiner, the ''Armeeabteilung Steiner'' ("Army Detachment Steiner"). Although "Army Detachment Steiner" was more than a corps it was less than an army. Hitler ordered Steiner to attack the northern flank of the salient made up of of Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front. At the same time, the German Ninth Army, which had been pushed south of the salient, was ordered to attack northward in a pincer attack.

Late on 21 April, Gotthard Heinrici called Hans Krebs, chief of the ''Oberkommando des Heeres'' (Supreme Command of the Army or OKH), to inform him that Hitler's defence plans could not be implemented. Heinrici also told Krebs to impress upon Hitler the need to withdraw the 9th Army from its position.

On 22 April, during military conference, Hitler asked about Steiner's offensive. After a long silence, Hitler was told that the attack had never been launched and that the Russians had broken through into Berlin. This news prompted Hitler to ask everyone except Wilhelm Keitel, Hans Krebs, Alfred Jodl, Wilhelm Burgdorf, and Martin Bormann to leave the room. Hitler then launched a tirade against the treachery and incompetence of his commanders, culminating in Hitler's declaration—for the first time—that the war was lost. Hitler announced that he would stay in Berlin, to direct the defence of the city and then shoot himself.

Before the day ended, Hitler again found fresh hope in a new plan that included General Walther Wenck's Twelfth Army. This new plan had Wenck turn his army – currently facing the Americans to the west – and attack towards the east to relieve Berlin. The Twelfth Army was to link up with the Ninth Army and break through to the city. Wenck did attack and made temporary contact with the Potsdam garrison. But the link with the Ninth Army, like the plan in general, was unsuccessful.

On 23 April, Joseph Goebbels made the following proclamation to the people of Berlin:

Also on 23 April, Göring sent a telegram from ''Berchtesgaden'' in Bavaria, arguing that since Hitler was cut off in Berlin, he, Göring, should assume leadership of Germany. Göring set a time limit after which he would consider Hitler incapacitated. Hitler responded angrily by having Göring arrested, and when writing his will on 29 April, Göring was removed from all his positions in the government. Hitler appointed General der Artillerie Helmuth Weidling as the commander of the Berlin Defence Area, replacing Lieutenant General (''Generalleutnant'') Helmuth Reymann and Colonel (''Oberst'') Ernst Kaether. Hitler also appointed Waffen-SS Brigadeführer Wilhelm Mohnke the (Kommandant) Battle Commander for the defence of the government district (Zitadelle sector) that included the Reich Chancellery and Führerbunker.

On 27 April, Berlin became completely cut off from the rest of Germany. As the Soviet forces closed in, Hitler's followers urged him to flee to the mountains of Bavaria to make a last stand in the national redoubt. However, Hitler was determined to either live or die in the capital.

On 28 April, Hitler discovered that Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler was trying to discuss surrender terms with the Western Allies (through the Swedish diplomat Count Folke Bernadotte). Hitler ordered Himmler's arrest and had Hermann Fegelein (Himmler's SS representative at Hitler's HQ in Berlin) shot. Adding to Hitler's woes was Wenck's report that his Twelfth Army had been forced back along the entire front and that his forces could no longer support Berlin.

After midnight on 29 April, Hitler married Eva Braun in a small civil ceremony in a map room within the Führerbunker. Antony Beevor stated that after Hitler hosted a modest wedding breakfast with his new wife, he then took secretary Traudl Junge to another room and dictated his last will and testament. Hitler signed these documents at 4:00 am. The event was witnessed and documents signed by Hans Krebs, Wilhelm Burgdorf, Joseph Goebbels, and Martin Bormann. Hitler then retired to bed. That afternoon, Hitler was informed of the assassination of Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, which presumably increased his determination to avoid capture.

On 30 April 1945, after intense street-to-street combat, when Soviet troops were within a block or two of the Reich Chancellery, Hitler and Braun committed suicide; Braun by biting into a cyanide capsule and Hitler by shooting himself with his 7.65 mm Walther PPK pistol. Hitler had at various times contemplated suicide, and the Walther was the same pistol that his niece, Geli Raubal had used in her suicide. The lifeless bodies of Hitler and Eva Braun were carried up the stairs and through the bunker's emergency exit to the bombed-out garden behind the Reich Chancellery where they were placed in a bomb crater and doused with petrol. The corpses were set on fire as the Red Army advanced and the shelling continued.

On 2 May, Berlin surrendered, and there were conflicting reports about what happened to Hitler's remains. Records in the Soviet archives— obtained after the fall of the Soviet Union—showed that the remains of Hitler, Eva Braun, Joseph and Magda Goebbels, the six Goebbels children, General Hans Krebs and Hitler's dogs, were repeatedly buried and exhumed. On 4 April 1970, a Soviet KGB team with detailed burial charts secretly exhumed five wooden boxes which had been buried at the SMERSH facility in Magdeburg. The remains from the boxes were thoroughly burned and crushed, after which the ashes were thrown into the Biederitz river, a tributary of the nearby Elbe.

According to the Russian Federal Security Service, a fragment of human skull stored in its archives and displayed to the public in a 2000 exhibition came from Hitler's remains. However, the authenticity of the skull fragment was challenged by historians and researchers, and DNA analysis conducted in 2009 showed the skull fragment to be that of a woman. Analysis of the sutures between the skull plates indicated that it belonged to a 20–40-year-old individual.

Legacy

Hitler's policies and orders resulted in the death of approximately 40 million people, including about 27 million in the Soviet Union. The actions of Hitler, and of the Hitler's ideology, Nazism, are almost universally regarded as gravely immoral. Historians, philosophers, and politicians have often applied the word ''evil'' to describe Hitler's ideology and its outcomes. Historical and cultural portrayals of Hitler in the west are overwhelmingly condemnatory. For example, the denial of the Holocaust along with the display of Nazi symbols such as swastikas, is prohibited by law in Germany and Austria.

Outside of Hitler's birthplace in Braunau am Inn, Austria, the Memorial Stone Against War and Fascism is engraved with the following message: }}

Loosely translated it reads: "For peace, freedom // and democracy // never again fascism // millions of dead remind [us]"

Following WWII the toothbrush moustache fell out of favour in the West because of its strong association with Hitler, earning it the nickname "Hitler moustache". The use of the name "Adolf" also declined in post-war years.

Hitler and his legacy are occasionally described in more neutral or even favourable terms. Former Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat spoke of his 'admiration' of Hitler in 1953, when he was a young man, but it is possible that Sadat's views were shaped mainly by his anti-British sentiments. Louis Farrakhan has referred to Hitler as a "very great man". Bal Thackeray, leader of the right-wing Hindu nationalist Shiv Sena party in the Indian state of the Maharashtra, declared in 1995 that he was an admirer of Hitler. Friedrich Meinecke, the German historian, said of Hitler's life that "it is one of the great examples of the singular and incalculable power of personality in historical life".

Religious views

Hitler's parents were Roman Catholics, but after leaving home he never attended Mass or received the sacraments. Hitler favoured aspects of Protestantism that suited his own views. However, he also adopted some elements of the Catholic Church's hierarchical organization, liturgy and phraseology in his politics. After his move to Germany, where Catholic and Protestant churches are largely financed through a church tax, Hitler did not leave his church, leading the historian Richard Steigmann-Gall to conclude that Hitler "can be classified as Catholic", but that "nominal church membership is a very unreliable gauge of actual piety in this context."

In public, Hitler often praised Christian heritage, German Christian culture, and professed a belief in an "Aryan" Jesus Christ, a Jesus who fought against the Jews. In his speeches and publications, Hitler spoke of his interpretation of Christianity as a central motivation for his antisemitism, stating that "As a Christian I have no duty to allow myself to be cheated, but I have the duty to be a fighter for truth and justice." In private, Hitler was more critical of traditional Christianity, considering it a religion fit only for slaves; he admired the power of Rome but maintained a severe hostility towards its teaching. Hitler's critical views on Catholicism resonated with Streicher's contention that the Catholic establishment was allying itself with the Jews. In light of these private statements, for John S. Conway and many other historians, it is beyond doubt that Hitler held a "fundamental antagonism" towards the Christian churches. However, some researchers have questioned the authenticity of Hitler's private statements; for instance, Hermann Rauschning's ''Hitler speaks'' is considered by most historians to be an invention.

In the political relations with the churches in Germany, however, Hitler readily adopted a strategy "that suited his immediate political purposes". Hitler had a general plan, even before his rise to power, to destroy Christianity within the Reich. The leader of the Hitler Youth stated that "the destruction of Christianity was explicitly recognized as a purpose of the National Socialist movement" from the start, but "considerations of expedience made it impossible" publicly to express this extreme position. His intention was to wait until the war was over to destroy the influence of Christianity. a belief system purged of what he objected to in orthodox Christianity, and featuring racist elements. By 1940, however, Hitler had abandoned advocating even the syncretist idea of a positive Christianity. Hitler maintained that the "''terrorism in religion is, to put it briefly, of a Jewish dogma, which Christianity has universalized and whose effect is to sow trouble and confusion in men's minds.''"

Hitler articulated his view on the relationship between religion and national identity as, "We do not want any other god than Germany itself. It is essential to have fanatical faith and hope and love in and for Germany".

Attitude towards occultism

Some researchers suggest that Hitler did not follow esoteric ideas, occultism, or Ariosophy, Others have suggested that Hitler's views, particularly on race, had been strongly influenced by works that promulgated a mystical superiority of the Germans; these works included the occult and antisemitic magazine ''Ostara'', whose publisher Lanz von Liebenfels claimed that Hitler had visited him in 1909 and had praised his work. Historians are divided on the question of the reliability of von Liebenfels' claim. Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke considers his account reliable, Brigitte Hamann leaves the question open and Ian Kershaw, although questioning the degree to which Hitler was influenced by it, notes that, "Most likely, Hitler did read ''Ostara'', along with other racist pulp which was prominent on Vienna newspaper stands." Kershaw notes that it is usually accepted that Hitler did read and was influenced by this occult publication, pointing to Hitler's account of his conversion to antisemitism after reading antisemitic pamphlets.

Health

Hitler's health frequently has been the subject of speculation. It has been suggested that he suffered from irritable bowel syndrome, skin lesions, irregular heartbeat, Parkinson's disease, syphilis, tinnitus, and Asperger syndrome. Hitler also had dental problems—his personal dentist, Hugo Blaschke, had fitted a large dental bridge to Hitler's upper jaw in 1933, and in 1944, Blaschke removed the left rear section of the bridge to treat an infection of Hitler's gums that coincided with a sinus infection.

From the mid-1930s, Hitler followed a largely vegetarian diet, and ate meat only occasionally. At social events, Hitler sometimes gave graphic accounts of the slaughter of animals in an effort to make his dinner guests shun meat. A fear of cancer (from which his mother died) is the most widely cited reason for Hitler's dietary habits. However, Hitler, an antivivisectionist, may have followed his selective diet out of a profound concern for animals. Martin Bormann had a greenhouse constructed near the ''Berghof'' (near ''Berchtesgaden'') to ensure a steady supply of fresh fruit and vegetables for Hitler throughout the war.

Hitler was a non-smoker and promoted aggressive anti-smoking campaigns throughout Germany. (See Anti-tobacco movement in Nazi Germany.) Hitler strongly despised alcohol.

Syphilis

During the last years of his life, Hitler suffered from tremors and irregular heartbeat, which could have been symptoms of tertiary (late-stage) syphilis. Theodor Morell (a specialist venereologist) and another physician diagnosed Hitler with syphilis in early 1945 in a joint report to SS head Heinrich Himmler. Some historians have noted Hitler's preoccupation with syphilis in ''Mein Kampf'', calling it a "Jewish disease" and leading to speculation he may have contracted the disease himself. Since the 1870s, however, it was common for the völkisch right to associate Jews with diseases such as syphilis. Historian Robert Waite claims that Hitler tested negative on a Wassermann test in 1939; however, the test was prone to false-negative results. Regardless of Hitler's infection status, he lived in constant fear of the disease, and took treatment for it ignoring his physician's opinions. For example, Hitler may have discovered in 1908 that he was syphilitic, and this may have influenced his views on prostitution and similar societal features and spurred his intent to eliminate these perceived ills. In ''Mein Kampf'', he wrote about the temptation of prostitution and the spreading of syphilis, specifically volume 1, chapter 10, "Causes of the Collapse".

The journalist Joseph Kessel reports that renowned masseur, Felix Kersten, in the winter of 1942 was shown a top-secret 26-page report that indicated that Hitler had contracted syphilis in his youth and was treated for it at a hospital in Pasewalk, Germany. In 1937, Hitler had first displayed late-stage symptoms, and by the start of 1942, progressive syphilitic paralysis (''Tabes dorsalis'') was occurring. Hitler was treated by Morell and his disease was kept as a state secret. The only people privy to the report's content were Martin Bormann and Hermann Göring.

Monorchism

It has been alleged that Hitler had monorchism, the medical condition of having only one testicle. Hitler's personal doctor, Johan Jambor, supposedly described this condition to a priest whose records were uncovered in 2008, 23 years after the doctor's death.

Soviet journalist, Lev Bezymensky, allegedly involved in the Soviet autopsy of Hitler's remains, stated in a 1967 book that Hitler's left testicle had been missing, but he later admitted to have falsified this claim. Hitler had been examined by many doctors throughout his life, and no mention of this clinical condition has been discovered. Records show that he was wounded in 1916 during the Battle of the Somme, with some sources describing his injury as a wound to the groin.

Parkinson's disease

It has also been speculated Hitler had Parkinson's disease. Newsreel footage of Hitler show tremors of his hand and a shuffling walk, which began before the war and worsened towards the end of his life. Morell treated Hitler with a drug that was commonly used in 1945 to treat the condition.

Ernst-Günther Schenck, working as emergency doctor in the Reich Chancellery during April 1945, also claimed Hitler might have had Parkinson's disease. However, Schenck saw Hitler only briefly on two occasions, and his diagnosis was formed at a time of immense stress and exhaustion, as he had been working in the surgery for several days without much sleep.

Other complaints

From the 1930s, Hitler suffered from stomach pains. In 1936, a non-cancerous polyp was removed from his throat and he developed eczema on his legs. He also suffered ruptured eardrums as a result of the 20 July plot bomb blast in 1944, and two hundred wood splinters had to be removed from his legs. Hitler's otologist observed that Hitler had developed tinnitus after the Röhm-Putsch, and considered it psychogenic in origin. Hitler treated the condition with the prescription-free lipid lecithin.

Addiction to amphetamine

Hitler began using amphetamine occasionally after 1937 and became addicted to the drug after the late summer of 1942. Albert Speer has linked Hitler's use of amphetamines with his increasingly inflexible decision making (for example, never to allow military retreats).

Historians' views

The German historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler dismisses theories that link the rise of Nazi Germany to Hitler's medical conditions and mental states. The theories about Hitler's medical condition are difficult to prove, and according them too much weight may have the effect of attributing many of the events and consequences of the Third Reich to the possibly impaired physical health of one individual. Ian Kershaw agrees that it is better to take a broader view of German history by seeking to examine what social forces led to the Third Reich and its policies rather than to pursue narrow explanations for the Holocaust and World War II based on only one person.

Sexuality

To the public, Hitler promoted his own image as that of a man without a domestic life, dedicated entirely to his political mission. However, he was engaged to Mimi Reiter in the 1920s, and later had a partner, Eva Braun. He had a close bond with his half-niece Geli Raubal, which may have included sexual relations, though there is no evidence that conclusively supports such a relationship. All three women attempted suicide, which has led to speculation that Hitler may have had sexual fetishes that affected the mental well-being of his close partners. Otto Strasser, a political opponent of Hitler, claimed that Hitler had urolagnia (sexual arousal by urine or urination), but Mimi Reiter has disputed this claim. Hitler may have also had a sexual relationship with British fascist, Unity Mitford.

Family

Paula Hitler, the last living member of Adolf Hitler's immediate family, died in 1960.

The most prominent and longest-living closest relative was Adolf Hitler's nephew, William Patrick Hitler, the son of Adolf's half-brother, Alois Hitler Jr.

Over the years, various investigative reporters have attempted to track down other living relatives of Hitler. Many are presumed to be living inconspicuous lives and have changed their last name.

Klara Hitler, mother

Alois Hitler, father

Alois Hitler, Jr., half-brother

Angela Hitler Raubal, half-sister

Bridget Dowling, sister-in-law

Eva Braun, partner and then wife

Geli Raubal, niece

Gretl Braun, sister-in-law through Hitler's marriage to Eva Braun

Heinz Hitler, nephew

Hermann Fegelein, brother-in-law through Hitler's marriage to Eva Braun

Ilse Braun, sister-in-law through Hitler's marriage to Eva Braun

Johann Georg Hiedler, presumed grandfather

Johann Nepomuk Hiedler, maternal great-grandfather, presumed great uncle and possibly Hitler's true paternal grandfather

Leo Raubal Jr, nephew

Maria Schicklgruber, grandmother

Paula Hitler, sister

William Patrick Hitler, nephew

Hitler in media

Oratory and rallies

Hitler honed his oratory skills by giving speeches to military audiences in 1919 and 1920. He became adept at using populist themes targeted to his audience, including the use of popular scapegoats who could be blamed for the economic hardships of his listeners. Munitions minister and architect Albert Speer commented that Hitler was above all else an actor.

Recorded in private conversation

Hitler visited Finnish Field Marshal Mannerheim on 4 June 1942. During the visit, an engineer of the Finnish broadcasting company YLE, Thor Damen, recorded Hitler and Mannerheim in conversation. Damen did so secretly, since Hitler did not permit recordings of him off the record. The 11½ minutes-long recording is the only audio record of Hitler in casual conversation. Most of the recording is a monologue of Hitler, which he delivers in a slightly excited, but detached manner. Hitler concedes that he had underestimated the Soviet Union's ability to conduct effective warfare. Audio recordings of Hitler and Mannerheim's public and private talk (w/English text) are available online.

Documentaries during the Third Reich

Documentary films were another propaganda tool for Hitler. Hitler was involved and appeared in a series of films by the pioneering filmmaker Leni Riefenstahl via Universum Film AG (UFA):

''Der Sieg des Glaubens'' (''Victory of Faith'', 1933).

''Triumph des Willens'' (''Triumph of the Will'', 1934), co-produced by Hitler.

''Tag der Freiheit: Unsere Wehrmacht'' (''Day of Freedom: Our Armed Forces'', 1935).

''Olympia'' (1938).

Hitler was the central figure of the first three films; they focused on the party rallies of the respective years and are considered propaganda films. For example, Leni Riefenstahl's ''Triumph of the Will'', shot during the 1934 Nuremberg Rally, shows Hitler from high and low angles, and only twice head-on. Some of the people in the film were paid actors, but most of the participants were not. Hitler also featured prominently in the ''Olympia'' film. Whether the latter is a propaganda film or a true documentary is still a subject of controversy, but it nonetheless perpetuated and spread the propaganda message of the 1936 Olympic Games, depicting Nazi Germany as a prosperous and peaceful country.

Television

As a prominent politician, Hitler was featured in many newsreels. His attendance at public functions, including the 1936 Olympic Games and Nuremberg Rallies, appeared on television broadcasts made between 1935 and 1939. These events, along with other programming that highlighted activity by public officials, were often repeated in public viewing rooms. Samples from a number of surviving television films from Nazi Germany were included in the 1999 documentary ''Das Fernsehen unter dem Hakenkreuz (Television Under the Swastika)''.

Documentaries post Third Reich

''The World at War'' (1974): a Thames Television series which contains much information about Hitler and Nazi Germany, including an interview with his secretary, Traudl Junge.

''Adolf Hitler's Last Days'': from the BBC series "Secrets of World War II" tells the story about Hitler's last days during World War II.

''The Nazis: A Warning From History'' (1997): six-part BBC TV series on how the cultured and educated Germans accepted Hitler and the Nazis up to its downfall. Historical consultant is Ian Kershaw.

''Cold War'' (1998): a CNN series about the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. The series begins with World War II footage, including Hitler, and how the Cold War began after Germany surrendered.

''Im toten Winkel – Hitlers Sekretärin (Blind Spot: Hitler's Secretary)'' (2002): an exclusive 90 minute interview with Traudl Junge, Hitler's secretary. Made by Austrian Jewish director André Heller shortly before Junge's death from lung cancer, Junge recalls the last days in the Berlin bunker. Clips of the interview were used in ''Downfall (film)''.

''Undergångens arkitektur (The Architecture of Doom)'' (1989): documentary about the National Socialist aesthetic as envisioned by Hitler.

''Das Fernsehen unter dem Hakenkreuz (Television Under the Swastika)'' (1999): documentary by Michael Kloft about the domestic use of television in Nazi Germany for propaganda purposes from 1935 to 1944.

''Ruins of the Reich'' (2007): four-part series of the Rise and Fall of Hitler's Reich and its effects, created by Third Reich historian R.J. Adams

Films and series

East German actor Fritz Diez depicted Hitler in ''Ernst Thälmann – Führer seiner Klasse'' (East Germany, 1955), ''Frozen Flashes'' (East Germany, 1967), ''I, Justice'' (Czechoslovakia, 1967), ''Liberation'' (1970–1, Soviet Union), ''17 Moments of Spring'' (1973, TV production, Soviet Union), ''Take Aim'' (1974, Soviet Union) and ''Soldiers of Freedom'' (1977, Soviet Union).

''Hitler'' (1962) is a U.S. made film (it was later re-released with the title, ''Women of Nazi Germany''). The film stars Richard Basehart. The film depicts Hitler through the years and focuses mainly on his private life.

''The Death of Adolf Hitler'', a British (7 January 1973) made-for-television production, starring Frank Finlay. The movie depicts the last days of Hitler.

''Hitler: The Last Ten Days'' (1973): movie depicting the days leading up to Adolf Hitler's death, starring Sir Alec Guinness.

Hans-Jürgen Syberberg's ''Hitler – Ein Film aus Deutschland'' ''(Hitler: A Film from Germany)'' (1977): a seven-hour work in four parts. The director uses documentary clips, photographic backgrounds, puppets, theatrical stages, and other elements.

''The Bunker'' (1981): a U.S. made-for-television movie describing the last days in the Führerbunker covering 17 January 1945 to 2 May 1945. The film stars Sir Anthony Hopkins.

''Europa, Europa'' (1990): based on the true story of a German Jew who joined the Hitler Youth to avoid capture. Hitler is portrayed by Ryszard Pietruski.

''Fatherland'' (1994): a hypothetical view of Germany in 1964, had Hitler won World War II, adapted from the novel by former journalist Robert Harris.

''The Empty Mirror'' (1996): a psychodrama which speculates on the events following Hitler (portrayed by Norman Rodway) surviving the fall of Nazi Germany.

''Moloch'' (1999): Hitler portrayed by Leonid Mozgovoy in a fictional drama set at his Berghof Retreat in the Bavarian Alps.

''Max'' (2002): fictional drama depicting a friendship between Jewish art dealer Max Rothman (John Cusack) and a young Adolf Hitler (Noah Taylor) as a failed painter in Vienna.

''Hitler: The Rise of Evil'' (2003): two-part TV series about the early years of Adolf Hitler and his rise to power (up to 1933), starring Robert Carlyle.

''Der Untergang'' ''(Downfall)'' (2004): German movie about the last days of Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich, starring Bruno Ganz. This film is partly based on the autobiography of Traudl Junge, a favourite secretary of Hitler's. In 2002, Junge said she felt great guilt for "... liking the greatest criminal ever to have lived."

''Valkyrie'' (2008): Hitler, played by David Bamber, is portrayed as a target of the famous assassination plot by Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg.

''The Man Who Crossed Hitler'' (2011): BBC film dramatising the true story where Jewish lawyer Hans Litten subpoenas Hitler, played by Ian Hart, as a witness in the trial of some Nazi thugs in 1931.

Plays

''Dr Freud Will See You Now Mr Hitler'' (2008): radio drama by Laurence Marks and Maurice Gran presenting an imagined scenario in which Sigmund Freud treats the young Hitler. Toby Jones played Hitler.

See also

Führermuseum

''Mein Kampf'' (online versions)

Poison Kitchen

Vorbunker

Footnotes

References

Further reading

External links

 – real life footage in documentaries  – as portrayed in film and TV

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Coordinates	34°26′″N35°51′″N
Name	Joachim von Ribbentrop
Alt	Portrait of a middle-aged man with short grey hair and a stern expression. He wears a dark military uniform, with a swastika on one arm. He is seated with his hands on a table with several papers on it, holding a pen.
Order	Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs
Term start	4 February 1938
Term end	30 April 1945
President	Adolf HitlerFührer
Chancellor	Adolf Hitler
Predecessor	Konstantin von Neurath
Successor	Arthur Seyss-Inquart
Order2	German Ambassador to the Court of St. James
Term start2	1936
Term end2	1938
Appointed2	Adolf Hitler
Predecessor2	Leopold von Hoesch
Successor2	Herbert von Dirksen
Birth place	Wesel, Rhine Province, Kingdom of Prussia, German Empire
Death date	October 16, 1946
Death place	Nuremberg, Germany
Party	National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP)
Spouse	Anna Elisabeth Henkell (m. 1920)
Children	5
Profession	Businessman, Diplomat
Signature	Joachim von Ribbentrop Signature.svg
Footnotes	}}

Ulrich Friedrich Wilhelm Joachim von Ribbentrop (30 April 1893 – 16 October 1946) was Foreign Minister of Germany from 1938 until 1945. He was later hanged for war crimes after the Nuremberg Trials.

Early life

Joachim von Ribbentrop was born in Wesel, Rhenish Prussia, the son of Richard Ulrich Friedrich Joachim Ribbentrop, a career army officer, and his wife Johanne Sophie Hertwig. Ribbentrop was educated irregularly at private schools in Germany and Switzerland. From 1904 to 1908, Ribbentrop took courses in French in a school at Metz, the most powerful fortress of the German Empire. One of his teachers at Metz later recalled that Ribbentrop "was the most stupid in his class, full of vanity and very pushy". His father was cashiered from the Imperial German Army in 1908, following a series of disparaging remarks he had made about the alleged homosexuality of Kaiser Wilhelm II, and the Ribbentrop family were often short of money. Fluent in both French and English, young Ribbentrop lived at various times in Grenoble, France, and London, before travelling to Canada in 1910. Initially, Ribbentrop planned to emigrate to the colony of German East Africa, where he had hopes of being a planter. During a summer vacation in Switzerland in 1909, Ribbentrop fell in love with a wealthy young socialite from a Montreal banking family named Catherine Bell, which led him to substitute Canada for Tanganyika as his choice of destination. Right up until 1914, Ribbentrop maintained hopes of marrying Bell, and so despite his constant wandering across North America, it was always towards Montreal that he was driven to return to time after time. He worked for the Molsons Bank on Stanley Street in Montreal and then for the engineering firm M.P. and J.T. Davis on the reconstruction of the Quebec Bridge. He was also employed by the National Transcontinental Railway, which constructed a line from Moncton to Winnipeg. He worked as a journalist in New York City and Boston and then rested to recover from tuberculosis in Germany. He returned to Canada and set up a small business in Ottawa importing German wine and champagne. In 1914, he competed for Ottawa's famous Minto ice-skating team, participating in the Ellis Memorial Trophy tournament in Boston in February.

When World War I began, Ribbentrop left Canada, which as part of the British Empire was at war with Germany as of 4 August 1914 for the neutral United States. He sailed from Hoboken, New Jersey on 15 August 1914 on the Holland-America ship ''The Potsdam'', bound for Rotterdam. He then returned home and enlisted in the 125th Hussar Regiment.

He served first on the Eastern Front, but was later transferred to the Western Front. He earned a commission and was awarded the Iron Cross. In 1918 1st Lieutenant Ribbentrop was stationed in Istanbul as a staff officer. During his time in Turkey, he became friends with another staff officer named Franz von Papen.

Family

In 1919 Ribbentrop met Anna Elisabeth Henkell, known as Annelies to her friends, daughter of a wealthy champagne producer from Wiesbaden. They married on 5 July 1920, and Ribbentrop travelled across Europe as a wine salesman. He and his wife had five children. Annelies von Ribbentrop was often described as being a Lady Macbeth-type who dominated her husband. Ribbentrop persuaded his aunt Gertrud von Ribbentrop to adopt him on 15 May 1925, which allowed him to add the aristocratic ''von'' to his name. During most of the Weimar Republic era, Ribbentrop was apolitical and displayed no anti-Semitic prejudices. A visitor to a party thrown by Ribbentrop in 1928 recorded that Ribbentrop had no political views beyond a vague admiration for Gustav Stresemann, fear of Communism and a wish to restore the monarchy. Several Berlin Jewish businessmen who did business with Ribbentrop in the 1920s and knew him well later expressed astonishment at the vicious anti-Semitism Ribbentrop was to display in the Third Reich, saying that they did not see any indications that he had held such views when they had known him. As a wealthy partner in the Henckel-Trocken champagne firm, Ribbentrop did business with Jewish bankers, and organized the Impegroma Importing Company ("Import und Export großer Marken") with Jewish financing.

Early Nazi career

In 1928, Ribbentrop was introduced to Hitler as a man who "gets the same price for German champagne as others get for French champagne" as well as a businessman with foreign connections. Ribbentrop was introduced to the Nazis by the SA leader Count Wolf-Heinrich von Helldorf, with whom Ribbentrop had served in the 12th Torgau Hussars in the First World War. He joined the National Socialist German Workers' Party on 1 May 1932 at the urging of his wife, who herself joined the NSDAP at the same time. His NSDAP card number was 1,199,927. In the summer of 1932, Ribbentrop began his political career when he offered to be a secret emissary between the Chancellor, Ribbentrop’s old war buddy Franz von Papen and Hitler. Ribbentrop's offer was refused at the time, but six months later, in January 1933, Ribbentrop's offer was taken up by Hitler and von Papen. The end result of these talks was the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor on 30 January 1933. Ribbentrop, who was both a Nazi Party member and an old friend of von Papen, facilitated the negotiations by arranging for von Papen and Hitler to meet secretly at his house in Berlin. This assistance endeared Ribbentrop to Hitler.

On 18 January 1933, Hitler had the first of several secret meetings with von Papen at Ribbentrop's house in the exclusive Dahlem district of Berlin. Among Ribbentrop's guests that night were Hitler; von Papen; Hermann Göring, Major Oskar von Hindenburg, the politically powerful son of the President and Otto Meißner, the Presidential State Secretary. At another secret meeting at Ribbentrop's house, this time without Hitler, on 24 January 1933 that Hermann Göring, Wilhelm Frick, Ribbentrop and von Papen worked out the plan that the best way of overcoming President von Hindenburg's opposition to appointing Hitler Chancellor was by creating a right-wing "government of national concentration" that would ensure the Chancellorship went to Hitler while giving the impression that Hitler's power would be limited by creating a coalition government of all the German right. On 27 January 1933, Ribbentrop invited Alfred Hugenberg, the leader of the D.N.V.P to a secret meeting at his house in an attempt to win his participation in the proposed "government of national concentration" that nearly scuttled Hitler's chances of getting the Chancellorship when Hugenberg objected to Hitler's proposed Cabinet line-up, complaining that too many portfolios went to the Nazis and not enough to the D.N.V.P. Ribbentrop played a key role together with von Papen in persuading Hitler at a meeting at the Kaiserhof Hotel on 28 January 1933 to back down on his demand that the office of ''Reich'' Commissioner of Prussia go to a Nazi that threatened to block Hitler's chances of getting the Chancellorship. Ribbentrop successfully argued to Hitler that Hindenburg might reluctantly appoint Hitler Chancellor, but that the President would never back down on his condition that Papen be the ''Reich'' Commissioner of Prussia, and that be so close to power, that now was not the time to be stubborn over a secondary office. The British historian Laurence Rees described Ribbentrop as "...the Nazi almost all the other leading Nazis hated" Typical of this hatred for Ribbentrop was the diary entry of Joseph Goebbels: "Von Ribbentrop bought his name, he married his money, and he swindled his way into office". To compensate for this, Ribbentrop became a fanatical Nazi, almost to the point of becoming a caricature of a Nazi brought to life. In particular, Ribbentrop became a vociferous anti-Semite.

He became German dictator Adolf Hitler's favourite foreign policy adviser, partly by dint of his knowledge of the world outside Germany, but mostly by means of shameless flattery and sycophancy. The professional diplomats of the elite ''Auswärtiges Amt'' (Foreign Office) told Hitler the truth about what was happening abroad in the early years of Nazi Germany; Ribbentrop told Hitler what he wanted Hitler to hear. One German diplomat, Herbert Richter, in an interview later recalled "Ribbentrop didn't understand anything about foreign policy. His sole wish was to please Hitler". To assist with this, Ribbentrop always questioned those who had lunch with Hitler about what he had said, thereby allowing Ribbentrop at his next meeting with Hitler to present Hitler's ideas as his own. Ribbentrop in turn was a great admirer of Hitler. Ribbentrop was emotionally dependent on Hitler's favour to the extent that he suffered from psychosomatic illnesses if Hitler was unhappy with him. In 1933 he was given honorary SS officer rank of ''SS-Standartenführer''. His SS membership number was 63,083. For a time, Ribbentrop was friendly with the ''Reichsführer-SS'' Heinrich Himmler, but ultimately the two became enemies mostly because the SS insisted upon the right to conduct its own foreign policy independent of Ribbentrop.

A factor that much helped Ribbentrop's rise was Hitler's distrust and disdain of the professional diplomats of the ''Auswärtiges Amt'', who he suspected were not entirely in favor of his revolution. In fact, as the German historian Hans-Adolf Jacobsen pointed out, the diplomats of the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' loyally served the Nazi regime and only rarely gave Hitler grounds for attacking them. The values and attitudes of the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' owed more to the nationalism of Wilhelmine Germany, under which most of the diplomats had begun their careers, than to the racist nationalism of the Nazis; but as the views of the traditional diplomats were ultra-nationalist, authoritarian, and anti-Semitic, there was enough overlap in values between the two groups to allow most of the traditional diplomats to work comfortably for the Nazis. This was especially the case as the men of the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' shared the goal of totally destroying the Treaty of Versailles and the "restoration of Germany as a great power" with the Nazis. When the Nazis came to power, there was only one resignation from the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' with German Ambassador to the United States Friedrich Wilhelm von Prittwitz und Gaffron quitting in March 1933 because he could not in good conscience serve the Nazi regime; every other senior diplomat remained at his post. Almost all of the diplomats of the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' in 1933 came from the German upper classes (with a disproportionate number coming from the nobility), had an average age of 52, began their careers in the Second Reich, saw themselves as part of an exclusive elite group and held extremely conservative views. Even those diplomats who did not entirely agree with the Nazis, were still inclined to serve the Nazi regime as the best way of serving Germany. Despite this, Hitler never quite trusted the ''Auswärtiges Amt'', and was always on the lookout for someone like Ribbentrop who would carry out the sort of National Socialist foreign policy that Hitler did not believe that the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' capable. Using the intermediary of Fernand de Brinon, Ribbentrop was able to meet the French Premier Édouard Daladier in September 1933. Ribbentrop tried hard to set up a secret summit between Daladier and Hitler, only to be told by Daladier that the idea of a secret Franco-German summit was unacceptable as it was inevitable that the French press would discover the secret summit. In November 1933, Ribbentrop was able to arrange an interview between de Brinon, who was writing for the ''Le Matin'' newspaper and Hitler, during which Hitler stressed what he claimed to be his love of peace and his friendship towards France. Nothing of any substance emerged from these talks. Up to the time of his appointment as German Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop aggressively competed with the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' (Foreign Office) and sought to undercut the current Foreign Minister, Baron Konstantin von Neurath, at every turn. Initially, Neurath held his rival in contempt, regarding anyone whose written German, to say nothing of his English and French, was full of atrocious spelling and grammatical mistakes to be unworthy of attention. Speaking of views of Prince Bernard von Bülow, the State Secretary at the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' between 1930–1936 and the nephew of the former Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow, one contemporary recalled that "Bülow could not regard as a serious competitor a man who had no formal training in diplomacy, who could not write a report in correct German, who did not listen carefully enough to the remarks of foreign statesmen to interpret them correctly, and who insisted upon seeing possibilities of alliance [with Britain] where none existed".

In March 1934, Ribbentrop visited France, where he met the Foreign Minister Louis Barthou. During the meeting, Ribbentrop suggested that Barthou meet with Hitler at once to sign a Franco-German non-aggression pact. In a report to President von Hindenburg, Neurath wrote:

"Such agents have often been active in the past and especially since the war. Their success and hence their usefulness is generally slight. In particular, it has been shown by experience that their connections are quickly used up. As soon as they meet with government members, the question concerning the official or semi-official nature of their instructions or mission is soon raised. Responsible statesmen naturally refuse to commit themselves to agents without responsibility. With that, the activity of these intermediaries in most cases comes to an end. Thus, in London recently Baldwin referred Herr Ribbentrop to Sir John Simon as the Minister responsible for questions of foreign policy. M. Barthou has now complained to Ambassador Köster about the manner of bringing in Herr Ribbentrop. From secret reports, it appears that M. Barthou was far from pleased with the visit and therefore treated Herr von Ribbentrop in a decidedly sarcastic manner...". After Ribbentrop's appointment as Special Commissioner, Neurath informed Erich Kordt, the diplomat assigned to Ribbentrop as his aide, not to correct any of Ribbentrop's spelling mistakes. Ribbentrop was given the office of Special Commissioner in large part because of doubts created in foreign capitals over just what precisely was his status as a diplomat. In his capacity as Special Commissioner, Ribbentrop frequently visited London, Paris and Rome. In his early years, Hitler's aim in foreign affairs was to persuade the world that he wished to reduce military spending by making idealistic but very vague offers of disarmament (in the 1930s, the term disarmament was used to describe arms-limitation agreements). At the same time, the Germans always resisted making concrete proposals for arms limitation, and they went ahead with increased military spending on the grounds that other powers would not take up German offers of arms limitation. Ribbentrop's task was to ensure that the world was convinced that Germany sincerely wanted an arms-limitation treaty while also ensuring that such a treaty never actually emerged. In the first part of his assignment, Ribbentrop was partly successful, but in the second part he more than fulfilled Hitler's expectations.

On 17 April 1934, French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou issued the so-called "Barthou note" terminating French involvement in the World Disarmament Conference on the grounds that Germany had been negotiating in bad faith for its return to the conference and declaring henceforth that France would look after its own security. The aggressive tone of the "Barthou note" led to concerns on the part of Hitler that the next meeting of the Bureau of Disarmament of the League of Nations would see the French asking for sanctions against Germany for violating Part V of the Treaty of Versailles. Ribbentrop volunteered to stop the rumored sanctions, and visited London and Rome. During his visits, Ribbentrop met with Simon and Benito Mussolini, and asked them to postpone the next meeting of the Bureau of Disarmament, in exchange for which Ribbentrop offered nothing in return other than promises of better relations with Berlin. Despite Ribbentrop's efforts, the meeting went ahead as scheduled, but since no sanctions were sought against Germany, this led to Ribbentrop claiming success (in fact, Ribbentrop's efforts had nothing to do with the lack of sanctions). As Special Commissioner, Ribbentrop was allowed to see all diplomatic correspondence relating to the subject of disarmament, which Ribbentrop refused to share with Neurath or von Bülow. Due to Ribbentrop's perceived success in stopping sanctions being applied against Germany, Hitler ordered that Ribbentrop be allowed to see all diplomatic correspondence that was not marked "For the Foreign Minister" or "For the Secretary of State". Ribbentrop used this privilege to go through the incoming diplomatic messages, snatching certain messages, taking them to Hitler and having a reply written without Neurath or Bülow being informed first.

In August 1934, Ribbentrop founded an organisation linked to the Nazi Party called the ''Büro Ribbentrop'' (later renamed the ''Dienststelle Ribbentrop'') that functioned as an alternative foreign ministry. The ''Dienststelle Ribbentrop'', which had its offices located directly across from the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' building on the Wilhelmstrasse in Berlin, had in its membership a collection of ''Hitlerjugend'' alumni, dissatisfied businessmen, former reporters, and ambitious Nazi Party members, all of whom tried to conduct a foreign policy independent of and often contrary to the ''Auswärtiges Amt''. Though the ''Dienststelle Ribbentrop'' concerned itself with German foreign relations with every part of the world, a special emphasis was put on Anglo-German relations, as Ribbentrop knew an alliance with Britain was a project specially favoured by Hitler. In the 1920s, Hitler had written that the principal goal of a future National Socialist foreign policy would be "the destruction of Russia with the help of England". As such, Ribbentrop worked hard during his early diplomatic career to realize Hitler's dream of an anti-Soviet Anglo-German alliance. Ribbentrop made frequent trips to Britain, and upon his return he always reported to Hitler that the great mass of the British people longed for an alliance with Germany. In November 1934, Ribbentrop visited Britain where he met with George Bernard Shaw, Sir Austen Chamberlain, Lord Cecil, and Lord Lothian. On the basis of remarks from Lord Lothian praising the natural friendship between Germany and Britain, Ribbentrop informed Hitler that all elements of British society wished for closer ties with Germany, a report which delighted Hitler, causing him to remark that Ribbentrop was the only person who told him "the truth about the world abroad". Since the diplomats of the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' were not so sunny in their appraisal of the prospects of an Anglo-German alliance, Ribbentrop's influence with Hitler increased. Hitler later stated: "In 1933–34 the reports of the Foreign Office [''Auswärtiges Amt''] were miserable. They always had the same quintessence: that we ought to do nothing". By contrast, Hitler found that the reports of the extremely aggressive and energetic Ribbentrop were more in tune with what Hitler wanted to hear, leading to the influence of the former being much increased at the expense of the ''Auswärtiges Amt''. Moreover, since Hitler regarded the diplomats of the'' Auswärtiges Amt'' as a collection of stodgy reactionaries out of touch with the spirit of "New Germany", the personality of Ribbentrop, with his disregard for diplomatic niceties, was in line with what Hitler felt should be the relentless dynamism of a revolutionary regime.

Ribbentrop was rewarded by Hitler by being made ''Reich'' Minister Ambassador-Plenipotentiary at Large (1935–1936). Ribbentrop then made numerous trips all over Europe, where he constantly presented various German proposals meant to upset the international order such as his 1935 offer to Belgium that Germany would renounce its claim to the Eupen-Malmedy region in exchange for a Belgian renunciation of the 1920 alliance with France. In 1935, Ribbentrop was able to arrange for a series of much publicized visits of World War I veterans to Britain, France and Germany. Ribbentrop persuaded the British Legion (the leading veterans' group in Britain) and many of the French veterans' groups to send delegations to Germany to meet German veterans as the best way of promoting peace. At the same time, Ribbentrop arranged for members of the ''Frontkämpferbund'', the official German World War I veterans' group, to make visits to Britain and France to meet veterans there. The visits of the veterans with the attendant promises of "never again" with regards to war did much to improve the image of the "New Germany" in Britain and France. In July 1935, the visit of the British Legion delegation to Germany was headed by Brigadier Sir Francis Featherstone-Godley. The Prince of Wales, who was the patron of the Legion, made a much publicized speech at the Legion's annual conference in June 1935 stating he could think of no better group of men than those of the Legion to visit and carry the message of peace to Germany, and stated that he hoped that Britain and Germany would never fight again. As for the contradiction between German rearmament and his message of peace, Ribbentrop argued to whoever would listen that the German people had been “humiliated” by the Treaty of Versailles, that Germany wanted peace above all, and German violations of Versailles were part of an effort to restore the “self-respect’ of the German people that Ribbentrop claimed that Versailles had robbed them of. By the 1930s, much of British opinion had been convinced that the Treaty of Versailles was monstrously unfair and unjust to Germany, so as a result, many in Britain like Thomas Jones were very open to Ribbentrop’s message that if only Versailles could be done away with, then the peace of Europe would be secured. Very typical of the anti-Versailles mood in Britain was a very well-received speech given in December 1934 by the South African soldier and British Empire elder statesman Jan Smuts. Smuts told an audience at the Royal Institute of International Affairs that:

"How can the inferiority complex which is obsessing and, I fear, poisoning the mind, and indeed the very soul of Germany, be removed? There is only one way and that is to recognize her complete equality of status with her fellows and to do so frankly, freely and unreservedly...While one understands and sympathizes with French fears, one cannot, but feel for Germany in the prison of inferiority in which she still remains sixteen years after the conclusion of the war. The continuance of the Versailles status is becoming an offence to the conscience of Europe and a danger to future peace...Fair play, sportsmanship-indeed every standard of private and public life-calls for frank revision of the situation. Indeed ordinary prudence makes it imperative. Let us break these bonds and set the complexed-obsessed soul free in a decent human way and Europe will reap a rich reward in tranquility, security and returning prosperity." Once the talks began, Ribbentrop, who possessed a certain elan and sense of audacity, issued Sir John Simon an ultimatum. He informed Simon that if Germany's terms were not accepted in their entirety, the German delegation would go home. Simon was angry with this demand and walked out of the talks under the grounds that "It is not usual to make such conditions at the beginning of negotiations". Much to everyone's surprise, the next day the British accepted Ribbentrop's demands and the A.G.N.A. was signed in London on 18 June 1935 by Ribbentrop and Sir Samuel Hoare, the new British Foreign Secretary. This diplomatic success did much to increase Ribbentrop's prestige with Hitler. Hitler called 18 June, the day the A.G.N.A. was signed, "the happiest day in my life" as he believed it marked the beginning of an Anglo-German alliance, and ordered celebrations throughout Germany to mark the event.

Immediately after the signing of the A.G.N.A., Ribbentrop followed up with the next step that was intended to create the Anglo-German alliance, namely the ''Gleichschaltung'' (co-ordination) of all societies demanding the restoration of the former German colonies in Africa into the ''Reichskolonialbund'' (Reich Colonial League) under General Franz Ritter von Epp. General von Epp in turn reported to Ribbentrop, who used the noisy agitation of the ''Reichskolonialbund'' to press for Germany's "inalienable" right to her former African colonies. On 3 July 1935 it was announced that Ribbentrop was now in charge of the efforts to recover Germany's former colonies in Africa. It was the joint idea of Hitler and Ribbentrop that demanding colonial restoration would pressure the British into making an alliance with the ''Reich'' on German terms. However, there was a certain difference of opinion between Ribbentrop and Hitler in that Ribbentrop sincerely wished to recover the former German African colonies, whereas for Hitler, colonial demands were just a negotiating tactic that would see Germany "renounce" her colonial claims in exchange for a British alliance.

In the fall of 1935, Ribbentrop founded two "friendship societies" in Berlin, namely the ''Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft'' for relations with Britain and the ''Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft'' for relations with France. Both of the societies were closely linked to two other societies Ribbentrop had helped to create, the ''Comité France-Allemagne'' headed by Fernand de Brinon and the Anglo-German Fellowship headed at first by Ernest Tennant. Through his work with these societies, Ribbentrop worked to trying to convert elites in France and Britain into following a pro-German line.

In February 1936, when Hitler asked Neurath and Ribbentrop for their advice about whether to remilitarize the Rhineland, Ribbentrop urged unilateral remilitarization at once. Ribbentrop went so far as to tell Hitler that if France attacked Germany because of the Rhineland, than Britain would come to Germany's aid and attack France.

During a visit to London in April 1936, Ribbentrop met the Welsh political fixer and former civil servant Thomas Jones. As Sir Robert Vansittart, the Permanent Undersecretary at the British Foreign Office, showed little interest in Ribbentrop's proposals for an Anglo-German alliance, Ribbentrop switched his efforts to cultivating Jones. As Jones was now in retirement (through he retained some influence through his friendship with the Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin), he was much impressed by Ribbentrop's efforts to cultivate him. Through Jones, Ribbentrop was able to meet Baldwin. Jones and Ribbentrop spent much of the spring and summer of 1936 attempting to set up a Hitler-Baldwin meeting only to be frustrated by Baldwin's dislike of travelling. At a meeting in May 1936, Jones told Baldwin that it was "a mistake to underestimate von Ribbentrop's influence and write him down as an ass because he does not adopt orthodox procedure. At the very least he is a reliable telephone from Hitler and the likelihood is that he is much more". Despite Jones's pleas, Baldwin was unmoved in refusing to make a trip to Germany.

The Anti-Comintern Pact of November 1936 marked an important change in German foreign policy. The ''Auswärtiges Amt'' had traditionally favoured a policy of friendship with China with an informal Sino-German alliance being created by the late 1920s. Neurath very much believed in maintaining Germany's good relations with China and distrusted Japan. Ribbentrop was opposed to the pro-China orientation of the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' and instead favoured an alliance with Japan. To this end, Ribbentrop often worked closely with General Hiroshi Ōshima, who served first as the Japanese military attaché, and then as Ambassador in Berlin in strengthening German-Japanese ties, in spite of furious opposition from the Wehrmacht and the ''Auswärtiges Amt'', who preferred closer Sino-German ties. The origins of the Anti-Comintern Pact went back to the summer and fall of 1935, when in an effort to square the circle between seeking a ''rapprochement'' with Japan and Germany's traditional alliance with China, Ribbentrop, together with General Ōshima, devised the idea of an anti-Communist alliance as a way of binding China, Japan and Germany together. However, when the Chinese made it clear that they had no interest in such an alliance (especially given that the Japanese regarded Chinese adhesion to the proposed pact as way of subordinating China to Japan), both Neurath and the War Minister Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg persuaded Hitler to shelve the proposed treaty in November 1935, lest it damage Germany's good relations with China. Ribbentrop for his part, who valued Japanese friendship far more than Chinese friendship, argued that Germany and Japan should sign the pact, even without Chinese participation. By November 1936, a revival of interest in a German-Japanese pact in both Tokyo and Berlin led to the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact in Berlin. When the Pact was signed, invitations were sent out for Italy, China, Britain and Poland to adhere; of the invited powers, only the Italians were ultimately to sign the Anti-Comintern Pact. The Anti-Comintern Pact marked the beginning of the shift on Germany's part from China's ally to Japan's ally.

During the same period, Ribbentrop often visited France to try to influence, though not very successfully, French politicians into adopting a pro-German foreign policy. According to Ribbentrop’s French agent, Fernand de Brinon Ribbentrop, who was markedly afraid of his wife, very much enjoyed his trips in Paris as it allowed him to engage in affairs without his wife being present. Ribbentrop enjoyed more apparent success with his policy of trying to win over elites in the United Kingdom, where he was able to persuade an impressive array of British high society to visit Hitler in Germany. That Ribbentrop possessed the power to set up meetings with Hitler and represented himself as Hitler's personal envoy made him for a time a much courted figure in Britain The most notable guest Ribbentrop brought to Hitler was the former Prime Minister David Lloyd George in 1936. Hitler's British guests were a mélange of aristocratic Germanophiles such as Lord Londonderry, professional pacifists such as George Lansbury and Lord Allen, retired politicians, ex-generals, fascists such as Admiral Barry Domvile and Sir Oswald Mosley, journalists such as Lord Lothian and G. Ward Price, academics such as the historian Philip Conwell-Evans, and various businessmen like the newspaper magnate Lord Rothermere and the merchant banker Lord Mount Temple. Very few of these people were actual decision-makers in the British government, such as Cabinet-level politicians or high-ranking bureaucrats. Neither Hitler nor Ribbentrop understood very well that when people like Lloyd George, Londonderry, Lansbury, Mount Temple, Allen, Lothian or Rothermere declared that they favoured closer Anglo-German ties, they were speaking as private citizens, not on behalf of Whitehall. As a German diplomat, Truetzschler von Falkenstein complained after the war that "Ribbentrop, having had contact with only a small group in England – representatives of the so-called two hundred families – did not know the great mass of the English people. The England with which he had hoped to collaborate was the England of this select group, since he believed that its members controlled Britain". Another German diplomat commented that Ribbentrop had the strange idea to "conduct international relations through aristocrats". Yet another German diplomat noted that, "He [Ribbentrop] did not have the capacity to form an overview; to see things in perspective. In England, for example, he relied upon people like Conwell-Evans who had no real influence". Earlier, speaking of Ribbentrop's activities and of the views of his British friends, Leopold von Hoesch, the German Ambassador in London from 1932–36, warned that Berlin should "...not pay any attention to the Londonderrys and Lothians, who in no way represented any important section of British opinion".

Ambassador to Britain

In August 1936, the German government appointed Ribbentrop Ambassador to Britain with orders to negotiate the Anglo-German alliance that Hitler had predicted in ''Mein Kampf''. Ribbentrop arrived to take up his position in October 1936. The two month delay between Ribbentrop's appointment and his arrival in London was due to the fracas caused by the death of the ''Auswärtiges Amt'''s State Secretary Prince von Bülow in July 1936. Ribbentrop immediately suggested to Hitler that he succeed Bülow as State Secretary. Neurath informed Hitler that he would rather resign than have Ribbentrop as State Secretary and proceeded to appoint his son-in-law Hans Georg von Mackensen to that office. Hitler, for his part, had been highly impressed by Neurath's skilful efforts at defusing the crisis caused by remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936, and moreover felt that Ribbentrop's talents better suited him to serving as Ambassador than as State Secretary. Ribbentrop, who would have much preferred the reverse, spent the next two months attempting to persuade Hitler to agree before reluctantly leaving for Britain in October 1936.

Before leaving to take up his post in London, Ribbentrop was commissioned by Hitler:

"Ribbentrop...get Britain to join the Anti-Comintern Pact, that is what I want most of all. I have sent you as the best man I’ve got. Do what you can... But if in future all our efforts are still in vain, fair enough, then I’m ready for war as well. I would regret it very much, but if it has to be, there it is. But I think it would be a short war and the moment it is over, I will then be ready at any time to offer the British an honourable peace acceptable to both sides. However, I would then demand that Britain join the Anti-Comintern Pact or perhaps some other pact. But get on with it, Ribbentrop, you have the trumps in your hand, play them well. I'm ready at any time for an air pact as well. Do your best. I will follow your efforts with interest".

The vain, arrogant, and tactless Ribbentrop was not the man for such a mission, but it is doubtful that even a more skilled diplomat could have fulfilled Hitler's dream of a grand Anglo-German alliance His time in London was marked by an endless series of social gaffes and blunders that worsened his already poor relations with the British Foreign Office (Punch referred to him as Von Brickendrop and the Wandering Aryan due to his frequent trips back to Germany.)

Upon arriving in Britain on 26 October 1936, Ribbentrop created a storm in the British press by reading the following statement:

"Germany wants to be friends with Great Britain and, I think, the British people also wish for German friendship. The ''Führer'' is convinced that there is only one real danger to Europe and to the British Empire as well, and that is the spreading further of communism, this most terrible of all diseases-terrible because people generally seem to realize its danger only when it is too late. A closer collaboration in this sense between our two countries is not only important but a vital necessity in the common struggle for the upholding of our civilization and our culture".

The ''Daily Telegraph'' newspaper commented that it was regrettable that the new German ambassador could offer no better basis for improved Anglo-German relations beyond a common hatred for a third country. To help with his move to London, and with the design of the new German Embassy Ribbentrop had built (the existing Embassy was deemed insufficiently grand for Ribbentrop), Ribbentrop hired a Berlin interior decorator named Martin Luther. Upon the recommendation of his wife, Ribbentrop hired Luther to work for the ''Dienststelle Ribbentrop''. Luther proved to be a master intriguer, and became Ribbentrop's favourite hatchet man.

Besides working to achieve Hitler's dream of an Anglo-German alliance against the Soviet Union, Ribbentrop served as the German delegate for the Non-Intervention Committee for the Spanish Civil War in London. Since Germany was in fact intervening in the civil war in Spain, Ribbentrop's purpose at the Non-Intervention Committee was to frustrate and sabotage the workings of the committee as much as possible.

Ribbentrop did not understand the King's limited role in government as he thought King Edward VIII could decide British foreign policy. He convinced Hitler that he had Edward's support; but this, like his belief that he had impressed British society, was a tragic delusion. Ribbentrop often woefully misunderstood both British politics and society. During the abdication crisis of December 1936, Ribbentrop reported to Berlin that the reason the crisis had occurred was an anti-German Jewish-Masonic-reactionary conspiracy to depose Edward (whom Ribbentrop represented as a staunch friend of Germany), and that civil war would soon break out in Britain between supporters of the King and supporters of the Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin. Ribbentrop's statements about the abdication crisis causing a civil war were greeted with much incredulity by those British people who heard them. This led to a false sense of confidence about British intentions with which he unwittingly deceived his ''Führer''.

Ribbentrop's time as Ambassador was notable as he threw the German Embassy into a total state of chaos due to his erratic personality. Ribbentrop's aide, the SS man Reinhard Spitzy, described a typical day working for Ribbentrop as:

"He [Ribbentrop] rose, muttering bad-temperedly...Dressed in his pyjamas, he received the junior secretaries and press attachés in his bathroom...He scolded, threatened, gesticulated with his razor and shouted at his valet...As he took his bath, he ordered people to be summoned from Berlin, accepted and cancelled, appointed and dismissed, and dictated through the door to a nervous stenographer...He cursed people in their absence, calling them saboteurs and communists...It was my task to put his calls through; his valet stood within splashing distance holding a white telephone...Ribbentrop believed only ministers ranked above him: everyone else, including his ambassadorial colleagues, had to kept waiting on the line. Sometimes they did not share this view and rang off. The outburst of rage which ensued was directed against me..'Mr. X', I would eventually say,'has been asked to call at ten o'clock and it is already nine-thirty. Shall I cancel or postpone the appointment?'.'Better cancel or postpone. No, get him to wait until he's blue in the face, but you had better cancel all the other appointments. I must write to the ''Führer'' today!' (In fact, during the whole period I worked for him, Ribbentrop only managed to complete about five such letters. But how often he planned them! He prepared endless drafts which he spread out on the floor. In the evening they usually ended up in the fireplace)...I longed for the moment when it was the turn of the protocol officials to come in and I could make my escape...Then I had to deal with the brigade of tailors, bootmakers, shirtmakers and other craftsmen who had been summoned from the best London firms, and had to be consoled with appointments for the following day. They withdrew, to report at the houses of other clients on the ill manners of the ambassadorial couple....At about eleven-thirty he would finally appear at his office. His waiting room would be crammed with impatient messengers, visitors, diplomats, officials... I had to console them with feeble excuses such as that His Excellency was not very well, or engaged in an urgent state call to Berlin...For the rest of the morning he listened to reports from members of the Embassy staff, unless I had to accompany him to the [British] Foreign Office...When Ribbentrop strutted through the [Foreign Office] corridors like a peacock, his head thrown back, it was a miracle that he did not fall over. His deportment aroused great mirth among the British officials, who often grinned at me with a pitying look...."

Ribbentrop's habit of summoning tailors from the best British firms, making them wait for hours and then sending them away without seeing him with instructions to return the next day, only to repeat the process, did immense damage to his reputation in British high society. As Ribbentrop progressively started alienating more and more people in Britain, Hermann Göring warned Hitler that Ribbentrop was a "stupid ass". Ribbentrop further compounded the damage to his image and caused a minor crisis in Anglo-German relations by insisting that henceforward all German diplomats were to greet heads of state with the "German greeting", who were in turn to return the fascist salute. The crisis was resolved when Neurath pointed out to Hitler that under Ribbentrop's rules, if the Soviet Ambassador were to give the Communist clenched fist salute, then Hitler would be obliged to return it. As a result of Neurath's advice, Hitler disavowed Ribbentrop over his demands that King George receive and give the "German greeting".

In his dealings with the British government, most of Ribbentrop's time was spent either demanding that Britain sign the Anti-Comintern Pact or that London return the former German colonies in Africa. Other than his fruitless meetings with the British Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden, who always refused on behalf of his government Ribbentrop's demands about the former colonies or the Anti-Comintern Pact, Ribbentrop spent most of his time as Ambassador courting what Ribbentrop called the "men of influence" as the best way of bringing about an Anglo-German alliance. Ribbentrop had developed the notion that the British aristocracy comprised some sort of secret society that ruled from behind the scenes, and if he could befriend enough members of Britain's "secret government", then he could bring about an alliance with his country. Almost all of the initially favourable reports Ribbentrop provided to Berlin about the prospects of an Anglo-German alliance were based on friendly remarks about the "New Germany" from various British aristocrats like Lord Londonderry and Lord Lothian; the rather cool reception that Ribbentrop received from British Cabinet ministers and senior bureaucrats did not make much of an impression on him at first. In 1935, Sir Eric Phipps, the British Ambassador to Germany, complained to London about Ribbentrop's British associates in the Anglo-German Fellowship, that they created "false German hopes as in regards to British friendship and caused a reaction against it in England, where public opinion is very naturally hostile to the Nazi regime and its methods". In September 1937, the British Consul in Munich, writing about the group Ribbentrop had brought to the Nuremberg Party Rally, reported that there were some "serious persons of standing among them" and that an equal number of Ribbentrop's British contingent were "eccentrics and few, if any, could be called representatives of serious English thought, either political or social, while they most certainly lacked any political or social influence in England". In June 1937, when Lord Mount Temple, the Chairman of the Anglo-German Fellowship, asked to see the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain after meeting Hitler in a visit arranged by Ribbentrop, Robert Vansittart, the British Foreign Office's Undersecretary wrote a memo stating that:

"The P.M. [Prime Minister] should certainly not see Lord Mount Temple – nor should the S[ecretary] of S[tate]. We really must put a stop to this eternal butting in of amateurs – and Lord Mount Temple is a particularly silly one. These activities – which are practically confined to Germany – render impossible the task of diplomacy. Lord Londonderry goes to Berlin; Lord Lothian goes to Berlin; Mr. Lansbury goes to Berlin; and now Lord Mount Temple goes. They all want interviews with the S of S, and two at least have had them. This flow is quite unfair to the service and Sir E. Phipps rightly complained of these ambulant amateurs. So did Sir N. Henderson in advance, and rightly, for Lord Lothian's last visit is being mischievously and unintelligently misused, particularly at the Imperial Conference. The proper course for any ambulant amateur is to be seen by someone less important than Ministers. If there is anything worthwhile in their remarks – there never is, for, of course, we have much better information than this naïf propaganda stuff – we can report it to the S of S. But a stage has now been reached where the service is entitled to at least this amount of protection. These superficial people are always gulled into the lines of least resistance – vide Lord Lothian – and we then have the ungrateful but necessary task of pointing out the snags and appearing obstructive. It is quite unfair and should cease".

After Vansittart's memo, members of the Anglo-German Fellowship ceased to see Cabinet ministers after going on Ribbentrop-arranged trips to Germany. One of the "men of influence" Ribbentrop attempted to win over was Winston Churchill (who in fact in 1937 possessed little influence), who during a 1937 meeting told him that though most people in Britain hated communism, neither the British government or British people wanted an anti-Soviet alliance with Germany nor would they accepted a ''quid pro quo'' in which Britain would abandon Europe to Germany in exchange for German support for maintaining the British Empire. Ribbentrop then told Churchill if Britain would not ally herself with Germany, then the Germans would have no other choice, but to destroy the British Empire, leading Churchill to reply that the last time the Germans tried that, it was the German Empire that ended up being destroyed.

In February 1937, prior to a meeting with the Lord Privy Seal, Lord Halifax, Ribbentrop suggested to Hitler that Germany together with Italy and Japan began a worldwide propaganda campaign with the aim of forcing Britain to return the former German colonies in Africa. Hitler turned down this idea of Ribbentrop's, but nonetheless during his meeting with Lord Halifax, Ribbentrop spent much of the meeting demanding that Britain sign an alliance with Germany and return the former German colonies. In March 1937, Ribbentrop attracted much adverse comment in the British press when he gave a speech at the Leipzig Trade Fair in Leipzig, where he declared that German economic prosperity would be satisfied either "through the restoration of the former German colonial possessions, or by means of the German people's own strength". The implied threat that if colonial restoration did not occur, then the Germans would take back by force their former colonies attracted a large deal of hostile commentary on the inappropriateness of an Ambassador threatening his host country in such a manner.

His aggressive and overbearing manner towards everyone except his wife and Hitler meant that to know him was to dislike him. His negotiating style, a strange mix of bullying bluster and icy coldness coupled with lengthy monologues praising Hitler, alienated many. The American historian Gordon A. Craig once observed that of all the voluminous memoir literature of the diplomatic scene of 1930s Europe, there are only two positive references to Ribbentrop. Of the two references, General Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg, the German military attaché in London, commented that Ribbentrop had been a brave soldier in World War I, while the wife of the Italian Ambassador to Germany, Elisabetta Cerruti, called Ribbentrop "one of the most diverting of the Nazis". In both cases the praise was limited, with Cerruti going on to write that only in the Third Reich was it possible for someone as superficial as Ribbentrop to rise to be a minister of foreign affairs, while Geyr von Schweppenburg called Ribbentrop an absolute disaster as Ambassador in London. The British historian/television producer Laurence Rees noted for his 1997 series ''The Nazis: A Warning from History'' that every single person interviewed for the series who knew Ribbentrop expressed a passionate hatred for him. One German diplomat, Herbert Richter, called Ribbentrop "lazy and worthless" while another, Manfred von Schröder, was quoted as saying Ribbentrop was "vain and ambitious". Rees concluded that "No other Nazi was so hated by his colleagues".

In September 1937, a group of German military and diplomatic officials led by Dr. Kurt Jahnke had worked out a plan for Anglo-German mediation of the Sino-Japanese war, which was to be followed up by a “general settlement” of all outstanding European problems, which led to a British agent being secretly sent to Berlin. The strongly pro-Japanese Ribbentrop, supported by Himmler seeing the mediation proposal as pro-Chinese, did his best to have it scuttled. As Dr. Carl Marcus, one of German officials involved in the mediation plan later recalled in an interview with the Chinese historian Hsi-Huey Liang:

“We had our pens ready for Hitler to affix his signature when Ribbentrop managed to gain Hitler’s ear one more time. He somehow succeeded to change the ''Führer''’s mind in the last minute. After that there was nothing more we could do. Reichenau was disgraced. He soon left Berlin for a new post in Munich. Jahnke and I took great care that the British agent made it safely back to England. But the good man was shaken and as he bade us farewell, he uttered the grim words “This means war!”. Since Hitler was not really interested in obtaining the former colonies, especially if the price was a brake on expansion into Eastern Europe, Ribbentrop was forced to turn down the Anglo-French offer that he had largely brought about. Immediately after turning down the Anglo-French offer on colonial restoration, Ribbentrop for reasons of pure malice ordered the ''Reichskolonialbund'' to increase the agitation for the former German colonies, a move which exasperated both the Foreign Office and Quai d'Orsay.

Ribbentrop's inability to achieve the alliance that he had been sent out for frustrated him, as he feared it could cost him Hitler's favour, and it made him a bitter Anglophobe. As the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano, noted in his diary in late 1937, Ribbentrop had come to hate Britain with all the "fury of a woman scorned". Ribbentrop, and Hitler for that matter, never understood that British foreign policy aimed at the appeasement of Germany, not an alliance.

When Ribbentrop travelled to Rome in November 1937 to oversee Italy's adhesion to the Anti-Comintern Pact, he made clear to his hosts that the pact was really directed against Britain. As Count Ciano noted in his diary, the Anti-Comintern Pact was "anti-Communist in theory, but in fact unmistakably anti-British". Believing himself to be in a state of disgrace with Hitler over his failure to achieve the British alliance, Ribbentrop spent December 1937 in a state of depression, and together with his wife, wrote two lengthy documents for Hitler denouncing Britain. In the first of his two reports to Hitler, which was presented on 2 January 1938, Ribbentrop stated that "England is our most dangerous enemy". In the same report, Ribbentrop advised Hitler to abandon the idea of a British alliance, and instead embrace the idea of an alliance of Germany, Japan and Italy, who would destroy the British Empire. Ribbentrop wrote:

"I have worked for many years for friendship with England and nothing would make me happier than if it could be achieved. When I asked the ''Führer'' to send me to London, I was sceptical whether it would work. However, in view of Edward VIII, a final attempt seemed appropriate. Today I no longer believe in an understanding. England does not work a powerful Germany nearby which would pose a permanent threat to the islands".

Ribbentrop wrote in his "Memorandum for the ''Führer''" that "a change in the status quo in the East to Germany's advantage can only be accomplished by force", and that the best way to achieve this change was to build a global anti-British alliance system. Besides converting the Anti-Comintern Pact into an anti-British military alliance, Ribbentrop argued that German foreign policy should work to "furthermore, winning over all states whose interests conform directly or indirectly to ours".

While the Ribbentrops were in Britain, his son, Rudolf von Ribbentrop, attended Westminster School in London. Peter Ustinov was Rudolf's schoolmate at this time, as related in his autobiography ''Dear Me'' (1971). Ustinov is also supposed to have clandestinely leaked Rudolf's presence at his school to ''The Times''. The result of this was the prompt withdrawal of the younger Ribbentrop from the school as a precautionary measure for his safety, as well as for security of his father's mission in London.

Rumors of affair with Wallis Simpson

Ribbentrop's time in London was also marked by scandal. It was believed by many members of the British upper classes that he was having an affair with Wallis Simpson, the wife of British businessman Edward Simpson and the mistress of King Edward VIII. According to files declassified by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mrs. Simpson was believed to be a regular guest at Ribbentrop's social gatherings at the German Embassy in London where it was thought the two struck up a romantic relationship. It was believed by the Americans at the time that Ribbentrop was said to have used Simpson's access to the King to funnel important information about the British to the German government. Supposedly, Simpson was paid by the Germans for this information and was happy to continue the relationship as long as she received payment. The FBI took the matter seriously enough to advise President Roosevelt of their findings; he once commented to a confidante that Simpson "played around...with the Ribbentrop set."

The truth of the matter is still very much in doubt. Simpson, who later married the former king – he had abdicated to marry her – and was known in later life as the Duchess of Windsor, noted in her book ''The Heart Has Its Reasons'' that she met Ribbentrop on only two occasions and had no personal relationship with him.

Foreign Minister of the ''Reich''

Background

On 5 November 1937, the conference between the ''Reich'''s top military-foreign policy leadership and Hitler recorded in the so-called Hossbach Memorandum occurred. At the conference, Hitler stated that it was the time for war, or, more accurately, wars, as what Hitler envisioned were a series of localized wars in Central and Eastern Europe in the near future. Hitler argued that because these wars were necessary to provide Germany with ''Lebensraum'', autarky and the arms race with France and Britain made it imperative to act before the Western powers developed an insurmountable lead in the arms race. Of those invited to the conference, objections arose from Neurath, the War Minister Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg, and the Army Commander in Chief, General Werner von Fritsch that any German aggression in Eastern Europe was bound to trigger a war with France because of the French alliance system in Eastern Europe, the so-called ''cordon sanitaire'', and if a Franco-German war broke out, then Britain was almost certain to intervene rather than risk the prospect of France's defeat. Moreover, it was objected that Hitler's assumption that Britain and France would just ignore the projected wars because they had started their re-armament later than Germany was flawed. Accordingly, Fritsch, Blomberg and Neurath advised Hitler to wait until Germany had more time to re-arm before pursuing a high-risk strategy of localized wars that was likely to trigger a general war before Germany was ready (none of those present at the conference had any moral objections to Hitler's strategy, with which they were in basic agreement; only the question of timing divided them). Hitler was most displeased with the criticism of his intentions, and in early 1938 asserted his control of the military-foreign policy apparatus through the Blomberg-Fritsch Affair, the abolition of the War Ministry and its replacement by the OKW, and finally by sacking Neurath as Foreign Minister on 4 February 1938. In the opinion of the official German history of World War II, from early 1938 Hitler was not carrying out a foreign policy that had carried a high risk of war, but was carrying out a foreign policy aiming at war. Ribbentrop was chosen as Neurath's successor as Hitler judged the former would be a more willing instrument to realize Hitler's foreign policy than the latter.

Appointment

On 4 February 1938, Ribbentrop succeeded Baron Konstantin von Neurath as Foreign Minister. Ribbentrop's appointment was generally taken at the time and since as indicating that German foreign policy was moving in a more radical direction. In contrast to Neurath's less bellicose and cautious nature, Ribbentrop unequivocally supported war in 1938–39. In May 1938 Benito Mussolini commented after meeting Ribbentrop that:

"Ribbentrop belongs to the category of Germans who are a disaster for their country. He talks about making war right and left, without naming an enemy or defining an objective".

Under Ribbentrop's influence, Hitler grew increasingly anti-British, though he never fully embraced Ribbentrop's anti-British foreign policy programme, which as the German historian Andreas Hillgruber noted was the "very opposite" of Hitler's foreign programme, which saw an anti-Soviet alliance with Britain as the best course. As Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop was highly concerned with counteracting the damage that he himself inflicted on the influence of the ''Auswärtiges Amt''. Friedrich Gaus, the chief of the Legal Division of the ''Auswärtiges Amt'', testified at the Nuremberg war crimes trials that:

"He [Ribbentrop] used to say that everything the Foreign Office lost in the way of terrain under Neurath he wanted to win back and, with all his passion, he fought for this aim in a manner which can only be understood by somebody who actually saw it".

Gaus went on to testify that "My main activity was 90 per cent concerned with competency conflicts". Moreover, as time went by, Ribbentrop started to oust the old diplomats from their senior positions in the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' and replaced them with men from the ''Dienststelle''. As early as 1938, 32% of the offices in the Foreign Ministry were held by men who previously served in the ''Dienststelle''. Ribbentrop was widely disliked by the old diplomats in ''Auswärtiges Amt''. Herbert von Dirksen, who was German Ambassador in London from 1938–1939, described his predecessor, Ribbentrop, as "an unwholesome, half-comical figure". Dirksen was later to write that he at first hoped that now that Ribbentrop was Foreign Minister this would mean the end of the ''Dienststelle'' "for no man can intrigue against himself. That Ribbentrop was able to perform even this miracle only came home to me much later". Many of the people Ribbentrop appointed to head German embassies, especially the "amateur" diplomats from the ''Dienststelle'', were grossly incompetent, thus limiting the effectiveness of the ''Auswärtiges Amt''.

Changes

Ribbentrop's first move as Foreign Minister was to sack Mackensen (who as Neurath's son-in-law was totally unacceptable to him) as State Secretary and replace him with Baron Ernst von Weizsäcker, a former naval officer turned career diplomat who joined the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' in 1920. Though Ribbentrop had competed with the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' in the past, his appointment as Foreign Minister was welcomed by the career diplomats who saw Ribbentrop as a Nazi champion who would improve the ''Auswärtiges Amt'''s standing with Hitler. The appointment of a general as Ambassador to Japan reflected Ribbentrop's belief that German–Japanese relations were in the future to be of a mainly military nature. As time went by, Ribbentrop took to restructuring the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' by creating new offices like the Agency for News Analysis which fought with the Propaganda Ministry for control of German propaganda abroad, and by creating an inner circle of loyalists, many of whom had come from the ''Dienststelle'' within the ''Auswärtiges Amt''.

One of Ribbentrop's first acts as Foreign Minister was to achieve a total volte-face in Germany's Far Eastern policies. Ribbentrop was instrumental in February 1938 in persuading Hitler to recognize the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo and to renounce German claims upon her former colonies in the Pacific, which were now held by Japan. By April 1938, Ribbentrop had ended all German arms shipments to China and had all of the German Army officers serving with the Kuomintang government of Chiang Kai-shek recalled (with the threat that the families of the officers in China would be sent to concentration camps if the officers did not return to Germany immediately). In return, the Germans received little thanks from the Japanese, who refused to allow any new German businesses to be set up in the part of China they had occupied, and continued with their policy of attempting to exclude all existing German (together with all other Western) businesses from Japanese-occupied China. At the same time, the ending of the informal Sino-German alliance led Chiang to terminate all of the concessions and contracts held by German companies in Kuomintang China.

Views

As Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop was noted for his virulent Anglophobia and anti-Semitism. Although he was almost lackey-like in Hitler's presence, he could be boorish when he was alone. At a meeting between Ribbentrop, Hitler and Henderson on 3 March 1938 during which Henderson offered on behalf of his government a proposal for an international consortium to rule much of Africa, in which Germany would play a leading role in exchange for which Germany would agree not to change its borders through violence, the British offer was flatly refused by Hitler, who had no real interest in colonies in Africa, and was more interested in the idea of ''Lebensraum'' or expansionism, in Eastern Europe. At the same meeting, Ribbentrop stated that the British government secretly controlled the British press, hence could silence at any moment all press criticism of the Nazi regime; the fact that the British government had not done so was proof of British malevolence towards Germany. After the meeting, Henderson reported to the British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax about a private conversation he had with Ribbentrop: "He [Ribbentrop] talked so much... about what Great Britain should do that I warned at last that you [Lord Halifax] would be expecting rather to hear what Germany would be prepared to do. His reply was: "What can we do? We have nothing to give". Ribbentrop loathed Neville Chamberlain, and viewed his appeasement policy as some sort of British scheme to block Germany from her rightful place in the world. Chamberlain for his part after meeting Ribbentrop in February 1938 wrote in a letter to his sister that : Ironically, Ribbentrop’s fierce Anglophobia, which he did nothing to disguise, had the effect in 1938 of encouraging, rather than discouraging appeasement. The British Ambassador Neville Henderson, in his reports back to London, argued that there were two factions in the German government warring for Hitler’s favour. Henderson called one the “moderates”, whose leader was Hermann Göring, and the other, the “extremists”, comprising Ribbentrop, Himmler and Goebbels. Henderson argued that if Britain could make enough concessions to Germany, then that might tip the scales in favour of the “moderates” by proving the international system was flexible enough to accommodate Germany's desires peacefully, and prevent World War II by discrediting the "extremists". The Brazilian allegation of German support for the ''Integralista'' coup had a galvanizing effect on the United States as it led to fears that German ambitions were not confined to Europe, but rather to the whole world. This in turn led the Roosevelt administration to change its previous view of the Nazi regime as an unpleasant regime that was however basically not an American problem. In response to objections from Baron Ernst von Weizsäcker, (the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' State Secretary 1938–1943) in August 1938 that if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia, it would cause a world war that Germany could not win, Ribbentrop replied that:

"...the ''Führer'' had never yet been wrong...One must believe in his genius as he, Ribbentrop, did, from long years of experience. If I had not yet come to blind faith in this matter, he urged me to do so".

Weizsäcker was opposed to the general trend in German foreign policy towards attacking Czechoslovakia out of the fear that it might cause a general war that Germany would lose; Weizsäcker had no moral objections to the idea of destroying Czechoslovakia and was only opposed to the timing of the attack. On 19 August 1938, Weizsäcker wrote a memo to Ribbentrop stating:

"I again opposed the whole theory of (an attack on Czechoslovakia) and observed that we should have to wait political developments until the English lose interest in the Czech matter and would tolerate our action, before we could tackle the affair without risk".

Weizsäcker never sent his memo to Ribbentrop out of the fear that he might lose his job.

Before the Anglo-German summit at Berchtesgaden on 15 September 1938, Henderson and Weizsäcker worked out a private arrangement that Hitler and Chamberlain were to meet with no advisers present as a way of excluding the ultra-hawkish Ribbentrop from attending the talks. Hitler's interpreter Paul Schmidt later recalled that it was "felt that our Foreign Minister would prove a disturbing element" at the Berchtesgaden summit. In a moment of pique at his exclusion from the Chamberlain-Hitler meeting, Ribbentrop refused to hand over to Chamberlain Schmidt's notes of the summit, a move which caused much annoyance on the British side. Ribbentrop spent the last weeks of September 1938 looking forward very much to the German-Czechoslovak war he expected to break out on 1 October 1938. Ribbentrop regarded the Munich Agreement as a diplomatic defeat for Germany, as it deprived Germany of the opportunity to wage the war to destroy Czechoslovakia that Ribbentrop wanted to see; the Sudetenland issue, which was the ostensible subject of the German-Czechoslovak dispute, had been just a pretext for German aggression. During the Munich Conference, Ribbentrop spent much of his time brooding unhappily in the corners. Ribbentrop told the head of Hitler's Press Office, Fritz Hesse, that the Munich Agreement was "first-class stupidity...All it means is that we have to fight the English in a year, when they will be better armed...It would have been much better if war had come now". Like Hitler, Ribbentrop was determined that in the next crisis, Germany would not have its professed demands met in another Munich-type summit, and that the next crisis to be caused by Germany would result in the war that Chamberlain had "cheated" the Germans out of at Munich.

In the aftermath of Munich, Hitler was in a violently anti-British mood caused in part by his rage over being "cheated" out of the war to "annihilate" Czechoslovakia that he very much wanted to have in 1938, and in part by his realization that Britain would neither ally herself nor stand aside in regard to Germany's ambition to dominate Europe. As a consequence, after Munich, Britain was considered to be the main enemy of the ''Reich'', and as a result, the influence of ardently Anglophobic Ribbentrop correspondingly rose with Hitler. Starting in the fall of 1938, Ribbentrop attempted to convert the Anti-Comintern Pact into an anti-British military alliance, without much success. Much to Ribbentrop's intense disappointment, the Japanese were more interested in 1938–39 in fighting the Soviets and the Chinese rather than fighting the British. The Japanese were willing to see the Anti-Comintern Pact converted into a military alliance, but only against the Soviet Union. Unknown to Ribbentrop, the differences in opinion during the winter of 1938–39 between Japan and Germany about whether to convert the Anti-Comintern Pact into an anti-British or an anti-Soviet military alliance were known to the Kremlin thanks to the fact that the Soviets had broken the Japanese diplomatic codes and through the spy ring in Tokyo headed by Richard Sorge.

As part of the anti-British course, it was deemed necessary in Germany to have Poland as either a satellite state or otherwise neutralized. The Germans believed this necessary on both strategic grounds as a way of securing the ''Reich'''s eastern flank and on economic grounds as a way of evading the effects of a British blockade. Starting in October 1938, Ribbentrop during several meetings with the Polish Ambassador to Germany Józef Lipski and the Polish Foreign Minister Colonel Józef Beck expressed his wishes that Poland agree to the return of the Free City of Danzig (modern Gdańsk, Poland) to the ''Reich'', allow for "extra-territorial" highways across the Polish Corridor to East Prussia, and most importantly, sign the Anti-Comintern Pact (the last gesture was generally understood as placing Poland within the German sphere of influence). At a meeting with Lipski in October 1938, Ribbentrop stated that he wanted ''eine Gesamtlösung'' (total settlement) between Germany and Poland with Poland being reduced to a subordinate state to the ''Reich'' within the Anti-Comintern Pact.

In October–November 1938, Ribbentrop together with the Italian Foreign Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano, delegations led by the Czecho-Slovak foreign minister František Chvalkovský, and the Hungarian foreign minister Count Kálmán Kánya conducted negotiations in Vienna that resulted in the First Vienna Award over the fate of the eastern part of Czecho-Slovakia (as Czechoslovakia had been renamed in October 1938). During the talks, a clash of interests arose between the Italians, who favoured seeing Hungary restored to pre-Trianon borders and the Germans, who were disappointed over Hungary's lukewarm attitude towards attacking Czechoslovakia in September 1938, tended to favour Czecho-Slovakia. At the same time, Ribbentrop, who was trying to enlist Italy in his anti-British alliance, was not inclined towards pushing the Italians too hard, and the resulting Vienna Award was a compromise between the rival German and Italian claims to influence in Eastern Europe.

In the aftermath of the ''Kristallnacht'' pogrom in November 1938, the U.S. government formally protested and withdrew Hugh Wilson, the American Ambassador in Berlin in protest. In retaliation, Ribbentrop withdrew the German Ambassador in Washington, Hans-Heinrich Dieckhoff, and delivered a counter-protest note accusing the U.S. government of being secretly controlled by Jewish plutocrats. Right up until 1941, German-American relations were conducted by chargés d'affaires as neither government ever sent back their ambassadors.

In regard to the anti-Semitic policies, Ribbentrop emerged as one of the leading hardliners, and refused to even consider the idea (which some of the other Nazi leaders were open to, though only on pragmatic grounds as a way of encouraging Jewish emigration) that German Jews be allowed to take their personal possessions with them when they left Germany. At a meeting in Paris with the French Foreign Minister, Georges Bonnet, in December 1938, when asked if it were possible for immigrating German Jews to bring their personal belongings with them, Bonnet reported Ribbentrop as replying:

"The Jews in Germany were without exception pickpockets, murderers and thieves. The property they possessed had been acquired illegally. The German government had therefore decided to assimilate them with the criminal elements of the population. The property which they had acquired illegally would be taken from them. They would be forced to live in districts frequented by the criminal classes. They would be under police observation like other criminals. They would be forced to report to the police as other criminals were obligated to do. The German government could not help it if some of these criminals escaped to other countries which seemed so anxious to have them. It was not, however, willing for them to take the property, which had resulted from their illegal operations with them".

On 6 December 1938 Ribbentrop visited Paris, where he and the French foreign minister Georges Bonnet signed a grand-sounding but largely meaningless Declaration of Franco-German Friendship. Ribbentrop was later to claim that Bonnet told him that France recognized Eastern Europe as being within Germany's exclusive sphere of influence. Later in December 1938, Ribbentrop, during a meeting with the Polish Foreign Minister Colonel Beck at Berchtesgaden, attempted to win his acceptance of the German proposals by promising him German support for Polish annexation of the Ukraine, only to be told that Poland had no interest in seeing either Danzig return to the ''Reich'', or in annexing the Ukraine. On 6 February 1939, in response to a speech given by Bonnet before the Chamber of Deputies, underlining French commitments in Eastern Europe, Ribbentrop offered a formal protest to Robert Coulondre, the French Ambassador in Berlin, arguing that because of Bonnet's alleged statement of 6 December 1938, that "France's commitments in Eastern Europe" were now "off limits".

Partly for economic reasons, and partly out of fury over being "cheated" out of war in 1938, in early 1939, Hitler decided to commence the destruction of the rump state of Czecho-Slovakia (as Czechoslovakia had been renamed in October 1938). Ribbentrop played an important role in setting in motion the crisis that was to result in the end of Czecho-Slovakia by ordering German diplomats in Bratislava to contact Father Jozef Tiso, the Premier of the Slovak regional government, and pressuring him to declare independence from Prague. When Tiso proved reluctant to do so on the grounds that the autonomy that had existed since October 1938 was sufficient for him, and to completely sever links with the Czechs would leave Slovakia open to being annexed by Hungary, Ribbentrop had the German Embassy in Budapest contact the Regent, Admiral Miklós Horthy. Admiral Horthy was advised that the Germans might be open to having more of Hungary restored to former borders, and that the Hungarians should best start concentrating troops on their northern border at once if they were serious about changing the frontiers. Upon hearing of the Hungarian mobilization, Tiso was presented with the choice of either declaring independence with the understanding that the new state would be in the German sphere of influence, or seeing all of Slovakia absorbed into Hungary. When as a result, Tiso had the Slovak regional government issue a declaration of independence on 14 March 1939, the ensuing crisis in Czech-Slovak relations was used as a pretext to summon the Czecho-Slovak President Emil Hácha to Berlin over his "failure" to keep order in his country. On the night of 14–15 March 1939, Ribbentrop played a key role in the German annexation of the Czech part of Czecho-Slovakia by bullying the Czechoslovak President Hácha into transforming his country into a German protectorate at a meeting in the Reich Chancellery in Berlin. On 15 March 1939, German troops occupied the Czech area of Czecho-Slovakia, which then became the ''Reich'' Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. On 20 March 1939 Ribbentrop summoned the Lithuanian Foreign Minister Juozas Urbšys to Berlin and informed him that if a Lithuanian plenipotentiary did not arrive at once to negotiate turning over the Memelland to Germany the Luffwaffe would raze Kaunas to the ground. As a result of Ribbentrop's ultimatum on 23 March, the Lithuanians agreed to return Memel (modern Klaipėda, Lithuania) to Germany.

In March 1939, Ribbentrop assigned the largely ethnic Ukrainian Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia region of Czecho-Slovakia, which had just proclaimed its independence as the Republic of Carpatho-Ukraine to Hungary, which then proceeded to annex it after a short war. The significance of this lies in that there had been many fears in the Soviet Union in the 1930s that the Germans would use Ukrainian nationalism as a tool for breaking up the Soviet Union. By allowing the Hungarians to destroy Europe's only Ukrainian state, Ribbentrop had signified that Germany was not interested (at least for the moment) in sponsoring Ukrainian nationalism. On 21 March 1939, Hitler went public for the first time with his demand for Danzig to rejoin the ''Reich'' and for "extra-territorial" roads across the Polish Corridor. This marked a significant escalation of the German pressure on Poland, which until then had been confided only to private meetings between German and Polish diplomats. That same day, on 21 March 1939 Ribbentrop presented a set of demands to the Polish Ambassador Józef Lipski about Poland allowing the Free City of Danzig to return to Germany in such violent and extreme language that it led to the Poles to fear their country was on the verge of an immediate German attack. Ribbentrop had used such extreme language, in particular his remark that if Germany had a different policy towards the Soviet Union then Poland would cease to exist that it led to the Poles ordering partial Mobilization and placing their armed forces on the highest state of alert on 23 March 1939. Ribbentrop in turn sent out instructions to the German Ambassador in Warsaw, Count Hans-Adolf von Moltke that if Poland agreed to the German demands, then Germany would ensure that Poland could partion Slovakia with Hungary and be ensured of German support for annexing the Ukraine. If the Poles rejected his offer, then Poland would be considered an enemy of the ''Reich''. The meeting ended with Ribbentrop screaming that if Poland were to invade the Free City, then Germany would go to war to destroy Poland. On March 28, Colonel Beck told Moltke that if any attempt to change the status of Danzig unilaterally would be regarded by Poland as a ''casus belli''. Through the Germans were not planning an attack on Poland in March 1939, Ribbentrop's bullying behavior towards the Poles destroyed whatever faint chance there was of Poland allowing Danzig to return to Germany.

The German occupation of the Czech area of Czecho-Slovakia on the Ides of March, in total contravention of the Munich Agreement that had been signed less than six months before, infuriated British and French public opinion and lost Germany all sympathy. Such was the state of public fury that it appeared possible for several days afterwards that the Chamberlain government might fall due to a backbencher rebellion. Even Ribbentrop’s standard line that Germany was only reacting to an unjust Treaty of Versailles, and really only wanted peace with everyone, which had worked so well in the past failed to carry weight. Reflecting the changed mood, the Conservative M.P Alfred Duff Cooper wrote in a letter to ''The Times'':

“Some of us are getting rather tired of the sanctimonious attitude which seeks to take upon our shoulders the blame for every crime committed in Europe. If Germany had been left stronger in 1919 she would sooner have been in a position to do what she is doing today”.

Moreover, the British government had genuinely believed in the German claim that it was only the Sudetenland that concerned them, and that Germany was not seeking to dominate Europe. By occupying the Czech part of Czecho-Slovakia, Germany lost all credibility with its claim to be only righting the alleged wrongs of Versailles. As the British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax put it later in August 1939:

“Last year the German government put forward the demand for the Sudetenland on purely racial grounds; but subsequent events proved that this demand was only put forward as a cover for the annihilation of Czechoslovakia. In view of this experience… it is not surprising that the Poles and we ourselves are afraid that the demand for Danzig is only a first move towards the destruction of Poland’s independence”.

Shortly afterwards, false reports spread in mid-March 1939 by the Romanian minister in London, Virgil Tilea that his country was on the verge of an immediate German attack, led to a dramatic U-turn in British policy of resisting commitments in Eastern Europe. Ribbentrop denied correctly that Germany was going to invade Romania, but since his denials were issued in almost identical language to the denials that he had issued in early March, when he denied that anything was being planned against the Czechs, this increased rather diminished the “Romanian war scare” of March 1939. From the British point of view, it was regarded as highly desirable to keep Romania and its oil out of German hands; since Germany had hardly any natural supplies of oil, the ability of the Royal Navy to successfully impose a blockade represented a British trump card both to deter war, and if necessary, win a war. If Germany were to occupy oil-rich Romania, this would undercut all of the British strategic assumptions based on Germany's need to import oil from the Americas. Since Poland was regarded as the East European state with the most powerful army, it became imperative to tie Poland to Britain as the best way of ensuring Polish support for Romania, since it was the obvious ''quid pro quo'' that Britain would have to do something for Polish security if the Poles were to be induced to do something for Romanian security. On 31 March 1939, the British Prime Minister Chamberlain announced before the House of Commons the British “guarantee” of Poland, which committed Britain to go to war to defend Polish independence, though pointedly the “guarantee” excluded Polish frontiers. As a result of the "guarantee" of Poland, Hitler began to speak with increasing frequency of a British "encirclement" policy, and used the “encirclement” policy as the excuse for denouncing in a speech before the ''Reichstag'' on 28 April 1939 the A.G.N.A and the Non-Aggression Pact with Poland.

In late March, Ribbentrop had the German chargé d'affaires in Turkey, Hans Kroll start pressuring Turkey into an alliance with Germany. The Turks assured Kroll that they had no objection to Germany making the Balkans their economic sphere of influence, but would regard any move to make the Balkans into a sphere of German political influence as most unwelcome. Anti Polish feelings had long been rampant in the ''Auswärtiges Amt'', and so in marked contrast to their cool attitude about attacking Czechoslovakia in 1938, diplomats like Weizsäcker were highly enthusiastic about the prospect of war with Poland in 1939. On April 23, 1939 the Turkish Foreign Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu told the British Ambassador of his nation's fears of Italian claims of the Mediterranean as ''Mare Nostrum'' and German control of the Balkans, and suggested an Anglo-Soviet-Turkish alliance as the best way of countering the Axis. As the Germans had broken the Turkish diplomatic codes, Ribbentrop was well aware as he warned in a circular to German embassies that Anglo-Turkish talks had gone much further "than what the Turks would care to tell us". Ribbentrop appointed Franz von Papen as the German Ambassador in Ankara with instructions to win Turkey to an alliance with Germany. Ribbentrop had been attempting to appoint Papen as an Ambassador to Turkey since April 1938. His first attempt ended in failure when the Turkish President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who remembered Papen well with considerable distaste from World War I, refused to accept him as Ambassador, complaining in private the nomination of Papen must have been meant as some sort of German sick joke. The German Embassy in Ankara had been vacant ever since the death of the previous ambassador Friedrich von Keller in November 1938, and Ribbentrop was only able to get the Turks to accept Papen as Ambassador when the Turkish Foreign Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu complained to Kroll in April 1939 about when the Germans were ever going to sent a new ambassador.

Instead of focusing on talking to the Turks, Ribbentrop and Papen became entangled in a feud over Papen's demand that he by-pass Ribbentrop and send his dispatches straight to Hitler. As a former Chancellor, Papen had granted this privilege of by-passing the Foreign Minister while he was Ambassador to Austria. Ribbentrop's friendship with Papen, which went back to 1918, ended over this issue. At the same time, Ribbentrop took to shouting at the Turkish Ambassador in Berlin, Mehemet Hamdi Arpag, as part of the effort to win Turkey over as a German ally. Ribbentrop believed that Turks were so stupid that only by shouting at them could one make them understand. One of the consequences of Ribbentrop's heavy-handed behavior was the signing of the Anglo-Turkish alliance of 12 May 1939.

From early 1939 onwards, Ribbentrop had become the leading advocate within the German government of reaching an understanding with the Soviet Union as the best way of pursuing both the short-term anti-Polish, and long-term anti-British foreign policy goals. Ribbentrop first seems to have considered the idea of a pact with the Soviet Union after an unsuccessful visit to Warsaw in January 1939, when the Poles again refused Ribbentrop's demands about Danzig, the "extra-territorial" roads across the Polish Corridor and the Anti-Comintern Pact. During the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact negotiations, Ribbentrop was overjoyed by a report from his Ambassador in Moscow, Count Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg, of a speech by the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin before the 18th Party Congress in March 1939 that was strongly anti-Western, which Schulenburg reported meant that the Soviet Union might be seeking an accord with Germany. Ribbentrop followed up Schulenburg's report by sending Dr. Julius Schnurre of the ''Auswärtiges Amt'''s Trade Department to negotiate a German-Soviet economic agreement.

Pact with the Soviet Union and the outbreak of World War II

Ribbentrop played a key role in the conclusion of a Soviet-German non-aggression pact, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, in 1939, and in the diplomatic action surrounding the attack on Poland. In public, Ribbentrop expressed great fury at the Polish refusal to allow for Danzig's return to the ''Reich'', or to grant Polish permission for the "extra-territorial" highways, but since these matters were only intended after March 1939 to be a pretext for German aggression, Ribbentrop always refused in private to allow for any talks between German and Polish diplomats about these matters. It was Ribbentrop's fear that if German-Polish talks did take place, there was the danger that the Poles might back down and agree to the German demands as the Czechoslovaks had done in 1938 under Anglo-French pressure, and thereby deprive the Germans of their excuse for aggression. To further block German-Polish diplomatic talks, Ribbentrop had the German Ambassador to Poland, Count Hans-Adolf von Moltke, recalled, and refused to see the Polish Ambassador, Józef Lipski. On 25 May 1939, Ribbentrop sent a secret message to Moscow to tell the Soviet Foreign Commissar, Vyacheslav Molotov, that if Germany attacked Poland "Russia's special interests would be taken into consideration".

Throughout 1939, in private, Hitler always referred to Britain as his main opponent, but portrayed the coming destruction of Poland as a necessary prelude to any war with Britain. A notable contradiction existed in Hitler's strategic planning between embarking on an anti-British foreign policy, whose major instruments consisted of a vastly expanded ''Kriegsmarine'' and a Luftwaffe capable of a strategic bombing offensive that would take several years to build (e.g. Plan Z for expanding the ''Kriegsmarine'' was a five year plan), and engaging in reckless short-term actions such as attacking Poland that were likely to cause a general war. Ribbentrop, for his part, because of his status as the Nazi British expert, resolved Hitler's dilemma by supporting the anti-British line and by repeatedly advising Hitler that Britain would not go to war for Poland in 1939. Ribbentrop informed Hitler that any war with Poland would last for only 24 hours, and that the British would be so stunned with this display of German power that they would not honour their commitments. Along the same lines, Ribbentrop told the Italian Foreign Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano on 5 May 1939 "It is certain that within a few months not one Frenchman nor a single Englishman will go to war for Poland". Ribbentrop supported his analysis of the situation by only showing Hitler diplomatic dispatches that supported his view that neither Britain or France would honour their commitments to Poland. In this, Ribbentrop was particularly supported by the German Ambassador in London, Herbert von Dirksen, who reported that Chamberlain knew "the social structure of Britain, even the conception of the British Empire, would not survive the chaos of even a victorious war", and so would back down over Poland. Furthermore, Ribbentrop had the German Embassy in London provide translations from pro-appeasement newspapers like the ''Daily Mail'' and the ''Daily Express'' for Hitler's benefit, which had the effect of making it seem that British public opinion was more strongly against going to war for Poland then was actually the case. The British historian Victor Rothwell wrote that the newspapers that Ribbentrop used to provide his press summaries for Hitler, such as the ''Daily Express'' and the ''Daily Mail'', were out of touch not only with British public opinion, but also with British government policy in regard to Poland.

Neville Chamberlain's European Policy in 1939 was based upon creating a "peace front" of alliances linking Western and Eastern European states to serve as a "tripwire" meant to deter any act of German aggression The new “containment” strategy adopted in March 1939 comprised giving firm warnings to Berlin, increasing the pace of British rearmament and attempting to form an interlocking network of alliances that would block German aggression anywhere in Europe by creating such a formidable deterrence to aggression that Hitler could not rationally chose that option. Underlying the basis of the “containment” of Germany was the so-called “X documents” provided by Carl Friedrich Goerdeler over the course of the winter of 1938–39 which suggested that the German economy, under the strain of massive military spending was on the verge of collapse, and which led British policy-makers to the conclusion that if Hitler could be deterred from war and if his regime was “contained” long enough, then the German economy would collapse, and with it, presumably the Nazi regime. At the same time, British policy-makers were afraid if Hitler were “contained”, and faced with a collapsing economy he would commit a desperate “mad dog act” of aggression as a way of lashing out. Hence, the emphasis on pressuring the Poles to allow the return of Danzig to Germany as a way of peacefully resolving the crisis by allowing Hitler to back down without losing face. As part of a dual strategy to avoid war via deterrence and appeasement of Germany, British leaders warned that they would go to war if Germany attacked Poland while at the same time tried to avoid war by holding unofficial talks with such would be peace-makers like the British newspaper proprietor Lord Kemsley, the Swedish businessman Axel Wenner-Gren and an another Swedish businessmen Birger Dahlerus who attempted to work out the basis for a peaceful return of Danzig. Ribbentrop and Hitler misunderstood the British attempts to provide for a peaceful settlement of the Danzig crisis as a sign that Britain would not go to war for Poland.

In May 1939, as part of his efforts to bully Turkey into joining the Axis, Ribbentrop had arranged for the cancellation of the delivery of 60 heavy howitzers from the Škoda Works, which the Turks had paid for in advance. The German refusal either to deliver the artillery pieces or refund the 125 million ''Reichsmarks'' the Turks had paid in advance for them was to be a major strain on German-Turkish relations in 1939, and had the effect of causing Turkey’s politically powerful army to resist Ribbentrop’s entreaties to join the Axis.

In June 1939, Franco-German relations were strained when the head of the French section of the ''Dienststelle Ribbentrop'', Otto Abetz, was expelled from France following allegations that he had bribed two French newspaper editors to print pro-German articles. Ribbentrop was enraged by Abetz's expulsion, and attacked Count Johannes von Welczeck, the German Ambassador in Paris, over his failure to have the French re-admit Abetz. In July 1939, Ribbentrop's claims about Bonnet's alleged statement of December 1938 were to lead to a lengthy war of words via a series of letters to the French newspapers between Bonnet and Ribbentrop over just what precisely Bonnet had said to Ribbentrop. In the spring and summer of 1939, Ribbentrop used Bonnet's alleged statement to convince Hitler that France would not go to war in the defense of Poland, despite the frequent denials by Bonnet that he ever made such a statement (which would not have been legally binding even had Bonnet had made the alleged statement; only a formal renunciation of the Franco-Polish treaty by the French National Assembly would end the French commitment to Poland).

On 11 August 1939, Ribbentrop met the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano, and the Italian Ambassador to Germany, Count Bernardo Attolico, in Salzburg. During that meeting, both Ciano and Attolico were horrified to learn from Ribbentrop that Germany planned to attack Poland that summer, and that the Danzig issue was just a pretext for aggression. When Ciano asked if there was anything Italy could do to broker a Polish-German settlement that would avert a war, he was told by Ribbentrop that "We want war!". Ribbentrop expressed his firmly-held belief that neither Britain nor France would go to war for Poland, but if that should occur, he fully expected the Italians to honour the terms of the Pact of Steel (which was both an offensive and defensive treaty), and declare war not only on Poland, but on the Western powers if necessary.

On 21 August 1939, Hitler received a message from Stalin reading "The Soviet Government has instructed me to say they agree to Herr von Ribbentrop's arrival on 23 August". Hitler believed that British policy was based upon securing Soviet support for Poland, which led him to perform a diplomatic U-turn and support Ribbentrop's policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union as the best way of ensuring a local war. This was especially the case as decrypts showed the British military attaché to Poland arguing that Britain could not save Poland in the event of a German attack, and only Soviet support offered the prospect of Poland holding out.

The signing of the Non-Aggression Pact in Moscow on 23 August 1939 was the crowning achievement of Ribbentrop's career. Ribbentrop flew to Moscow, where, over the course of a thirteen hour visit, Ribbentrop signed both the Non-Aggression Pact and the secret protocols, which partitioned much of Eastern Europe between the Soviets and the Germans. Ribbentrop had only expected to see the Soviet Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov, and was most surprised to be holding talks with Joseph Stalin. During his trip to Moscow, Ribbentrop's talks with Stalin and Molotov proceed very cordially and efficiently with the exception of the question of Latvia, which Hitler had instructed Ribbentrop to try to claim for Germany. When Stalin claimed Latvia for the Soviet Union, Ribbentrop was forced to telephone Berlin for permission from Hitler to concede Latvia to the Soviets. After finishing his talks with Stalin and Molotov, Ribbentrop, at a dinner with the Soviet leaders, launched into a lengthy diatribe against the British Empire, with frequent interjections of approval from Stalin, and then exchanged toasts with Stalin in honour of German-Soviet friendship. For a brief moment in August 1939, Ribbentrop convinced Hitler that the Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union would cause the fall of the Chamberlain government, and lead to a new British government that would abandon the Poles to their fate. Ribbentrop argued that with Soviet economic support (especially in the form of oil), Germany was now immune to the effects of a British naval blockade, and as such, the British would never take on Germany. On 23 August 1939 at a secret meeting of the ''Reich'''s top military leadership at the Berghof, Hitler argued neither Britain nor France would go to war for Poland without the Soviet Union, and fixed "X-Day", the date for the invasion of Poland for 26 August. Hitler added that "My only fear is that at the last moment some ''Schweinehund'' will make a proposal for mediation". Unlike Hitler, who saw the Non-Aggression Pact as merely a pragmatic device forced on him by circumstances, namely the refusal of Britain or Poland to play the roles Hitler had allocated to them, Ribbentrop regarded the Non-Aggression Pact as integral to his anti-British policy.

The signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact on August 23, 1939 not only won Germany an informal alliance with the Soviet Union, but also neutralized Anglo-French attempts to win Turkey to the “peace front”. The Turks always believed that it was essential to have the Soviet Union as an ally to counter Germany, and the signing of the German-Soviet pact undercut completely the assumptions behind Turkish security policy. The Anglo-French effort to include the Balkans into the “peace front” had always rested on the assumption that the cornerstone of the “peace front” in the Balkans was to be Turkey, the regional super-power. Because of the Balkans were rich in raw materials like iron, zinc and above all oil that could help Germany survive a British blockade, it was viewed as highly important by the Allies to keep German influence in the Balkans to a minimum, hence British efforts to link British promises to support Turkey in the event of an Italian attack in exchange for Turkish promises to help defend Romania from a German attack. British and French leaders believed that the deterrent value of the “peace front” could be increased if Turkey were a member and if the Turkish Straits were open to Allied ships. This was especially damaging to Ribbentrop, as he always assured Hitler that "Italy's attitude is determined by the Rome-Berlin Axis". Because of Ribbentrop's firmly held views that Britain was Germany's most dangerous enemy and that an Anglo-German war was thus inevitable, it scarcely mattered to him when his much desired war with Britain came. Even if the British were serious in their warnings of war, Ribbentrop took the view that since a war with Britain was inevitable, the risk of a war with Britain was an acceptable one and accordingly he argued that Germany should not shy away from such challenges.

Ribbentrop for his part told Hitler that Chamberlain's letter was just a bluff, and urged his master to call it. Henderson stated that the terms of the German "final offer" were very reasonable, but argued that Ribbentrop's time limit for Polish acceptance of the "final offer" was most unreasonable, and furthermore, demanded to know why Ribbentrop insisted upon seeing a special Polish plenipotentiary and could not present the "final offer" to Józef Lipski or provide a written copy of the "final offer". The Henderson-Ribbentrop meeting became so tense that the two men almost came to blows. The American historian Gerhard Weinberg described the Henderson-Ribbentrop meeting in this way:

"When Joachim von Ribbentrop refused to give a copy of the German demands to the British Ambassador [Henderson] at midnight of 30–31 August 1939, the two almost came to blows. Ambassador Henderson, who had long advocated concessions to Germany, recognized that here was a deliberately conceived alibi the German government had prepared for a war it was determined to start. No wonder Henderson was angry; von Ribbentrop on the other hand could see war ahead and went home beaming."

As intended by Ribbentrop, the narrow time limit for acceptance of the "final offer" made it impossible for the British government to contact the Polish government in time about the German offer, let alone for the Poles to arrange for a Polish plenipotentiary envoy to arrive in Berlin that night, thereby allowing Ribbentrop to claim that the Poles had rejected the German "final offer". As it was, a special meeting of the British cabinet called to consider the "final offer", they declined to pass on the message to Warsaw under the grounds this was not a serious proposal on the part of Berlin. On August 31, Ribbentrop met with Attolico to tell him that Poland's "rejection" of the "generous" German 16-point peace plan meant that Germany had no interest in Mussolini's offer to call a conference about the status of Danzig. Besides for the Polish "rejection" of the German "final offer", the aggression against Poland was justified by the Gleiwitz incident and other SS-staged incidents on the German-Polish border.

As soon as the news broke in the morning of 1 September 1939 that Germany had invaded Poland, the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini launched another desperate peace mediation plan intended to stop the German-Polish war from becoming a world war. Mussolini's motives had nothing with anything altruistic, and were instead motivated entirely to escape his self-imposed trap of the Pact of Steel, which had obligated Italy to go war when the country was entirely unprepared or suffer the humiliation of having to declare neutrality, which make him appear cowardly. The French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet acting on his initiative told the Italian Ambassador to France Baron Raffaele Guariglia that France had accepted Mussolini's peace plan. Bonnet had Havas issued a statement at midnight on 1 September saying:"The French government has today, as have several other Governments, received an Italian proposal looking to the resolution of Europe's difficulties. After due consideration, the French government has given a "positive response". Through the French and the Italians were serious about Mussolini's peace plan, which called for an immediate ceasefire and a four-power conference ''à la'' Munich to consider Poland's borders, the British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax stated that unless the Germans withdrew from Poland immediately, then Britain would not attend the proposed conference. Ribbentrop finally scuttled Mussolini's peace plan by stating that Germany had utterly no interest in a ceasefire, in a withdrawal from Poland and in attending the proposed peace conference.

When on the morning of 3 September 1939 Chamberlain followed through with his threat of a British declaration of war if Germany attacked Poland, a visibly shocked Hitler asked Ribbentrop "Now what?", a question to which Ribbentrop had no answer except to state that there would be a "similar message" forthcoming from the French Ambassador Robert Coulondre, who arrived later that afternoon to present the French declaration of war. Weizsäcker later recalled that "On 3 Sept., when the British and French declared war, Hitler was surprised, after all, and was to begin with, at a loss". In part due to Ribbentrop's influence, it has been often observed that Hitler went to war in 1939 with the country he wanted as his ally – namely the United Kingdom – as his enemy, and the country he wanted as his enemy – namely the Soviet Union – as his ally.

After the outbreak of World War II, Ribbentrop spent most of the Polish campaign travelling with Hitler. On 27 September 1939, Ribbentrop made a second visit to Moscow, where at meetings with the Soviet Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov and Joseph Stalin, he was forced to agree to revising the Secret Protocols of the Non-Aggression Pact in the Soviet Union's favour, most notably agreeing to Stalin's demand that Lithuania go to the Soviet Union. The imposition of the British blockade had made the ''Reich'' highly dependent upon Soviet economic support, which placed Stalin in a strong negotiating position with Ribbentrop. On 1 March 1940, Ribbentrop received Sumner Welles, the American Under-Secretary of State, who was on a peace mission for President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and did his best to abuse his American guest. Welles asked Ribbentrop what terms Germany might be willing to negotiate a compromise peace under, before the Phoney War became a real war. Ribbentrop told Welles that only a total German victory "could give us the peace we want". Welles reported to Roosevelt that Ribbentrop had a "completely closed and very stupid mind". On 10 March 1940, Ribbentrop visited Rome where he met Mussolini, who promised him that Italy would soon enter the war. For his one-day Italian trip, Ribbentrop was accompanied by a staff of thirty-five, including a gymnastics coach, a masseur, a doctor, two hairdressers, plus various legal and economic experts from the ''Auswärtiges Amt''. After the Italo-German summit at the Brenner Pass on 18 March 1940, which was attended by Hitler and Mussolini, Count Ciano wrote in his diary: "Everyone in Rome dislikes Ribbentrop". On 7 May 1940, Ribbentrop founded a new section of the ''Auswärtiges Amt'', the ''Abteilung Deutschland'' (Department of Internal German Affairs) under Martin Luther, to which was assigned the responsibility for all anti-Semitic affairs. On 10 May 1940, Ribbentrop summoned the Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg ambassadors to present them with notes justifying the German invasion of their countries, several hours after the Germans had invaded those nations. Much to Ribbentrop's fury, someone leaked the plans for the German invasion to the Dutch Embassy in Berlin, which led Ribbentrop to devote the next several months to conducting an unsuccessful investigation into who leaked the news. This investigation tore apart ''Auswärtiges Amt'', as colleagues were encouraged to denounce each other.

In early June 1940, when Mussolini informed Hitler that he at long last would enter the war on 10 June 1940, Hitler was most dismissive, in private calling Mussolini a cowardly opportunist who broke the terms of the Pact of Steel in September 1939 when the going looked rough, and was only entering the war in June 1940 after it was clear that France was beaten and it appeared that Britain would soon make peace. Ribbentrop, through he shared Hitler's assessment of the Italians, nonetheless welcomed Italy coming into war partially because it seemed to affirm the importance of the Pact of Steel, which Ribbentrop had negotiated and partly because with Italy now an ally, the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' now had more to do. Ribbentrop championed the so-called Madagascar Plan in June 1940 to deport all of Europe's Jews to Madagascar after the presumed imminent defeat of Britain.

Relations with wartime allies

After June 1940, Ribbentrop, who was a Francophile, argued that Germany should allow Vichy France a limited degree of independence within a binding new Franco-German partnership. To this end, Ribbentrop appointed a colleague from the ''Dienststelle'' named Otto Abetz as Ambassador to France with instructions to promote the political career of Pierre Laval, who Ribbentrop had decided was the French politician most favourable to Germany. The amount of ''Auswärtiges Amt'' influence in France varied, as there were many other agencies competing for power there such as the military, the SS and the Four Year Plan office of Ribbentrop's archenemy Hermann Göring, but in general from late 1943 to mid-1944, the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' was second only to the SS in terms of power in France.

From the latter half of 1937, Ribbentrop had championed the idea of an alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan that would partition the British Empire between them. After signing the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, Ribbentrop expanded on this idea for an Axis alliance to include the Soviet Union to form a Eurasian bloc that would destroy maritime states such as Britain. The German historian Klaus Hildebrand argued that besides Hitler's foreign policy programme, there were three other factions within the Nazi Party who had alternative foreign policy programmes, whom Hildebrand dubbed the agrarians, the revolutionary socialists, and the Wilhelmine Imperialists. Another German diplomatic historian, Wolfgang Michalka argued that there was a fourth alternative Nazi foreign policy programme, and that was Ribbentrop's concept of a Euro-Asiatic bloc comprising the four totalitarian states of Germany, the Soviet Union, Italy and Japan. Unlike the other factions, Ribbentrop's foreign policy programme was the only one that Hitler allowed to be executed during the years 1939–41, though it was more due to the temporary bankruptcy of Hitler's own foreign policy programme that he had laid down in ''Mein Kampf'' and ''Zweites Buch'' following the failure to achieve an alliance with Britain, than to a genuine change of mind. Ribbentrop's foreign policy conceptions differed from Hitler's in that Ribbentrop's concept of international relations owed more to the traditional Wilhelmine ''Machtpolitik'' than to Hitler's racist and Social Darwinist vision of different "races" locked in a merciless and endless struggle over ''Lebensraum''. The different foreign-policy conceptions held by Hitler and Ribbentrop were illustrated in their reaction to the Fall of Singapore in 1942: Ribbentrop wanted this great British defeat to be a day of celebration in Germany, whereas Hitler forbade any celebrations on the grounds that Singapore represented a sad day for the principles of white supremacy. Another area of difference was that Ribbentrop had an obsessive hatred for Britain – which he saw as the main enemy – and the Soviet Union as important ally in the anti-British struggle; whereas Hitler saw the alliance with the Soviet Union as only tactical, and was nowhere as anti-British as his Foreign Minister.

In August 1940, Ribbentrop oversaw the Second Vienna Award, which saw about 40% of Transylvania region of Romania returned to Hungary. The decision to award so much of Romania to the Hungarians was Hitler's, as Ribbentrop himself spent most of the Vienna conference loudly attacking the Hungarian delegation for their coolness towards attacking Czechoslovakia in 1938 and then demanding more than their fair share of the spoils. An angry Súñer replied that he would rather see the Canaries sink into the Atlantic then cede an inch of Spanish territory. Another area where Ribbentrop enjoyed more success occurred in September 1940, when he had the Far Eastern agent of the ''Dienststelle Ribbentrop'', Dr. Heinrich Georg Stahmer, start negotiations with the Japanese foreign minister, Yōsuke Matsuoka, for an anti-American alliance (the German Ambassador to Japan, General Eugen Ott, was excluded from the talks on Ribbentrop's orders). The end result of these talks was the signing in Berlin on 27 September 1940 of the Tripartite Pact by Ribbentrop, Count Ciano, and the Japanese Ambassador Saburo Kurusu. It was Ribbentrop's hope that the prospect of facing the Tripartite Pact would deter the United States from supporting Britain, but since the Pact was more or less openly directed against the United States (the Pact made a point of stressing that the unnamed great power it was directed against was not the Soviet Union), it had the opposite effect on American public opinion to the one intended.

In October 1940, ''Gauleiters'' Josef Bürckel and Robert Wagner oversaw the almost total explusion of the Jews into unoccupied France not only from the parts of Alsace-Lorraine that had been annexed that summer to the ''Reich'', but also from their ''Gaues'' as while. Ribbentrop treated the ensuring complaints by the Vichy French government over the expulsions in a "most dilatory fashion".

In November 1940, during the visit of the Soviet Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov to Berlin, Ribbentrop tried hard to get the Soviet Union to sign the Tripartite Pact. Ribbentrop argued that the Soviets and Germans shared a common enemy in the form of the British Empire, and as such, it was in the best interests of the Kremlin to enter the war on the Axis side. In the aftermath of the failed coup in Bucharest, the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' assembled evidence that the SD had backed the coup, which led to Ribbentrop sharply restricting the powers of the SD police attachés, who since October 1939 had operated largely independently of the German embassies at which they had been stationed. In the spring of 1941, Ribbentrop appointed an assemblage of SA men to German embassies in Eastern Europe, with Manfred von Killinger going to Romania, Siegfried Kasche to Croatia, Adolf Beckerle to Bulgaria, Dietrich von Jagow to Hungary, and Hans Ludin to Slovakia. The major qualifications of all these men, none of whom had previously held a diplomatic position before, were that they were close friends of Luther, and as a way of splitting the SS (the traditional rivalry between the SS and SA was still running strong).

In March 1941, Japan's Germanophile foreign minister Yōsuke Matsuoka visited Berlin. On 29 March 1941, during a conversation with Matsuoka, Ribbentrop as instructed by Hitler told the Japanese nothing about the upcoming Operation Barbarossa, as Hitler believed that he could defeat the Soviet Union on his own and preferred that the Japanese attack Britain instead. Hitler did not wish for any information that might lead the Japanese into attacking the Soviet Union to reach their ears. Ribbentrop tried to convince Matsuoka to urge the government in Tokyo to attack the great British naval base at Singapore, claiming the Royal Navy was too weak to retaliate due to its involvement in the Battle of the Atlantic. Matsuoka responded to this by stating preparations to occupy Singapore were under way.

In the winter of 1940–41, Ribbentrop strongly pressured Yugoslavia to sign the Tripartite Pact, despite advice from the German Legation in Belgrade that such a move would probably lead to the overthrow of Crown Prince Paul, the Yugoslav Regent. Ribbentrop's intention with pressuring Yugoslavia into signing the Tripartite Pact was to gain transit rights through that country, which would allow the Germans to invade Greece. On 25 March 1941, Yugoslavia reluctantly signed the Tripartite Pact, which led to the overthrow of Prince Paul the next day in a bloodless coup by the Yugoslav military. When Hitler ordered Yugoslavia to be invaded, Ribbentrop was opposed, though only because the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' was likely to be excluded from ruling the occupied Yugoslavia. As Hitler was displeased with Ribbentrop over his opposition to attacking Yugoslavia, he then broke down and took to his bed for the next couple of days. When Ribbentrop recovered, he sought a chance for increasing ''Auswärtiges Amt'' influence by giving Croatia independence. Ribbentrop chose the Ustaša to rule Croatia, and had Edmund Veesenmayer of the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' successfully conclude talks in April 1941 with General Slavko Kvaternik of the Ustaša on having his party rule Croatia after the German invasion. Reflecting his displeasure with the German Legation in Belgrade, which had advised against pressuring Yugoslavia into signing the Tripartite Pact, when the Bombing of Belgrade took place on 6 April 1941, Ribbentrop refused to have the staff of the German Legation withdrawn in advance, who were thus left to survive the fire-bombing of Belgrade as best they could.

Ribbentrop liked and admired Stalin, and was against the attack on the USSR in 1941. He passed a word to a Soviet diplomat: "Please tell Stalin I was against this war, and that I know it will bring great misfortune to Germany." In the spring of 1941, upon hearing of the coup in Baghdad that brought Rashid Ali al-Gaylani to power, Ribbentrop dispatched Dr. Fritz Grobba on a secret mission to Iraq to make contact with the new government. When Grobba reported that the Iraqis as Arab nationalists saw the British and the Jews as their enemies and wished to ally themselves with Germany against their common foes, Ribbentrop was delighted and become obsessed with the idea of an Iraqi-German alliance. In pursuit of his Iraq project, Ribbentrop strongly pushed for German aid to the Rashid Ali al-Gaylani government in Iraq, where he saw a great opportunity for striking a blow at British influence in the Middle East. It was Ribbentrop's hope that a striking German success in Iraq might lead to Hitler abandoning his plans for Operation Barbarossa, and focusing instead on the struggle with Britain. The abject failure of Ribbentrop's Iraq scheme in May 1941 had a totally opposite effect to the one intended. When it came to time for Ribbentrop to present the German declaration of war on 22 June 1941 to the Soviet Ambassador, General Vladimir Dekanozov, Paul Schmidt described the scene:

"It is just before four on the morning of Sunday, 22 June 1941 in the office of the Foreign Minister. He is expecting the Soviet Ambassador, Dekanozov, who had been phoning the Minister since early Saturday. Dekanozov had an urgent message from Moscow. He had called every two hours, but was told the Minister was away from the city. At two on Sunday morning, von Ribbentrop finally responded to the calls. Dekanozov was told that von Ribbentrop wished to meet with him at once. An appointment was made for 4 amVon Ribbentrop is nervous, walking up and down from one end of his large office to the other, like a caged animal, while saying over and over, "The ''Führer'' is absolutely right. We must attack Russia, or they will surely attack us!" Is he reassuring himself? Is he justifying the ruination of his crowning diplomatic achievement? Now he has to destroy it "because that is the ''Führer'''s wish".

When Dekanozov finally appeared, Ribbentrop read out a short statement saying that the ''Reich'' had been forced into "military countermeasures" because of an alleged Soviet plan to attack Germany in July 1941. However, Ribbentrop's motives in seeking to have Japan enter the war were more anti-British then anti-Soviet. In addition, Ribbentrop hoped that recognizing Wang would be seen as a coup which might add to the prestige of the pro-German Japanese Foreign Minister Yōsuke Matsuoka, who was opposed to opening American-Japanese talks. Despite Ribbentrop's best efforts, Matsuoka was sacked as Foreign Minister later in July 1941, and the Japanese-American talks began.

Ribbentrop was found to have had culpability in the Holocaust on the grounds that he persuaded the leaders of satellite countries of the Third Reich to deport Jews to the Nazi extermination camps. In August 1941, when the question of whether to deport foreign Jews living in Germany arose, Ribbentrop argued against deportation as a way of maximizing the influence of the ''Auswärtiges Amt''. In order to deport foreign Jews living in the ''Reich'', Ribbentrop then had Luther negotiate agreements with the governments of Romania, Slovakia and Croatia to allow Jews holding citizenship of those states to be deported. In September 1941, the Reich Plenipotentiary for Serbia, Felix Benzler of ''Auswärtiges Amt'', reported to Ribbentrop that the SS had arrested 8,000 Serbian Jews, whom they were planning to execute en masse, and asked for permission to try to stop the massacre. Ribbentrop assigned the question to Luther, who in turn ordered Benzler to co-operate fully in the massacre.

In October 1941, Ribbentrop’s prestige was badly damaged by the discovery of the Soviet spy ring in Tokyo headed by Richard Sorge, who was arrested by the Japanese while in bed with the wife of General Eugen Ott, the German Ambassador. Sorge had been a close friend of General Ott, who had given him a free rein at the Tokyo Embassy, and thus allowed him to pass along all sorts of German secrets to Moscow. The resulting scandal was another blow to the ''Auswärtiges Amt'', made all the more worse in that it was the Japanese who had discovered and broken up the Sorge spy ring without any assistance from the Germans.

In the fall of 1941, Ribbentrop worked for both the failure of the Japanese-American talks in Washington and Japan attacking the United States. In October 1941 Ribbentrop ordered General Ott to start applying pressure on the Japanese to attack the Americans as soon as possible. Ribbentrop argued to Hitler that a war between the United States and Germany was inevitable given the extent of American aid to Britain and the increasingly frequent "incidents" in the North Atlantic between U-boats and American warships guarding convoys to Britain, and that having such a war begin with a Japanese attack on the United States was the best way to begin it. Ribbentrop told Hitler that because of his four years in Canada and the United States before 1914, he was an expert on all things American, and that the United States in his opinion was not a serious military power. On 4 December 1941, the Japanese Ambassador General Hiroshi Ōshima told Ribbentrop that Japan was on the verge of war with the United States, which led to Ribbentrop promising him on behalf of Hitler that Germany would join the war against the Americans. On 7 December 1941 Ribbentrop was jubilant at the news of Pearl Harbor, and did his utmost to support declaring war on the United States, which was duly delivered on 11 December 1941. In the winter and spring of 1942 following American entry into war, all of the Latin American states except for Argentina and Chile under American pressure declared war on Germany. Ribbentrop who considered taking declarations of war from such small states as Costa Rica and Ecuador to be deeply humiliating refused to see any of the Latin American ambassadors and instead had Weizsäcker take the Latin declarations of war. From Ribbentrop's point of view, this had the dual benefit of ensuring popular support for the German Army as it advanced into the Caucasus and of ensuring that it was the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' that ruled the Caucasus once the Germans occupied the area. Alfred Rosenberg, the German Minister of the East, saw this as an intrusion into his area of authority, and told Hitler that the émigrés at the Hotel Adlon were "a nest of Allied agents". Much to Ribbentrop's intense disappointment, Hitler sided with Rosenberg. For Hitler, the Soviet Union was to be Germany's ''Lebensraum'' and he had no interest in even setting up puppet governments in a region he planned to colonize.

Despite the often fierce rivalry with the SS, the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' played a key role in arranging the deportations of Jews to the death camps from France (1942–44), Hungary (1944–45), Slovakia, Italy (after 1943), and the Balkans. Ribbentrop assigned all of the Holocaust-related work to an old crony from the ''Dienststelle'' named Martin Luther, who represented the Foreign Ministry at the Wannsee Conference. In 1942, Ambassador Otto Abetz secured the deportation of 25,000 French Jews, and Ambassador Hans Ludin secured the deportation of 50,000 Slovak Jews to the death camps. Only once, in August 1942, did Ribbentrop attempt to impede the deportations, but only because of jurisdictional disputes with the SS. Ribbentrop ordered the halt of deportations from Romania and Croatia: In the case of the former, he was insulted because the SS were negotiating with the Romanians directly, and in the case of the latter because the SS and Luther were jointly pressuring the Italians in their zone of occupation in Croatia to deport their Jews without informing Ribbentrop first, who was supposed to be personally kept abreast of all developments in Italo-German relations. In September 1942, after a meeting with Hitler, who was most unhappy with his Foreign Minister's actions, Ribbentrop promptly changed course and ordered that the deportations be resumed at once with all speed.

It should be noted that the professional diplomats were highly involved in the “Final Solution”, and not just Ribbentrop's cronies from the ''Dienststelle''. Very typical of the involvement of the professional diplomats was the fiercely anti-Semitic Curt Prufer, who joined the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' in 1907, served as the German Ambassador to Brazil in 1938–1942, and then worked closely with the exiled Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husayni in recruiting Balkan Muslims to kill Jews in 1943. As an Orientalist who spoke fluent Arabic, Prufer was especially concerned with relations with the Arabs. Through Prufer loathed Ribbentrop, whom he viewed as an inept bully who was trashing his beloved ''Auswärtiges Amt'', and the rest of the Nazis, Prufer's hatred for the Jews was even greater. After the war, Prufer rewrote his entire diaries in order to remake himself from an anti-Semitic German ultra-nationalist into an opponent of the Nazis who was utterly disgusted by Nazi anti-Semitism; his deception was not exposed until the 1980s by the American historian Donald McKale.

In November 1942, following Operation Torch, Ribbentrop was involved in a meeting with Pierre Laval in Munich, where Laval was presented with an ultimatum for the German occupation of the unoccupied zone of France, plus Tunisia. At the same time, Ribbentrop attempted to unsuccessfully arrange for the Vichy French troops in North Africa to be formally placed under German command to resist the Allies. Ciano was amazed at the way that Laval fell in with the German demands, and thought it all typical of Ribbentrop that he should remind Laval in a very tactless way how this forest had once served as Napoleon's headquarters. Luther had become estranged from Ribbentrop because he continued to be treated as a household servant by Frau Ribbentrop, who, in turn, had pressured her husband into ordering an investigation into allegations of corruption on Luther's part. The ''putsch'' failed largely because at the last minute Himmler decided that a Foreign Ministry headed by Luther would be a more dangerous opponent than one by Ribbentrop, and so withdrew his support from Luther. In the aftermath of the failed ''putsch'', Luther was sent to Sachsenhausen concentration camp.

In April 1943, during a summit meeting with Admiral Horthy of Hungary, Ribbentrop strongly and unsuccessfully pressed the Hungarians to deport their Jewish population to the death camps. Ribbentrop's own views about the Holocaust were well summarized when during his meeting with Admiral Horthy, Ribbentrop declared "the Jews must either be exterminated or taken to the concentration camps. There is no other possibility". Later, when on trial for his life at Nuremberg, Ribbentrop claimed to have always been opposed to the "Final Solution" and to have done everything in his power to stop it.

Declining influence

As the war went on, Ribbentrop's influence declined. Since much of the world was at war with Germany, which was losing, the usefulness of the Foreign Ministry became increasingly limited. By January 1944, Germany maintained diplomatic relations only with Argentina, Ireland, Vichy France, the Salo Republic in Italy, Occupied Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Croatia, Bulgaria, Switzerland, the Holy See, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Thailand, Japan, and the Japanese puppet states of Manchukuo and the Wang Jingwei regime in China. Of these, during the course of 1944 Argentina and Turkey both broke off diplomatic relations with Germany while Finland, Romania and Bulgaria all joined the Allies and declared war on the ''Reich''.

Hitler, for his part, found Ribbentrop increasingly tiresome, and sought to avoid him. The Foreign Minister's ever more desperate pleas for Hitler to allow him to find some way of making peace with at least some of Germany's enemies – the Soviet Union in particular – certainly played a role in this estrangement. In September 1943, the German Embassy in Stockholm came into contact with a NKVD agent who offered on behalf of the Soviet Union to start German-Soviet peace talks. Ribbentrop very much favoured taking up the Soviet peace feeler, only to be overruled by Hitler, who had no interest in the Soviet peace offer. As Ribbentrop's influence with Hitler went into a sharp decline after 1943, he increasingly spent his time feuding with other Nazi leaders over control of anti-Semitic policies as a way of trying to win back Hitler's favour. In late 1943, Ribbentrop sacked von Weizsäcker, with whom his relations had been declining for some time as State Secretary, and appointed as his replacement, Baron Gustav Adolf Steengracht von Moyland, whose principal qualification was his status as "Ribbentrop's parrot". In November, the Vichy Chief of State Marshal Philippe Pétain made an show of independence by calling for the French National Assembly which he had dismissed in July 1940 to reconvene in order to consider all of the important issues of the day. On 4 December 1943, Otto Abetz handed Marshal Pétain a letter from Ribbentrop telling him that if Vichy France continued to show such independence, then the Germans would not bother with dealing with him anymore and would impose a ''Gauleiter'' to rule France like Poland. Pétain submitted to Ribbentrop's threat. Later in December 1943, Ribbentrop played a key role in having radical French fascists installed in key positions in the Vichy cabinet as a way of binding Vichy more closely to the ''Reich''. Ribbentrop had Joseph Darnand appointed as Interior Minister, Marcel Déat as Labour Minister and Philippe Henriot as Information Minister. Following a new clash with Goebbels in December 1943 over control of propaganda abroad, Goebbels wrote in his diary:

"If Ribbentrop is as clever in his foreign policy as he is in matters of domestic politics, I can well understand why we achieve no notable success in our dealings with foreign nations”.

In January 1944, Ribbentrop strongly pressured Mussolini to execute Count Galeazzo Ciano, whom Ribbentrop had long hated, and whom he loathed even more after reading the disparaging remarks about himself in Ciano's diary. One of Ribbentrop's last significant acts in the field of foreign relations was his role in the Ryti-Ribbentrop Agreement with Finnish President Risto Ryti.

In March 1944, upon learning of Hungarian attempts to make peace with the Allies, Hitler resolved to invade Hungary. The defection of Hungary from the Axis threatened to undermine the entire German war effort, as it was through Hungary that Romanian oil from the Ploieşti oil-fields passed on its way to the ''Reich''. Ribbentrop, who was opposed to Hitler's plans lest Germany lose another country to have diplomatic relations with, which would have lessened the importance of the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' even further, talked Hitler instead into giving the Hungarians an ultimatum. Horthy chose the former course.

In the spring of 1944, the German Reich Plenipotentiary for Hungary, Edmund Veesenmayer (formally Ribbentrop's liaison man with the IRA) of the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' played a major role in helping to arrange the deportation of 400,000 Hungarian Jews to the death camps. Veesenmayer kept Ribbentrop fully informed about the Hungarian deportations, sending the Foreign Minister weekly reports about the deportations, and threatened the Hungarian Regent, Admiral Miklós Horthy, when he ordered a halt to the deportations in July 1944. On 28 April 1944, Ribbentrop, who had finally won control of foreign propaganda, founded a new section at the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' called "Anti-Jewish Action Abroad" under Rudolf Schleier, which included Mohammad Amin al-Husayni and Rashid Ali al-Gaylani as members, and was given the responsibility of conducting anti-Semitic propaganda abroad.

A major blow against Ribbentrop was the participation of many old diplomats from the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' in the 20 July 1944 ''putsch'' and assassination attempt on Hitler. Ribbentrop had no knowledge of the plot, but the involvement of so many former and serving members of the Foreign Ministry reflected badly on him. Hitler felt with some justification that Ribbentrop was not keeping proper tabs on what his diplomats were up to, because of his "bloated administration". After 20 July, Ribbentrop worked closely with the SS, with whom by this time he was reconciled, in purging the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' of those suspected of involvement with the ''putsch''. Two of the more notable diplomats to be executed after the July ''putsch'' were Count Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg and Ulrich von Hassell. As part of the purge effort, and at the instigation of his wife, Ribbentrop had Lieny Behlau, the widow of Frau Ribbentrop's younger brother, sent to a concentration camp in August 1944 under the ''Sippenhaft'' law, and the custody of her two children assigned to him and his wife, which had the benefit of making the Ribbentrops the legal guardians of Behlau's share of the Henkell family fortune. Ribbentrop worked in close co-operation with the SS for what turned out to be his last significant foreign policy move, Operation Panzerfaust, the coup that deposed Admiral Miklós Horthy, the Regent of Hungary, on 15 October 1944. Horthy was deposed because he attempted to seek a separate peace with the Allies, and was replaced by Ferenc Szálasi, who resumed the deportation of Hungarian Jews in co-operation with the SS and the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' that Horthy had halted in July 1944.

On 20 April 1945, Ribbentrop attended Hitler's 56th birthday party in Berlin. This was one of the last times he saw Hitler. On 23 April 1945, Ribbentrop attempted to have a meeting with Hitler, only to be told to go away, as Hitler had more important things to do than talk to him. This was his last meeting with Hitler.

On 14 June 1945, Ribbentrop was arrested by Sergeant Jacques Goffinet, a French citizen who had joined the Belgian SAS and was working with British forces near Hamburg. Found with him was a rambling letter addressed to the British Prime Minister "Vincent Churchill" criticizing British foreign policy for anti-German bias, blaming the British for the Soviet occupation of the eastern half of Germany, and thus for the advance of "Bolshevism" into central Europe. The fact that Ribbentrop even in 1945 did not recall that Churchill's first name was "Winston" reflected either his general ignorance about the world outside of Germany, or else a distracted state of mind at the time of writing the letter.

Trial and execution

Ribbentrop was a defendant at the Nuremberg Trials, charged with crimes against peace, deliberately planning a war of aggression, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Prosecutors presented evidence that Ribbentrop was actively involved in the planning of German aggression and the deportation of Jews to death camps, as well as his advocacy of the killing of American and British airmen shot down over Germany. The latter two charges carried the penalty of death by hanging.

The Allies' International Military Tribunal found him guilty of all charges brought against him. Even in prison, Ribbentrop remained loyal to Hitler, stating "Even with all I know, if in this cell Hitler should come to me and say 'Do this!', I would still do it."

During the trial, Ribbentrop rather unsuccessfully attempted to deny his role in the war. For example, during his cross-examination, the prosecution brought up claims that he (along with Hitler and Göring) threatened the Czechoslovak President Emil Hácha in March 1939, with a "threat of aggressive action". The questioning resulted in the following exchange between the British Prosecutor Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe and Ribbentrop:

::Maxwell-Fyfe: ''What further pressure could you put on the head of a country beyond threatening him that your Army would march in, in overwhelming strength, and your air force would bomb his capital?''

::Ribbentrop: ''War, for instance.''

During the trial, Gustave Gilbert, an American Army psychologist, was allowed to examine the Nazi leaders who were tried at Nuremberg for war crimes. Among other tests, a German version of the Wechsler-Bellevue IQ test was administered. Joachim von Ribbentrop scored 129, the 10th highest among the Nazi leaders tested.

At one point during the trial proceedings, U.S. Army interpreter for the prosecution Richard Sonnenfeldt asked Baron Ernst von Weizsäcker, Ribbentrop's State Secretary, how Hitler could have made him a high official. Weizsäcker responded "Hitler never noticed Ribbentrop's babbling because Hitler always did all the talking."

Since Göring had committed suicide a few hours prior to the time of execution, Ribbentrop was the first politician to be hanged on the morning of 16 October 1946. After being escorted up the 13 steps to the waiting noose, Ribbentrop was asked if he had any final words. He calmly said: "God protect Germany. God have mercy on my soul. My final wish is that Germany should recover her unity and that, for the sake of peace, there should be understanding between East and West." As the hood was placed over his head, Ribbentrop added: "I wish peace to the world." After a slight pause the executioner pulled the lever, releasing the trap door Ribbentrop stood upon. Although his neck snapped, he hung for seventeen minutes before the doctor declared him dead.

Historian Giles MacDonogh records a very different result: "The hangman botched the execution and the rope throttled the former foreign minister for twenty minutes before he expired."

In 1953 Ribbentrop's memoirs, ''Zwischen London und Moskau'' (''Between London and Moscow''), were published.

Portrayal in popular culture

Joachim von Ribbentrop has been portrayed by the following actors in film, television and theater productions;

Henry Daniell in the 1943 United States propaganda film ''Mission to Moscow''

Graham Chapman (as "Ron Vibbentrop") in the 1970 British television comedy ''Monty Python's Flying Circus'': ''The Naked Ant''

Henryk Borowski in the 1971 Polish film ''Epilogue at Nürnberg''

Miodrag Radovanovic in the 1971 Yugoslavian television production ''Nirnberski epilog''

Geoffrey Toone in the 1973 British television production ''The Death of Adolf Hitler''

Robert Hardy in the 1974 television production ''The Gathering Storm''

Kosti Klemelä in the 1978 Finnish television production ''Sodan ja rauhan miehet''

Demeter Bitenc in the 1979 Yugoslavian television production ''Slom''

Anton Diffring in the 1983 United States television production ''The Winds of War''

Hans-Dieter Asner in the 1985 television production ''Mussolini and I''

Richard Kane in the 1985 US/Yugoslavian television production ''Mussolini: The Untold Story''

John Woodvine in the 1989 British television production ''Countdown to War''

Wolf Kahler in the 1993 Merchant-Ivory film ''The Remains of the Day''

Benoît Girard in the 2000 Canadian/U.S. TV production ''Nuremberg''

Ivaylo Geraskov in the 2006 British television docudrama ''Nuremberg: Nazis on Trial''

Edward Baker-Duly in the 2010 BBC Wales/Masterpiece TV production ''Upstairs, Downstairs''

Ribbentrop is also a key figure in the historical novel ''Famous Last Words'' by Timothy Findley (Penguin Books 1982, ISBN 0-14-006268-8) and Harry Turtledove's alternate history series ''Worldwar'' where his Soviet counterpart Molotov frequently expresses contempt for his lack of intelligence.

Ribbentrop appears in Kazuo Ishiguro's 1989 novel ''The Remains of the Day'' (ISBN 0-679-73172-5) in which he is a frequent guest at Darlington Hall.

Ribbentrop is also mentioned in the movie, ''The King's Speech'', for sending the future British king's fiancée 17 carnations a day.

See also

Glossary of Nazi Germany

List of Nazi Party leaders and officials

Otto Abetz: German Ambassador to Vichy France (1940–1944)

Diego von Bergen: German Ambassador to the Vatican (1915–1918, 1920–1943)

Rudolf Buttmann: German Ambassador to the Vatican (1920–1943)

Hans-Heinrich Dieckhoff: German Ambassador to the United States of America (1937–1938) and Spain (1943–1945)

Herbert von Dirksen: German Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1928–1933), Japan (1933–1938), and the United Kingdom (1938–1939)

Fritz Grobba: German Ambassador to Iraq (1932–1939, 1941) and Saudi Arabia (1938–1939)

Ulrich von Hassell: German Ambassador to Italy (1932–1938)

Eduard Hempel: German Ambassador to Ireland (1937–1945)

Walther Hewel: German diplomat

Leopold von Hoesch: German Ambassador to France (1923–1932) and the United Kingdom (1932–1936)

Manfred Freiherr von Killinger: German Ambassador to the Slovak Republic (1940) and Romania (1940–1944)

Hans Luther: German Ambassador to the United States of America (1933–1937)

Eugen Ott: German Ambassador to Japan (1938–1942)

Franz von Papen: German Ambassador to Austria (1934–1938) and Turkey (1939–1944)

Cecil von Renthe-Fink: German Ambassador to Denmark (1940–1942)

Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg: German Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1934–1941)

Heinrich Georg Stahmer: German Ambassador to Japan (1942–1945)

Hans Thomsen: German Ambassador to the United States of America

Ernst von Weizsäcker: German Ambassador to the Vatican (1943–1945)

Notes

References

Bloch, Michael. ''Ribbentrop''. New York: Crown Publishing, 1992. ISBN 0-517-59310-6.

Browning, Christopher R. ''The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office: A Study of Referat D III of Abteilung Deutschland, 194–43''. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1978. ISBN 0-8419-0403-0.

Craig, Gordon. "The German Foreign Office from Neurath to Ribbentrop". In Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (eds.) ''The Diplomats 1919–39''. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953, pages 406–436.

Hildebrand, Klaus. ''The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich'', Anthony Fothergill (trans.). London: Batsford, 1973. ISBN 0-520-02528-8.

Hillgruber, Andreas. ''Germany And The Two World Wars'', William C. Kirby (trans.). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981. ISBN 0-674-35321-8.

Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf. "The Structure of Nazi Foreign Policy, 1933–45". In Christian Leitz (ed.), ''The Third Reich''. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999, pages 49–94. ISBN 0-631-20700-7.

Michalka, Wolfgang. "From Anti-Comintern Pact to the Euro-Asiatic Bloc: Ribbentrop's Alternative Concept to Hitler's Foreign Policy Programme". In H.W. Koch (ed.), ''Aspects of the Third Reich''. London: Macmillan 1985, pages 267–284. ISBN 0-333-35272-6.

Michalka, Wolfgang. "Joachim von Ribbentrop: From Wine Merchant to Foreign Minister". In Ronald Smelser and Rainer Zitelmann (eds.), ''The Nazi Elite''. London: Macmillan, 1993. ISBN 0-333-56950-4.

Oursler Jr., Fulton. "Secret Treason", ''American Heritage'', 42 (8) (1991).

Synder, Louis. ''Encyclopedia of the Third Reich''. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976. ISBN 0-07-059525-9.

Lukes, Igor, and Erik Goldstein (eds.). ''The Munich Crisis, 1938: Prelude to World War II''. London: Frank Cass Inc, 1999. ISBN 0-7146-8056-7.

Overy, Richard "Germany, 'Domestic Crisis' and War in 1939" pages 95–128. In Christian Leitz (ed.), ''The Third Reich''. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999, pages 49–94. ISBN 0-631-20700-7.

Turner, Henry Ashby. ''Hitler's Thirty Days To Power: January 1933''. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1996. ISBN 0-201-40714-0.

Waddington, Geoffrey. "'An Idyllic and Unruffled Atmosphere of Complete Anglo–German Misunderstanding': Aspects of the Operation of the ''Dienststelle Ribbentrop'' in Great Britain 1934–1939". ''History'', Volume 82, 1997, pages 44–74.

Watt, D.C. ''How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938–1939''. London: Heinemann, 1989. ISBN 0-394-57916-X.

Weinberg, Gerhard. ''The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Diplomatic Revolution in Europe 1933–36''. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970. ISBN 0226-88509-7.

Weinberg, Gerhard. ''The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Starting World War II 1937–39''. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. ISBN 0-226-88511-9.

Weitz, John. ''Hitler's Diplomat: The Life And Times Of Joachim von Ribbentrop''. New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1992. ISBN 0-395-62152-6.

Windsor, Wallis. ''The Heart has its Reasons: The Memoirs of the Duchess of Windsor''. Bath: Chivers Press, 1956.

External links

The Trial of German Major War Criminals, access date 1 July 2006.

Category:1893 births Category:1946 deaths Category:People from Wesel Category:German Nazi politicians Category:German diplomats Category:Foreign Ministers of Germany Category:Nazi Germany ministers Category:People executed by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg Category:People executed by hanging Joachim von Category:SS generals Category:World War II political leaders Category:German military personnel of World War I Category:Foreign relations of Germany Category:People from the Rhine Province Category:German people convicted of the international crime of aggression Category:German people convicted of crimes against humanity Category:Executed German people Category:Executed Nazis Category:Recipients of the Iron Cross Category:Knights of the Order of the Most Holy Annunciation

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