The Patriot

CHARLESTON: ASSEMBLY HALL

Two dozen ANGRY, YELLING, MEN OF PROPERTY. Among them are ROBINSON, HAMILL and JOHNSON, who are Patriots. Opposed to them are SIMMS, WITHINGTON and BALDRIDGE who are Loyalists. As Martin makes his way to his seat, the SPEAKER OF THE ASSEMBLY POUNDS HIS GAVEL.


SPEAKER
ORDER! ORDER!



Slowly, the room quiets down.



SPEAKER
Our first order of business...



SIMMS
And our last if we vote a levy...



The ROOM ERUPTS.



SPEAKER
ORDER! ORDER! Mr. Simms, you do not have the floor.



The ROOM SETTLES DOWN.


SPEAKER
Our first order of business is an address by Colonel Harry Lee of the Continental Army.



An imposing figure makes his way to the front of the assembly, COLONEL HARRY LEE, about Martin's age and cut from the same cloth -- strong, weathered, with a powerful bearing. Lee sees Martin and offers a familiar nod, which Martin returns, stone-faced. At the dais Lee pauses, then speaks simply.



LEE
You all know why I am here. I am not an orator and I will not try to convince you of the worthiness of our cause. I am a soldier and we are at war and with the declaration of independence we all expect from Philadelphia, it will soon be a formal state of war. In preparation for that, eight of the thirteen colonies have levied money in support of a Continental Army. I ask South Carolina to be the ninth.



In the balcony, Gabriel nods in agreement. Simms rises.



SIMMS
Colonel Lee, Massachusetts may be at war, along with New Hampshire and Rhode Island and Virginia, but South Carolina is not at war.



LEE
Massachusetts and New Hampshire are not as far from South Carolina as you might think and the war they're fighting is not for independence of one or two colonies. It's for the independence of one nation.



WITHINGTON
And what nation is that?


Robinson, one of the Patriots, stands up.


ROBINSON
An American nation. Colonel Lee, with your permission?


Lee nods.


ROBINSON
Those of us who call ourselves Patriots are not seeking to give birth to an American nation, but to protect one that already exists. It was born a hundred-and-seventy years ago at Jamestown and has grown stronger and more mature with every generation reared and with every crop sown and harvested. We are one nation and our rights as citizens of that nation are threatened by a tyrant three thousand miles away.



LEE
Were I an orator, those are the exact words I would have spoken.



Laughter. Martin rises.



MARTIN
Mister Robinson, tell me, why should I trade one tyrant, three thousand miles away, for three thousand tyrants, one mile away?



Laughter from the Loyalists. Surprise from Lee and the Patriots. In the gallery, Gabriel winces.



ROBINSON
Sir?



MARTIN
An elected legislature can trample a man's rights just as easily as a King can.



LEE
Captain Martin, I understood you to be a Patriot.



MARTIN
If you mean by a Patriot, am I angry at the Townsend Acts and the Stamp Act? Then I'm a Patriot. And what of the Navigation Act?  Should I be permitted to sell my rice to the French traders on Martinique? Yes, and it's an intrusion into my affairs that I can't... legally.


Laughter.


MARTIN
And what of the greedy, self-serving bastards who sit as Magistrates on the Admiralty Court and have fined nearly every man in this room.  Should they be boxed about the ears and thrown onto the first ship back to England? I'll do it myself.

(beat)

And do I believe that the American colonies should stand as a separate, independent nation, free from the reins of King and Parliament? I do, and if that makes a Patriot, then I'm a Patriot.


Martin grows more serious.


MARTIN
But if you're asking whether I'm willing to go to war with England, the answer is, no. I've been to war and I have no desire to do so again.



The room is quiet, the Assemblymen having been thrown off- balance. Gabriel is disappointed by his father's speech.



ROBINSON
This from the same Captain Benjamin Martin whose anger was so famous during the Wilderness Campaign?



Martin glares at Robinson, then smiles.



MARTIN
I was intemperate in my youth. My departed wife, God bless her soul, dampened that intemperance with the mantle of responsibility.



Robinson looks derisively at Martin.



ROBINSON
Temperance can be a convenient disguise for fear.



Martin bristles but before he can answer, Lee steps in.



LEE
Mister Robinson, I fought with Captain Martin in the French and Indian War, including the Wilderness Campaign. We served as scouts under Washington. There's not a man in this room, or anywhere, for that matter, to whom I would more willingly trust my life.



ROBINSON
I stand corrected.



LEE
But, damn it, Benjamin! You live in a cave if you think we'll get independence without war...



MARTIN
Wasn't it a Union Jack we fought under?



LEE
A long time ago...



MARTIN
Thirteen years...



LEE
That's a damn long time...



The Speaker POUNDS HIS GAVEL again.



SPEAKER
Gentlemen! Please! This is not a tavern!



Martin and Lee ignore the speaker.



MARTIN
You were an Englishman then...



LEE
I was an American, I just didn't know it yet...



The Assemblymen and even the Speaker turn their heads in simultaneous anticipation of each rejoinder.



MARTIN
We don't have to go to war to gain independence...



LEE
Balderdash!



MARTIN
There are a thousand avenues, other than war, at our disposal...



Martin speaks slowly and firmly.


MARTIN
We do not have to go to war to gain independence.



Lee says nothing for a moment, then he speaks more seriously, quietly, grimly.



LEE
Benjamin, I was at Bunker Hill. It was as bad as anything you and I saw on the frontier. Worse than the slaughter at the Ashuelot River.  The British advanced three times and we killed over seven hundred of them at point blank range. If your principles dictate independence, then war is the only way. It has come to that.



Martin is silent for a long moment. He softens and grows unsteady, speaking far more honestly than he ever wanted to.



MARTIN
I have seven children. My wife is dead. Who's to care for them if I go to war?



Lee is stunned by Martin's honesty and his show of weakness. At first Lee has no answer, then:



LEE
Wars are not fought only by childless men. A man must weigh his personal responsibilities against his principles.



MARTIN
That's what I'm doing. I will not fight and because I won't, I will not cast a vote that will send others to fight in my stead.



LEE
And your principles?



MARTIN
I'm a parent, I don't have the luxury of principles.



The other Assemblymen, both Patriots and Loyalists, stare at him, appalled. Martin, feeling weak, sits down. Lee looks at his friend with more sympathy than disappointment. In the gallery Gabriel turns and walks out.

Radaelli: "No Rupture, But Also No Continuity"

Sandro Magister hosts a new contribution by Enrico Radaelli to the ongoing rupture vs. continuity debate.  Seemingly unconvinced by the Holy Father's proposal of a hermeneutic of reform in continuity with Tradition, and in sharp contrast to the arguments proposed by Fr. Cavalcoli, Radaelli argues that the Church currently finds itself in a state where there is neither rupture nor continuity.

According to Radaelli, formal rupture is theoretically impossible -- being limited to the first and second degrees of (infallible) doctrine.  On the other hand, Radaelli considers that the third degree of doctrine is ultimately and in the final analysis "not at all obligatorily binding for the obedience of the faithful."  According to Radaelli, this third degree of doctrine is subject to errors that can even contradict dogmatic truth or irreformable doctrines of the first and second degrees (i.e., authentic magisterial teachings of the third degree can be heretical).  On one hand, Radaelli denies that third degree doctrines touch upon the "dogmatic field".  On the other hand, Radaelli considers that third degree doctrines can nevertheless contradict dogma or doctrines within the "dogmatic field" representing a "false continuity with dogma".  While this does not constitute "formal rupture" it nevertheless can reflect a disparity with Tradition and a loss or disconnect with dogmatic truth.  So, we are left with a situation where there is no formal rupture, nor formal continuity -- so long as the errors and contradictions persist within the third degree of doctrine.  According to Radaelli, the only way out is to "purify" the doctrines of the third degree by raising them to the "supernatural level" and bringing them into contact with the "dogmatic fire".  The author proposes that the concilar doctrines be purified by the "white hot fire" on the occasion of the "fiftieth anniversary of the council of discord".


UPDATE:
Fr. Cavalcoli has responded to Radaelli in a postscript where he further clarifies some of the confused ideas regarding doctrines of the third degree.  The Dominican theologian states that the third level of doctrine often contains a mixture of both doctrinal elements as well as pastoral provisions.  The doctrinal elements can "do no wrong" whereas pastoral provisions are subject to change according to circumstances or can even be imprudent, misguided or wrong in isolated cases.  It is only this later aspect that represents the fallible "straw" of the third degree -- and the process of separating the pure doctrine from the "straw" of pastoral provisions and other contingencies is precisely what is involved in order to raise doctrines from the third to the second or first degree.  Indeed, history has shown this to be a painstaking process that can even take centuries to sort out.  It is by virtue of the doctrinal content (even if these are newly developed points in continuity with the old) that religious submission of intellect and will is due to doctrines of the third degree. 

Giovanni Cavalcoli: The Infallibility Of Vatican II

The ongoing debates between various theological experts (hosted by Sandro Magister) has produced a number of interesting exchanges and clarifications. For example, in one postcript, Fr. Giovanni Cavolcoli clarifies his position relative to the doctrinal authority of Vatican II.

All agree that there are three basic "degrees" of Catholic teaching.  The first and second degrees are infallible and definitive.  The third degree, however, while demanding religious assent is nevertheless reformable.  At the same time, however, it would be false to assume that this "reformability" implies the possibility of a contradiction between the various levels or degrees of doctrine.  So we are left with something of a parodox: if third degree doctrines can't contradict doctrines of the first and second degree then in what sense can these be fallible?  Fr. Cavalcoli resolves the problem by distinguishing between (a) the dogmatic order and (b) practical-pastoral directives.  The supreme magisterium can never defect with respect to the former (a) -- even if it is subject to err at times in the later (b).  The reason is that doctrines of the third degree can treat dogmatic elements that are proposed in a manner that is nevertheless comingled with non-dogmatic and contingent aspects:

"The third degree also admits the fallibility of opinions and doctrines of a pastoral, moral or legal character." (Adapted from Google Translation)

Therefore, the hermeneutic of reform in continuity presupposes that the development of newer points of doctrine (third degree doctrines) must be perfectly compatible and analogically homogeneous with previously declared doctrines of the first and second degrees.  At the same time, however, third degree doctrines are not irreformable and "definitive" insofar as they contain contingent aspects related to the pastoral-prudential order.  The proper understanding of these distinctions is the key to the hermeneutic of reform in continuity and protects us from the dangers of rupture theology.

Basile Valuet On Hermeneutic Of Reform

Sandro Magister brings us another important contribution by Benedictine theologian Basile Valuet to the ongoing debate concerning the nature and interpretation of the "hermeneutic of reform" proposed by Pope Benedict XVI.  As we have seen previously, the philosopher Martin Rhonheimer considers that Vatican II had "corrected" previous teaching relative to the nature and function of the state in relation to the Church and its duties towards religious truth.  Furthermore, Rhonheimer considers the logic behind the "due limits" taught by DH to correspond to a conception of a civil order that has a secular character in the sense of being "neutral" towards the diverisity of religious traditions.  This is precisely where Rhonheimer identifies the "discontinuity" introduced by vatican II -- even if not at the level of a dogmatic rupture.  According to Rhonheimer, the previous Magisterium seemed to demand the "confessional" Church-state model (where the state acts as a department or "secular arm" of the Church) whereas Vatican II seemed to propose the secular model of the state where the spiritual and temporal powers are each considered mutually autonomous.

    

Basile Valuet rejects this conclusion and indicates that Vatican II leaves open the possibility for a variety of governmental forms -- including a confessional state.  The Benedictine theologian also stresses that the errors of liberalism, condemned in the 19th century, remain condemned today and are perfectly compatible with DH and the "hermeneutic of reform" proposed by Pope Benedict XVI:   

"According to Benedict XVI, Pius IX was taking aim at the "radical liberalism" of the 19th century, but not at other forms of the organization of society, rising from a further evolution of liberalism. The discontinuity between Vatican II and Pius IX stems from the fact that RF is not the "freedom of conscience" condemned in the 19th century: it did not have either the same foundation, or the same object, or the same limitations, or the same goal. So it will always remain true that the liberalism condemned by Pius IX was condemnable (R. does not see this), but it will not always remain true that the theories or the states of law that we have before us are the ones that Pius IX condemned (R. grasps this perfectly)."

The principles of RF are universal whereas the application can vary accrording to the circumstances of time and place.  In other words, there is no universal or "one size fits all" juridical formula to implement RF in every possible circumstance or social context.  The development or "novelty" introduced by Vatican II was to formulate the principles governing RF in a more general way -- taking into account changing circumstances and the wide diversity of legitimate social and governmental forms in the modern era:

"If a change of situation cannot change the natural law, it can nevertheless make a principle of the natural law (let's call it P1: it is not contrary to the natural law that the state should repress religious error), valid in a previous situation of ius gentium (in which RF is not yet recognized in reciprocal form), no longer apply in the same way in a new situation of ius gentium (in which RF is mutually recognized), and make another principle be applied now (P2: the modern state does not have penal competency, not even delegated, in religious matters).  In this way, if one wishes to have a truth that is valid in every situation, one is obligated to formulate a principle P3, more general, which combines P1 and P2, and which DH has made an effort to formulate: it is contrary to the natural law that the state - in any age - should repress religious error, unless, in the circumstances considered, it disturbs the just, objective public order."    

A Minor Dispute On Discontinuity

The "hermeneutic of reform" proposed by Pope Benedict XVI presupposes a certain degree of real discontinuity.  But what exactly is the nature and extent of the discontinuity introduced by Vatican II?  This is an aspect of the question that Sandro Magister has uncovered recently in a minor dispute between Massimo Introvigne and Martin Rhonheimer.  Specifically, is the discontinuity merely a result of a "new" application of immutable principles in light of changed circumstances?  This seems to be the interpretation given by Massimo Introvigne.  Martin Rhonheimer, on the other hand, takes the discontinuity to another level.  In addition to the discontinuity arising from a new application of immutable principles, there is the basic recognition that Vatican II in fact "corrected certain historical decisions" with respect to the "relationship between the Church and the modern state".  Martin Rhonheimer then draws the conclusion that Vatican II has made a correction "with respect to past conceptions of the state" in itself.  In any case, both writers agree that the discontinuity does not reach the level of a dogmatic rupture.   

It seems to me that there is another way to understand this.  There is also the distinct possibility of prudential errors in connection with specific historical decisions.  To "give a new definition to the relationship between the Church and the modern state" does not necessarily entail a redefinition of the nature of the state or political society in itself.  It merely sets out a new "relationship" in light of changed circumstances (application).  At the same time, this does not exclude the possibility of prudential errors with respect to the historical decisions themselves.  For example, it does not serve the common good to cling to a status quo "out of season" or when circumstances dictate a needed reform.  In this sense, it is possible to "correct certain historical decisions" from changed circumstances, prudential errors or some combination of these.  Finally, I think it is important to recall that the 19th century Popes indeed defended a certain (confessional) conception of the state.  On the other hand, it is not clear that this was proposed as an absolute.  In other words, the circumstances must be ripe (including a religiously united body politic) for the legitimacy of such a confessional model.  Therefore, to defend the existence of a confessional state in principle is not the same as demanding it at all times and in every place.  Bishop Dupanloup of Orleans (1865) explains how to properly understand the Syllabus of Pope Pius IX on this question:

Would this same Catholic tradition teach, that if, in the course of ages there had been, or that there are yet, certain regions of the world where the law of the Church has become the civil law, in consequence of the unity of faith, and the agreement of the will among the citizens, where the State has constituted the Bishop protector of the holy canons – does it say that there the Church and the State have acted without right? For this is the meaning of the 77th proposition...But circumstances having changed, and the public law also, do we learn from this that Catholics would fail in their duty to God and the Church by accepting sincerely, and in all simplicity of thought, the constitution of their country, and the civil freedom of worship which it authorizes?  Or, if we speak of liberty, when we are weak, is it only to refuse it to others when we shall be strong? (Cf. Dupanloup).                 

Religous Freedom: Principles and Application

In his recent address to the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, the Holy Father affirmed the "anthropological foundation" to religious freedom that was "renewed" with Vatican II.  Rooted in the natural law this right is universal and immutable.  At the same time, however, the Pope recognized that "every state has a sovereign right to promulgate its own legislation and will express different attitudes to religion in law."  What this means is that immutable principles may vary in application depending upon the circumstances or social context (Cf. CCC 2109).  Mary Ann Glendon, President of the Pontifical Academy for Social Sciences, put it another way by indicating that there can be no "one size fits all" model or juridical formulation for religious freedom: 

"Given the wide diversity of human societies, there cannot be one model of religious freedom that suits all countries.  Nor can one country's approach to religious liberty serve as a model for another if by "model" one means something that can simply be copied and transplanted. Each nation’s system is the product of its own distinctive history and circumstances...To accept that there are no universal models is not to deny that religious freedom is a universal right.  Rather, it is to recognize that there must be room for a degree of pluralism in modes of bringing religious freedom and other fundamental human rights to life under diverse cultural circumstances...That was the approach taken by the Second Vatican Council which affirmed in Dignitatis Humanae that there could be several valid ways to implement that right."

This corresponds to the fact that the exercise of a natural right is never considererd ulimited and unqualified.  Under various circumstances the exercise of a right can be justly moderated by law (in view of the common good) without doing violence to the fundamental right of the human person.  The practical implication is that the "due limits" to religious freedom will vary as determined by prudence according to the particular circumstances and social context (CCC 2109).

Fr. Giovanni Cavalcoli On Rupture Theology

Sandro Magister once again presents us with a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate on the question of continuity vs. rupture with respect to Vatican II.  The latest contribution is by Fr. Giovanni Cavolcoli O.P. and it addresses two critical distinctions that I have previously explored here and here.  Let's take a brief look at these.

The first point deals with the distinction between analogy and univocality.  If one applies a univocal conception to theological and pastoral questions then every kind of development or reform will appear as a substantial rupture.  On the other hand, the classical conception of analogy is proper to all vital phenomena - including the knowledge of metaphysical and spiritual realities (Cf. Thomistic theses IV, XX).  This distinction highlights the contrast between Aristotle and Descartes.

The second point deals with the distinction between matters of Faith (per se) and practical-pastoral dispositions.  Often times both elements are comingled and it is necessary to properly distinguish one from the other.  With respect to matters of Faith, and in consequence of the promise of Our Lord,  "we can suppose a priori that the Council cannot teach us something that is false or contrary to what the Church taught before."  Therefore, in the field of dogma, there is never a question of rupture but only (organic) development in continuity.  With respect to practical-pastoral directives, there can and ought to be discontinuity periodically as a consequence of legitimate reform.  It is important to note the possibility of error in this field (practical prudential order).  While changed circumstances may dictate reform it could also happen that reform is undertaken to correct mistaken practical-prudential decisions of the past.  

Rhonheimer On Religious Freedom

Sandro Magister has presented a recent contribution by Fr. Martin Rhonheimer to the debate on the question of continuity vs. rupture with respect to Vatican II and the doctrine on religious freedom in particular. The article makes the observation that the “hermeneutic of reform” involves the interplay of both continuity (in essential and immutable principles) and discontinuity (in accidentals that are historical and transitory in nature). The trick is to properly distinguish the one from the other. This is why Pope Benedict has observed that the fundamental continuity in immutable principles is a fact that is “easy to miss at a first glance.” For example, the condemned errors of relativism and indifferentism remain equally condemned today. Furthermore, religious license or the unlimited and unqualified concept of “religious freedom” and “freedom of conscience” also remain equally condemned. The concept of “due limits” to religious freedom applies yesterday, today and always – even if these are not univocally applied in every given circumstance or social context. Fr. Rhonheimer points out that the fundamental moral norms rooted in natural law have remained constant before and after Vatican II. In a certain sense, it may appear as if there was a kind of shift in the primacy of truth in contradistinction to the primacy of the person. The reality is that these are linked as one is never preserved at the expense of the other. If the continuity of immutable principles remains solid then where does the discontinuity come into play?

The discontinuity fundamentally lies in a differentiated prudential and juridical application in light of circumstances and in view of the common good. Of course, this is a familiar theme that I have previously explored here and here.  For example, the 19th century Popes were concerned with preserving the religious and Catholic character of states as had existed for centuries. Therefore, those propositions were condemned that would deny in principle the very right of existence of a confessional state. In fact, Dignitatis Hamanae reaffirms the essence of this principle: that special civil recognition can be given to one religious community in view of the circumstances or social context (Cf. DH, 6). It is important to recognize, however, that such a state of affairs has always presupposed the existence of a fundamental religious unity among the body politic (Cf. Ketteler). The prudential decisions of public policy are largely dependent upon a question of fact: to what extent does religious unity exist among the body politic? The same question of fact has been given a decisively different answer with Dignitatis Humanae. For centuries the Popes had presupposed a basic religious unity within “Catholic” states. This recognized “fact” supported a fundamental orientation with respect to the juridical application of immutable natural law principles. With Vatican II, however, the “fact” of globalization and religious pluralism became recognized as the predominant social characteristic. The formal recognition of this new social context supports a different fundamental orientation with respect to the juridical application of immutable natural law principles. Therefore, the “due limits” inherent in religious freedom must be prudentially applied in an analogical manner according to the requirements of a given social context (CCC #2109). What this means is that the “due limits” will be applied differently in the context of a confessional state than in the context of a pluralistic secular state that is lacking true religious unity among the body politic. The Catholic confessional state, for example, will not permit the spread of heresy insofar as it militates against public order and the common good in a social context that is constituted on the very basis of unity in faith. The secular state, on the other hand, constituted on the basis of affinities of nature, will not permit those religious practices that are in latent violation of the natural moral law.  Nevertheless, this shift highlighted another discontinuity with respect to the social doctrine on the duties of the (Catholic) state towards the Faith and the Church.  The traditional view often presupposed an "ideal" governmental form that considered the civil authority as "secular arm" to the spiritual authority.  This model considered the faithful and the citizen as equivalent terms and it implied the use of coercion by civil authorities in order to protect the Faith from the spread of heresy and to advance the interests of the Church.  Vatican II has effectively given a new application to the immutable principles in light of modern circumstances.  The civil authorities still have the same duties towards religious truth.  These duties, however, are now fulfilled by the Christian faithful (including political authorities) in an organic manner and without direct recourse to coercive measures.  The use of coercion remains legitimate, however, should a particular religious practice go beyond the "due-limits" established by law in view of the common good (CCC 2109).

In summary, we must affirm the continuity in immutable principles while also recognizing the discontinuities that are merely transient and resulting from accidents of history. For example, the social teachings of the Magisterium will often combine elements of both – and it will often become clear only with the passage time which elements are truly immutable (Cf. Donum Veritatis). In addition, we must strive never to over-simplify, distort or exaggerate magisterial teaching according to our own theories or preconceived notions. Of course, the teachings of Pope Pius IX in Quanta Cura and the Syllabus are not immune to similar distortions and exaggerations as was evident at the time (Cf. Dupanloup).


Doctrinal Note on The Participation of Catholics in Political Life 
"The teaching on freedom of conscience and on religious freedom does not therefore contradict the condemnation of indifferentism and religious relativism by Catholic doctrine;[30] on the contrary, it is fully in accord with it."

[30] Cf. Pius IX, Encyclical Letter Quanta cura: ASS 3 (1867), 162; Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter Immortale Dei: ASS 18 (1885), 170–171; Pius XI, Encyclical Letter Quas primas: AAS 17 (1925), 604–605; Catechism of the Catholic Church, No. 2108; Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration Dominus Iesus, 22.     

Bishop's Authority vs. False Collegiality

Owing in large part to the para-conciliar ideology (hermeneutic of rupture), a false notion of collegiality has crept into the Church that seeks to apply secular political forms to the government of the Church.  This false collegiality calls for a progressive vision of "democracy" in the Church at all levels.  The concept of the "people of God" was often misinterpreted as "we the People" or understood "in accordance with a merely sociological or political concept." (Cf. Pope Benedict XVI, Address at the Lateran, May 26, 2009)  At the highest level, this erroneous view of collegiality seeks to undermine the legitimate authority and primacy of the Pope.  This error was already denounced at the time of the Second Vatican Council (Cf. LG, Nota explicativa praevia).  Extending to other levels, this false notion of collegiality also seeks to diminish the authority and role of the individual Bishop over his particular Church.  In an analogous manner, the office and legitimate authority of the parish rector or pastor is often undermined when "parish councils" operate based on similar mis-guided notions and false ideologies.  Within this false ideological vision, the authority of the Bishop in his "See" is exchanged for a "Seat" within his respective Bishop's conference.  Pope Benedict reminds Bishops of their individual responsibility within their own particular Church.         

Starting afresh from Christ in every area of missionary activity; rediscovering in Jesus the love and salvation given to us by the Father through the Holy Spirit: this is the substance and lifeline of the episcopal mission which makes the Bishop the person primarily responsible for catechesis in his diocese. Indeed, it falls ultimately to him to direct catechesis, surrounding himself with competent and trustworthy co-workers...

 

Precisely because faith, life, and the celebration of the sacred liturgy—the source of faith and life—are inseparable, there is need for a more correct implementation of the liturgical principles as indicated by the Second Vatican Council, as well as those contained in the Directory for the Pastoral Ministry of Bishops (cf. 145-151), so as to restore to the liturgy its sacred character. It was with this end in view that my Venerable Predecessor on the Chair of Peter, John Paul II, wished "to appeal urgently that the liturgical norms for the celebration of the Eucharist be observed with great fidelity ... Liturgy is never anyone’s private property, be it of the celebrant or of the community in which the mysteries are celebrated" (Encyclical Letter Ecclesia de Eucharistia, 52). For Bishops, who are the "moderators of the Church’s liturgical life", the rediscovery and appreciation of obedience to liturgical norms is a form of witness to the one, universal Church, that presides in charity...

 

If we are to stay true to our solemn commitment as successors of the Apostles, we Pastors must be faithful servants of the word, eschewing any reductive or mistaken vision of the mission entrusted to us. It is not enough to look at reality solely from the viewpoint of personal faith; we must work with the Gospel in our hands and anchor ourselves in the authentic heritage of the Apostolic Tradition, free from any interpretations motivated by rationalistic ideologies.

Indeed, "within the particular Churches, it is the Bishop’s responsibility to guard and interpret the word of God and to make authoritative judgments as to what is or is not in conformity with it" (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on the Ecclesial Vocation of the Theologian, 19). As the primary Teacher of faith and doctrine, the Bishop will rely on collaboration with the theologian, who, in order "to be faithful to his role of service to the truth, must take into account the proper mission of the Magisterium and collaborate with it" (ibid., 20). The duty to preserve the deposit of faith and safeguard its unity calls for strict vigilance so that the faith may be "preserved and handed down with fidelity and so that particular insights are clearly integrated into the one Gospel of Christ" (Directory for the Pastoral Ministry of Bishops, 126).  This, therefore, is the enormous responsibility you have assumed as formators of your people, and especially of the priests and religious under your care. (Pope Benedict XVI, Address to the Bishops of Brazil, May 11, 2007) 

Full Communion vs. Partial Communion

There is not a little confusion on the concept of full communion vs. partial communion with the Church.  Specifically, what does it mean to be in partial or imperfect communion with the Church?  Is this in fact possible?  This question has some relation to the canonical status of the Society of St. Pius X (SSPX) and recently there has been some controversy on the question of whether or not the SSPX in fact enjoys "full communion" with the Church.  For example, Pope Benedict XVI summarizes the situation from the perspective of the Holy See within the context of the remission of the excommunications and reorganization of the Ecclesia Dei Commission in view of the subsequent doctrinal discussions:    

In the same spirit and with the same commitment to encouraging the resolution of all fractures and divisions in the Church and to healing a wound in the ecclesial fabric that was more and more painfully felt, I wished to remit the excommunication of the four Bishops illicitly ordained by Archbishop Lefebvre. With this decision I intended to remove an impediment that might have jeopardized the opening of a door to dialogue and thereby to invite the Bishops and the "Society of St Pius X" to rediscover the path to full communion with the Church. As I explained in my Letter to the Catholic Bishops of last 10 March, the remission of the excommunication was a measure taken in the context of ecclesiastical discipline to free the individuals from the burden of conscience constituted by the most serious of ecclesiastical penalties. However, the doctrinal questions obviously remain and until they are clarified the Society has no canonical status in the Church and its ministers cannot legitimately exercise any ministry. (Ecclesiae Unitatem) 

Full Communion

Before taking up the question of partial communion, it seems worthwhile to take a brief look at the notion of full communion.  Basically, those that are fully incorporated into the Church enjoy a threefold bond of unity with the Church: (1) unity of faith; (2) unity of sacraments; (3) unity of ecclesiastical government in communion with the successor of St. Peter.

What are these bonds of unity? Above all, charity "binds everything together in perfect harmony."  But the unity of the pilgrim Church is also assured by visible bonds of communion:

- profession of one faith received from the Apostles;

- common celebration of divine worship, especially of the sacraments;

- apostolic succession through the sacrament of Holy Orders, maintaining the fraternal concord of God's family. (CCC, 815) 

 

Fully incorporated into the society of the Church are those who, possessing the Spirit of Christ, accept all the means of salvation given to the Church together with her entire organization, and who - by the bonds constituted by the profession of faith, the sacraments, ecclesiastical government, and communion - are joined in the visible structure of the Church of Christ, who rules her through the Supreme Pontiff and the bishops. Even though incorporated into the Church, one who does not however persevere in charity is not saved. He remains indeed in the bosom of the Church, but 'in body' not 'in heart.'  (CCC, 837) 

The Human Family

If all three of these bonds are missing then there is a complete lack of communion.  On the other hand, if there are only partial defects while other elements or bonds of unity remain in tact then the communion with the Church is considered more-or-less imperfect (not full).  What this implies is that the question of communion (or lack thereof) is not always answered with a binary (all-or-nothing) solution (e.g., analogous to being half-pregnant).  Rather, this implies the possibility of degrees of communion with the Church.  Therefore, a more fitting analogy would be the various degrees of family relationships.  For example, brothers have a closer family bond than first cousins.  First cousins have a closer family bond than second cousins, etc.  Ultimately, there is a certain bond that extends across the entire human family.  What we are dealing with here has to do with variations of degree rather than a simple yes-no problem.

 

The Family of God

How does one become a member of the family of God or the Church?  He does so by entering through the "door" of baptism.  Therefore, all of the baptized are related to one another within the family of God.  Just as the wayward son still retains a relationship with his kinsmen, even those Christians that belong to dissident sects retain a certain union with the Church: "Validly baptized Protestants are still by virtue of baptism in a certain union with the Church" (Cf. Ketteler).  In one sense it is possible to say that heretics, schismatics and the excommunicated are "separated" from the Church and "excluded from her pale."  At the same time, however, this is not understood as an absolute separation.  Even those responsible for the personal sin of separation still belong in a certain way to the Church and remain "subject to the jurisdiction of the Church" in a manner analogous to how "deserters belong to the army from which they have deserted" (Cf. Catechism of the Council of Trent, art. ix).  To put it another way, the prodigal son remains a "brother" to his kinsmen in spite of his "separated" status.  Therefore, baptism creates a bond that can never be completely severed.      

Baptism makes us members of the Body of Christ: "Therefore . . . we are members one of another." Baptism incorporates us into the Church. From the baptismal fonts is born the one People of God of the New Covenant, which transcends all the natural or human limits of nations, cultures, races, and sexes: "For by one Spirit we were all baptized into one body." (CCC, 1267) 

Baptism constitutes the foundation of communion among all Christians, including those who are not yet in full communion with the Catholic Church: "For men who believe in Christ and have been properly baptized are put in some, though imperfect, communion with the Catholic Church. Justified by faith in Baptism, [they] are incorporated into Christ; they therefore have a right to be called Christians, and with good reason are accepted as brothers by the children of the Catholic Church." "Baptism therefore constitutes the sacramental bond of unity existing among all who through it are reborn." (CCC, 1271)        

Elementa Sanctificationis et Veritatis

What is true for wayward individuals is also true for dissident groups.  Dissident groups retain a certain union with the Catholic Church insofar as they retain Catholic elements of sanctification and truth.  These Catholic element may subsists -- in an imperfect and partially debased state -- even outside the visible boundaries of the Catholic Church.  Cardinal Journet explains this as follows:

Insofar as the dissident Churches carried away with them fragments of the true Church and still retain genuine Christian elements, something of her nature may still be found there, in a debased state; and therefore also something of her influence.  The notes may then in a manner be present, no doubt attenuated and altered, even in the dissident Churches. Far from demonstrating the ineffectiveness of these notes to indicate the true Church, this imperfect presence attests the existence of remnants of the true Church in the very core of the sects that have left her. They enable us to recognize, under the debris, something of the splendor of the original design.  Catholic apologists have often recognized the presence of signs of a Christian origin in the separated Churches. They have even proposed to call them "negative notes", that is to say notes accompanying the true Church but insufficient to reveal her. It is, I think, preferable to think of them as debased or mutilated notes. When compared with the notes in their state of perfection and integrity they witness at once to the presence of Christian elements in the dissident Churches and to the alteration they have undergone.  One may say, for example, that the Oriental Churches, where the power of order has been validly transmitted, possess a partial and mutilated apostolicity. (Cf. Journet, The Church of the Word Incarnate, Sheed and Ward, 1955, pp. 531-532)    

What this means, for example, is that the power of order can survive even the ruptures of schism and heresy.  In this case the power of order may exist in a more-or-less debased state insofar as the power of jurisdiction is lacking (following a rupture with the Sovereign Ponfiff).  In other words, those lacking this power of jurisdiction cannot legitimately exercise any ministry.  Indeed, a certain union exists -- but not the perfection of union insofar as the power of order is exercised in an "uprooted state" or beyond its "proper and natural sphere."  Cardinal Journet again explains as follows:  

The hierarchy is indivisible. But it can, in certain regions, be broken by force so that fragments of it subsist in a mutilated state beyond the field of the Church. Thus, in lands overrun by schism or by heresy we may find not only the sacramental powers deriving from Baptism and Confirmation, but the hierarchical power of order.  The violent disjunction of the power of order from the power of jurisdiction—which latter disappears of itself whenever there is a rupture with the Sovereign Pontiff—its persistence in the uprooted state to which it is then reduced, its transmission, valid but not licit, beyond its proper and natural sphere, is always the sign of a terrible spiritual catastrophe, a partial victory of the spirit of evil over the Church of Christ, which henceforth will move through history as though divided in herself, and become a scandal to the Gentiles.  However, the Church is not in reality divided. She is indivisible like the hierarchy from which she is suspended. Peoples who have received her and belonged to her can fall away from her in consequence of schism and heresy; yet, despite failing her in this way, they can still carry away with them some of her treasures and certain relics of her royalty. What then remains of her among them may, at first glance, suggest a division; but to a wider knowledge and a deeper perception these scattered riches will themselves witness to her unicity. They are rays from one same original centre of life and activity.  Those who are responsible before God for a schism or a heresy may carry away with them the valid succession of the sacrament of Holy Order. They do so in the darkness of a personal sin by which they partially rend the Church; and insofar as their own hearts are closed to the good influence of the sacraments they are like sick men taking to others medicines which they do not know how to use for their own benefit. But their followers in later times, who inherit a patrimony of schism or heresy from their birth, are not culpable on that account. They can grow in spiritual stature by remaining in good faith. The sanctifying influence of the sacraments, no longer finding the same obstacles in the will, can result in graces of a high order.  What they still lack in order to be fully and openly of the Church is the divinely assisted orientation of the jurisdictional power. But, from this standpoint, the uninterrupted transmission of the valid exercise of the power of order within the dissident Churches is a moving witness to the depth of the salvific will of God. By thus continuing to dispense the graces of contact by way of His sacrifice and His sacraments, and thereby closely conforming to Christ many whose spiritual situation is in itself very precarious, He reveals an astonishing design: that of beginning, in a way, to form the Church outside the Church, to collect His "other sheep" as in a flock, and to draw them to the one fold by a strangely powerful ontological desire, a "virtual act" not far removed from ‘act achieved’.  (Cf. Journet, The Church of the Word Incarnate, Sheed and Ward, 1955, pp. 504-505)

 

All of this helps us to avoid the pitfalls of one-sided positions.  On one hand, we should not exaggerate the unity that exists between Catholic and non-Catholic Christians.  On the other hand, we should not exaggerate the separation that exists between Catholic and non-Catholic Christians.  A certain union does not mean full union nor does it mean a complete lack of union.  Put another way, one may "affirm correctly that the Church of Christ is present and operative in the churches and ecclesial Communities not yet fully in communion with the Catholic Church, on account of the elements of sanctification and truth that are present in them.  Nevertheless, the word “subsists” can only be attributed to the Catholic Church alone precisely because it refers to the mark of unity that we profess in the symbols of the faith (I believe... in the “one” Church); and this “one” Church subsists in the Catholic Church" (CDF, Responses to Some Questions Regarding Certain Aspects of the Doctrine on the Church).  But if all of this is true regarding "partial communion" then why does it seem as though the Holy See sometimes puts heavy emphasis on the aspect of separation while in other cases it seems to put the emphasis on the aspect of unity?  The answer seems to lie in the particular pastoral (prudential) approach depending on the circumstances.  For example, if an individual or group is in the process of a growing separation from the Church then the aspect and consequences of separation will be stressed.  On the other hand, if an individual or group is in the process of drawing closer to the Church then there appears to be a greater emphasis and appeal to those bonds of unity that link them to the Church.  One could say that this pastoral approach is somewhat analogous to using a "carrot" or "stick" depending on the direction one is moving in relation to communion with the Church.