OK, so we have the first of what no doubt will be a long series of chin-scratchers on 'whither the CPC' in advance of HJT’s retirement next year. And at a guess we’re going to get a lot more along the lines of en emerging split over policy between “socialist” Chongqing and “free market” Guangdong and the styles and opinions of their respective leaders Bo Xilai and Wang Yang. So:
Qiu of the Unirule Institute of Economics believes that the existence of the Chongqing model and the Guangdong model, with their different constituencies, has sharpened the debate.
"These two models have made people conscious of the factions. They will seriously consider which model they support," Qiu says. "An even bolder prediction is that maybe the Communist Party could split along those lines, and become two parties: one for the middle class, let's call it a Liberal Party; the other for the lower class, the Democratic Party."
Well it’s an interesting question, and it certainly beats “will (bloke in suit with dyed hair) be China’s Gorbachev. But I think it overlooks a few things.
Now the other week there was an MGI I missed at the time in northern Zhejiang, at a town called Zhili. A tax riot, no less:
Over ten thousand migrant workers reportedly surrounded the government office of Zhili, a township under the city of Huzhou in eastern China's Zhejiang province on Wednesday following a confrontation between tax collectors and local shop owners. The confrontation arose after authorities in Zhili doubled the business tax it imposed on local children's garments workers from 300 yuan (US$47) last year to 600 yuan (US$94).
The key phrase here is migrant workers. A number of years ago some friends of mine did some economic research in various townships in Northern Zhejiang, and found a system whereby pretty much all the enterprises were owned ‘collectively’ (ie by the local government), managed by local people and staffed by migrant workers from other parts of China. The profits went to pay for city government, local security forces and a welfare/healthcare/education system only for local huku holders. What seems to have happened since then is that migrants have been allowed to form enterprises. But it’s clear that the township government, or elements therein, still sees migrant labour simply as a source of revenue, whether in the form of profits or taxes.
The Yangtse delta towns have certain things in common: they’re traditionally better off areas, they have established industries (variations on textile), they’re very handy for export markets and they ‘reformed’ their economic structures fairly early on when there were stricter limits on what you could do. The result seems to be an odd form of ‘socialism in one township’ stretching across the fish and rice towns in the Delta.
The most obvious contrast to this is Wenzhou, the ‘city of millionaires’ currently undergoing something of a crisis as China’s unofficial debt market implodes. Wenzhou has no natural advantages or established industries; it was originally dirt poor, hardscrabble farming country with lousy communications links. It reformed comparatively late when the rules on what you could do were more relaxed, and chose a low tax, completely unregulated, red in tooth and claw approach to economic development.
The point here is that both of these radically different strategies are being pursued within the same province, and I’d bet you could point to many more examples of things like this happening across China as a whole. This makes discussion of China’s policy in binary terms – ‘red’ Chongqing versus ‘capitalist’ Guangzhou – a bit beside the point, because it implies a centralization of administrative power to an extent that is highly unlikely to happen.
As I’ve said before, I think the thing to look for here is differences in styles of governance. Wang Yang’s MO is as a consensus building, money in the bank kind of guy who leaves the places he once was as richer and more peaceful. Bo Xilai might be reclaiming the whole Mao scheme of thing in kitsch form, but he always had the reputation as the kind of man who ‘took no nonsense’ and ‘got things done’. Wang is an advanced example of China’s evolution from tyranny to oligarchy. Bo harkens back to when everyone looked to the big boss for a lead. For that reason alone, my money’s on Wang to advance to the standing committe next year and for Bo to get a slapdown.
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