| Unit name | Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolutionسپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی |
|---|
| Dates | 1980-present |
|---|
| Country | Iran |
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| Branch | Combined arms force |
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| Size | 220,000 |
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| Headquarters | Tehran |
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| Battles | Iran-Iraq War |
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| Commander1 | Mohammad Ali Jafari |
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| Commander1 label | Commander |
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The Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution ( / , or Sepāh for short), often called Revolutionary Guards, is a branch of Iran's military, founded after the Iranian revolution to prevent internal dissident and military uprisings. The IRGC has 125,000 military personnel including ground, air and naval forces. It also controls the paramilitary Basij militia which has 90,000 active personnel, and in recent years has developed into a "multibillion-dollar business empire,"
Since its origin as an ideologically driven militia, the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution has taken an ever more assertive role in virtually every aspect of Iranian society. Its expanded social, political, military, and economic role under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's administration — especially during the 2009 presidential election and post-election suppression of protest — has led many analysts to argue that its political power has surpassed even that of the .
The Chief Commander of the Guardians is Mohammad Ali Jafari, who was preceded by Yahya Rahim Safavi.
Terminology
In Iran, due to the frequent use of referencing government organizations with one word names (that generally denotes their function) as opposed to acronyms or shortened versions, the entire general populace universally refer to the organization as
Sepāh (Army). Although
Artesh also means army as well, Sepāh has a connotation that is more security driven as opposed to Artesh, which is more militaristic, and henceforth, is used to refer to the general Armed Forces. However the Iranian Government, media, and those who identify to the organization generally use
Sepāh e Pāsdārān (Army of Guardians), although it is not uncommon to hear
Pāsdārān e Enqelāb (پاسداران انقلاب) (Guardians of the Revolution), or simply
Pāsdārān (پاسداران) (Guardians) as well.
Because the Basij is the only part of the organization that is visible on a daily basis, and the ones that suppress internal unrest (i.e. Protests, civil disobedience, etc.), many Iranians also informally use the term to refer to the Revolutionary Guards as well.
Most foreign Governments and the English-speaking mass media usually use the term Iranian Revolutionary Guards ("IRG") or simply the Revolutionary Guards. In the US media, the force is frequently referred to as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps ("IRGC"), although this force is rarely described as a "corps" by non-US media.
Organization
The force's main role is in national security. It is responsible for internal and border security, law enforcement, and also
Iran's missile forces. IRGC operations are geared towards
asymmetric warfare and less traditional duties. These include the control of smuggling, control of the
Strait of Hormuz, and resistance operations. The IRGC is intended to complement the more traditional role of the regular Iranian military, with the two forces operating separately and focusing on different operational roles. and
special forces. It also controls the
Basij militia, which has a potential strength of eleven million. The Basij is a volunteer-based force, with 90,000 regular soldiers and 300,000 reservists. The IRGC is officially recognized as a component of the Iranian military under Article 150 of the Iranian Constitution. It is separate from, and parallel to, the other arm of the
Iran's military, which is called
Artesh (another Persian word for army).
History and Structure
The IRGC was formed in May 1979 as a force loyal to
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, but later became a full military force alongside the army in the
Iran–Iraq War. The force (at least in theory) only reports to the Supreme Leader, and does not report to the president.
Much of the internal structure within the organization remains unclear and is possibly subject to frequent change depending on the political situation within the country. As a result, the IRGC has vastly evolved from its original purpose. It was founded alongside the Regular Armed Forces to prevent a military coup during the 1979 Iranian Revolution, but as internal opposition grew against the regime and the Iran-Iraq War during the 80's proving disastrous for the regular Armed forces, it was reorganized to protect the regime from external and internal forces while at the same time, exporting Islamic Movements to other countries as well. After the death of Khomeini however (and possible dissatisfaction with Khamenei), the IRGC began to take on its own control rather than taking orders directly from the Supreme Leader and began taking control over the country itself. Though it tolerated no dissident, it left suppressing it to the former Basij Militia, which was reorganized to combat internal unrest. It rarely cooperates with other government agencies, never discloses its operations and finances to oversight ministries, and is immune from prosecution in courts.
As the younger generation have taken control of the IRGC, the top echelons of power within the organization which consisted largely of protesters against the Shah's regime and clerics close to Ayatollah Khomeini have been replaced with veterans of the Iran-Iraq War. Because of this, the foundations of the IRGC have also changed, from being a force used to establish an Islamic State and imposing the control of the Supreme Leader, to a military force largely distrustful of outside influences and preventing external threats alongside exporting Iran's Islamic Revolution to other countries, which includes financing Hamas and Hezbollah. Because of the heavy losses sustained during the Iran-Iraq War (particularly the human wave attacks) which were largely blamed on formations and decisions made by Ayatollah's with no familiarity with combat strategies, the IRGC have apparently removed Clerics from most upper level military positions and replaced them with non-clerical commanders more familiar with modern day war tactics. The recent replacement of Radical conservatives in the IRGC leadership with moderate conservatives, particularly in regards of Mohammad Ali Jafari taking over from Yahya Rahim Safavi seems to confirm this.
Military Structure
The Revolutionary Guards have a rather unusual military tactic in regards to national defense. Although the regular armed forces are the primary force for defending against external threats and even mandated in the constitution, their command remains largely limited to the regional capitals, and air defense. Everything else, even the Navy, is mandated by the Revolutionary Guards. For example, should a foreign power attempt to attack Iran, the regular military would be used to combat the initial onslaught (such as border wars and air raids), while as the war progresses, the Revolutionary Guards would be used to prevent an advance and be used to combat military action within the country. This system was most likely adopted after the Iran-Iraq war, largely due to the failure of the regular armed forces being able to maintain superiority. The regular military is consisted of conscripts and aging commanders and is widely subject to desertion or failure to follow orders. The Revolutionary Guards however contain soldiers who are much more dedicated and trained than their army counterparts, and is able to offset this.
Basij
The Basij is a paramilitary volunteer militia founded by the order of the Ayatollah Khomeini in November 1979. The Basij are (at least in theory) subordinate to, and receive their orders from, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and current Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. However they have also been described as "a loosely allied group of organizations" including "many groups controlled by local clerics." Currently, the Basij serve as an auxiliary force engaged in activities such as internal security as well as law enforcement auxiliary, the providing of social service, organizing of public religious ceremonies, and more famously morals policing and the suppression of dissident gatherings.
Quds Force
The elite Ghods (or Quds) Force, sometimes described as the successor to the
Shah's
Imperial Guards, is estimated to be 2,000-5,000 in number.
Ansar-ol-Mahdi Corps
Ansar-ol-Mahdi Corps is primarily responsible for the protection of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other top officials of government. But as an elite, secretive force within the IRGC, its officers are entrusted with many other special assignments, including those in the area of weapons of mass of destruction and terrorist activities beyond Iran's borders.
Training
Most of the Iranian public are not readily permitted to join the IRGC and the current Membership either consists of war veterans or children of clerics and veterans who have been trained from birth to work for the organization. As the life of Islamic Republic has extended, much of the combatants do originate from the latter, while leadership comes from the former. Those who are raised from birth are from families affiliated with the IRGC and while they may live with the general population, they are generally on military bases and do not go to school with other Iranian Students. Their education comes either from military officers who provide technical information, and clerics who provide religious education. Nevertheless, their education does primarily consist of recognizing that "performing the Supreme Leader's wishes is similar obedience to God". They undergo this training until the age of 13-16 when they are put through weapons training and may be given assignments, after which they reach adulthood do they become ranking combatants. Most IRGC combatants are not affiliated with any political organization and are expected to serve until retirement.
In the regime's early years, the IRGC largely consisted of protesters and opponents of the former Shah's regime, but because of heavy losses during the war with Iraq and their poor military record, most of the early leadership have been removed, purged, or faded into obscurity.
Size
The
IISS Military Balance 2007 says the IRGC has 125,000+ personnel and controls the Basij on mobilisation. It estimates the IRGC Ground and Air Forces are 100,000 strong and is 'very lightly manned' in peacetime. It estimates there are up to 20 infantry divisions, some independent brigades, and one airborne brigade.
The IISS estimates the IRGC Naval Forces are 20,000 strong including 5,000 Marines in one brigade of three or four Marine Battalions., and are equipped with some coastal defence weapons (some HY-2/CSS-C-3 Seersucker SSM batteries and some artillery batteries) and 50 patrol boats (including 10 Chinese Houdang fast attack craft). The IRGC air arm, says the IISS, controls Iran's strategic missile force and has an estimated one brigade of Shahab-1/2 with 12-18 launchers, and a Shahab-3 unit. The IISS says of the Shahab-3 unit 'estimated 1 battalion with estimated 6 single launchers each with estimated 4 Shahab-3 strategic IRBM.'
Senior commanders
Major General
Mohammad Ali Jafari (Commander-in-chief)
Brigadier General
Mohammad Hejazi (Chief of the Joint Staff)
Brigadier General
Mohammad-Reza Zahedi (
Revolutionary Guards' Ground Forces)
Brigadier General
Hossein Salami (
Revolutionary Guards' Air Force)
Brigadier General
Mohammadreza Naqdi (
Commander-in-chief of the Mobilized
Basij forces)
Brigadier General
Qassem Soleimani (
Quds Force) General Soleimani was responsible for negotiating several accords between Iraqi political figures.
Brigadier General
Abdol-Ali Najafi (Ansar-ol-Mahdi Corps)
In Lebanon, political parties had staunch opinions regarding the IRGC's presence. Some, mainly the Christian militias such as the
Lebanese Forces,
Phalanges, and most of the Christian groups declared war on the IRGC, claiming they violated Lebanese sovereignty, while others, including Muslim militias, were neutral to their presence. Groups such as the
PSP and
Mourabiton did not approve of their presence, but to serve political alliances they decided to remain silent on the matter.
Allegations of terrorism
Former CIA officer, Robert Baer, claims significant Pasdaran involvement in various terrorist activities ranging from the
1983 United States Embassy bombing in Beirut to the 1988 hijacking of Kuwait Airlines flight 422. Kidnapped U.S. citizens were allegedly held at Pasdaran's Shaykh Barracks in the Balabakk.
The 1992 Israeli Embassy attack in Buenos Aires and the 1994 AMIA Bombing also in Buenos Aires, Argentina, for which the Argentinian government issued an arrest warrant for Imad Mugniyah of Hezbollah, have been linked to Iran. According to Robert Baer, Mugniyah was an IRGC operative, and close ties between IRGC and Hezbollah are described elsewhere in this article. According to Jeffery Goldberg, writing in the New Yorker, "It is believed that Mugniyah takes orders from the office of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, but that he reports to a man named Ghassem Soleimani, the chief of a branch of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps called Al Quds, or the Jerusalem Force—the arm of the Iranian government responsible for sponsoring terror attacks on Israeli targets."
2006 Lebanon War
During the
2006 Lebanon War, the IRGC played a key role. Revolutionary Guards directed the firing of a missile on the Israeli Naval vessel
INS Hanit, which killed four sailors. This vessel was responsible for bombing targets in Beirut. Revolutionary Guards also assisted Hezbollah in the firing of rockets into Israel. During the war, several Iranian Revolutionary Guards were reportedly killed by Israeli forces in Baalbek, a town close to the Syrian border.
2006 plane crash
In January 2006, an IRGC
Falcon crashed near Oroumieh. All fifteen passengers died, including twelve senior IRGC commanders. Among the dead was General Ahmad Kazemi, the IRGC ground forces commander.
Possible attacks on Quds Force
On July 7, 2008,
Pulitzer Prize winning investigative journalist and author
Seymour Hersh wrote an article in the
New Yorker stating that the Bush Administration had signed a
Presidential Finding authorizing the
CIA's
Special Activities Division to begin cross border paramilitary operations from Iraq and Afghanistan into Iran. These operations would be against the
Quds Force, the commando arm of the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard that had been blamed for repeated acts of violence in Iraq, and “high-value targets” in the President’s war on terror.
October 2009 Pishin bombing
In October 2009, several top commanders of the Revolutionary Guards were killed in a suicide bombing in the
Pishin region of
Sistan-Baluchistan, in the south-east of Iran. The Iranian state television said 31 people died in the attack, and more than 25 were injured. Shia and Sunni tribal leaders were also killed. The Sunni resistance group,
Jundullah claimed this attack, although Jundallah, officially designated as a terrorist group by the US state department, is widely believed to be secretly financed by the US government and CIA.
Influence
Political
Ayatollah Khomeini urged that the country's military forces should remain unpoliticized. However, the Constitution, in Article 150, defines the IRGC as the "guardian of the Revolution and of its achievements" which is at least partly a political mission. His original views have therefore been the subject of debate. Supporters of the Basiji have argued for politicization, while reformists, moderates and
Hassan Khomeini opposed it. President Rafsanjani forced military professionalization and ideological deradicalization on the IRGC to curb its political role, but the Pasdaran became natural allies of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei when reformists threatened him.
Although never explicitly endorsing or affiliating themselves with any political parties, the Alliance of Builders of Islamic Iran (or Abadgaran), is widely viewed as a political front for the Revolutionary Guards. Many former members (including Ahmadinejad) have joined this party in recent years and the Revolutionary Guards have reportedly given them financial support.
As an elite group, members of Pasdaran have influence in Iran's political world. President Ahmadinejad joined the IRGC in 1985, serving first in military operation in Iraqi Kurdistan before leaving the front line to take charge of logistics. A majority of his first cabinet consisted of IRGC veterans. Nearly one third of the members elected to Iran's Majlis in 2004 are also "Pásdárán". Others have been appointed as ambassadors, mayors, provincial governors and senior bureaucrats. Three weeks after the election the Guard's commander, Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari, "publicly acknowledged they had taken over the nation's security during the post-election unrest" and called this `a revival of the revolution,` in a press conference. It is thought to control around a third of Iran's economy through a series of subsidiaries and trusts.
The Los Angeles Times estimates that IRGC has ties to over one hundred companies, with its annual revenue exceeding $12 billion in business and construction. IRGC has been awarded billions of dollars in contracts in the oil, gas and petrochemical industries, as well as major infrastructure projects. As enforcers of cross border activities, the IRGC has maintained a monopoly on smuggling, arresting competitors and controlling the vast bulk of the Iranian alcohol, tobacco, opium, etc. industries. As enforcers of Iranian moral codes, the IRGC uses its power to control prostitution rackets as well. It runs laser eye-surgery clinics, makes cars, builds bridges and roads, develops gas and oil fields and controls black-market smuggling.
Khatam al-Anbia Construction Headquarters, the IRGC’s major engineering arm & one of Iran’s largest contractors employing about 25,000 engineers and staff on military (70%) and non-military (30%) projects worth over $7 billion in 2006.
Ghorb Nooh, IRGC also owns 45% participation in automotive Bahman Group and has a majority stake in Iran's naval giant SADRA through Khatam al-Anbia.
The IRGC also exerts influence over bonyads, wealthy, non-governmental ostensibly charitable foundations controlled by key clerics. The pattern of revolutionary foundations mimics the style of informal and extralegal economic networks from the time of the Shah. Their development started in the early 1990s, gathered pace over the next decade, and accelerated even more with many lucrative no-bid contracts from the Ahmadinejad presidency. — training Hezbollah and Hamas fighters, and has been accused by the US government of being involved in the Iraq War.
In December 2009 evidence uncovered during an investigation by the Guardian newspaper and Guardian Films linked the IRGC to the kidnappings of 5 Britons from a government ministry building in Baghdad in 2007. Three of the hostages, Jason Creswell, Jason Swindlehurst and Alec Maclachlan, were killed. Alan Mcmenemy's body was never found but Peter Moore was released on 30 December 2009. The investigation uncovered evidence that Moore, 37, a computer expert from Lincoln was targeted because he was installing a system for the Iraqi Government that would show how a vast amount of international aid was diverted to Iran's militia groups in Iraq.
According to Geneive Abdo IRGC members were appointed "as ambassadors, mayors, cabinet ministers, and high-ranking officials at state-run economic institutions" during the administration of president Ahmadinejad
See also
Ali Movahedi-Kermani
Ali-Reza Asgari
Composite Index of National Capability
Islamic Republic of Iran Army
References and notes
Further reading
(discusses U.S. military clashes with Iranian Revolutionary Guard during the Iran–Iraq War)
also available for free download
in full or a
brief summary
External links
Background
The Rise of the Pasdaran, Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s - RAND Corporation
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Réalité-EU (2007-04-02)
Ali Alfoneh The Revolutionary Guards' Role in Iranian Politics, Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2008
Pasdaran - Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRCG) GlobalSecurity.org
Greg Bruno (2009-06-22) Iran's Revolutionary Guards Council on Foreign Relations
IRGC
[ Weekly Newsletter] published by the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution (in Persian)
Official media news outlet used by the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution (in Persian)
General
Vali Nasr and Ali Gheissari (2004-12-13) Foxes in Iran's Henhouse, New York Times Op-Ed article about the growing IRGC role in Iran's power structure
Steven R. Hurst, Associated Press (2007-01-24) U.S. Envoy: Iran Revolutionary Guards Ghods Force Director Detained IranFocus.com
Yoshie (2007-11-20) Guardians of the Revolution Critical Montages Blog post
David Ignatius (2008-04-17) A Blast Still Reverberating Washington Post Discussion of 1983 Beirut US Embassy bombing
Iran Electoral Archive - Guardians of the Islamic Revolution
Category:Military units and formations established in 1979
Category:1979 establishments in Iran
Category:Organizations designated as terrorist by the United States government
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