Posted by: Aryeh | July 31, 2011

Some Comments on the Social Protest in Israel

Rabin

The demonstrations in Tel Aviv on Saturday night had a lot in common with the spirit of the week following Rabin’s assassination. Tweets, signs, and speeches, all shared a rhetoric that was attributed in the fall of 1995 to the “Candle Youngsters” (No’ar ha-Nerot). At some point I realized that many of the protesters were the Candle Youngsters. Many, of course, are younger, and were little children at the time. But still, I think that something of that spirit is hovering over the protest. The ethos that by going out to the streets ad speaking out in the name of a nation you can lead change; and also a sense of duty, of a task unfulfilled. The anger and frustration of the demonstration are, in part, a backlash to the solemnity that characterized the Candle Youngsters. It would be a wonderful historical irony if the Candle Youngsters were to bring Netanyahu down, a mere 16 years after they failed to stop his rise to power.

Tahrir

This is not to deny the effect of the Arab Spring, another splendid manifestation of the power of the people when they go out on the streets. Some people are aware of the connection and proud of it (holding signs bearing the comparison), others are surprise and even offended by it. This debate is important, because it encapsulates Israelis’ attitude to their surroundings. Are they willing to accept that their neighbors are humans who share the same basic concerns they do? Are they willing to concede that Egyptians realized something several months before they did? That they actually might learn something from dialogue and openness to their environs?

Comparisons, as always, are worthless if they do not contain an element of contrast. Tahrir and Rothschild are both the result of personal, everyday strife. I guess it is ultimately impossible to motivate so many people without such concerns. Tahrir had a demand and a target which was straight-forward, measurable and compressible into one sentence. Israeli protest has demands that are complex, draw a plethora of contradicting solutions, and require full-scale change of priorities and procedures, rather than the change of government. You might think that switching from tyranny to democracy would be harder than sticking with democracy and shifting those in power, but the hard truth that Israelis are learning, is that a removal of a single dictator is more visible and measurable than shifting the entire structure of a socio-economic system.

Left or Right

Many are asking if this is a leftist protest, or national. That depends on what you mean by left. The demands for social justice, government intervention in housing prices (and other costs of living) are easily identified as classic left-wing goals. They rely on Israel’s past as a welfare state, and the ethos of its forefathers, Zionists who identified with the socialist dream to various degrees. There is no cause for surprise there.

On the other hand, the multitudes of demonstrators are not all of one mind and voice. There are plenty right-wing conservatives or liberals (in Israel, “liberal” is opposite of social-democrat, not of “republican” or “conservative”). They have either not thought through the means the government has to respond to their demands, or they simply are out to express their frustration. In any case, they are very likely to vote to right-wing parties again, and should the leaders of the protests draw connections to the Israeli-Palestinian  conflict, many of their followers will leave before you get a chance to say “September”. So, whether you are hoping or concerned that this protest will lead to the end of the occupation (depending on your politics), I am quite certain this will not happen, and there is no cause for panic or self-delusion (depending on my politics…).

Forming a Socio-Economic Stance

If there is any cause for optimism, and even here I would be extremely careful, it is in the possibility to diversify and nuance Israeli political discourse, so as to allow people to identify themselves as "social lefties" but "right-winged foreign policy" and vice versa.

Holding a socio-economic opinion is based, as any political view, on one’s personal experiences. What would you do if your health insurance was covered regardless of how much you worked, indeed of whether you worked? is it fair that some people work hard all their lives, and still don’t have money to buy a house or pay for a new pair of glasses? What measures of rectifying this would be unfair to others, who are more well-off? Who is to blame for people being poor, and what is the best way the government can help them get out of it? What is the worst way? The practical solutions can be debated, but people need to form their own opinion on such questions, and debate them with others.

These questions might seem rehash of old, endless and pointless debates to American readers. for the most part, they are unheard in Israel, even amidst the Social Justice Protest. I think such debates are a sign of a healthy political system (not the only sign, of course, and not to idealize the American system in any way), and even more than that – they’re plain interesting! So – I hope a culture of socio-economic debates will linger after the protests are over and forgotten.

Forgetfulness

Yes, despite all the excitement of the past few days, there is still more than a fathomable chance that the protests will be over by September, some changes will be made supposedly in response to the demands, but only enhancing Free Market economy in Israel. By the next elections, everything will be back to normal. Netanyahu is a fan of Reagan and Thatcher. He may well have learned from Thatcher that all he needs is to brave the protests, until they blow over, and then continue with his new financial order.

The Ever-Expanding Israeli Middle-Class

The protesters are right, I believe, that more regulation, planning and intervention could ease the cost of living and aid struggling Middle Class families. But one thing no-one is talking about, is that Israel is consistently dissolving its Working Class. The Middle Class is absorbing more and more households, and this brings down salaries.

Zionist revolution included in its ethos a transformation of the Jewish people from Middle-Class merchants, to working people. This ethos informed the agricultural Kibbutzim and moshavim, as well as industries in the cities. This is rapidly diminishing. I am always weak when it comes to numbers, so I won’t pretend to know them, but most professional schools, training teenagers for industry jobs closed by the end of the previous millenium. Manual labor was gradually handed over to Palestinians since 1967, and when that was no longer viable (starting in the early 1990s), more and more laborers were brought from the Balkans, Africa, China, Thailand and the Philippines. More and more Israelis are getting college degrees, and will do anything but manual labor.

The problem, of course, is that no-one (almost) wants to do manual labor. I’d be a hypocrite advising people to degrade their social status and income, when I’m not willing to do the same myself.

But there are measures the government can take to encourage a creation of a native working class:

- Limit number of working permits for foreigners.

- Increase punishment and enforcement for employers of workers without permits

- Increase punishment and enforcement for employers who do not pay minimum wages.

- Limit number of degrees universities and colleges can award each year (esp. in the “practical fields” of Law and Business Management, but also across the board). There is no point with having so many people who invest three-four years of their lives, and at least $10,000 expecting their degree to improve their socio-economic status, only to be faced with the sad truth that employers are not impressed by a BA anymore. The limit will force Higher Education institutions to set a higher bar (this can be coupled with higher demands for the degree itself), and will discourage people from pursuing a degree without passion. At the same time, more options need to be provided for accessible, and affordable (or free!) non-degree courses for those interested in learning, li-shma, for its own sake. Knowledge is a wonderful thing. Confusing knowledge with a depreciating college degree is bad news for everyone.

I’m not even trying to conceal that I thought more about the last condition than the others. I am in Higher Education, and its problems and challenges occupy me more than other things. But the growing Middle Class is one of the biggest unspoken problems in Israel. Foreign workers stay and raise children, who see themselves as Israelis, and will not continue with the menial labor of their parents. They will pursue college degrees and Middle Class jobs as well. So more foreigners will have to be brought in. The cosmopolitan-humanist in me would like to say, “let them in! who cares?” but things are never that simple in Israel. It can work in the US, although I am not thrilled about it there either, but the US is big enough and its ethos inclusive enough to allow for it. Also, unlike Israel, Americans have conquered their problems of First Nations. Israel will not be able to continue as a state privileging Jews, and discriminating two other groups. I wonder, and I am sure this is not original but have not studied it in depth either, if there are connections to be made between the abolition movement, and a feeling that the threat of Native Americans has been terminally removed.

Heavy Competition

Netanyahu has said more than once that his proposed solution for reducing the cost of living, is opening the market to competition, thus bringing prices down. The practical implications are more import, less produce and industry, less Israelis working in agriculture and factories, and Israel relying more and more on the cheap labor of third-world populations (marketed, perhaps, by elegant European / North-American brands). In addition to the fact that this ties in well with the previous point, it also raises two further problems: a. this is not a solution that enfolds social justice. On the contrary. If the “People Demand Social Justice” as they chanted around the country last Saturday night, it cannot be achieved by injustice to those more remote and more invisible. Second, Israelis should consider very seriously if their stance in the Middle East, Europe and the Global community is such that will allow them to rely more heavily on overseas suppliers. Clue: not if you continue fearing BDS you don’t.

1 Comment

Posted in Israeli Politics | Tags: , , , ,

Posted by: Aryeh | July 30, 2011

Revisiting Notes from Camp David (2000)

Dan Meridor’s personal notes from his diary during the Camp David talks published this weekend in Haaretz provide a fascinating peephole for the mundane details of negotiation, peacemaking, and politics.

Shortly after the failure of the Camp David talks and the outbreak of violence, I assumed that Barak, who was never pleased with the outcome, planned this all along. Most of what I read afterwards confirmed this premonition, including Barak’s repeated statements of removing the veil off Arafat’s face. If Meridor had any such impressions, they were left out of the sections of his diary that were published. His impressions of Barak depict a sincere effort to cut a deal and reach a peace agreement that lingered until the last day, and a grave disappointment when the talks fail. It is hard to believe that Barak went to Camp David with such a degree of naïveté – indeed, just as much as it is quite unbelievable that Meridor would buy it.

Nevertheless, thus the story Meridor provides us goes: Barak was willing to reach a compromise at Camp David over Jerusalem, one that the hardliners on his negotiation team (namely Meridor and Elyakim Rubinstein) opposed.

But even according to Meridor, the Clinton Parameters were not much different than what Barak was willing to offer Arafat during the talks. This raises once again the question of the US as a fair broker and its stance in relation to Israel, a question that concerned previous posts regarding Obama and Netanyahu. It is worthwhile considering the similarities between the Clinton-Barak relationship and the Obama-Netanyahu relationship in light of the seeming differences between the two. Indeed, Meridor tells of a rift between Clinton and Barak as well, but all the same, the American presidents align themselves to the Israeli line.

Presuppositions, insinuations and allegations of the power of the Jewish lobby are hardly in place as explanation. More interesting, and Meridor’s account confirms what most people have said previously, is that the Israelis laid concrete offers on the table, which were not reciprocated by Palestinian offers (most people, to exclude the famous Agha-Malley accounts that were published in NYRB at the time). In other words, the American president follows along the lines of the Israeli offer, because he has no counter-offer to try and balance it.

On the other hand, it was interesting to learn from the Meridor account that Barak and Arafat never met alone. In one section it comes across as Barak’s fault and insistence; in another, as Arafat’s.

One may assume that the timing of the publication of these notes is far from coincidental. Meridor notes that Barak claimed that if Arafat would unilaterally declare independence, he would unilaterally annex parts of the West Bank. Barak is once more the Minister of Defense (as he was at the time along with his position as PM), the minister responsible for the Occupied Territories. Once again, “threats” of a Palestinian declaration of independence are drawing attention around the world, gaining hope from left-wing Israelis and peace-activists, stirring concerns by others, and leading to various pressures and debates between Palestinians and World Leaders, and Palestinians and themselves. Arafat played the same trick several years earlier with Barak’s predecessor, Netanyahu, who is once again Prime Minister.

I enjoyed the mundane details, as I said: Meridor’s impression of his cabin; the fact that he shared a room with Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami (one would expect people of that stature to enjoy the privacy of their own room); Meridor’s conversation with and impressions of Chelsea Clinton; and his order not forward calls from outside the retreat, except from his wife (a prohibition that was bypassed by Israeli reporter Keren Neubach, leading Meridor to suspect she identified herself as his wife to the operator). Such sketches remind us that the fate of negotiations is ultimately in the hands of humans, infallible and limited like the rest of us.

I will continue to hold that Barak thought that another round of violence was unavoidable, and that undoing Oslo was good. But everything else remains open: to what end? What did Arafat hope to gain by that round of violence? What would Barak have done differently had he stayed in power, and after the Oslo agreements were de facto annulled? What would he have done had Arafat accepted the Clinton parameters? We may never know.

Leave a Comment

Posted in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict | Tags: , , , , , , ,

Posted by: Aryeh | June 7, 2011

On J Street’s Stance, and Radical Left Response to It

In his latest post, The Magnes Zionist criticizes J Street’s support of the latest Israeli peace rally. I subscribe to his sentiments, and am openly indebted to his recurring observation that most supporters of a two-state solution, actually seek a one-and-a-half state solution, with Israel being the one, and Palestine, only a half. As a sideway, I will note that this general critique should be coupled with the warning that if such a solution comes to realization, it is not at all certain that Israel will remain a one-state in its own right. The Palestinian struggle in Israel might bar it from being so, and Israel might be pushed to exert further force and undemocratic steps, resulting in what Hagai El-Ad recently as “two pseudo-states” (a misnomer, to be sure, but nevertheless a warning worth heeding).

But despite my siding with MZ’s goals, I think his analysis is flawed on some points that are well worth the debate on this important issue. My two major points of contention are (a) the correct approach towards J Street and the understanding of its motivations and actions; and (b), what seems to be a confusion of principles and specifications. I begin with the latter:

As I argued in my previous post, Netanyahu and Obama are in agreement that a two-state solution should be sought to be implemented in the West Bank, loosely following the Green Line, with several blocs remaining under Israeli sovereignty and the borders being altered accordingly. Gaza Strip, as MZ notes, remains an open question. This solution indeed sheds serious doubt over the feasibility and viability of a Palestinian statehood, but its feasibility should not be confused with its endorsement. Ehud Barak outlined these blocs as early as 2000, and it has since been accepted by various Israeli, Palestinian and American leaders, including in the Bush Roadmap, the Geneva Accords, and the recent rounds of speeches by Obama and Netanyahu. This is the principle that is widely accepted. It is true that its specifications vary. Barak himself has changed his list of blocs in several interviews (although I sometimes doubt it’s the same list but with Barak grouping them differently). The Geneva Accords exclude Ariel from Israel sovereignty, while other maps include them. The map outlined for the Taba 2000 talks or the one implied by the Olmert negotiations are each different. But the principle remains the same.

J Street and the Israeli National Left endorse the principle. At this point, MZ’s debate over what will be considered a bloc becomes less than helpful because we have no way of knowing what each of these movements considers as a bloc. Looking at the map or at the statistics of a settlement in order to deem it as a bloc or a non-bloc is simply unhelpful. This is not a question of subjective impressions. I think it is clear that all parties who endorse the principle accept that its specifications should and would be decided in the negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. We can also assume, as a simple matter of reasonability, that Palestinians will prefer to keep these blocs at the minimum, and Israelis, even if a very lenient PM is in power (which is surely not the case with Netanyahu), will want to leave as much as possible in his hand, certainly not less than what the Palestinians will agree to.

For myself, I oppose the principle more than its specifications, and have no consequential observations on the differences between the Geneva Accords movement and the INL.

Which leads me to my second contention: J Street is a pro-Israel lobby. It has never claimed otherwise. Various peace activists and radical left-wing writers seem disappointed with them at times, and I shall not be surprised if I myself expressed similar sentiments in my past writing. But it’s been around long enough and consistent enough to make it clear to us that we should not expect it to be something it is not. It is pro-peace in the way that peace can strengthen Israel; it supports Palestinian rights inasmuch as the violation of these rights weakens Israel. It is willing to criticize any Israeli government who does not advance these goals, just as Yossi Sarid criticizes his government. This does not make them anti-Israel. Some Israeli politicians tried to portray them as anti-Israeli, either because they don’t like being criticized, or for the same reasons that Netanyahu had difficulties with Obama : it is helpful to argue with those who support you in the long run, there’s really nothing to lose.

The disparity between Israel and Occupied Palestinians is so big, that there is no way to achieve real peace without a heavy price for Israel: economically, strategically and by land, if we’re talking of a Two-State solution, and all that and more (such as questions of identity and creed), when thinking of a Bi-National model. In any case, it’s a heavy price and most Israelis and Israel-supporters are unwilling to pay it. So they’re trying to figure out a way of getting out of this mess without paying the price. Radical left-wingers realize that such attempts might be beneficial on a short-term basis, but will not enable a long-lasting peace, and therefore will raise the conflict even more in the future. J street is very clear as to which side it’s on in this debate, and radical left-wingers should not expect it to be something it is not. Furthermore, radical left-wingers, more than anyone else, should be aware of the wide range the term “left” can denote, and keep that in mind as they negotiate the fact that J Street is left-wing, and still so much farther to the right than they are. Such awareness will be helpful to all, not only for the sake of future analysis, but also for a clear and respectful debate between various parties.

Leave a Comment

Posted in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict | Tags: , , , ,

Posted by: Aryeh | May 22, 2011

So Why Wasn’t Netanyahu Pleased When Obama Agreed with Him?

The main thing needed for understanding the recent Obama-Netanyahu transactions, in my view, is the six principles outlined by Netanyahu in his speech in the Knesset (Israeli Parliament) last week:

I also believe that most people are united in regard to my viewpoints on the issue that seems to be in dispute, the political process with the Palestinians. The citizens of Israel are much more united than is commonly believed, and much more united than the political parties that are supposed to represent them here in this house. There is consensus regarding the basic issues: 

First, about my demand that the Palestinians recognize the State of Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people.

Second, about my view, which is shared by many here, that the agreement between us must end the conflict and end the demands on the State of Israel.

Third, that the problem of the Palestinian refugees will be resolved outside of Israel and not within its borders.

Fourth, that a Palestinian state only be established under a peace treaty that will not compromise the safety of Israel. I believe there is agreement on this, and I stress that this state must be demilitarized, with practical security arrangements, including long-term IDF presence along the Jordan River.

Fifth, we agree that we must maintain the settlement blocs. There is widespread agreement that the settlement blocs must remain within the State of Israel.

Sixth, that Jerusalem remain the united and sovereign capital of the State of Israel.

These are the principles that guide my path, our path.

(Quoted from the Israeli MFA’s website)

President Obama’s speech at the State Department accepted most of these points. The tension, if any, remains in the major issue of borders: the President’s mention of the 1967 borders, which contradict the demand for keeping the settlement blocs in Israel. At the same time, however, it is clear that when Premier Netanyahu specifies the blocs he is excluding the settlements outside of these blocs, thus theoretically agreeing to withdrawing from most of the West Bank. Furthermore, compensation for the loss of the land of the blocs is not off the table. The views are not irreconcilable.

We can assume that the American President is not invested in the precise compromise concerning Jerusalem and the refugee problem, as long as there is one. Obama wisely stressed that it is ultimately the responsibility of the Israeli and Palestinian parties to reach a settlement. I am certain this emphasis will not deter those who expect to see severe US pressure towards an agreement, and rest assured that the President will not venture into such futile efforts.

On much more important points, however, the President accepts the Israeli demands, and reaffirms them: Netanyahu’s fourth principle is intended to delegitimize a unilateral move of the Palestinians, namely a UN resolution in the coming September. Obama stressed that such efforts will lead them nowhere, assuring Israel that the US will not support such a declaration of independence. We should bear in mind that while Netanyahu would like to be remembered as one who opposed the disengagement and resigning over it from government, he did vote in favour of it before submitting his resignation.

I consider the President’s commitment to a “Jewish and Democratic” state implies a principal agreement to the Israeli refusal to house Palestinian refugees, and likewise his emphasis on the security arrangements assure that despite any romantic fantasies peace-activists may have of a full, one-toime withdrawal, Israel’s presence in the West Bank will linger many years after a Peace agreement is reached. Complex and in-depth examinations of Time and Space are necessary for understanding the conflict properly.

People are baffled:

1. How can Obama be so supportive of Israel if he is a Muslim?

2. If Obama accepts so much of Netanyahu’s terms, why the tension? Why didn’t Netanyahu just wait to hear a Palestinian objection before raising his own qualifications and dissent?

The first question is tongue-in-cheek of course, but it has a serious side to it. Obama’s detractors never miss an opportunity to slur. When he’s against Israel, it’s because he is a Muslim, and Israeli pundits use his middle name time and again, as if bearing an Arabic name is a fault. When he outlines a pragmatic peace plan, albeit without specifications, they claim that the Westerner doesn’t understand the Middle-East. So which is it going to be? Is he the WASP that can’t understand the Middle-East, as every president and State-Dept-Secretary before him, or is he the Arab-Muslim who hates Israel?

Naturally, my answer is neither, but right-wing Israelis will have no problem holding both, interchangeably.

The second question is partially answered by Netanyahu’s needs at home. Gallantly fighting the American emperor for the fate of the Jewish people is always a good caricature for his right-wing partners in the coalition and their support base. But it is also a very basic negotiation move: Obama has already agreed to most of Netanyahu’s terms. He has America on his side. Saying that he accepts the speech as fair, and responding to most of his concerns, would make him lose on two aspects: first, it would reaffirm the old notion of the US as an unfair broker for an Israeli-Palestinian peace, as it is partial on Israel’s behalf; second, Netanyahu would lose any chance of making the US raise its offer. Netanyahu’s disappointed response therefore provides both President Obama and President Abbas with a little rope, allowing them to portray the US as putting pressure on Israel. At the same time, we may speculate that when the door closed behind them, Obama and Netanyahu didn’t suffice in mocking the media for falling for it and exchanging friendly remarks. Netanyahu continued to stage his stance for the President, allowing the President to make some security offers that had not been raised previously.

This means that Netanyahu might very well be prepared to reach a deal based on a two-state solution model. Does this mean there will be peace? Of course not. The problems only begin here. But first we need to see if an agreement is reached, before we start worrying about that. History shows us that both sides have too many concerns to allow them to reach a deal: the Palestinian leadership can’t afford to fold the “Right of Return” flag; the Israelis dread the moment of evacuation of West Bank Settlements’ extremists. Both sides will not easily make a compromise in Jerusalem.

Leave a Comment

Posted in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict | Tags: , , , , ,

Posted by: Aryeh | January 24, 2011

Between Space and Place, Mobility and Accessibility

A. Space, Place, Movement, Mobility

The problem with writing preliminary thoughts on any given subject, especially for someone whose profession resides in the academia, is that some original reflections are revealed to be less-articulated versions of well-known statements by others. This is to be expected. If more than two millennia ago, a Persian Jew writing under the pseudonym of Qoheleth (Ecclesiastes) considered everything that can be said to already have been said, this will be all the more so in the case of a fledgling scholar of the twenty-first century as myself.

Thus, I wrote in August 2010 [in my preliminary notes towards an analysis of the Politics of Mobility], "[s]pace is not only the arena in which mobility takes place. In order to understand space, we need to observe how space is construed. Indeed, for mobility to occur we need more than one defined place: we need the place left behind, and the place that serves as a target… Thus, we see that mobility necessitates at least two conceptualized spaces, and additionally, that each space will be defined by idiosyncratic characteristics that at the least distinguish it from the other conceptualized space…"

When I wrote this, I had not yet read Yi-Fu Tuan’s Space and Place [Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1977]. As early as the first page of the introduction, he states (regarding the relation of space and place):

In experience, the meaning of space often merges with that of place. "Space" is more abstract than "place." What begins as undifferentiated space becomes place as we get to know it better and endow it with value… The ideas "space" and "place" require each other for definition. From the security and stability of place we are aware of the openness, freedom, and threat of space, and vice versa. Furthermore, if we think of space as that which allows movement, then place is pause…

 

This is going to be extremely helpful for future discussion.

 

B. Accessibility vs. Mobility

And from the differentiation of space and place, to another distinction:

René Schoonbrodt kindly sent me his 2007 publication, Vouloir et dire la ville ([Bruxelles] : AAM editions, [2007]). Schoonbrodt’s center, ARAU (Atelier de Recherche et d’Action Urbaines) proves to be an excellent example for the ways in which academia is not an ivory tower separate from society, but very much invested in it. Those who know my views on the matter, know I consider this to be the case with all academia, but I do concede that ancient history does not bear immediate consequences on my surroundings. This is a very different case for Schoonbrodt, whose book’s subtitle reads: "Quarante années de participation citoyenne à Bruxelles" (forty years of civil participation in Brussels).

I will begin by quoting two passages that demonstrate Schoonbrodt’s distinction of Accessibility and Mobility [my translation]:

Let us put aside the technical and ambiguously postulated solutions, in order to address the meaning or the function of mobility. For, what use is it if not to make physical contact between separate people or things? The need for mobility derives from an absence, a lacking, from the need to cross a space separating two places of activity. Separation of home and workplace, of labor and consummation, of home and leisure … (277)

The city as access, therefore, changes the answers provided for transportation. It does not produce immobility: it does not lock people in their neighborhood or in their social condition. It gives meaning to the street, the avenue, the square … It renders urban public transport meaningful, it alters or transforms, the need to rely on private vehicles.
All of ARAU’s engagements with mobility issues, progressively follow on this conception of the city. The Solution begins with the city, resides in the city. The Priority is the inhabited city, with its businesses, its shops, its public spaces allowing multiple uses: walking, stopping and resting, the traffic of bicycles and public transport, the passage of commercial vehicles and private cars. The public space must offer versatility – banning the monopoly of usage, as any monopoly contradicts the city. In the politics of mobility, the city access is the first priority. (280)

 

Mobility is the movement that burdens the city (traffic, pollution, wasted hours of commute, jams and parking problems), whereas accessibility strives to diminish the need for mobility. In the final quoted sentence, "mobility" strikes me as being used very differently from its definition on p. 277, marking either the general use of the word, or a desirable sense of it, rather than the descriptive sense of "mobility" as it is in action today.

Some of this may sound utopian, especially to someone like me, whose "City" for the past few years has been New York. The affirmation that "any monopoly contradicts the city" will not be greeted by American readers as a tongue-in-cheek reference to the famous Parker Brothers game, but as an alarming anti-capitalist statement. More importantly, it is almost counter-intuitive to what makes a city desirable, from a New Yorker’s eyes (and not that I have any pretentions of being one): why would anyone want to go to a decent restaurant that is around the block from where they live, when you can cross the city to the other end of town, to reach a restaurant that got raving reviews, that you have to make reservations two months in advance, and where you can never find parking? The inconvenience (anti-accessibility, hyper-mobility) is almost a constitutive element of status. This, of course, is not a critique of Schoonbrodt, but of human nature, if that’s what it is, or of American rating culture, if that’s what it is.

This is not accessibility for the disabled, or at least, it is not exclusively this sense of accessibility. The overlapping of terms brings to mind the ways we are disabled or confined to our wheels and subjugated by them. The reversal of the solution, ostensibly simple and impossible at once, calls for a revision of purpose and means when thinking about mobility. Most of the chapter provides examples from Brussels, and I am not competent to judge on that matter, fascinating as the discussion itself was to read. However, the ideas, summarized in my choice of quotation/translation, are far-reaching than Brussels alone. It reminded me of Eliav Lieblich’s blog, Jane’s Streets, documenting mishaps, errors and crimes of urban planning in Israel (mostly Tel Aviv). In his latest post, Lieblich writes: "In sum, Tel Aviv at the beginning of 2011, as Israel in general, has forgotten that the individual is the one who should be at the center of its policy, and not only the one who owns a car or has fortune."

Schoonbrodt’s distinction will also be extremely helpful for future discussions.

C. A Personal Note

My interest in spatial theory and the constructions of space run along two separate axes: the first spans along my interest in the topic as a literary historian of ancient Judaism. This topic is not a major feature in my dissertation, but rather one that stemmed from it, and which I plan to pursuit after completing my dissertation this summer. For those impatient, I am compiling a bibliography of space in ancient Judaism, which I will be happy to share, once I have something substantial. For now, you will want to consult the following studies: Joosten , Jan. People and Land in the Holiness Code [Leiden: Brill, 1996]; Lied, Liv Ingeborg. The Other Lands of Israel [Leiden: Brill, 2008]; Halvorson-Taylor, Martien A. Enduring Exile. The Metaphorization of Exile in the Hebrew Bible [Leiden: Brill, 2010]. There are plenty of essays on the topic, too, but I will not burden my blog by listing them.

Anyway, a distinction between mobility and accessibility, for example, will not be relevant, I suspect, for a discussion of ancient Judaism. The challenge of applying contemporary thought to illuminate ancient texts is a difficult one, which I have been tackling during my work on my dissertation. However, it is also not an exercise in futility, as long as one keeps in mind that the application is relevant only if grounded in textual/archaeological evidence. In other words, hypothetical "what-ifs" are not only useless, but can even be harmful for such a study.

The second axis of my interest in spatial theory is the political project (mainly on this blog, but recently also as an academic endeavor), of understanding Israeli politics through the politics of space (or, specifically, the politics of mobility), both regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (where space is plays a cardinal role), and the relations of the State of Israel with Jewish (and Israeli!) diaspora, in which space becomes an issue by way of absence.

 

D. Some Implications for Analysis of Israeli Politics

Following Tuan, we may say that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict [IPC] is primarily concerned with place, that is a defined and delimited space, idiosyncratically linked (and burdened) with identity and people (although this link is in effect more than one, debatable and contestable). Furthermore, precisely since the IPC primarily revolves around place, it is contained and manipulated through space, that is through the limitations of movement and mobility.

A propos the debate on Macy Gray’s performance in Tel Aviv, Noam Sheizaf proposed that every artist planned to perform in Israel, qualifies his consent with a set percentage of tickets to be sold to Palestinians in the West Bank:

If the Israeli organizers of the show refuse or if they are unable to deliver – it will become much harder for them to claim that there is no political problem with the gig, or that Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians shouldn’t be compared to Apartheid. And if they deliver, the artist gets to play a real part in bringing down the walls between Jews and Arabs. In any case, everyone would know where they stand.

 

The rationale is this: if Israel can’t allow for innocent music-lovers to go see a show in Tel Aviv, then the limitations on Freedom of Movement from the West Bank extend far beyond security measures, and are thus collective punishment and discriminatory. My one caveat to this description, is that people tend to think of Apartheid as racially based, whereas in the West Bank it is a question of citizenry status. This is not mentioned in defense of the separationist policies of Israel’s control in the West Bank (and Gaza Strip!), but for the sake of precision.

Sheizaf, of course, is not naïve in this sense. His proposal is a rhetorical maneuver, intended to demonstrate and explicate why performances in Tel Aviv are not as simple or a-political as some would want them to be. However, in light of Schoonbrodt’s distinction we can note that Macy Gray’s performance is not the most important step in Paletsinians’ Freedom of Movement. It’s a fair enough place to start talking to Israelis and pro-Israelis, since they seem to care more about this issue than others, but it is not the main issue for Palestinians.

More important than travel to Tel Aviv, is, first of all, the travel between Gaza and the West Bank. I oppose any limitations Israel imposes on Palestinian movement within Palestine (except for limited-from-the-start, brief and specific interventions necessary for security purposes). As such, I have also advocated more than once that any "safe corridor" that Israeli leaders envision between Gaza Strip and the West Bank should be constructed prior to the end of the peace process, starting yesterday.

However, Schoonbrodt (in a passage I didn’t quote-translate here, but which will be understood based on what I did), stresses the artificialness of transportation solutions that are not part of the visible geography, that don’t "live" together with the city. In this case, we are not talking about one city, but about two dismembered regions of one land, to join in one state. This is not enough to completely disqualify a highway between Gaza and Hebron, but there is a good reason to rethink this stance: do I support a geography where Palestine-Palestinians are invisible to Israelis, and transportationally inaccessible to Israel-Palestinians? And if they should be able to reach Israeli-Palestinians easily even after a two-state solution is implemented, doesn’t this make a Gaza-Hebron highway redundant? Of course, this is also an important question in relation to the possibility of Jewish settlers in Palestine, and what they will be able to access and so forth.

I think this is more than enough for now.

Leave a Comment

Posted in Israeli-Palestinian Conflict | Tags: , , , , ,

Posted by: Aryeh | December 28, 2010

Three Simple Steps towards a Two-State Solution

Prime-Minister Netanyahu’s statement that the current round of negotiations might culminate in an interim agreement is a good point to stop and think of the meaning and difference between a "final solution" / comprehensive agreement and an interim one.

Before expanding on this point, a note to the perplexed who fail to understand why Netanyahu does not fire Lieberman, where does he stand in relation to the peace-process and so forth: if one stops to try and reconcile the opposing statements of Lieberman and Netanyahu, but rather examines the situation in its entirety, things are less perplexing. Yes, Netanyahu originally said he is willing to reach a final agreement with a Palestinian state. But before that he said he was not willing to sit with Tzipi Livni in the same government, because she required that he expresses his support for a two-state solution. And still, even after Netanyahu has done so, the two refuse to serve together in government. And then the Labor party ministers claim, now and again, that if no progress is made, they will resign. And they haven’t, to date. So all the talk of Netanyahu being "unable" due to "political constraints" is not convincing. Instead, this is precisely the policy: state your support of a two-state solution, then put every possible obstacle, then regret your failure to reach it. How many times have we heard that the Prime-Minister was "this close" to cutting a deal, but elections got in the way of reaching true peace? Barak and the Taba talks, no, Rabin-Peres before that, then Barak, then Olmert, and I suspect we’re going to hear the same tune once Netanyahu is out of office (or not, because it’s Netanyahu).

So, why not reach an agreement? The reality of the conflict is that it cannot be resolved. The partition of Jerusalem and Return of Refugees are two delicate topics, no-one is willing to commit. The problem of the refugees is more obvious than Jerusalem: whatever compromise is reached, cannot be assured to be final. So Israel’s fear is that it agrees to a two-state, dismantles settlements, divides Jerusalem, allows for a "humanitarian-symbolic" return of 10,000 or 100,000 refugees. Then what? What does Israel have to offer when ten years later a terrorist group demands that refugees be allowed to return to their homes in Jaffa, Asdud, Majdal, Safed, Lud and so forth? Now, we can be naïve and say that Israel will not have to offer anything, because the conflict has been resolved, but there are more chances for people coming to accept that Israel still has not paid for its wrongdoings, then retaining a historical memory of the elevation when the "final accord" was signed. Hence, it is always better to reach an interim agreement, which allows to postpone the refugee problem, rather than reaching a compromise and dealing with the fear of future demands.

There is a way out of this, but as an Israeli I am not comfortable in stating it, because it means laying most of the responsibility with the Palestinians. So before I describe my solution, I will add this note of self-awareness: as an Israeli, one grows up with the sense that "we" want peace, and if the "Arabs" weren’t so obstinate and malicious, we could have peace by now. I’m not claiming that I participated in explicit hate lessons, but you grow up assuming that your side is the "good guys" and whoever the political enemy is, will also be viewed as the "bad guys". I’m sure it’s the same for the Palestinians, especially those living under the injustice of the occupation. So, yes, I am going to say here something that might sound childish in that sense ("if they help us solve it, it will be okay"). I feel I have legitimacy to do this, especially because my stance of the occupation and disenfranchisement of Palestinian rights is that it is wrong, and that it should stop regardless of the peace process, and even in light of some security risks which Israel has to assume. So while I think that there is a crucial element of the peace process which is much more in the hands of the Palestinians than the Israelis, I think there is much more in the hands of the Israelis in terms of human rights and conflict alleviation which the Israeli government could do, even unilaterally, even if it does not promote peace in the short-term.

As for my suggestion: there are three major steps that I think the Arabs can do to relax Israeli concerns, and naturally, they are intertwined. The first regards the Arab Initiative. The fact that the Arab League has stated it is backing off its famous Khartoum resolution, and is willing to make peace with Israel is great. The fact that they conditioned this on the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is regrettable. This is the most intricate and complex aspect of the Israeli-Arab conflict to solve, and it feeds on mutual feelings of mistrust, nurtured, among other things, by Israeli experience as being isolated in the region. Embassies of Saudi-Arabia, Lybia, Tunisia, Morroco, UAE and others in Tel Aviv will do a great service to alleviate this. If you can add Syria and Iraq into this, it is even a dream. Having all of these embassies in Israel, encouraging Israeli tourism to Damascus and Tripoli, being involved in Israeli culture, attending gala events, TV shows and more, will weaken the Israeli stance of suspicion. I realize this is a naïve view, since Saudi-Arabia is an repressive theocracy, and will not engage in bringing heathens to Mekka, for example. But I think it is less naïve than the allegedly dream-package deal of the Arab League ("just solve this minute conflict with the Palestinians and we’ll stand in line to open embassies in Tel Aviv"). It makes more sense the other way around: open the embassies in Tel Aviv, the Palestinian cause will seem less frightening.

The second aspect of this concern is the refugee problem. Everyone knows that the refugees of 1948 will not be allowed to return to their homes, most of which are long gone. Instead of holding on to them as a valuable card in the negotiation, Palestinian leadership should recognize the disservice this problem is causing for the resolution of the whole conflict. Therefore, it should first be solved practically, without involving Israel. Then, negotiations over compensations will be much easier. As Jews we know too well that there is no way to undo a wrongdoing or to compensate for it properly. A victim should not seek compensation or undoing, but instead means to help him move on. Yes, I am thinking of German reparations to Holocaust survivors; no, I am not equating the Nakbah and the Holocaust. German reparations are not intended to undo the evils of the Holocaust, because there is no way to undo them. But there are technical and practical needs of victims which can and should be addressed. Not to clear the past, but to pave a path for the future. This is what Israeli nationalists such as Begin failed to understand when opposing the agreement. And in application to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Israel cannot and will not repatriate displaced Palestinians. Solutions should be made wherever the refugees are located now, and then Israel can follow suit with monetary compensation. This is not only the practical solution for the refugee problem, it is also the moral one. Eventually, if my suggestion here is adopted, it will assist immensely in diminishing Israeli fears that acknowledging the Nakbah and taking responsibility for it will pose a threat. If the only consequence is money, it is much more easy to face, and this makes this suggestion also the most achievable. Refugees living in Palestinian territories will be allowed to relocate anywhere within the Palestinian territory, and special projects will be funded by Israel for improvement of residential conditions of refugees in Gaza and the West Bank.

Finally, the third element is the fear that following a two-state solution, Palestinians will demand representation in Israel as a non-Jewish state, and/or will demand autonomy in largely populated Palestinian areas such as the Galilee and the "Triangle".

Netanyahu has tried to address this concern by demanding a Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state. Palestinians have denied this request, and Netanyahu has been criticized by many Israelis, too, for this demand. The Palestinians counter-argument, that Israel’s self-definition is not in their hands is fair enough. But it is not sufficient that their response makes sense, they should take active steps to respond to the concern that raised the demand.

In order to address this, the negotiations must be not exclusively over the West Bank, not even merely about the 1967 territories, but between the Israeli government as the sole representative of the Jewish people’s national body, and between a Palestinian body that represents all Palestinian people. I am not concerned with a minority of dissenters. Neturei Karta, Boyarin and Chomski don’t consider Israel to represent the Jewish people as a national entity. Fine. The world was willing to accept the Zionist representation between the 1920s and the 1940s, and that’s what counted. Something of that equivalent is necessary among the Palestinian people, so that when the Israeli government negotiates an end-deal with them, it is accepted internationally that this body speaks for the Palestinian refugees all over the Middle-East; for residents of the occupied territories in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and for Palestinians who are Israeli citizens. This body will have the mandate to negotiate compensation for refugees (without calling for their relocation in Israel); to negotiate swap of land within Israel and Palestine (including Liberman’s interesting proposal to transfer some of the "Triangle" to Palestine) and the agreement reached will face less fears of future demands. I have heard some argue that the Fatah is precisely that. I don’t know enough about Palestinian politics to determine if this is true, or even about the feasibility of such a body garnering support.

Despite the tongue-in-cheek title, I fully realize that these three points which I think are essential to alleviate Israeli concerns and fears are no minor issue. And since there is no likelihood of Palestinians and Arabs following up on these three points, there is little chance for peace. And with this little chance, we can expect things to go worse (gradually, as I expressed in my previous post), and should continue to demand that even without peace, Palestinians living under Israeli rule deserve all basic human rights denied to them today by Israeli martial law.

[I hate myself for publishing this post. As for questions of whether isn't there Israel can do to promote peace: I hope I adequately responded above. If not, here are a couple more responses: a. of course, if Israel obstinately refuses reasonable requests, such as the settlement freeze, it is an obstacle for progress. But on a more foundational level, I am not aware – and as always, this might be entirely my fault – of any concerns that Palestinians have regarding the aftermath of the two-state solution. Their concerns relate to the situation as it is, and that should definitely be addressed, according to international law and human rights, and even regardless of the two-state solution.]

6 Comments

Posted in Israeli Politics, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict | Tags: , , , , ,

Posted by: Aryeh | December 22, 2010

Where Do We Stand?

In 2000, following the outbreak of violence and the symbolic collapse of the Oslo Accords, I posited that a Jewish State and a Democratic State are no longer compatible, if they ever were. Personally, I believed they were possibly compatible, taking "Jewish" to be an ethnic characteristic rather than religious. The struggle over sovereignty in Greater Palestine, or the Land of Israel, seemed to be torn between demography and geography, and if democracy prevails, it will no longer be a Jewish State, whereas in order for the Jewish side to prevail, it could no longer be democratic.

This decade-old recognition of mine might seem naïve, to those who made such arguments at least since the beginning of the occupation of 1967, or to those who still hold that a two-state solution is achievable and viable, and will allow for both components to rest in one state called Israel.

However, I think that many Israelis do not consider democracy and their Jewish identity to be incompatible, and hence will find my forecast from 2000 to be false. Since then, I myself have changed my views slightly, and over the past few years of blogging have suggested that Israel was far from being comparable with the Apartheid regime of South Africa.

I still think there are several differences which should be of interest to Israelis and detractors of Israel alike. Actually, I am not so interested in detractors of Israel per se, but as one opposing the disenfranchisement of Palestinian rights, I do have an interest in critical aspects of Israeli policy. The first difference is that of naming and branding: Apartheid began as a neutral term describing an explicit policy of separation between blacks and whites. I cannot think of a neutral term of Israel’s policies (other than "bitachon", security), and therefore cannot see it shifting from a neutral term of policy to a source of shame.

More importantly, the difference between the status of Palestinian Israelis and Palestinians under Israeli occupation was in itself proof that the regime was not racist or consistently discriminatory. It was pretty easy to argue with people who called Israel an Apartheid, but were unaware of Arabs serving in courts and Parliament, and always found this piece of information baffling.

The events of the past year, therefore, have been puzzling, because several legislative steps seemed to stress the advantage of Jewishness in the Jewish state in a way that could either point to lack of awareness of the possible consequences of such legislation (and especially the possible chain of consequences), or could manifest a willingness to cross the line to an explicit regime of a privileged Jewish community in Israel, in other words – the first step towards what I anticipated in 2000.

At some point I wrote that an explicit Apartheid regime in Israel would be incompatible with Israelis self-image, and will therefore not happen. Now I think that two things might be combined to produce such an awful outcome: the first is the slow and gradual process by which Jews are gaining advantages in Israel; the other is the possible perception of a threat. Given the choice between "Jewish" and "Democratic" most Israelis will choose "Jewish". I don’t know if there always had to be a choice, or whether it was possible to continue living with the self-perception that the two need not be exclusive. But given the choice, that will be the outcome. All the more so, if the choice is not a leap from a democracy to an Apartheid, but merely from a semi-privileged population to a fully-privileged population (on expense of others).

Recognizing this possibility requires bearing a few things in mind:

First, that if this does happen, it will not be "Jews" vs. "Arabs" or "Palestinians," but rather "Jews" vs. "Non-Jews" to include labor immigrants. Such language also serves to intensify the myth of the majority (regardless of actual numbers) threatened by multiple forces which are never portrayed as cohesive or united, but only designated by their otherness.

Second, that not only has the two-state solution ceased to be an assurance against this possibility, it is even possible that it will accelerate the process (because "now that they have their own state, we have to defend the nature of our own state").

Finally, that I give special weight to the terms "slow," "gradual" and "privileged". Anyone who expects to see an overt fascist regime with racist rhetoric, shortly to be defeated by Allied Forces, is delusional. We are still very far from this point, and after reaching it (and only after), precisely because it was slow and gradual, it will be an even longer process to convince people that this indeed is the case, and only then will there be a third longer process of raising awareness and public pressure to change it. The last thing people should expect is for Israel to define itself as apartheidist within a year, and for the regime to collapse a year after that. That is extreme, as are many other expectations.

Leave a Comment

Posted in Israeli Politics, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict | Tags: , , , ,

Posted by: Aryeh | October 3, 2010

As Beautiful as You (in memoriam Clementi)

The murder of Ophir Rahum, who was lured to Ramallah via the internet in 2001, was a changing point in Israel that raised awareness to the possibilities of anonymity, masked identities and deceit through the internet. Having matured and learned the possibilities of the anonymity of others on the internet, it was horrifying to learn how one’s own anonymity can be stripped off involuntarily, as seen in the tragic circumstances of Tyler Clementi’s death.

From what I’ve read, there is little room for doubt that this suicide was a result of hate-crime related harassment, that it was homophobic and that it was a form of bullying. These are all serious offences (I am not sure about the laws against bullying in NJ, though), but I want to focus on the lesson we all need to draw. It is not related to homophobia not because I consider that lightly. Sadly, I recognize that homosexuals will always be a minority in society, and thus have their cross to bear. I reject it, I lament it, I do everything I can in my own life to promote tolerance, and I hope for a day where things will be different. I also recognize that people will always be apprehensive of the other, and anyone who is in a group of "others" is likely to suffer at one point or another from some form of heterophobia: racism, antisemitism, islamophobia, homophobia, xenophobia – I’m sure we can think of more. They will not disappear in any foreseeable future. The first step to fighting these evils, is to admit that they exist, and discuss them openly. Not only when others discriminate against us, but also wherever we see that we suffer of similar bias.

It would be a shame if this case received emphasis and attention because of its tragic consequences. Clementi’s choice is saddening, unfathomable, irreversible. But the horror of this story does not begin there. The true horror lies in the actions of Dharun Ravi and Molly Wei, both old enough to tell right from wrong, who crossed a line no-one should cross in their lifetime. This transgression is the most terrible thing that happened, and it should serve as a frightful alarm, one that is not sounded loud enough in the hollow space of the virtual web.

In the beginning of the Book of Genesis, we are told that the serpent claims that God forbade Adam and Eve to eat from the fruit of the tree of knowledge, because they would become as gods, knowing good and evil. The quintessential character of knowledge is portrayed here as a moral quality, the ability to discern right from wrong. We do not know whether the serpent was truthful or erroneous, but the immediate consequence of eating the fruit was awareness of nudity, and shame of it. Thus, from an early stage of human history, a mythic connection is tied between morals and bodily privacy. Dharun Ravi and Molly Wei should have known that their actions are a despicable intrusion of a person’s privacy, just as they must have known that this exposure means shame.

The technologies of the past five or ten years are said to have destroyed anonymity. As much as this can be true, it still remains the decision of a person how much of this anonymity to relinquish to Facebook, Twitter and other forms of communication. I do not intend to denounce the technologies themselves. They are merely a platform, which can be used in various ways for better or for worse. We should, however, pay attention to the opportunities at hand for evil-doers, and give serious consideration to walls of protection grounded in this technology.

What is perhaps even more disconcerting is the notion that Ravi and Wei did not feel the slightest tremble as they were crossing the final frontier from human decency to pure evil. Their whole lives are embedded in visibility, publicity and technology, that playing a prank with the same media, did not seem like what the same action would have entailed twenty or thirty years ago.

Thus, the main problem that poses itself before with this tragedy, is the immediacy, accessibility and rapidity of media. Video cameras were becoming popular when I was growing up in the 1980s. They seem so cumbersome compared to an in-built laptop webcam, or a camera in a cellphone. The same is true for stills.

Options for dissemination, broadcast and publicity were close to none. After making a family video, the best you could do was to find a time for everyone to sit together in the living room and watch the video tape. Compare this to immediacy of Twitter, to the audience of your Facebook account, to your followers on MySpace (are any left?), and you instantly realize the distance we have come. Light years, which human incapacity to adapt, accept and transpose common etiquette for these new circumstances is quickly turning into Dark Years.

Rapidity and immediacy means less barriers, less sublimation. We are heading to an era with no censorship, with no editors, and we are on screen. So the first thing that has to be said is an affirmation of responsibility for your actions, for your own privacy, and for privacy of your friends, relatives, co-workers and roommates. Anyone you may accidentally capture digitally and might make his private moment public without asking. If we all start with this sense of responsibility and respect, we will be far better than where we are now.

The second step we have to take is to be responsible viewers. True, there were enough reasons to call for responsible spectatorship for over three decades, with the deteriorating criteria of television, with the quality of films, with the violent invasion of advertisements to public space. But in the visually-heightened world we are living in, this is true more than ever: not every link on Facebook is worth clicking, if a tweet sounds suspiciously gross, you should have the sense to protect your senses from setting your personal threshold of horrors. Remember, with every click you are numbing your senses a little more. If an ad promises you will see this or that star in a paparazzi nude – you don’t have to look! Your life will be just as complete without seeing the woman with the three nipples, or the underwear-less singer. Isn’t there a wonderful sense of liberation in this choice? Send those spammers and "like" pages on Facebook a clear message, that they are going to have to work harder – and I mean real hard, cerebral hard – to get your attention. Don’t promote your networking space with filth and nonsense that is clattering your brain and soul and creating too much noise from anything that is important. There are important things in life. There are things that have to stop. There are, far too many, nonsense that make no difference either way.

The new media is culture-shocking a wide part of civilization. Some treat it like a new toy, others like a juvenile driver driving recklessly. Many are simply unable to handle their public visibility. The worst thing would be to blame the technology and be afraid of it. We need to embrace it, and we need to teach ourselves to live with it, to mature as a community in order for us to use it wisely for our benefit. Two simple rules, please spread the word: 1. Be responsible producers of visual data; 2. Be responsible spectators.

I didn’t know Tyler Clementi, and have no clever words of comfort for his loss. After reading the NYT article, I went to the piano, and played Don Mclean’s "Vincent":

 

Colors changing hue
Morning fields of amber grain
Weathered faces lined in pain
Are soothed beneath the artist’s
Loving hand.

And now I understand what you tried to say to me
How you suffered for your sanity
How you tried to set them free.
They would not listen, they did not know how,
Perhaps they’ll listen now.

For they could not love you
But still your love was true
And when no hope was left in sight on that starry
Starry night –
You took your life
As lovers often do;
But I could have told you, Vincent
This world was never meant for one
As beautiful as you.

 

May we be clever enough to make this world worthy of its beautiful, fragile people.

3 Comments

Posted in Culture, Ruminations | Tags: , , , , ,

Posted by: Aryeh | October 2, 2010

This is not an Extraordinary Insight

Do I really want to spend the rest of my life nitpicking arguments with fanciful or incompetents commentators of Israeli politics? A negative answer raises severe doubts about this blog project, both in English and in Hebrew. An affirmative answer seems to be damnation of an exercise in futility, one that I should not succumb to voluntarily. Let them write what they will, and I’ll believe as I wish, a voice in me says. As it is I have no delusional pretentions of changing the course of history. At most, I am seeking understanding through dialogue. But since few seem to share my presuppositions, this venture may have little prospects of success. At times I think that my blogs can only be useful (to me, if not to others) if I engage in larger, fundamental questions which overshadow Israeli politics, such as issues of identity, Judaism as nationalism and as a religion, the constructions of space, or the historical components of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On the other hand, I am compelled to acknowledge that any discourse about such a topic will be drenched with suppositions based on my analysis of recent history, founded on my values as a human being, and assuming much disputed data as established facts. It is this acknowledgements that drives me time and again to argue against the common wisdom regarding current events, in a helpless attempt to illuminate the incredulity of how some affairs are being analyzed as they are happening, and how these misrepresentations, be they in good faith or not, disserve any understanding and hence any possibility of a fruitful and insightful discussion of current events. However, in doing so, I confine my blogs to elaborate and detailed analysis of trifle debates which are soon forgotten. The spewed trail of such analyses that droops behind me as I look over three years of blogging is, in brief, fatiguing.

And here, ironically, I cannot step any further without providing such an example from current events: Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman’s speech in the UN has stirred quite a commotion in Israel, with repeated calls for the Prime-Minister to relieve him of his office. I read the speech (English; Hebrew), and failed to find the terrible, embarrassing phrases that would serve as cause for resignation or dismissal. This is not to say that I agreed with every sentence, or that I found it to be an inspirational speech. Lieberman is not a great orator, but in his brusque, laconic manner, he stated his views quite clearly, and they are not as remote from Israeli consensus as some would have them. Let us examine together the decisive paragraph:

Thus, the guiding principle for a final status agreement must not be land-for-peace but rather, exchange of populated territory. Let me be very clear: I am not speaking about moving populations, but rather about moving borders to better reflect demographic realities.

Ladies and gentlemen, this is not an extraordinary insight, and is far less controversial than some may seek to claim. In fact, precisely this notion – that a mismatch between borders and nationalities is a recipe for conflict – has long been accepted as a virtual truism in the academic community.

Of course, one is free to dispute or even reject Lieberman’s claims to "virtual truisms." Postmodern academia is rather apprehensive of such notions. But what do we have here? Neither a call for transfer, Lieberman makes an effort to stress this; nor an objection to relinquishing Israeli sovereignty in some territories. Furthermore, there is no objection to the principal of the Two-State Solution which the Israeli Government is committed to in various forms (the road map, the Annapolis summit, the Bar-Ilan speech and more).

Lieberman is only saying that the basis for the partition should be demographic rather than territorial, unarguably alluding to the Green Line. Now, how does this differ from left-wing spokesmen such as Yossi Beilin and Gidon Levy, who consider the Two-State Solution to be a necessity for demographic reasons? The Palestinian right to self-determination is not constituted by the Six-Day War, and not even by the Rhodes armistice agreement. The foundation for this right of Palestinians (in terms of international law, not historical or claims of national ethos) is based primarily on the UN resolution 181, which was a partition plan based on demographics.

I am not arguing practicalities here, I am stressing principle. Perhaps 181 will never be implemented, perhaps it is easier to base a solution on the Green Line. If all agree that the solution is a two-state solution, then its legal foundation is resolution 181. If Beilin and Levy and Akiva Eldar, and Eldad Yaniv and Gadi Taub and Yair Lapid agree that they do not want to live in a country with an Arab majority, why such a strong opposition to re-aligning the border, so it will not reflect the Rhodes armistice, but the reality today? Furthermore, let us keep in mind that most of the aforementioned supporters of a Two-State solution also support corrections of the border, to accommodate the inclusion of the large settlements in Israel. If we can change the Green Line in one direction, why not in another?

One of the arguments against such rhetoric is that a country cannot disown its citizens and naturalize them to another state. This is a slogan that ignores the facts on the ground. The denial of the Palestinian identity of Israeli Arabs has long been untenable. In commemorations for the 2000 riots yesterday, Palestinian flags were proudly waved all over. The old common-sense duck adage, proves truthful also here: if someone speaks a Palestinian dialect, claims he is a Palestinian, and waves the Palestinian flag, he is probably a Palestinian. And just as it is clear to most two-state proponents that those who speak Hebrew, consider themselves Israeli, and wave the Israeli flag should be on the Israeli side when the partition is implemented, so it should be clear that those who claim they are Palestinian would ideally be on the Palestinian side. "Ideally" – because there would be too many problems with implementing this. So some compromise can be made. Not all Palestinians, perhaps not all Israelis. But why the harsh opposition to Lieberman’s suggestion, as if it were racist? Nationalism and patriotism, especially when heightened, can sound like racism. But if we are going to use as a premise that a national identity is a healthy, legitimate element of the human experience, then why so much apprehension of he claim that Palestinians belong in Palestine? What demons are people afraid Lieberman is letting loose?

That was a deplorably elongated discussion of two paragraphs in an unremarkable speech. But my disappointment did not stop at the reports of the speech itself. Reporters and pundits were apparently so enthralled by their own proposal to fire Lieberman, that they forgot the most elementary component of their trade: facts. Reality. Instead of decreeing Lieberman’s removal, and then being forced to explain why the Prime-Minister is refraining from this action, I would suggest reversing the order: did the Prime-Minister fire Lieberman? Good, so now go back to the speech to see if there really was even a single quote that you can point to in which Lieberman contradicted the official government stance. Failure to do so, and then hypothesizing on the reasons Netanyahu is afraid to fire Lieberman, transmits the pundits to a fantasy-world, one where the Prime-Minister and the Foreign Minister are worlds apart, but still stick together for no apparent reason. This hypothesis has been quite stable for the most part of this government’s term, despite the lack of any evidence.

So we have a fictionalized reality, one that most Israelis subscribe to. In this reality, Haaretz journalists are pluralist liberals, and Lieberman is a terrible racist. Left-wingers only want peace, and right-wingers don’t care about human rights. If you hear a left-winger like Gidon Levy intimidating people that they will need to suffer co-existence with Arabs, that’s a good point for your next argument with your hardliner neighbor, just forget where you heard it, it won’t fit with you perception of him. Things that have been printed time and again are forgotten and ignored. Lieberman’s speech will be evoked here and there as a reminder to the perils of hardliners in the Foreign Office. Few, if any, will bother to read the speech themselves, and ask the questions I’ve raised here: what was so terrible about it? Where does it differ from the government or from Israeli consensus regarding relationships with Palestinians?

With such a never-never land rhetoric, is there any hope to understand the political reality as it truly is?

7 Comments

Posted in Israeli Politics, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict | Tags: , , , , , , ,

Posted by: Aryeh | September 2, 2010

Some Comments on the New Round of Negotiations

I don’t think it takes an elaborate conspiracy theory to draw a connection between Haaretz journalist Ari Shavit’s interview with Ehud Barak yesterday (Hebrew here), and Ari Shavit’s editorial of today (Hebrew here). Shavit declares the collapse of the conception that led to Oslo and even finger-points Yossi Beilin as the father of this conception. Barak’s fingerprints are spread elsewhere in the article, too, such as the assessment that a refugee and Safedian who is Mahmoud Abbas will never relinquish Safed or denounce the Right of Return. The conclusion is clear: despite the hullabaloo of the launch of negotiations yesterday in Washington, "there is no partner," to quote Barak’s notorious catchphrase.

Acknowledging this possibility is a sobering peephole of the interactions between politicians and journalists. In the "on-record" interview, Barak was portrayed as the optimist peacenik, preparing the Israeli public for a partition of its capital. Off the record, he remains suspicious of any accord, and will therefore not be conducive to reaching it. The only thing that remains in question for me is whether the conclusion in Shavit’s editorial can also be ascribed to Barak: Shavit proposes to reach an interim agreement, that will either include a temporary Palestinian state, or a partial evacuation of settlements. Interestingly, Moty Cristal published yesterday an editorial in Haaretz written as a pseudo-letter from Premier Netanyahu to his envoy Yitzhak Molcho (I couldn’t find an English version. Hebrew here). In this letter, Netanyahu directs Molcho to reach an agreement that will be as general as possible. All he wants is to have a document constituting the establishment of a Palestinian state in principle, without getting into details. After that, they can reach an agreement on borders, security and economy within a year, according to "Netanyahu", as envisioned by Cristal. The borders, we should note, are based on the maps that the Palestinians gave Barak in Taba (according to Cristal). Cristal is an experienced attorney in the field of conflict resolution, and in this capacity he worked under Rabin’s and Barak’ governments. In other words, I suggest that it’s not far-fetched to draw a connection between Shavit’s article, proposing an interim agreement and Cristal’s article, proposing a framework agreement.

The most surprising element in this tendency is perhaps the shift towards and away from "interim agreements": when presenting the accords in the early-mid 1990s, the Oslo supporters (including Beilin) explained the beauty of an interim agreement that allows gradual progress towards peace. Today, the same people oppose an interim agreement (by the way, with PLO and not with Hamas, where they do support provisional agreements). Those opposing the Oslo accords at the time (such as Barak), now support an interim agreement (and I hope my hermeneutical choice of considering the Shavit article as a more authentic Barak stance than the interview requires no further explanation). This is yet another example of the imminent tension between form and content: there is never one good model that works always, under any circumstance. Rather, models for solution can be implemented in various ways, and a good model can turn bad under new circumstances and vice versa.

Before concluding, a few brief remarks on the negotiations themselves: Abbas might well consider Israel to be in a disadvantage if the parties fail to reach an agreement in this round of talks. Under American sponsorship, Israel has some advantages, and in any case (i.e., even without American sponsorship), direct negotiations with no pre-conditions furnish Israel with the vantage-point of making demands. On the other hand, the Palestinian cause will continue to be viewed as a just cause as long as an agreement has not been reached (and, I suspect, long after that), and therefore if an agreement isn’t reached in Washington, the Palestinians can still hope for either international / UN / EU pressure that will eventually compel Israel to relinquish the West Bank entirely, or for a unilateral Declaration of Independence that will bring about this pressure and the same results. I would not gamble the Palestinian future in this manner, but it is a possible suggestion as to the Palestinian motives in this round of talks. If so, one must also face the possibility that the two terrorist attacks in the West Bank are not necessarily an embarrassment to the Chairman, and might even be to his benefit.

The Israeli motives, on the other hand, are clarified by the above editorials I discussed. In short, it is the old game of buying time, time that will allow for establishing more facts on the ground, and to make a complete partition solution unfeasible. This is confusing when considering the repeated intimidations of an Apartheid-state unless a partition agreement is reached, but it is quite possible that the will to keep hold of the Jordan Rift Valley for strategic reasons (stated explicitly in Barak’s interview) is considered more crucial than the demographic danger. If so, Israeli policymakers will take the demographic risk in order not to lose hold of the valley. However, as I wrote in greater detail in a Hebrew post, if Israelis expect to model a Palestinian state solely according to their own needs, this Palestinian state will be seen as a puppet-government installed by Israel solely to avoid giving Palestinians their citizenry rights in Israel proper and allowing them to share in the land’s wealth and resources, in the same regard as the Bantustans of apartheid South-Africa were viewed. If such a scenario comes to be, the inevitable outcome will be a new criticism of Israeli policy, in which the two-state solution will not mark the end of cries of apartheid against Israel, but only harbinger their beginning.

1 Comment

Posted in Israeli Media, Israeli Politics, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict | Tags: , , , , , , , , , ,

Older Posts »

Categories

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 6 other followers