

5 Governing cities, governing citizens¹

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The city, for at least two centuries, has been both a problem for government and a permanent incitement to government. Modern cities are not so much entities but more like accidental agglomerations of forces, sedimented layers and fractures overlaid through time and space, seeping out at the edges, impossible to reduce to any single principle or determination except that illusion of unity and stability conferred by the proper name. Hence it is not surprising that the recurrent visions of the administered city have always been quickened by a sense of crisis, of the nefarious activities and mobile associations within urbanized territories that elude knowledge and escape regulation. For the first half of the twentieth century, the government of urban existence in the face of such anxieties was always inspired, explicitly or implicitly, by a utopian dream: a dream of the perfect rational city planned in such a way as to maximize the efficiency, tranquillity, order and happiness of its inhabitants while minimizing crime, disorder, vice, squalor, ill health and the like. This implicit utopianism that took the city as a whole as its object has largely been abandoned. Rather than 'planning the city', today, there appears to have been a pluralization of the problematizations of life that take an urban form, and a pluralization of the ways in which programmes have been designed to address them. These seek new ways of harnessing the forces immanent within urban existence: they dream of a city that would almost govern itself.

The active city and the active citizen

In Britain and America in the 1980s it became fashionable to interpret the new strategies that were emerging for governing cities in terms of the rise of 'neo-liberalism'. But subsequent events have shown that these shifts in the rationalities and technologies of government cannot be understood in terms of the temporary dominance of a particular political ideology. What we are seeing here, in my view, is the emergence of a way of thinking about government and its enactment that we can consider as an 'advanced' form of liberalism: one that underpins the programmes and policies set out by forces of almost all political persuasions. These new urban governmentalities are liberal not simply in that they stress the importance of political rule respecting the boundaries of certain

associations as agencies of regulation. But more significant, in my view, is the displacement of an earlier notion of social space by the micro-moral territory of the community, and the emergence of new games of citizenship that operate in terms of the relations between community and subjectivity, between collective responsibilities and an ethic of personal obligation.

It is in terms of this new ethical space of the community – the ways of understanding it, the passions that motivate it, the pathologies that inhere in it, the potentials that it offers up – that all our new forms of urban governmentality operate. At its most general, in contemporary games of citizenship, citizenship is no longer primarily realized in a relation with the state. Indeed, the idea that it was is probably a false path opened up by T.H. Marshall's famous essay on citizenship. Nor does citizenship inhere in participation in a single 'public sphere', even if this is understood as a diversified 'civil society'. What we have are a set of dispersed and non-totalized practices within which games of citizenship must be played. Games of citizenship today entail acts of free but responsible choice in a variety of private, corporate and quasi-public practices, from working to shopping. The citizen as consumer is to become an active agent in the regulation of professional expertise. The citizen as prudent is to become an active agent in the provision of security. The citizen as employee is to become an active agent in the regeneration of industry. The citizen as consumer is to be an agent for innovation, quality and competitiveness. The citizen as inhabitant is to enhance economic development through his or her intimate knowledge of the economic environment, through networks of trust and reciprocity. The citizen is to enact his or her democratic obligations as a form of consumption through new techniques such as focus groups and attitude research. In these contemporary 'post-political' games of citizenship, and in the new expectations and hopes attached to the ethical comportment of citizens, new agonistic possibilities open up. It is in this respect that we can see, in the new urban activism, the signs of a new radical politics of urban citizenship.

Note

- 1 This chapter is largely drawn from a piece authored jointly with Thomas Osborne and published as 'Governing cities', in E. Isin, T. Osborne and N. Rose, 1998, *Governing Cities: Liberalism, Neoliberalism and Advanced Liberalism*, Urban Studies Working Paper no. 19, York University, Toronto, Canada.

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Africa' to be exposed by intrepid explorers, a laboratory for investigations into 'unknown England' (see also Stallybrass and White, 1986). The urban reportage of the nineteenth century sought to capture these forms of debased subjectivity secreted by the urban. But it also represented, for its proponents, a kind of work upon the self, a search for sensation which was made possible by urban existence itself: this is why the urban explorers are so often to be seen taking a walk.

Hence the other side of urban sociality which is so often written about: the city as the place for the chance encounter, as, in Judith Walkowitz's terms, the *City of Dreadful Delight* (Walkowitz, 1992). In one version of this argument, the city produces a kind of *alienated* sociality in the city dweller. Urban existence sunders social bonds and replaces them by a mass of impersonal relations; the city is the place where there are masses in close, almost paranoiac, contiguity, yet where interpersonal relations are cold and artificial. And, at the same time, the city subjects the human psyche to shocks, sensations, impressions and experiences that are overwhelming, simultaneously exciting and enervating the character of the urban dweller and producing a particular urban mentality. But, from Walter Benjamin to the contemporary post-modern romances of the urban *flâneur* and *flâneuse*, of department stores, shopping malls and the 'public sphere', another version has been made popular – the city as a site of a peculiarly civilized array of pleasures. It is the site of the quintessentially civic pleasure of the bohemian promenade, of public life and the encounter of one with another in the civilized spaces of the city centre street with its window displays, its pubs and clubs, its museums and galleries. And it is the site of the transgressive pleasure that escapes the governmental dream of a purified, hygienic, moral space inhabited by a well-regulated population: it is the opaque, excessive, ungoverned city, a fecund, heterogeneous, spontaneous, dangerous, promiscuous warren of 'other spaces' where pleasure is spiced with danger, and where desire can run free in alleyways, tenements, clubs, bars, theatres, music halls and gambling dens (see also Donald, 1992).

But pleasure has not evaded the networks of capture that filiate the advanced liberal city: transgression is itself to be brought back into line and offered up as a package of commodified contentment. The city of pleasure celebrated in poetry, novels, films and systematized in social theory has itself been fed into the programmatic imagination, in an alliance between city politics and commercial imperatives. A multitude of projects, in almost all major cities, seek to reshape the real city according to this image of pleasure, not least in order to enter into the competitive market for urban tourism. In these programmes and projects, the image of urban space as providing a multitude of spontaneous encounters, of sudden glimpses of architectural oddities and esoteric markets, of bustling yet safe public spaces, this urban experience, seen by its celebrants as arising out of the intersection and accumulation of thousands of spontaneous histories and schemes, has been transformed into calculated, rationalized and repetitive programmes for reshaping waterfronts and port areas, sites of old buildings, palaces, warehouses,

piers, vegetable markets and the like into tourist attractions and urban theme parks, each more hyper-real than real. Disused wharves become craft markets. Victorian structures that accommodated carcasses of sheep and cows on their way to butchers, sacks of potatoes and cauliflower on their way to corner shops are now filled with trendy boutiques and cafes. Sectors of space once occupied, for specifiable economic and other reasons, by people of Chinese extraction become 'Chinatown' and are proclaimed by street signs and with elaborate and publicly funded festivals to mark the start of the Chinese year of a particular animal. Each 'conservation area', each 'heritage trail' is populated, not by the spontaneous movements of the urban inhabitants, but by those transported by tour coaches, clutching guidebooks, video cameras and postcards. The city becomes not so much a complex of dangerous and compelling spaces of promises and gratifications, but a series of packaged zones of enjoyment, managed by an alliance of urban planners, entrepreneurs, local politicians and quasi-governmental 'regeneration' agencies. But here, once more, urban inhabitants are required to play their part in these games of heritage, not only exploiting them commercially through all sorts of tourist-dependent enterprises, but also promoting their own micro-cultures of bohemian, gay or alternative lifestyles, and making their own demands for the rerouting of traffic, the refurbishment of buildings, the mitigation of taxes and much more in the name of the unique qualities of pleasure offered by their particular habitat.

A new political diagram?

Since at least the nineteenth century, the urban has been the site par excellence of the politics of plural forces, of philanthropists, pressure groups, localities, neighbourhoods, local business interests and the like; and the urban politics of the twentieth century is a tangle of alliances, conflicts, stand-offs, incorporations, bribes and corruptions in the relations between these local forces and the aspirations of local politicians. In the second half of this century, between the territorializing ambitions of municipalism and the work of *interesement* undertaken by the indigenous tribes of the urban space – residents, entrepreneurs, traders, construction firms, utility suppliers and carpetbaggers – one saw a new plane of activity, the work of a thousand agencies operating in the name of urban renewal on educational enrichment, housing action, crime prevention, drug education, community responsibility and so on. Hence the creativity of the new diagram of urban politics should not be overdramatized, nor seen as essentially characterized by reaction. The plethora of associations, forums, regeneration agencies, enterprises, partnerships, stakeholders and the like brought into existence by these novel forms of urban government and its games of citizenship are not novel because they pluralize and fragment a previously organized set of political forces traversing urban space. Of course in part their novelty lies in the well-explored disenchantment with representative democracy at the local level and the invention of new forms of accountability, from those of the contract to those which seek to re-engineer community

entrepreneurship and allegiance, in which rights in the city are as much about duties as they are about entitlements. Each tries to govern through a certain kind of citizenship game. Each, by virtue of its dependence on an active practice of citizenship, opens the possibilities for a certain agonism. This political agonism is not a traditional politics of the party, the programme, the strategy for the organized transformation of society or the claim to be able to implement a programme of better government. Rather, these minor practices of citizen formation are linked to a politics of the minor, of cramped spaces, of action on the here and now, of attempts to reshape what is possible in specific spaces of immediate action, which may connect up and destabilize larger circuits of power. Strategies of governing through citizenship are inescapably risky because what they demand of citizens may be refused, or reversed and redirected as a demand from citizens for a modification of the games that govern them, and through which they are supposed to govern themselves. Four brief examples may clarify this argument.

Healthy cities

The city has long been imagined as a threat to health: an agglomeration of dangers and hazards to be governed in order to prevent or minimize the harms immanent to urban forms of human and inhuman associations. But in recent decades, a new image of the city has come to dominate the urban imagination. For the planners of the first half of the twentieth century, the city could, in its optimum form, be constructed, almost *ab initio*, as a machine for health. But more recently, a new image of the healthy city has emerged: the city as a network of living practices of well-being. This is not a matter of imposing some rational, sterile, planned diagram of sanitary existence. Rather, the aim is to configure the forces immanent to urban life, to shape the ecology of the city in order to maximize the processes that would enhance the well-being of its inhabitants individually and in their 'communities', and to minimize those that would threaten them. All aspects of urban life are now understood as factors that can be instrumentalized in the name of a norm of maximized health: health now appears, simultaneously, as a maximization of the values of community, public safety, economic development, family life. Roads, traffic and pollution, zoning, the design of buildings and open spaces, the organization of shopping locales, and other elements of 'urban design' are to be suffused with this 'ecological' concern for health. Further, the activities of health professionals, as well as the media, local politicians, trade unions, educationalists, representatives of non-governmental organizations, local community 'grassroots' organizations and others are brought into an alliance that would perceive and act upon all aspects of urban existence – jobs, housing, environment, public safety, diet, transport – not just to ward off sickness but to promote well-being.

In the name of well-being, urban communities are to be empowered such that they are collectively and individually made responsible for their own

healthiness. In other words, health is not simply a value in its own right, but rather a resource within a whole spiral of positive values that can be made to breed and spread in the urban ecology. In this vision of urban health, the very idea of disease in the city has been transformed. It is no longer imagined in epidemic form – the invasion of the urban milieu by cholera or typhus, putting its inhabitants at risk of infection. Rather, disease, and ill health more generally, are imagined in terms of activities – diet and coronary heart disease, smoking and lung cancer, obesity and all manner of threats to health – and relationships – unsafe sex and HIV, rave parties and drugs. We no longer have the sick on the one side of a division, the healthy on the other – we are all, actually or potentially, sick, and health is not a state to be striven for only when one falls ill, it is something to be maintained by what we do at every moment of our everyday lives. Threats to well-being are immanent to the life of the active individual: they result from a breakdown of controls on conduct, the failure to develop a healthy lifestyle, to eat properly, to manage stress. But threats to well-being also inhere in the relations of individuals to their environment, which can exacerbate or minimize the risks, not merely because of the levels of pathogens – physical and psychological – circulating within it, but also because of the styles of living which are promoted within particular communities.

The healthy citizen exercises active self-responsibility in a health-conscious community. This is not only because one can only be held responsible on the condition that one possesses the good health to exercise one's responsibility, but also because the health field has itself become an arena of responsibility. The domain of health has become a novel and paradigmatic kind of civic space, where the exercise of a popular ascetic of self-control will be implanted and augmented through a community politics of healthy living, by stress clinics, and exercise centres, by healthy diets in factory canteens and local health promotion campaigns. The imperative of health thus becomes a signifier of a wider – civic, governmental – obligation of citizenship in a responsible community. The healthy city is not a city of minimal disease and social contentment, it is an active organic striving for its own maximization against all that which would threaten it, including the threats that it secretes as part of its very existence. But as the individual aspirations of citizens to their own health are enhanced, their complaints, disaffections and demands achieve a new significance, and new points of application and leverage develop within the practices that seek to govern their conduct in the name of health.

Risky cities

Since the nineteenth century, the criminal character of urban space has been charted by the police forces of each nation through the collection, classification and presentation of the statistics of crime. Perhaps this always gave rise to an image of the city in terms of zones of danger and safety, and to a way of living in the city informed by a perception of the relative riskiness of particular zones. Riskiness, of course, was not merely a negative value: risk-taking in the city is a

zones that are out of its reach, such as markets, communities, private life. Rather, they are liberal in that they reawaken and revitalize the scepticism of classical liberalism of the nineteenth century over the capacity of political action, informed by political reason and political calculation, to act so as to bring about the good of individuals, populations and the nation at large. This is not a recipe for political inaction: as we know, nineteenth century liberal government, as it actually took shape, entailed a whole array of interventions in order to shape and discipline the freedoms and liberties upon which it depended, much to the irritation of liberal philosophers. One of the achievements of the philosophers of 'new liberalism' in the early decades of the twentieth century was to find a way, at a conceptual level, of reconciling the need for state activism with the classical liberal imperatives of autonomy, freedom and individual responsibility. Similarly, the new advanced forms of liberalism that took shape in the last decades of the twentieth century in Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, America and Great Britain – and which were exported elsewhere by such organizations as the World Bank and the IMF – did not preach policies of political withdrawal and abstention. It is true that they attacked 'big government': bloated bureaucracies and civil services; complacent and patronizing professionals; the fostering of tutelage and dependency; the belief that the state could maximize economic, social and individual well-being through policies of 'tax and spend'. But they did not demand a return to the minimalist 'night-watchman' state imagined by the neo-liberal gurus of the 1970s and 1980s. Rather, they sought a new role for the political apparatus as merely one partner in government, facilitating, enabling, stimulating, shaping, inciting the self-governing activities of a multitude of dispersed entities – associations, firms, communities, individuals – who would take onto themselves many of the powers, and the responsibilities previously annexed by 'the state'.

The characteristics of contemporary strategies for 'reinventing politics' are familiar: downsizing the state, decentralizing decision-making, devolving power to intermediate bodies such as trusts or associations, privatizing many functions previously part of the state machinery and opening them up to commercial pressures and business styles of management, introducing managerialism and competitive pressures into the residual state apparatus, displacing the substantive knowledge of the welfare professionals by the knowledge of examination, scrutiny and review undertaken by accountants and consultants. In relation to urban politics, these have entailed something of an assault on the old democratic enclaves of local government, now represented as hidebound by bureaucracy and riddled with nepotism. The tendency is to bypass the traditional democratic mechanisms of the periodic vote for an elected representative with all manner of newer democratic techniques – consultations, surveys, opinion polls, citizens juries, focus groups, tele-democracy and the like. Functions of 'democratic' local government – from street cleaning to urban regeneration – have been devolved to a multiplicity of private firms or public-private partnerships. This simultaneously pluralizes the agencies and entities

involved in governing, involves regulation through the techniques of the 'new public management', and transforms political control, which now operates 'at a distance' through setting budgets, targets, standards and objectives, all overseen by the ubiquitous techniques of monitoring and audit. These strategies thus involve the generation of autonomy plus responsibility. They multiply the agencies of government while enveloping them within new forms of control. The autonomy of political actors is to be shaped and used to govern more economically and more effectively. This is thought to require a reduction in the scope of direct management of human affairs by state-organized programmes and technologies, and an increase in the extent to which the government of diverse domains is enacted by the decisions and choices of relatively autonomous entities – whether these are firms, organizations such as hospitals, professionals such as doctors, community bodies and associations, or individuals themselves – in the light of their own assessment of their interests, needs and desires and the ways in which they may be advanced in a particular environment of rewards and sanctions.

These 'advanced' liberal strategies conceive of citizens, individually and collectively, as ideally and potentially 'active' in their own government. The logic of the market, in which economic agents are viewed as calculating actors striving to realize and actualize themselves through their choices in a lifeworld, according to the information that they have at their disposal, are generalized to areas previously thought immune – to all the decisions individuals and groups make about their lives in relation to the education of their children, the disposal of their income for housing or for pleasure, the investment of their energies in law-abiding enterprise or in crime, and indeed their choices about who should govern them and how. These new forms of government through freedom multiply the points at which the citizen has to play his or her part in the games that govern them. But, inescapably, they also multiply the junctures where these games are opened up to uncertainty and risk, and to contestation and redirection.

I follow James Tully here in thinking of citizenship games as practices, with certain implicit or explicit rules, that make certain actions thinkable, possible and meaningful, and in doing so actually constitute the players, or shape what it is to be a citizen (Tully, 1999). There are, of course, different ways of taking this metaphor of games and rules. One way of thinking about these games implies that the rules are fixed, given, closed, imposed, impervious to change. Those who want to play at all must obey them, because not to obey is to be excluded from the game. Some games of citizenship make themselves more or less resistant to modification, and some forms of contestation actually confirm the rules of the game. But while such aspects are clearly present in our contemporary games of citizenship, they are less closed than this implies: their rules are open to modification by the players themselves and the games can be played to many different ends. Contemporary games of citizenship, especially those that make up urban existence, contain multiple possibilities for modification: in the way in which they are played one can see the ways in

within pathways of mobility, a matrix of flows, a point of connection and rebranching of lines of activity which connect persons, processes and things. No doubt mercantilism, capitalism, colonialism, imperialism were always matters of flows over distance and concentrations in space: cities as economic concentrations of raw materials, labour power, wealth, a local market; trade routes, exports, imports, competition and so forth as economic networks into which each was integrated to a greater or lesser degree. But the contemporary images of globalization and localization spatialize economic activity in new ways. A growing literature argues that the route to economic success lies in the establishment of entrepreneurial localities with fluid and flexible internal economic arrangements dependent upon physical proximity, and competing with one another on a world market. The idea of a 'local economy' informs economic policy at the regional level and, increasingly, within urban government itself. As the boundaries and unity of national economies are thought to be breached by flows of goods, money, information, expertise, profit and labour, and around global networks, 'local economies' are understood as almost the only geographical zones where capital, labour, raw materials and expertise can be captured and acted upon. Perhaps more significantly, their novelty lies in the relations established between previously nomadic forces, in the attempt to connect the restless energy of the entrepreneur with more than simply the pursuit of maximum profit. The relation of capital to the urban should be more than that of a raiding party with its prey: it should take a stake in the shaping and destiny of the urban itself, in the reshaping of its decayed docklands and abandoned factories into shopping malls and waterfronts, in the rebuilding of its concrete and windswept wastelands into malls and markets, in the reconstruction of its estates so that they shift from spaces for the residential storage of labourers at maximum density into communities of homes that activate the dreams of possession and self-improvement necessary to bind the energies of young men and women into the regimes of civility.

There are, of course, different versions of this new economic localism. It can have a left-wing, corporatist formulation, as in some arguments on the governmental requirements and inter-agency relations necessary to promote the interaction, trust, cooperation and mutual obligation necessary for flexible specialization. Or it can have an entrepreneurial form: the city is an entity to be made entrepreneurial in and through acting upon the enterprising capacities of different 'partners' or 'stake-holders', stimulating their competitiveness, their rivalry, their capacity to meet the challenge of economic modernization in a harsh ecology full of Pacific tigers and other voracious beasts in an economic struggle for the survival of the fittest in which cities, rather than nations, are the key actors. It is in these terms that it has now been possible to render the city as an economic subject, not a favourable geographical location on coast, river, trade routes, nor as a milieu within which some prosper and some strive and all benefit from their enterprise, but as itself an economic actor in the world economy of cities, such that one can talk about the remarkable revival of Glasgow, the decline of Sunderland, or the reawakening of Baltimore. In each

case what is declining or reviving is a kind of ethico-economic character of enterprise imbuing a city as a whole by virtue of the motivation, the sense of pride and competitiveness, the installation of a relentless rivalry between cities and regions mobilized by means of the enterprise of each and of all (see also Sassen, 1991; Knox and Taylor, 1995; King, 1990).

The urban economy, here, has a kind of quasi-organic life of its own: it can be in health, decline or recovery, it can be regenerated by calculated means of intervention, it is in competition with other 'local economies', and it must therefore have its own peculiarities and advantages that will provide it with a niche within this competitive ecology of local economies – its labour force, its transportation systems, its rates of local tax and subsidy, its skill levels and so on – in order to attract inward investment and the like. Increasingly, and perhaps surprisingly, economic regeneration at this local level is itself understood in terms of new games of citizenship. On the one hand, this is a matter of entrepreneurship, of acting upon the dependency culture fostered in the heart of industrial urban decline, the lack of entrepreneurship which is the legacy of an age of mass factory employment now past. But on the other hand, it is a matter of recreating communities of obligation and allegiance within these zones. The recent upsurge of interest in trust relations as a condition of economic health, the communitarian emphasis upon civic commitment as a key factor in economic development, the arguments of social capital theorists that very local features of moral relations – networks, norms, trust and so forth – facilitate coordination and cooperation, minimize transaction costs, serve as vital sources of economic information and so on – all these make economic regeneration a matter of local economic citizenship. The immanent productive capacities of the city are to be released by action upon the subjects and agents who make up its economy. A whole range of initiatives for economic regeneration have taken shape, which operate through action on the culture of enterprise within cities, seeking simultaneously to maximize the enterprise of these constituents of the labour force now thought of in terms of their location and residence, and to maximize the relations of obligation which they feel to others, not in a society or a nation, but in a localized and particular network of commitment, allegiance and reciprocal responsibility.

Cities of pleasure

From at least the nineteenth century, the city has been represented, in literature and in documentary descriptions, as promoting a certain type of mentality and sociality. These analyses have usually had a negative tone. First, perhaps, it was a matter of the production of certain degenerate characters within the city: Baudelaire's rag-pickers, Mayhew's costermongers, Booth's forgotten classes, Engels' proletariat – in short, misbegotten peoples who have little in common beyond their poverty, exclusion and the territory they inhabit, and little to lose but their misery. The city becomes a site for investigation of these strange underclasses or non-classes; an unknown territory like 'darkest

matter not only of an awareness of hazards of assault and robbery, but also of an active pursuit of the prospects of excitement, sexual gratification, debauchery, licence, gambling and the like. But our current image of the criminogenic city governmentalizes risk as a spatialization of thought and intervention. Using techniques pioneered by the commercial demands of insurance, and based on informatics and postcode mapping, this spatialization is now at the molecular level of urban existence. The contemporary city is thus visualized as a distribution of risks: one of those maps with coloured overlays where each layer marks out a particular breed of riskiness – of street crime, of sexual assault, of burglary, of car theft, of beggars and marginal persons, of single-parent families and ethnic minorities. Unlike the moral topographies of urban space developed in the mid-nineteenth century, the contemporary urban topography of risk indicates less a concrete statistic attached to a locale, and more a factor calculated through the amalgamation of a concatenation of ‘indicators’ to each of which may be attached a certain probability of a less than optimal outcome of an activity – shopping, parking a car, buying a house, walking to the shops. Risk is thus as much a feature of spatialization itself as it is of the particular ‘characteristics’ of people that inhabit certain zones. It is to be governed through the continual monitoring and assessment of risk in relation to urban space and place, and through the active adoption of strategies of risk reduction by authorities, communities and individuals.

One vision for urban risk reduction is animated by the dream of a new separation of the virtuous and the vicious, a new and clear spatialization of danger into safe zones and risk zones. Fictional representations of urban life capture this well: such as in the so-called ‘Blade Runner’ scenario, in which a division is attempted – and always threatened – between the safe spaces of civility – in certain secured zones, policed buildings, civilized communities with broad boulevards, watered gardens, elegant interiors and the like – and the space lying outside the limits of these secure spaces, full of threat, chaos and danger but also excitement, seduction, glamour, glitter, drugs, sex and ‘real life’, ‘the glōp’, the ‘sprawl’. This fictional representation is imitated in real life in a defensive spatialization that has come to shape city space: shopping malls and shopping centres with their own internal security systems, guarded at their perimeters and monitored by close circuit TV; and, ‘contractual’ communities with walls around them and entrances controlled by security guards, as in the so-called gated communities that have arisen from Istanbul to Islington. Mike Davis is right in one respect to regard these developments as entailing the *death* of the city: for what would be marked by such developments would be the death of a particular kind of *liberal* dream of the city as an open, civilized and civilizing habitat for the existence of free citizens (see also Davis, 1988, p. 87).

Hence it is not surprising that this image of government of risk through spatial separation is increasingly coming under challenge by another, in which security is not thought of in absolute terms. In this image, there can be no inherently safe locales or activities and, in addition, there must be no ‘no-go’ zones where law-abiding citizens will not venture and where the innocent are

effectively held hostage by criminal anti-citizens. Risk reduction is to form part of the moral responsibility of urban citizens themselves. This brings into alignment a whole array of discrepant issues within a single programmable domain – from domestic violence to street crime, from burglary to car theft, from routes for travel to arrangements for children’s play areas. Safer Cities initiatives, Neighbourhood Watch and other community safety programmes work by enrolling citizens in the practices of crime reduction: planning our travel arrangements, securing our homes and property, instrumentalizing our daily activities in the name of our own security, guided by police, community safety officers and a host of other experts of risk. But they also seek to reawaken in citizens their own moral responsibilities to the policing of conduct, in particular, through the popularity of such notions as ‘zero tolerance’ and the ‘broken windows thesis’ – the argument that toleration of minor breaches of civility sows the seeds of a more dangerous and insidious criminal culture.

This new image of citizenship must be understood in relation to that which opposes it, a kind of anti-citizen that is a constant enticement and threat to the project of citizenship itself. The emergence of the notion of exclusion to characterize those who previously constituted the social problem group defines these non-citizens or anti-citizens not in terms of substantive characteristics but in relational terms; that is, it is a question of their distance from the circuits of inclusion into virtuous citizenship. The ‘excluded’ might make it into citizenship if they can only be connected up to the right networks of community and the requisite channels of enterprise. Exclusion is imagined in a spatial form, in the form of excluded and marginal spaces within the urban fabric itself, enclosures where the lines of virtuous inclusion have somehow become disconnected and failed to flow: not so much a ghetto, more a precise localization of the marginal which is given the name of an estate, a housing project, an urban enclave, for example Spitalfields, Broadwater Farm. In these enclaves, the links of citizenship and community have turned against themselves, and all those things which would connect individuals into the networks of inclusion have instead produced negative feedback: family life, welfare solidarity and state education are all seen as machines for disconnection rather than for connection. Hence the need to reawaken in these zones the dormant moral energies of those who exist within them: in neighbourhood-based schemes for the reclamation of the streets from drug dealers and prostitutes; in estate-based schemes for regeneration which target the anti-social, name and shame them, refuse to be terrorized by their immoral and criminal conduct, and so forth. Once more, government of risk is to proliferate at a molecular level through the enrolment of the capacities and commitments immanent to citizens themselves.

Cities of enterprise

In contrast to the classical liberal diagram, the economic salience of the city has ceased to be thought of simply in terms of a space or a milieu: it is a node

which certain individual or collective lines of flight can challenge, subvert or modify the rules, can introduce something new.

Despite their celebrated 'individualism', the games of citizenship promoted by the right-wing versions of advanced liberalism located the autonomy of the individual within a set of 'natural' relations of concern and commitment – counterpoised to the 'artificial' bonds supposed to exist between individuals and their society – embodied most clearly in the family and kinship but also extending to less immediate communities of allegiance such as those of religion, voluntary associations and 'nation'. These imaginary bonds of allegiance have been accentuated even further in our contemporary games of urban citizenship. The citizens who are imagined here are not the social citizens who formed the final stage of T.H. Marshall's tale of the evolution of citizenship. Citizenship is understood as formed by allegiance to something closer, something more natural, arising out of the lived experience of modern existence: community. This is not a relation of citizen and community in terms of blood, descent, lineage, tradition, fixity, mechanical solidarity and the like, but a relation of identification. Citizens are here imagined as bound to communities through ties of allegiance, affinity and mutual recognition, and as acquiring their identities – thought of as a complexity of values, beliefs, norms of conduct, styles of existence, relations to authority, techniques of self-management, ways of resolving dilemmas and coping with fate – in and through these identifications. Note that community, here, includes the values of love, care, emotion, solidarity, sharing, self-sacrifice and so forth, which some feminist philosophers mistakenly think have been excluded or marginalized by a rationalistic patriarchal world. Community here is construed as natural: unlike 'society', it is not a political fabrication. But community also must be built, must be made real, must be brought into being by campaigns of consciousness raising, by pressure groups and community activists, and increasingly by acts of political government themselves.

Advanced liberal forms of government rest in new ways upon the activation of the powers of the citizen. In doing so, they involve new ways of recognizing those who are citizens. As Tully suggests, this involves a number of things: binding them into the games as players of certain types (for example, active citizens); generating novel forms of exclusion of those who cannot meet the criteria for recognition (for example, the underclass or 'three strikes and you are out', as citizenship has to be earned by certain types of conduct); generating new practices of reformation to turn recalcitrant subjects into recognizable citizens (for example, citizenship education, reconstruction of the will); and stimulating new formations of the demands for recognition as citizens capable of playing the games, or as requiring a modification of the games to allow certain identities to be included (for example, gay marriages). Crucially, the citizen as member of a community is to be made responsible for his or her fate as well as for that of family, kin and neighbours. Here we see all the arguments for reviving the community: Etzioni-style communitarianism as political cure-all; Fukuyama-style community as trust relations for economic success;

Himmelfarb/Gingrich-style community as neo-conservative politics of the remoralization of America; multicultural-style demands for communities of identity to be recognized; and the emphasis on 'social capital' in the policies from those of the World Bank to those of the British proponents of the Third Way. Government is to work in partnership with citizens to enhance the levels of civic engagement in all manner of urban activities – from residents groups to churches, Parent-Teacher Associations, drop-in centres for the homeless and choral societies – thus promoting the networks, norms, trust and relationships within which citizens cooperate for mutual benefit, and so generating the public engagement necessary to overcome poverty, reduce crime and violence, enhance solidarity, boost economic development and much more.

The urban politics of citizenship today

Of course, city and citizenship have long been linked. The origin of the public sphere wherein modern citizenship took shape has been traced to the specific form of civility brought into existence by the intercourse among free burghers made possible by the towns; and in the eighteenth century, coffee houses, newspapers and popular literature produced both a certain form of public persona and a certain form of private subjectivity. Critical theorists in particular have mourned the transformation and potential liquidation of the public sphere with the rise of a mass media, of public opinion pollsters and of a variety of other ways of manipulation to produce pseudo-participation (Habermas, 1989; Koselleck, 1988, p. 66). While the limited forms of citizenship in the nineteenth century stressed the moral proprieties of the few, the universalistic citizenship of social welfare societies over the first half of the twentieth century was to be solidaristic and responsible, with social duties matching individual rights. Over the past two decades, however, we have seen the emergence of a novel way of imagining the citizen and the links between private subjectivities and will and the public good. Citizenship – ceasing to be a kind of 'possession' or simple right of persons – has taken on a relational form. Citizenship is as much a capacity to act in relation to the particular circumstances of one's environment, as well as in relation to others, as it is a 'right' conferred by the state. If the city is again central here it is in that – as with the Ancient Greeks – the city can be imagined as a field of competitive relations between individuals in the context of a specifiable environment; and also in that – insofar as it is a concrete, localized space – the city can take over from the state as the primary reference point of citizenship. This transformation from citizenship as possession to citizenship as capacity is embodied in the image of the active and entrepreneurial citizen who seeks to maximize his or her lifestyle through acts of choice, linked not so much into a homogeneous social field as into overlapping but incommensurate communities of allegiance and moral obligation.

The multiple projects of contemporary urban government work with these presuppositions about urban citizenship in terms of activity and obligation,