
Sovereignty and Governmentality: From the Problematics of the "New World Order" to the Ethical Problematic of the World Order

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Man is not fitted for society by nature, but by discipline.

—Thomas Hobbes

Homelessness becomes world destiny.

—Martin Heidegger

The constitution of (inter)national political order is undisputedly a creation of power. But how? And can raising the central question of power, once more, cast any new light on the condition of (inter)national politics now that the question of (inter)national order as such has been so forcefully re-posed in the aftermath of the ending of the Cold War and the dissolution of the postwar order?¹ I think the answer to this second question is, "yes it can," and that that answer serves to clarify the first. If we look outside of the canon of international political theory, I also think we can find an understanding of power that will afford some new interpretive purchase upon contemporary (inter)national politics. This understanding is made available in Continental European philosophy, specifically in the work of Michel Foucault.

It is more than fifteen years since Foucault observed that the concepts and categories that have organized our thinking about power in the modern age, its working and its effects, failed adequately to comprehend the way in which it is generally exercised and experienced. He was, of course, not the only analyst to note the limitations of the traditional juridical conception of power as a matter

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of command and will, largely concerned with rights relating to the exercise of coercion and constraint, traditionally enframed within political discourse by reference to subjectivity, territoriality, and the problematic of sovereignty.² Foucault's response, however, was to develop his now-well-known idea of the disciplinary and normalizing power of power/knowledge: a positive account of power, derived from his reading of both Nietzsche and Heidegger, which conceived of it as an all-pervasive enabling, as well as disabling, process, rather than an exclusively repressive object or quality situated in a particular person or institution. For Foucault, power in the modern age operates distinctively through knowledge in the form of discursive practices. These employ sophisticated technologies of surveillance, observation, normalization, calculation, evaluation, and differentiation. That is to say, modern epistemology itself simply is a sophisticated form of power, and not, as once claimed, a disinterested representation of the world of objects by a reasoning subject. The principal effect of such power, and the feature that he believed most distinguished it from more conventional political conceptions of power (which were dominated by juridical discourse and the subjectivist fallacy of a unitary, discrete, and willing subject thought to exist antecedent to the discourses that constituted and empowered it) is that it does not negate but actually produces human beings as agents, and thereby involves them as mediums of power in the very exercise of power upon themselves.

The simplest way to capture the force and subtlety of Foucault's thesis is to remain alert to the powerfully ambiguous quality of the key term, *subject*. A subject is simultaneously both a body that is empowered to act and one that is also subject to power. "Man," he says in *The Order of Things*, "appears" in an "ambiguous position as an object of knowledge and as a subject that knows."³ *Man*, it ought to be noted, and stressed, is not some generic term for human being. Rather, Foucault uses it to identify that particular account of human being that characterizes the modern age and that, here as well as elsewhere in his writing, he forcefully contests. A body here is also both a biological body and a body of people; that is, a population. The order of what Foucault calls subjectification is, then, not an order of prohibitions productive of restrained wills and disempowered agents. Rather, it is an order of knowledgeable practices, norms of conduct, and elaborate protocols of behavior. Its object is to produce calculable subjects operating in calculable spaces, formidably empowered by their very subscription to, indeed inscription into force by, technologies of calculation. The defining and distinguishing paradox of power/knowledge is therefore that it is that very subjectification to power that is empowering.

Construing "reality" as calculable, problematizing it as amenable and accessible to technologies of knowing, and constituting it as a domain of calculable subjects and calculable spaces is a historically derived condition of possibility for such power/knowledge, integral to its emergence as a modality of power, and not a mere natural phenomenon. The construal of things in this way is critical to a second crucially distinguishing feature of power/knowledge. This is its capacity to enable government at a distance. For it enables subjects to do their own *self-governing* in ways that, while empowering a degree of autonomy, nonetheless integrate them into a web of power/knowledge and reporting that systematically holds them to (self-)account. By these means, power is able to operate without a requirement for the direct intervention of force. Consequently, bodies—in the sense both of sexed and gendered individuals as well as of populations—are the more effectively normalized and domesticated. In the process, of course, and simultaneously, the norm produces the abnormal, and *the subject*, as Judith Butler noted so effectively, produces *the abject*.⁴ Forced migration, in general, and refugees and asylum seekers, in particular, I will therefore suggest later, although a product of a wide variety of circumstances, are also the abject products of the intensely subjectifying practices of that modern combination of juridical and disciplinary power that is characteristic of contemporary (inter)national politics.

Foucault's work thus drew attention to the extraordinarily positive role that the differentiating and individual practices of modern power/knowledge—exemplified in certain human and social sciences, and certain modern institutional practices—have in constituting individuals as empowered subjects by specifying the norms and standards to which they should subscribe as subjects, in such a way that they discipline themselves by internalizing and seeking to live according to these criteria. Knowledge, here, it should also be emphasized, does not mean simply "ideas"; it refers to the vast, institutionalized manifold of persons, theories, projects, experiments, and technologies that are so integral to the government of conduct in modern societies. He examined the emergence and institutionalization of this form of power in his studies of madness, the prison, and sexuality.⁵

A few scholars have already begun to draw upon Foucault's account of power in their work in the discipline of international relations.⁶ I want to propose a significant extension of that application, and to do so in several additional ways. First, I want to offer a more general Foucauldian interpretation of (inter)national politics as an order of modern power, as well as of international relations as a discipline that is complicit in that order of power. Here I seek to undermine

the term *new world order*, which was popularized after the European revolutions of 1989 and 1990 and employed by some to define the problematic of international relations as the need accurately to represent, and so disclose the dynamics of, the correlations of state power that have succeeded the demise of bipolarity. I suggest that this not only obscures the complexity of global power and politics in late modern times but also the genealogy of modern power relations. I argue, instead, that the difficulty we face is not that of finding an appropriate way of characterizing the relations between states now that the bipolar confrontation between the two superpowers has come to an end, but the advent and later globalization of that complex interplay of juridical and disciplinary power, to which Foucault alerts us but does not himself explore, that distinguishes the constitution of states and the order of (inter)national politics as such.

Second, I want to suggest that Foucault himself acknowledges that power/knowledge complements and does not merely replace traditional forms of power. Consequently, the problem arises of considering (something that Foucault himself did not do) the complex relationship that must obtain between power/knowledge and juridical power. Finally, I maintain that one of the significant features of the dissolution of the Cold War is that it does, in fact, disclose an especially revealing site for considering the relationship between power/knowledge and juridical power, and that it does so in the vast population movements that the European revolutions of 1989 and 1990 precipitated across the Eurasian landmass. Here, with the renewed phenomenon of forced Eurasian migration, and with the allied production also of refugees and asylum seekers, arise the traditional questions of territoriality and sovereignty *simultaneously with those of population and biopower* that Foucault addressed in his power/knowledge thesis.⁷ It is precisely on this site, I argue, that an opportunity arises to note the complex interdependence of modern forms of power, so bringing Foucauldian and traditional modes of analysis to bear in a way that helps to disclose something of the complex problematics of the world order rather than the problematics of “the new world order.”

It is here also, I suggest, that the question of the ethical arises as well, and it is that aspect of forced population movement to which I want to call particular attention. I am less interested, then, in detailing the new governmentalization of population and the new juridical delineation of sovereignty that has been going on both within the European Union and in the border countries of Poland and Hungary, especially, as well as the Czech and Slovak Republics, that now comprise the current ambiguous and liminal limit of “Europe,” than

to note how forced migration raises the fundamental ethical question of the membership of a political community, so also reflecting on the character of its justice, as well as the technical question of ordering and disciplining large mobile or potentially mobile populations. This has the additional virtue of continuing to foreground the ethical dimension to the work of thinkers like Foucault.

Such thinkers are habitually criticized by a tradition that, relying on the empirical/normative distinction as much as it does on a subject/object distinction, conceives of the world in such a way that the ethical has to be injected into it via the specification of normative codes or moral commands. From the radical hermeneutical phenomenology upon which I think Foucault draws for much of his philosophical resource, the world always already is ethical, but is ethical now in an epistemological way that radically impoverishes what it is to be a human being. Foucault was consequently an incorrigible ethical insurrectionist; his irruptions continuously exposed the hypocrisy and the denied cruelty underlying modern regimes of power. Like all ethical insurgents he was vilified both for naïveté and for impropriety. That is, for not understanding the reality of the world and for offending against its current moral prejudices. The trouble was, of course, that he knew that the real always exceeds both the realist and the moralist representation of it and he agonistically championed that excess on behalf of his understanding of the ethic of the human way of being itself. All of the powerful ethical force of Foucault’s genealogies of power are, therefore, directed against this confinement of the human and toward exposing how being human always already exceeds the categories that are employed to define and control it—specifically, those supposedly emancipatory disciplines of power/knowledge that he thinks characterize the operation of power in the modern age.

To pursue these tasks, I propose to employ that more general consideration of the disciplinary character of modern power that Foucault began to articulate toward the end of his life, and to which he gave the term *governmentality*.⁸ This general *problematic of government* has been especially well summarized, and explored throughout social science, management and accounting studies, and across a wide range of topics, in recent work by, for example, Graham Burchall, Colin Gordon, Peter Miller, Michael Power, Nikolas Rose, and others.⁹

I do not, therefore, merely want to explore how one may apply Foucault to (inter)national politics. I want to call attention to this very conjunction between sovereignty and governmentality as a way of posing both the problematics and the ethics of the order of modern

power. Governmentality and sovereignty actually share the same genealogy. Although the process of subjectification furnished the modern world of politics with its ordering discursive economies of sovereignty, juridical power and balance of power, state interest, *raison d'état*, *realpolitik*, and so on, it simultaneously furnished population with its policing.¹⁰ The sovereign political subject and the sovereign knowing subject, in short, are Siamese twins. Consequently, what is most interesting about the relationship between governmentality and sovereignty is not that it is competitive, much less that it is oppositional. Nor is it that they can be reduced to the same thing. What distinguishes the relationship between the two is their very complementarity. That complex interdependence, the complicity of the one in the other, is exhibited in their mutual reliance upon each other and upon the discursive production, dissemination, and consumption of regimes of truth. The will to know, and the will to power, as of course Foucault continually insisted, share the same pedigree. Although political sovereignty, is, of course, habitually concerned with the discernment and implementation of inclusions and exclusions (moral, religious, ethnic, etc.), and paradigmatically, according to that modern Hobbesian Carl Schmitt, with the friend/enemy distinction, it, too, therefore relies upon regimes of power/knowledge.¹¹ The order of the panopticon does not replace the order of sovereign spectacle, as Foucault, in other moods, was inclined to insist. The two orders are combined in the modern manifold of power, but in ways that still remain obscure because the *combination* has not received much attention. Sovereignty consequently poses challenging questions to governmentality, just as governmentality poses challenging questions to sovereignty. As I have noted, this complementarity is one that Foucault himself acknowledges but does not much discuss.¹² What he did not acknowledge, however, is that this might account for why, in his terms, we have still not cut off the head of the king. Governmentality, I hope to show, seems to need its kings as much as kings and princes need governmentality.

Sovereignty, Governmentality, and the Genealogy of Modern Power Relations

The origin of the term *governmentality* arose out of Foucault's study of a body of literature that emerged between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, during the advent of the modern age and the early establishment of an (inter)national system of so-called nation-states. He noted that this literature was not concerned with providing

advice to the prince or ruler, exactly, as many other texts then were (classically, of course, if from an earlier time, *The Prince*). Neither was it concerned with the closely related problematics of sovereign power and territoriality that have, of course, provided the canonical texts and interpretive frameworks of understanding of contemporary (inter)national politics and of international relations. Rather, it was preoccupied instead and in the most general sense of the term with what was termed the "art of government." And government, it was explained, applied to all aspects of living—including, in addition to the government of states, the government of oneself as expressed in the revived interest in Stoicism;¹³ the government of souls and of lives, expressed in the new pastoral thought produced by the Reformation conflict between the Protestant and Catholic Churches; and the government of children, manifested in the growth of interest in pedagogy.¹⁴

Whereas Machiavelli's *The Prince*, as an example of advice to rulers, was designed to counsel the ruler on how to secure territory to which he has no necessary integral claim (and to exercise juridical sovereignty over that territory, as well as over the subjects who inhabited it), government was distinguished precisely because it was not concerned with sovereignty and did not bear upon territory. Instead, according to Foucault, governmentality sought purchase

on the complex unit constituted by men and things. Consequently the things which the government is to be concerned about are men, but men in their relations, their links, their imbrication with those other things which are wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory with its specific qualities, climate, irrigation, fertility, etc.; men in their relation to that other kind of things which are customs, habits, ways of doing and thinking, etc.¹⁵

This combination of men and things, Foucault maintained, is the ensemble of *population*. It is this unit above all, a unit that itself was a function of the invention of the governmental science of statistics (once known as political arithmetic) that provides the object of governmentality.¹⁶ In other words, governmentality works so as to specify and organize population, and it does so through the operation of what Foucault elsewhere and earlier analyzed as power/knowledge.

By means of the power/knowledge through which it operates and the rationalizing administration that it thereby brings into effect, governmentality translates and subordinates law, custom, force, and ethics into the strategic and tactical, epistemological and regulatory, preoccupations and devices by which population is delimited,

its manifold characteristics and behavioral patterns made known, and its ordering secured. In its earliest days, it gave rise not to the science of politics, to which modern political theories aspired, but to what became known as the science of police. To achieve this, however, population has first to be configured in and as a theater of calculable space-time populated by calculable and calculating subjects. *En passant*, I want to suggest that this is Foucault's way of putting social and political flesh on Heidegger's thesis about the way the history of Western metaphysics realizes itself in that technological domination of representative-calculative thought that characterizes the modern age. For governmentality is technology in the classic Heideggerian sense of the term. It, too, is a positing, ordering, and placing of all beings, here especially human beings as population, at the disposal of an enframing mode of representative-calculative order that, in rendering all nature, including "human nature," a realm of calculability, constitutes the realm of human being as a standing reserve for ordering as such.¹⁷

Foucault's elaboration of governmentality clearly demonstrates this. It is not, he says,

a matter of imposing laws on men, but rather of disposing of things, that is to say, to impose tactics rather than laws, and if need be to use the laws themselves as tactics. To arrange things in such a way that, through a certain number of means, such and such ends may be achieved.¹⁸

Governmentality does not, therefore, rely on law—as juridical power does—but on the operation of certain philosophical, and especially epistemological, presuppositions as these are expressed and institutionalized in the specific knowledgeable practices by which subjects are formed, and things, including of course subjectified human beings themselves as calculable objects, are administered. Governmentality is, consequently, a domain of cognition rather than legislation; it is a grid of insistent calculation, experimentation, and evaluation concerned with the conduct of conduct. It does not merely make use of knowledge, it is comprised by knowledge, and therefore deeply dependent upon the products and practices of those cohorts of experts and institutions of knowledge whose preoccupation is less "one of weaving an all-pervasive web of 'social control'" than of effecting "the calculated administration of diverse aspects of conduct through countless, often competing, local tactics of education, persuasion, inducement, management, incitement, motivation and encouragement."¹⁹ Its object is "to shape the beliefs and

conduct of others in desired directions by acting upon their will, their circumstances, or their environment."²⁰

How then did this dense, reified, and refined, specific and yet comprehensive problematization of life—as a terrain of calculability where knowledge is the technology of power—come to be posed? What precipitated it? And with what consequences for the determination of the political universe? There are in effect two closely related answers to this question; one is philosophical, the other genealogical. The philosophical one, provided by Heidegger, maintains that this was the ineluctable terminus of the metaphysical thought of the West. The genealogical account, clearly stimulated by Heidegger, but focusing on the historically specific materialization of technology in practices of governmentality, is, I think, what Foucault can be said to be trying to provide. He does so, but without appropriating Heidegger's millennial history of the destinal sending of Being, according to the following argument. That argument is in effect a history of the present that diverges significantly from simple progressivist accounts of the advent and trajectory of the modern age, which was why it so offended rationalists and certain kinds of humanists.

The problematic of government was posed by the simultaneous dissolution of, on the one hand, established practices of religious thought and observance, and, on the other, practices of temporal rule that precipitated the emergence of the modern state. It was posed, equally, of course, by the dissolution of established ways of knowing, and the invention of new ones, that became part of the terminal crisis of the medieval world. In short, the dissolution of the Christian imaginary, with all its attendant intellectual, secular, and spiritual changes, put in question not only the manner in which one was to be spiritually ruled and led in order to achieve salvation, but also the manner in which people were to be temporally ruled and led in order—*inter alia*—for new territorial claims to be secured; for rights and responsibilities to be reconfigured; populations to be statistically specified, enumerated, and domesticated; for new ways of knowing to be instituted and disseminated; for new forms of economic and political association to be established, refined, and legitimated; and so on. Because the crisis of Christianity was a generic problematization of established authority that consequently posed the problematic of government in its widest possible sense—from the government of souls and the self to the government of inquiry as well as of communities, associations, and populations of every description. And this precisely because the crisis of authority induced by the dissolution of the Christian imaginary had induced a crisis in all forms of belief and understanding—from the theological to the

philosophical; hence, of ontotheology—as well as of all forms of rule, from the individual to the collective and from the spiritual to the temporal.²¹

That crisis, therefore, created a hitherto unprecedented demand for new political as much as spiritual, intellectual, economic, individual, or social *savoir faire* (which was also, of course, a demand for new forms of *savoir dire*, because language is constitutive and performative and not merely referential). In an age that was to realize itself in knowledge and production as technology, it was not surprising that the problematic of rule, again in the widest possible sense of the term, became technologized through new forms of knowledge also. It is that problematic, and the ever widening and microscopic process of power that emerged as a response to it, that Foucault eventually termed *governmentality*. And he quotes one of its early expositors in order, pithily, to illustrate its essentially teleotechnological character: “Government is the right disposition of things, arranged so as to lead to a convenient end.”²²

One has only to appreciate the degree to which the Christian imagination had influenced all aspects of life, with its cosmological interpretation of the universe of all beings and its providential message to human beings, to appreciate how scandalously irreligious, and how familiarly modern, this proposition was. However, as Foucault noted, before a realm of conduct can be brought under the remit of government, the grip of old ways of imagining it has to be relaxed so that things can be newly imagined and understood in a way peculiar to what Foucault terms *governmentality*. That is to say, it has to become possible to imagine and understand the world in a certain way in order for it to be delineated as a realm of governable conduct amenable to knowledge and accessible to the management and administration of power/knowledge. Such an imaginative reconstruction of the world is necessary, therefore, before the “economy,” or “the international system,” “the state,” or “the subject” can emerge as such things—realms of conduct subject to their own laws of formation and operation and governable according to the changing technologies of the knowledge that adequately so represents them. It is here that the close reciprocity that obtains between the bureau and the academy, between the specific and changing demands of the state and the model building, theorizing, information gathering, disciplinary analysis, and discursive intellectual economies of the social and human sciences in general—and, I would argue, of the disciplines of international relations and strategic studies in particular—becomes apparent. This is also where the original conjunction between sovereignty and governmentality lies.

While the power/knowledge programs of government have first to presuppose “the real” to be programmable—that “the real” is a domain subject to determinable determinants—government also needs its experts to realize in practice the possibilities that that imagination discloses. Thus, while the “reality” of government has to be thinkable in such a way that the discrepancies between its ambitions and its conditions, between its dreams and its circumstances, are diagnosable and prescribable, this “reality” has also to be made real. The world, in short, has to be made to conform to such an imaginative depiction of it because the presupposition that “the real” is like this is actually not enough to bring this imagination and its associated, manifold, and institutionalized, order of government into existence. This is why, for Foucault, governmentality does not refer so much to a concept as a realm of practices and institutions that constitutes a regime of power: ways of doing things; ways of ordering things; and sites where these practices are not only employed and taught, but also researched and refined, and their remit extended into the government of all walks of life. Governmentality is, therefore, a regime of power critically reliant not only on the operationalization of the modern will to knowledge, and on the technologies of representational thought by which this will to knowledge advances, but also on the forceful delimitation of the spaces in which it can operate. These, of course, are precisely what all the spectacles, assertions, legislative, territorializing, and identifying practices of sovereignty itself help to furnish and establish.

An analysis of government, therefore, takes as its central analytical concern this discursively organized and executed political imaginary: the specific systems of thought and of action; the peculiar ways both of speaking and doing; the conventionally available dreams, ambitions, expectations, and vanities; and the modes of interpretation and understanding, and the generative principles of formation of, the world as a calculable entity and the people in it as calculable subjects. Through all of these devices, political authorities have not simply posed, specified, and pursued the resolution of problems of *government*, but have understood their own *political* task as discharging precisely this function in respect both of their own state practices and the management of their populations; progressively giving effect, thereby, to the complex regime of governmentality that characterizes modern life. So tightly has this web been woven, so pervasively has the modality of governmentality pervaded the domain of the political, however, that the great ideologies of socialism, communism, and liberalism interpreted their values and ambitions through it as well. It is this imaginary formation, comprised of prior interpretation of life,

language, and knowledge, and applied to “population,” that is actually anterior to, so enabling the reality of, the reality of both the realism, neorealism, and idealism that has largely defined the horizons of traditional international relations.

Governmentality and Juridical Power

Ordinarily, Foucault is regarded as a trenchant critic of the juridical power that sovereignty seeks to exercise and to which it makes appeal, and his account of disciplinary power/knowledge is frequently represented as an alternative to legal-sovereign forms.²³ To some degree he encouraged this view, for example, in the complaint that we have still not cut off the head of the sovereign, and in the way he emphasized the negative aspect of juridical power in *The History of Sexuality*:

Law cannot help but be armed, and its arm, par excellence, is death; to those who transgress it, it replied, at least as a last resort, with that absolute menace. The law always refers to the sword. But a power whose task is to take charge over life needs continuous regulatory and corrective mechanisms. It is no longer a matter of bringing death into play in the field of sovereignty, but of distributing the living in the domain of value and utility.²⁴

That distributive life-regime of power is, of course, the modality of power to which governmentality refers. But Foucault was not so much concerned to dismiss juridical power and the organizing principle of territoriality, as many have claimed with some support from his own texts, as to draw attention to, and amplify the way in which, modern power radically exceeds the analytics of juridical and territorial discourse, functioning positivistically throughout all the knowledgeable practices that constitute our forms of life. “We must consequently see things,” he was therefore careful to note, “not in terms of the substitution for a society of sovereignty of a disciplinary society and the subsequent replacement of a disciplinary society by a governmental one”²⁵ (emphasis added). Quite the contrary. Foucault was arguing for a way of conceiving of the broad, intrinsically productive and intrusive, manifold of power that characterizes all of life in the modern age. A manifold of power that traverses in its compass, and so reproblematises the juridical and territorial practices of statecraft—the predominant means of determining modern political subjectification and objectification—as well as introducing us to the notions of biopower and

population management. In short, we are not subjects at all, especially political subjects, except by virtue of some combined regime of juridical and disciplinary power/knowledge that constitutes us as such and that may or may not be extended to incorporate new populations or to admit new flows of people to its grid of cognition.

In his summary of an early exploration of the governmentality theme, which he developed in a seminar on “Security, Territory and Population,” he reinforced this point asking: “Does this [governmentality] entail transition from the ‘Territorial States’ to the State which subsists in its population, or ‘Population State’?” His answer was: “*Emphatically not*, since there is no question of any substitution but rather of a change of accent and the appearance of new objectives generating new problems and new techniques”²⁶ (emphasis added). “*In reality*,” Foucault insisted, “we have a triangle: sovereignty-discipline-government”²⁷ (emphasis added). The change of accent that he sought in discussions of modern power was, therefore, designed to broach a new analytics of power specifically by focusing critical attention on the production of the new problems and techniques of ordering to which the general problematic of governmentality, and the technologizing response of modern power/knowledge, gave rise.

Part of that new problematic of modern power, I am arguing, must, however, include the complementarity that necessarily obtains between governmentality and sovereignty, because the general problematic of governmentality indicates not just another, and hitherto unexamined aspect of, modern power, but also an intersection between juridical and disciplinary power that itself emerged with the emergence of the modern secular state. From its very inception, this intersection was an intimate, mutually informing, and interdependent one, because the practices of state and the ambitions associated with statecraft in a newly disenchanted age (linguistically performative and semantic devices; hence, the “stat[e]ing of states”²⁸) had also to call up and call upon the development and application of autonomous, comprehensive, and pervasive governmental technologies to realize their new ordering tasks.²⁹ Indeed, the formation of political rationality, integrally related as it was to allied transformations also in the understanding of language and the recovery of classical thought,³⁰ was integral to the way that the modern understanding of the political, as such, acquired autonomy from religious determination; that is to say, became construed as a regional ontology manifesting its own laws and logic.³¹

The modern state, which continues to be the single most important focus of analysis and general area of concern for international relations, was born, then, of the dissolution of the Christian world.

But that dissolution was the dissolution of an entire imaginary structure of thought and belief, as well as of political, economic, and social institutions, practices, forms of power, and forms of life. It bequeathed more to us in terms of the formation of political power and of forms of political life, therefore, than juridical discourses of power, state-dominated vocabularies of politics, and the interpretive scholarship of international relations ordinarily allow. The “demoralization of politics” and the “privatization of conscience,” by means of which an exit from the irreconcilable sectarian religious conflict of the seventeenth century was effected, and an answer was partially provided to the newly posed problem of political rule, in addition to other forms of social order and control, was a historical political achievement. Secularizing both state and politics in Europe, in other words, was no mean practical discursive political task; even if it only ever remained partially accomplished. But it was not the only ethico-politically significant consequence of that profound and pervasive crisis of knowing and of doing that comprised the complex dissolution of the Christian world from out of which the modern world has emerged. Inasmuch as traditional understandings of the discipline of international relations continue to circulate, celebrate, and refine the very conceptual terms and categories (as well as the handy symbolic generalizations) that comprised this aspect of the advent of the modern, alone, however, the very intellectual and political imagination of the discipline remains captured and confined by it. Because the dissolution of the Christian world bequeathed us much more: it represented such a comprehensive mutation in human beings’ understanding of understanding, understanding of itself, and understanding of its location in the universe of all other beings, that dissolution produced what is better described as a radical breach in political imagination that inaugurated a new manifold and mutable political imaginary, continuously grounding itself, pursuing the intimations of its understandings and pluralizing and elaborating its technologies of control as well, through what Foucault called power/knowledge.³²

With the dissolution of the Christian world, the conduct of conduct (individual and collective) could no longer be believed to be guided by a divinely inspired and theistically meaningful cosmological world order in the way that it once had been. It followed that the principles of conduct had subsequently to be discovered, therefore, within the (subject-object) domain of conduct itself. This development applied to politics, too. It found particular expression there through, for example, the doctrine of *raison d'état* and the newly emerging discursive practices of modern statecraft. For political rule,

as the understanding of *raison d'état* construed its novel problematic, required that the principles of the state were to be found within that very ensemble of practices that comprised the state. And these consequently became very effectively reified in the process. Later, as the idea of the state came to be elaborated more fully as a subject of interest as well as of will, so the deduction of those principles was extended to include also the exercise of that supposed will and the articulation and pursuit of those supposed interests.³³

Thus, the governmentalizing subjectification of the state, as of the self itself, turned the state and its practices simultaneously into an object of positive knowledge in a way that, although somewhat related, was distinct even from that outlined in Machiavelli’s classic. For, unlike the prince, after Hobbes, and after the demise of Christian legitimations of rule, the state (subspecie *securitatis*) had to be able to comprehend every finite thing and hold out forever. As Reinhart Koselleck summarized this crucial point following the dissolution of the Christian world: “To meet his all-encompassing responsibility, the prince had [now] to seek the measure of his actions in their calculable effect on everyone else. The compulsion to act thus provoked a need for heightened foresight. A rational calculation of all possible consequences came to be the first political commandment.”³⁴ In short, once God was (politically) dead—his death, of course, being much exaggerated—the problematic of sovereignty also invoked the problematic of governmentality.

Foucault’s exploration of governmentality, therefore, does note the connection with (though it does not fully address the intersection between) sovereign juridical discourses of power and disciplinary forms. An example that has particular relevance to the question of forced migration, refugee production, and asylum seeking that I want to address later is Foucault’s observation that, in addition to displaying itself in its murderous splendor, the sovereign juridical power of the state must also continuously pose the question of where to draw “the line that separates the enemy of the sovereign from his obedient subjects.”³⁵ It is here that the intimacy of the intersection between sovereignty and governmentality, and the character of the detailed dynamics that arise between them, are best illustrated. For the practices of statecraft, especially in the core areas of foreign and defense policymaking and of “national security,” for example, are peculiarly preoccupied by—and continually challenged with accumulating the knowledge and expertise concerned to specify—the norm around which the distribution of friends, enemies, allies, terrorists, subversives, and so on may be produced.³⁶ Around which, also, the

classification of conduct as benign, threatening, dangerous, intimidating, subversive, or supportive can equally be distributed. And, finally, around which the living, as both subjects and objects, can be distributed in the broad domain of value and utility constituted by what has come to be the paradigmatically governmentalized domain of sovereign subjectivity known as national security discourse. Subjectifying and securing the state necessarily entailed subjectifying and securing the subjects that comprised its population. That dual task was the task of a certain form of cognition that has burgeoned into a monumental enterprise of surveillance, information acquisition, policing, and calculation. Moreover, securing the subjectification of the state and subject alike required that rule of the self (individual and collective) must know and master not only friends and enemies but also contingency itself. The notorious post-Cold War proposition that the enemy, in the absence of the old Soviet or Communist enemy, is uncertainty itself is a logical consequence not merely of the collapse of the Soviet empire, therefore, but of the way in which the realm of the political itself came to be understood from very earliest modern times.

We have been used to thinking about power largely in juridical terms, however, because we are still the bearers of a kind of modern scholasticism, derived from the debates that effected the transition from the medieval to the modern world, and so have remained largely preoccupied with the metaphysics of the political universe and specifically with what I would call the twin dogmas of sovereign absolutism—a reoccupation of the problematic of theological absolutism³⁷—and state subjectivity.

But the state, while a legal, political, economic, and social device (an agent and a source of agency) is neither a mere apparatus, designed to hold off threats to public order or to furnish the necessary integrative functions of a certain form of life, nor a prediscursive agent in pursuit of public, national, or even state interests. Juridical, functional, and subjectivist discourse are equally limited, then, in their theorization of the state. Rather, I would argue, the state is a sign for a manifold of complex subjectifying and objectifying discursive economies of knowledge. In producing order it also and simultaneously “defines disorder and creates disorder and preserves its right to suppress that disorder.”³⁸ Governmentality, therefore, disrupts the priorities and trajectories of traditional interpretations of the state particularly by demonstrating that subjectivity is a function also of power/knowledge, as well as of the symbolic and juridical productions of political order, rather than a mere expression of some immanent, essentialist, or metaphysical property of an antecedently given (political) body.

But the very requirement for some new articulation of (political) subjectivity in virtue of the dissolution of the Christian world, was itself a goad to the development of governmentality; inasmuch as that problematic of political subjectivity sought its resolution in knowing the body of the political subject—however conceived or construed—in its most intimate details in order to effect not only the rule but also the self-government of that political subject.

According to the governmental perspective, the state especially, of course, is not comprised of essential subjective properties. Foucault, for example, attacks the dogma of state subjectivity in a way entirely consistent with one of the main features of post-Nietzschean philosophy, which was to problematize subjectivity *tout court*. There are no subjects defined by their essence as subjects. States are not subjects with essences. A fortiori, the *persona ficta* of the state is not a subject in the traditional sense within which a subject has been understood. It can be thought of much more effectively instead as an ensemble of governmental practices more or less suspended within and between (inter)national juridical and territorial boundaries.³⁹ That change of perspective opens up an entire agenda of questions and tasks concerned in a radically phenomenological (rather than ontological) way with how this ensemble is actually brought to appearance, made to persist, and claimed to be enduring, as well as how it functions; because its functioning is a monumental phenomenological production. More or less enframèd within juridical and territorial boundaries (I say *more or less*, because spatial and juridical boundaries are themselves mutable and polymorphous products of signifying practices,⁴⁰ and because there is no automatic fit or match between the juridicoterritorial delineation of the state and the wider field of governmentality whose object is the conduct of conduct as such) there is, I suggest however, a powerful architectonic tension between the universal and totalizing claims of sovereign juridical discourse and the individuating, differentiating, technologizing practices of power/knowledge. The development and extension of technologies of governmentality, therefore, may be blocked or frustrated by certain assertions of or claims made for sovereign (political) subjectivity.

There is, I would consequently conclude, not only an intersection but also always a complex torsion between the twin discourses of power that characterize the modern age, the traditionally dominant *macroscopic* juridicoterritorial discourses of sovereignty and the more extensive, least observed and understood—at least as a general regime of power in (inter)national politics—*microscopic* processes of governmentality. That torsion imposes enormous stresses and strains, and has always manifested all sorts of contradictions and conflicts, in the expressions of power and between the different legitimating

rationales to which these different modalities of power give rise. Further, I want to argue that this torsioning becomes explicit in the changes brought about by the dissolution of the Cold War order.

(Inter)National Politics, International Relations, and Governmentality

In the light of Foucault's thesis, and what I have argued about it so far, I would like to advance three very broad propositions. One of these concerns the character of contemporary (inter)national politics. The second is directed at the discipline of international relations. And the third is directed back from our contemporary condition to the thesis concerning governmentality itself. Stated bluntly, they go like this.

1. First, that which international relations takes as its object domain of knowledge—as if it existed outside its complex discursive production and delineation as such—and to which I have been referring, disruptively, as (inter)national politics, can be reinterpreted as exhibiting many of the features of the operation of governmentality. Our modern political vocabulary, structured by the traditional oppositions between domestic and international politics, public and private, internal and external, government and market, coercion and consent, sovereignty and interdependence, and so on, does not, therefore, adequately characterize the diverse ways in which rule is exercised through a combination of juridical and disciplinary processes; it does this neither at the level of the state nor at the level of the interstate, geopolitical, system. Nor does it begin to comprehend the fundamental reliance of both rule and governance upon stat(e)ing practices—precisely because of the generalized hostility to the performative and constitutive character of language displayed by modern epistemologies, together with their sometimes violent insistence on it (see, classically, Hobbes and Locke) as representational, referential, or nominalistic. To a considerable degree, conventional interpretations consequently obscure as much as they illuminate the characteristics of modern forms of (inter)national political power, inasmuch as they remain epistemologically complicit with denying, or eliding, its radically phenomenological character.⁴¹ I would maintain, with Foucault, that (inter)national power in the modern age is at least as much a matter of inventing all manner of subject positions, especially political subject positions, that are capable of bearing and exercising “a kind of regulated freedom,”⁴² as it is one of

allowing expression to, or of imposing constraints upon, what are thought to be antecedently existent political and economic subjects. In short, it is a complex exercise in “taking charge” of life, as much as it remains, also, a complex regime that wields power over death.

Hence, political power is exercised globally today through a profusion of shifting alliances between many diverse authorities in knowledgeably derived projects and enterprises designed to effect self-government in manifold aspects of the political, economic, and social behavior of populations, as well as of individual conduct. These operate at every level of political life (so-called national, international, [inter]national, and global), producing multiple overlapping and superimposed matrices of power/knowledge. And they operate primarily by constituting calculable agents and calculable spaces through the development and application of technologies of calculation. States, for example (the same may be said for any “actor” in the domain of [inter]national politics), are not merely the bearers of power, but subject, as all subjects are, to those productive (inter)national protocols and regimes of knowledge that themselves empower them as subjects. States themselves are both the product of mobile and plural mechanisms of calculation for the production of political subjectivity as well as collections of devices by which such subjectivity can be produced and graduated for other subjects—including other states.

I would argue, then, that (inter)national politics is as much about constituting calculable subjects operating in calculable spaces as it is about the traditional features that preoccupy its dominant realist and neorealist modes of interpretation. And I would go further, to argue that (inter)national politics is a prime site of intersection between juridicoterritorial and disciplinary power, and consequently a rich source of the tension between them. Because the (inter)national system—its (inter)national law, diplomatic practices, treaties, economic regulatory regimes, alliances, states, governmental, non-governmental, quasi-nongovernmental, and other “actors”—is not only a theater of conflict between sovereign subjects ultimately governed by the sanction of violent conflict that they wield against one another, and over their own subjects; it is also an expression of governmentality, a dense production of calculable subjects operating in calculable spaces according to calculable dynamics in the positive, and productive, microscopic ordering of life. Calculable subjects and calculable spaces have, however, to be brought into presence, sustained, and refined. Such calculable/calculating subjects inhabiting the calculable spaces of (inter)national relations are the contingent accomplishments, therefore, of the conjunction between sovereignty and power/knowledge. The power politics of the traditional vocabularies of

international relations, indeed, appear often only to be an expression of the effort that goes into the very processes of subjectification and objectification that characterizes the operation of governmentality. And international relations, itself, appears often only to be an integral part of the production, dissemination, and means of ensuring the consumption of them.

2. Second, the so-called realism and neorealism of international relations can also be refigured as integral aspects of the powerful problematizing activity of governmentality itself, inasmuch as they too are epistemologically committed, despite the wide variety of epistemic subscriptions that characterizes the discipline, to satisfy its appetite for the technologies of knowing by which to effect order.

An analysis of government, therefore, eschews the mock combat between the realism, neorealism, and idealism of international relations, together with the burdens of explanation and causation that accompany them. Indeed, it would say that these are part of the problematic of governmentality itself. That is to say, they comprise some of the things that have to be accounted for as part of the emergence and refinement of the modern order of power—specifically, for example, as conduits for its codification, popularization, and dissemination—rather than merely things that do the explaining.

Theories of international relations, of defense, of (inter)national political economy, and so on, therefore constitute no mere neutral reference to the reality of the world. Rather, they are integral discursive components of the knowledgeable production and government of it. Precisely because a mode of discourse does not merely describe a world that exists independent of its categories and vocabularies of explanation, these, too, are domains of discursive power/knowledge complicit, albeit most often only parasitically, with the production and dissemination of (inter)national order itself.⁴³ As such they are intrinsic to the modern imaginary and contribute to its processes for rendering the world thinkable; for taming its intractable realities by differentiating them and subjecting them to the disciplined analysis of thought; and for clarifying the problematizations of government and adding critically to the changing repertoire of knowledgeable technologies through which it meets the challenge of discerning how best to govern the conduct of conduct. They serve, in other words, to produce the world we inhabit, bringing its subjects and objects—problematizations, schemes, dreams, and ambitions—into play and disseminating knowledge about them.⁴⁴

To the extent that the modern state “rules,” and to the extent that an (inter)national system operates, they do so on the basis, therefore, of an elaborate network of relations, discursive economies, and

processes of political and knowledgeable subjectification that were formed in response to a profound change in political imagining that issued in both sovereignty and governmentality. This interpretation would consequently *relocate* international relations, and especially its predominant focus of analysis, “the state,” by enframing both within the problematic of government.

No state has ever possessed the unity of subjectivity, or the uniformity of functionality, often ascribed to it, of course. Rather, as a site of governmentality, practices of state have always been to some large degree governmentalized and always integrally related to the development, extension, and refinement of all the technologies of power/knowledge that comprise the domain of governmentality. In late modern times, they have become intensively so. It might even be possible to argue that the success of the liberal democracies in their struggle with Stalinist state socialism is that the former were more powerful precisely because they were the more effectively governmentalized both as societies and states.⁴⁵ This governmentalization of the state has been a long-standing if somewhat neglected feature of (inter)national politics.⁴⁶ Indeed, without the governmentalization of the state, and also of the system of relations between states upon which individual states crucially depend for their own constitution and survival, there would be no (inter)national system of states. Just as the state is a site of governmentality, so also is the (inter)national system of states.

Approached from this interpretive direction, the issue that arises from the first two propositions is no longer one of accounting for government and politics in terms of “the power of the state.” Instead, the task is one of “ascertaining how, and to what extent, the state is articulated into the activity of government.” That entails, *inter alia*, establishing “what funds, forces, persons, knowledge or legitimacy are utilised; and by means of what devices and techniques are these different tactics made operable”⁴⁷ so that the project of rule is conceived and pursued in governmental terms. What I am suggesting here, therefore, is not simply that governmentalization is a feature of the state or of the (inter)national system. Rather, I am proposing that the state and the system of states has, to an important degree, and from very early modern times, been a function of knowledgeable governmentality as much of sovereign territoriality; and that, moreover, governmentalization of the state and of the system of states—the codes, protocols, and regimes of knowledge of (inter)national relations—has been the principal device by which the technologization of the political (and the democratic) has been disseminated globally in the modern age.⁴⁸

3. Third, despite the power of the governmentality thesis, (inter)national relations is precisely the domain where this account of the conduct of conduct also displays its limitations, thus calling for some direct consideration of, rather than the mere acknowledgment of, the relationship between juridical and disciplinary modes of power. For limits are not mere deficiencies. They are places where things come and hang together. I want to explore this point further, however; only after I have offered a brief interpretation of the dissolution of the postwar order.

Governmentality and the Dissolution of the Postwar Order

The chain of interdependences, linking meaning, power/knowledge, and political subjectivity, is a kind of genetic political encoding, carried primarily through orders of discourse—where discourse is a *savoir-dire* that is also a *savoir-faire*. It is these that constitute the regimes of truth of the worlds of subjects and objects, problems and solutions, facts, interests, forces, and dynamics. It is these, too, that determine knowledge, and in determining knowledge, determine the way we live, so producing the reality of appearances that the realists gullibly take to be (and more to the point to exhaust) the real, but that the real nonetheless always exceeds. The principal device of government, a regime of truth, is a product of power/knowledge mediated through discursive practices. Thus:

Each society has its regime of truth, its "general politics" of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.⁴⁹

These regimes function as discursive economies for the constitution of meaning. They represent, in other words, a complex network for the production, dissemination, consumption, and refinement of knowledge and understanding of the ways to interpret, and the ways consequently to do things, that then govern conduct. Hence, the inscribed world of (inter)national politics, which, in constituting meaning also provides the objects of political affection and commitment, so also comprising the complex fabric of political legitimacy, is

an economy of signs. The sign, in this instance the significations of political order, is a commodity that does work and, therefore, also possesses value for those who produce, employ, and exchange it.

A discursive economy is also constituted in exactly the same way as that of its material counterpart. It, too, is reliant upon institutions and social and professional networks, and operates through institutionalized sites of practice and through capillaries of communication. These, so to speak, constitute its material and social base, because knowledge and understanding are not just social products, they are collective assets to which title and usage is claimed. Consequently, they comprise the discursive capital of the networks and institutions that produce them.⁵⁰ And, like all capital, they have to be continually invested and reinvested in the processes of production and exchange. The knowledgeable orders of governmentality, therefore, never remain fixed or stable. They are always doing something, and in the process of doing something they are also constantly, albeit sometimes only minimally, changing their form. They also have to be fought for, in all the ways that people fight for the capital that sustains their lives and the meaning that gives life to those lives. The world so produced often has the appearance of being natural, ineluctable, and permanent. Realism and neorealism, especially, are distinguished by their continual insistence upon returning and reducing us to this bottom line of calculation, to the single figures of the calculable subjects and the calculable regimes of the calculable spaces through which governmentality and sovereignty insistently order the conduct of conduct.

Occasionally, however, there are dramatic ruptures in the closely woven texture of the twinned history of government and sovereignty that comprise such an essential part of the (political) history of the present. These afford fleeting opportunities to observe the character of the weave before the productive processes of order regain their composure and reestablish their command over the imaginative and critical space opened up by the faltering logics of their regimes of truth. They afford, in particular, opportunities to observe the conditions of possibility and existence required for the hybrid regime of sovereignty-government to operate and be extended.

The European revolutions of 1989 and 1990 provided just such an opportunity. In *simultaneously* problematizing meaning, knowledge, and power, they also called into question the very grounds of modern political subjectivity on the two sites where the claims to agency are not only most interdependent but also where they are most violently dogmatic, and where they always demand to be most natural and unproblematic, and so secure; that is to say, on the site

of the state and in the context of the interstate system. Hence, the articulation and disarticulation of the postwar military blocs provides illustration of the articulation and disarticulation of the multiple states of political subjectivity with which the practice of modern politics, and the formation of modern political order, is so intimately concerned. But it also registered the limits where the remit of governmentality, and the tight alliance between governmentality and sovereignty, itself becomes problematized.

Knowledge in doubt radically problematizes the exercise of power, because the one is the principal medium of the other. Power/knowledge problematized, then, threatens the character and constitution of political order, of course, for without the inscriptions of power/knowledge there is no order of the secure self-governing kind associated with the sovereignty-governmentality matrix. But sovereign claims disrupted, disputed, and newly applied with genocidal vigor, also problematize networks of power/knowledge. Hence, the events of 1989 and 1990 have precipitated a reformulation of meaning, a reevaluation of expertise, and a reconstitution of political agency, all of which is taking place to a greater and lesser extent throughout all the familiar institutional structures of the old postwar bipolar world. What we are witnessing in the current conflicts in the (inter)national system, therefore, is a contest not only to establish new sovereign identities (with all the violence that goes with the rage for sovereign subjectivity) but also to introduce new regimes of truth out of the sudden death of their predecessors, to extend governmentality to where its sway was always weakest, and instantiate it where its remit had hardly run before.

The current transformation of our political landscape is, therefore, a discursive and epistemic change of enormous proportions. In consequence, it is serving as the means for introducing profound transformations in the character of political subjectivity at all three traditional levels of "national," regional, and global politics. No political actor is unaffected by these changes, not least those triumphant over the dissolution of Soviet hegemony and Stalinist-style dictatorship in Eastern and Central Europe and in the Balkans. Witness the political changes in and between the United States and the countries of the European Union and of NATO, for example. What is currently in train, therefore, is not only a contest both to governmentalize and subjectivize the hugely heterogeneous populations formerly ruled under Soviet hegemony (to establish claims of sovereign identity within them), but also to try to extend the remit of governmentality to them; and, finally, on the part of the western parts of Europe, and of North America, to preserve those places and populations

from the infection of "disorder" that now characterizes many of these other peoples and territories. But there is also a mutation of the sovereignty-governmentality matrix in Europe and North America, as the nation-states there seem prone both to a certain renewal of nationalism, or at least an arrest of their enthusiasm for supranational adventures, and a significant measure of hollowing out, by virtue of the continuing transfer of powers upward to supranational authorities and to global networks, downward to regional agencies or local states, and sideways to cross-border networks and nonstate actors. Therefore, as Bob Jessop has recently noted: "It is not just a rearticulation of formal juridico-political powers across various territorial levels of government that is occurring, but also a major reorganisation of how key functions are performed between governmental and non-governmental agencies on all spatial [local, regional, national, international, supranational and global] scales."⁵¹

Violent politics of identity have surfaced in the former territories of the Soviet bloc as internecine war is waged to establish a tight coincidence between territorial boundaries, ethnic uniformity, and sovereign juridical power over populations that are irredeemably hybrid. The violent politics of self-determination that has surfaced there necessarily results in the most violent determination and extermination of the (political) self, because no self conforms to the uniformity that they both presume and yet also insist upon bringing to violent presence. The drive to subjectification may thus become a drive to extermination as well. This is a process that has, however, also brought governmentality under enormous stress, for the complex interinstitutional fabric of knowledge and meaning that all actors relied upon prior to the collapse of Soviet hegemony has been radically disrupted for all parties by the events of 1989 and 1990. If this is a historic moment in the history of the order of sovereignty-governmentality, it is a moment that also casts light on the tensions that exist between juridical and governmental processes of power and formations of (political) subjectivity.

The contemporary reposing of basic questions of political order that we are now witnessing, back on the continent where it seemed largely to have been settled, has been precipitated directly by the astonishing devaluation of our postwar discourse of (in)security and consequent radical problematizing of postwar political identities. In short, besides witnessing the dissolution of one regime of truth and another struggling toward articulation, besides witnessing the reformation of political order and identity, always contingent upon regimes of truth, we are also witnessing on the problematic site of "Europe"—not only in the renewed politics of political subjectivity

and political space but also in the changing problematic of the government of population—the politics of modern political discourse itself. In stark relief, therefore, are the shifting demarcations of the political boundaries, internal and external, of political agency consequent upon the subjectifying community-constituting knowledgeable discursive practices of inclusion and exclusion so clearly foregrounded now in contemporary politics, because our past ones have become so radically problematized by recent events.

Moreover, all these issues arise in respect of one of the features that has caused most surprise and concern in Western Europe, especially, since 1989 and 1990—the resurgence of what is a historically well-established European phenomenon, albeit it has not been seen since the end of World War II; namely, the incidence of mass forced migration of peoples, together with the consequent rise in the incidence of refugees and of asylum seeking. Population and migration are therefore explicitly at issue once more in European politics over the politics of “Europe.” It is this historical “accident” that calls most direct attention to the intersection of sovereignty and governmentality. That is not to say that the issue is either new, or that it is confined to “Europe.” Quite the contrary. Historically, mass displacement of peoples is a very common European phenomenon, but in the last fifty years it has been one that has characterized the so-called Third World more than it has “Europe.” Neither new, nor alien to the developed countries, including those of North America, of course, the historicity and ubiquity of this phenomenon attests similarly to the historicity and ubiquity of the alliance between sovereignty and governmentality in the history of modern forms of (inter)national power. Because what is raised by the forced migration of populations and the mass production of refugees and asylum seekers, radically estranged from their previous homes and thrown as strangers into other peoples’ homes, are the fundamental political questions of both *government* and *belonging* for “native” and “refugee” alike.

Population and Migration:

The Ethical Intersection of Sovereignty and Governmentality

There is, of course, no “new world order.” But there is, as there has been throughout modern times, a particular and profound perplexity about order—combined in certain places with an astonishing intensification of it—to which the articulation of sovereignty and governmentality continues to be an evolving joint response. Furthermore, because there has also been a question of order there has also

been a question of identity; because, if the ideal of modern times has been self-government (for democrats as well as for totalitarians, in the peculiar way in which the latter elevate the collective over the individual), the issue of self-government necessarily raises the question not only of the identity but also of the very constitution of the self to be governed. There is no question of order without the allied question of identity, no management of populations and of population movement, therefore, without their mobilization also around some representation of what is said to unite them. Whereas for social and political scientists these are seen first and foremost as epistemological issues, to which moral or normative frameworks may (or may not) then be attached, I want to emphasize here that they are fundamentally, and intrinsically, ethicopolitical ones from the outset.

For modern epistemologies, in making their classic distinctions between subjects and objects, also draw the related distinction between the normative and the empirical. The philosophical resources upon which I draw, however, challenge this very binary coding of life. It is not a matter of describing populations and their management, and the ways in which sovereignty and governmentality have tried to resolve them, as if it were possible to do so without reference to the so-called normative dimension of life. Because the management of population, as much as the sovereign-judicial control of territory, inasmuch as combined they comprise the very forms of life of modern times, simply is an *ethos*, and that *ethos* is fundamentally a political question. The domain of “value,” in other words, does not arise after the constitution of a form of living; it is an integral part of its very constitution as such. We are not thrown into a world of facts, then, to sit back and think about whether or not and how these may or may not advance or accord with our so-called values. We are always already thrown instead into a world of meaning that is always already, itself, a domain of “valuing.” As if it could be anything other than that. And yet modern epistemology nonetheless teaches us to the contrary. We are then enjoined by it to specify our moral codes and determine how they are to apply in practice. But we already live an ethical life—even when it is “immoral” or “amoral”—inasmuch as a mode of life is a mode of dwelling that is an *ethos*. The issue is not, therefore, one of trying to figure out what morals we should have and of how we may introduce them into the living and into the accounts we give of our forms of life. By virtue of the kinds of beings that we are, we are, ethical beings in that our way of being is inherently one of inheriting, interpreting, and interrogating the forms of life in which we always already find ourselves thrown. The question then is one of interpreting and interrogating the ethicality that

already inheres within them, and defines them as such. This, I maintain, is fundamentally not only a political task; the response to it is also a mark of the kind of politics to which we are subject and to which we are willing to subscribe. It is a test, in short, of our very understanding of the foundation and membership of a political community, because so intimately and specifically concerned with both the governmental and juridical details of admission to and exclusion from that community.

Penetrating to the very heart of questions of order and of political identity, the question of forced migration of populations also penetrates with equal force to the heart of questions of democracy and democratic citizenship. One of the paradoxes of the current state of the discipline of international relations, so regularly castigated, and with some reason, for the narrowness of its once traditional outlook, is that it is precisely upon this now radically ambiguated site of (inter)national politics, aspects of which it once claimed as its domain of distinctive intellectual competence, that these vital questions are currently posed with greatest vigor and political immediacy; and so the site of international relations becomes even more important than it once thought itself to be, if such fundamental ethicopolitical issues are to be articulated and explored by conceptual and analytical means that exceed the old defining and confining disciplinary distinctions between “domestic” and “international” politics. This means a significant change in the character, or at least the defining preoccupations of, international relations as it accommodates the complexities of this problematic ethicopolitical terrain of analysis. For it is precisely because the old idea of a division between the inside and the outside is utterly inadequate as a way of enframing issues that by their very nature comprise that of the border itself that they arise neither as a foreign nor as a domestic policy issue, but as an ethicopolitical hybrid that problematizes the settledness of that very distinction and of its traditionally technical (policy, or police, science), rather than ethical and political, concerns. Such is *dramatized* by the huge numbers of people who are in fact on the inside, in their camps and in their need, as much as on the supposed outside of the states to whose territories they have been ejected. Here, the outside does penetrate and permeate the inside, to adapt Jacques Derrida, and, “the border of the political, of *politeia* and of the State as European concepts”⁵² are put at practical and immediate issue. Here, too, the question of native and stranger—of who belongs and on what terms and conditions, as well of who does not, and of what obligations the one owes to the other—are precisely

what (inter)national politics are, politically and ethically, and so also of course violently, about.

The question of the political and the question of the ethical, as well as the indissociable relationship between the two, are as problematic now as ever they were in the seventeenth century, and for the same reason. Late modern times seems to be undergoing a generalized crisis of authority comparable with the one that overwhelmed the Christian world, as the very responses to the dissolution of that world—responses that marked the break between it and the modern, so marking the Modern as such—are themselves increasingly mutating with dramatic speed and global effect in our age. Here, the “demoralization of the political” and the “privatization of conscience” that I described earlier as two of the most important moves by which the secularization of politics disdistinguishing the advent of modern politics has special salience, because it presents a complex dilemma for contemporary politics. For morals were seen to be incommensurable—in the sense, of course, of the sectarian dogmas of the warring Christian factions; but then Christianity pretty well exhausted the domain of the moral at that time in Europe—and had to be removed from the public domain if peace was to be restored. “Privatization of conscience” allowed people their confession of faith so long as it remained private. Thereafter, it has been difficult for modern politics to know how to reintegrate debate about the ethical into the public domain without threatening the early modern political achievement whereby sectarian conflict between irreconcilable consciences was effected. Its epistemological commitments, of course, with their differentiation of the empirical from the normative, powerfully reinforced this difficulty. From the resources upon which I draw, however, this state of affairs nonetheless still represents an ethos; albeit one in which the public domain has become radically impoverished in respect of its ability to make the ethos of a form of life a matter of political contestation short of political disintegration precisely because of the way it understands both morality and politics.⁵³

I raise the ethical here in a somewhat abrupt and perhaps surprising turn of argument precisely because it has a such a direct bearing upon the question of population, to which I now want to turn. The contemporary drive for *political subjectivity* has resulted in a mass production of *political abjection*. While I therefore think that the site of population is one where those interested in the conjunction of Foucauldian and juridical forms of power would find much in detail to illuminate that intersection, especially where the developing rules of the European Union are concerned, I want to raise it as an

ethical political question, also intimately associated with the inauguration of politics, community, and justice, because, from the perspective upon which Foucault, among others, drew, I believe it ultimately arises as a fundamentally ethical matter: a matter of hospitality, justice, and belonging that problematizes the very understandings we currently have—especially democratic ones—of the foundation of political community.⁵⁴ I particularly want to do so, also, because the ethical force of Foucault's work has been diminished as much by those who would turn him into another political sociologist as by those who would dismiss him (among others) as just another Parisian *poseur*.

The study of migration has almost as long a history as the study of population itself.⁵⁵ (Although I do not have the time to pursue the point here, my suspicion is that it was also stimulated by many of the same factors that contributed to the growth of political arithmetic and its evolution into the science of statistics.) Furthermore, the study of population has not only been the study of radical hybridity and heterogeneity, one crucial aspect of it had also, of course, to include its movement. The most crucial aspect of the movement of population from the perspective of this essay is, however, the way in which it radically problematizes boundaries and, in doing that, immediately raises the fundamental questions of political belonging—of order and identity and also of justice and hospitality. The very porosity and mutability of boundaries, their constitution also by a host of policing mechanisms, their reliance upon vast systems of surveillance and documentation constructed by and shared increasingly between states, as well as upon the juridical discourses of sovereign power, the centrality of flows to politics, as well as of structures, of knowledge and information as much as of law, and of migration as much as of mobilization, are all foregrounded in a forceful way when large numbers of people either take to the road or are forcibly expelled by violence or fear from their homes.

This phenomenon is one that especially characterizes contemporary politics. After the vast population movements precipitated in Europe by World War II were frozen by the Cold War, mass forcible displacement of population became a phenomenon of the process of state formation that followed the dissolution of the European empires. By drawing attention to the reemergence of this phenomenon in Europe, therefore, I do not want to pretend that it has not been happening on a monumental scale elsewhere in the world over the last forty years and with the same problematizing ethico-political effect. Rather, I want to dramatize the point about population—and the point about membership of a political community—on the site

where it appeared to have been settled in a way that caused little significant disruption to the postwar orthodoxy of traditional international relations. Population movement in Europe now is integrally related to the mutation of the state form, to the mutation of international capital, to questions of political belonging increasingly expressed again in violent and xenophobic politics of identity, and to the generic problem of government that has become more intricate than ever in the interdependently industrialized and technologized countries of Europe in particular, and of the developed world as a whole. All these are problems that challenge liberal representative understandings of the foundation of political community as much as those that appeal to mythic ethnic and nationalist accounts of sovereign identity.

No natives without strangers: the issue of the stranger in the theory of politics is as old as politics itself. "For you must have noticed," Plato has Socrates ask at the beginning of *The Republic*, when drawing a didactic comparison between a guard dog and the Guardians of the State in this first theorization of the political, "that it is a natural characteristic of a well-bred guard dog to behave with the utmost gentleness to those it is used to and knows, but to be savage to strangers?"⁵⁶

The dog's disposition to be "annoyed when it sees a stranger, even though it has done it no harm" is contrasted with the way in which "it welcomes anyone it knows, even though it has never had a kindness from him."⁵⁷ This trait, Plato has Socrates say, "is a trait that shows discrimination and a truly philosophical nature." The reason is simple: "The dog distinguishes the sight of friend and foe simply by knowing one and not the other. And a creature that distinguishes between the familiar and the unfamiliar on the grounds of knowledge or ignorance must surely be gifted with a real love of knowledge."⁵⁸

Hence, the reason why *The Republic* was preoccupied with teaching how the principle of identity was to be learned, operated, and elevated. Plato was no naive empiricist. He thought politics in the way that he did because of the way that he thought. So much, then, for a thinking that equates knowledge with secure and certain identity. It ends up in a politics of identity governed by well-bred guard dogs—a phenomenon with which we are not unfamiliar today.

No political subjects without political objects either, therefore; consequently, the advent of *refugees* on a mass scale is a particular phenomenon of the early twentieth century, and it was then, as it is now, closely allied to the formation and dissolution of states and the intensification of border controls that accompanies that process.

Specifically, the ending of World War I, together with the Russian Revolution, created a crisis that stimulated international action on behalf of refugees in 1921 by the newly formed League of Nations. It was these measures that were subsequently to be modified and extended after World War II—first with the establishment of the UN International Refugee Organisation (IRO) in 1947 and, soon after, in 1951, with the establishment of the UNHCR as the IRO's successor—to constitute the basis of the contemporary international regime governing refugees. These developments did not, however, simply establish the basis of an international regime for succoring refugees: they defined what a refugee was; and so also, of course, refined and elaborated what a state and, later, what a "nation" was. According to the 1951 UN Convention as amended by the 1967 Protocol, signed by 120 members states of the United Nations, a refugee is a person who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence . . . is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it."⁵⁹

According to the 1993 UNHCR report, *The State of the World's Refugees*, there were 2.5 million officially registered refugees in the world in 1970. By 1980, that figure had risen to 11 million. By 1993, it had climbed to 18.2 million. While presenting these figures, the UNHCR also acknowledged the difficulties of compiling them, as well as the many incentives that exist for people to evade official registration, so that the scale of the phenomenon is undoubtedly greater than these statistics suggest. The US government's Bureau for Refugee Programs concurs: "Given the fluidity of most refugee situations," it noted, "counting refugees is at best an approximate science."⁶⁰ Moreover, there are also fundamental definitional problems involved, especially because not only does the power to decide whether or not an individual fits this description necessarily lie with the admitting state, the state also, of course, further interprets the definition. Neither do these figures, and this definition, include those who, having been forcibly removed from their homes, nonetheless remain within the boundaries of their state, which other commentators and authorities would also classify, in effect, as refugees. If these are included, the UNHCR has concluded, 1 in 130 people in the world are currently in forced flight from their previous homes. The total number of officially recorded refugees and of other forcibly displaced people continues to grow; however, the global

picture is more complex than that statement suggests. Some places, such as Central America, Mozambique, Southeast Asia, and Afghanistan, have seen significant numbers of people returning to their homes. Repatriation does not, however, mean return to secure and settled existences. Most refugees return to lands devastated and permanently blighted by war, or to countries that continue to be ruled by brutally repressive political regimes. They therefore return to a life that often continues to be exposed to extreme danger. Large numbers of other people have, however, settled more or less in the countries to which they have been forced to flee. Finally, such evidence does not cover large numbers of people who are also migrating for economic reasons, or for what are an indivisible mix of violent economic and political reasons. As one authority noted: "There may be as many refugees in the world as there are people who migrate in response to employment opportunities."⁶¹

The character and the proportions of the global phenomenon of mass displacement and of explicitly forced migration are many and varied. It can be said nonetheless that the reasons for it include a complex combination of war; violent political persecution, often on a mass scale; regional and global economic transformation in the form of the redistribution of capital, labor, and industry; environmental disaster; and civil conflict. The single most important current reason is, however, violent internecine conflict. Where refugees are concerned, the UNHCR concluded: "Virtually all of the refugee producing conflicts taking place in the world during the early part of 1993 were within states rather than between them."⁶²

The consequent dissolution of the markers of territorial and "national," or "ethnic," political certainty that accompanies these extraordinarily fluid and diverse flows of people also offers a fertile breeding ground for the development or intensification of xenophobic politics. Characteristically, these violently invent, reanimate, and assert new markers of certainty in the form of newly imagined and exclusively defined historical and ethnic identities, at least as violently hostile to the stranger within as the stranger without. The sheer scale of recent geographical mobility has, therefore, not only threatened to overwhelm the regime of international protection provided by international organizations, it also politically destabilizes individual states and mythic understandings of identity, while threatening to intensify "ethnicity" and the prospect of ethnic conflict between states. The buck thus returns to the institution that claims the privilege of being the place where the buck stops. It has come back in particular to the place from which the state in its current form arose; namely, Europe. Since 1989, Europe has become a cockpit both of state formation

and state dissolution, on a scale unprecedented since 1919, and of forced migration flows not seen since 1945. The breakup of Yugoslavia, for example, precipitated a refugee flow in Europe unprecedented since World War II. Nearly 4 million people from the former Yugoslavia have thus come to depend on international emergency assistance since late 1991. During the 1970s, the average number of registered asylum seekers in Western Europe was around 30,000 a year. By the end of the 1980s, the annual figure was more than 300,000. In 1992 it passed 680,000, of whom no less than 438,000 applied for asylum in the Federal Republic of Germany.

If the pattern of mass and manifold forced migration has been plural, although nonetheless largely precipitated by violent internecine conflict and domestic persecution, the responses to it in the last ten years have been similarly varied. But these, too, have been moving in a common direction. In effect governed by a combination of international, regional, and national regulation, established regimes of control at each of these levels now fear being overwhelmed by the scale of such movement and the abject need it creates. The UNHCR report to which I have referred was itself a response to the sense of crisis that overtook international agencies.⁶³ At the level of individual states, especially in Western Europe, widespread fear of mass influxes, not only of forcibly displaced people but also of economic migrants from the East (which has largely failed to materialize both because measures have been taken against it and because it did not happen on the scale many predicted), led to the apparent paradox of the European Union tightening its border controls at the periphery while simultaneously moving toward the abolition of border controls within the territory of the Union.⁶⁴ In the process, there has also been a considerable extension and harmonization of the governance of asylum, immigration, and visa arrangements among its member states, as well as the introduction of strict immigration regimes by states like Italy, which hitherto operated very relaxed forms of entry requirements, or parallel border controls negotiated bilaterally and multilaterally with Hungary and Poland, and the Czech and Slovak Republics, which now constitute Western Europe's border region.⁶⁵ Along with these developments has come an intensification of the tendency to criminalize strangers arriving as economic migrants, refugees, or asylum seekers, and to construe them not only as a danger but also as potential or real enemies.

Just as the global phenomenon of forced migration has challenged the system of international protection, so the growth of asylum seeking has challenged national asylum regimes particularly in Western Europe and North America. With an exponential increase

in the scale of such movement, a confusion of the categories that are employed to define, interpret, study, and regulate it rapidly takes place. Ways of talking about, and making sense of, population movement become equally confused, as the current excitement in the migration literature over new theories of migration testifies. This, in turn, radically disrupts the varied international, regional, and national regimes that resist and direct, channel and contain, reverse and accommodate these population flows. The flow of refugees seeking temporary relief quickly merges with that of asylum seekers requiring permanent protection and "economic migrants" searching for a more sustainable life; hence, the economic migrant's best strategy may be to appear as a refugee seeking asylum. The result has been as monumental a problem for government as it has been for sovereignty, with conflicts between the two, as, for example, the authorities of the United Kingdom balk at subscribing to European wide governance of these affairs. And that is not to suggest that the category *economic migrant* is in any way unproblematic. Quite the contrary—since many "economic migrants" are fleeing from conditions of violent political conflict and economic dereliction that have simply made life unsustainable in their homelands. Such fusion of categories has, together with the very significant reduction of legal opportunities for labor migration that took place in Western Europe, for example, with the severe economic downturn of the 1970s and early 1980s, contributed substantially to the discrediting of national asylum regimes and to the proliferation of restrictions and constraints placed upon asylum seeking, especially by West European countries, since the mid-1980s. Of the 272,000 officially registered individual applications for asylum considered by West European countries in 1992, for example, only 9 percent were granted refugee status under the terms of the 1951 Convention (an additional 29,000 were allowed to stay on humanitarian grounds).⁶⁶ Similarly, the current escalation in the mass displacement of peoples has fundamentally challenged many established and narrowly conceived, especially economic, theories of migration and foregrounded the vexed political aspects of such movement.⁶⁷

Our age is one in which, therefore, the very activities of their own states—combined regimes of sovereignty and governmentality—together with the global capitalism of states and the environmental degradation of many populous regions of the planet have made many millions of people radically endangered strangers in their own homes as well as criminalized or anathematized strangers in the places to which they have been forced to flee. The modern age's response to the strangeness of others, indeed the scale of its politically instrumental,

deliberate, juridical, and governmental manufacture of estrangement, necessarily calls into question, therefore, its very ethical and political foundations and accomplishments—particularly those of the state and of the international state system. In such circumstances, and given the often vaunted moral and political claims made on behalf of the state and of the system of states, as well as of so-called international society, we are increasingly left not knowing to what symbolic political space or regime we can entrust what we call freedom and humanity.

The way in which the advent of the stranger, particularly the stranger in need forcibly expelled from original place of residence and seeking admission to another, raises the question of the membership of a political community has not been overlooked in the contemporary literature of political theory and of international relations. Both Michael Walzer and Stanley Hoffman, for example, have addressed it.⁶⁸ But each has done so in a way that, because they are enframed within the very boundaries and bounded moral codes that the very advent of the stranger problematizes, fails adequately to address the ethical and political issues the stranger raises.

For each new arrival, especially one in dire need, raises a profound and inescapable question: that of the provenance of the native as well as that of the provenance of the stranger. “Where did you come from?” is a question that applies to each, equally. Each new arrival also, however, proposes a profound and inescapable truth: that of the common facticity of native and stranger in a provenance that they actually share in, but that nonetheless remains mysterious to them. Both of them, native and stranger alike, stands out, is disclosed in, the opening of existence itself. But who knows from whence they came or where they are headed? Thus, encountering the stranger, natives undergo a trial of estrangement that discloses the estrangement they, too, bear within themselves. Ultimately no one is at home in this encounter. Strangers to each other, each is also a stranger to himself, in that neither can be any more certain than the other of ultimate provenance or destiny. Neither the question, “From whence do you come?” nor the curious truth that neither knows, but that this is what they nonetheless share in, can ultimately be turned away. Both the question and that truth always have to be addressed somehow. But where that question and its allied truth may lead, should either of them be welcomed and pursued, is precisely the challenge that, despite the very significant differences that obtain between them, thinkers who think like Foucault and the other philosophical suspects, whose resource I draw on here, face.⁶⁹ For the stranger, by his or her very nature as stranger, is out of the settled

modes of questioning, and the received understandings of truth and identity, as well as the laws, of which the community is comprised. And yet the stranger is there not only in all of the mystery that provokes the question, but also in all of the inescapable and shared facticity that demands a response. The mystery is compounded further because the stranger who comes as a suppliant is not the weaker or even the weakest of the parties concerned. The suppliant stranger is, quite simply, off the scale.

Being off the scale is, therefore, precisely what calls into question not simply the measures that the community takes in respect of the stranger, but the very measure by which the community constitutes and takes stock of itself: its own scales, the justice of its laws, and its regimes of governance. These scales have to be used, however, because they are the things at hand, but they are not the final judge, because the very status of the scales themselves—whether of legislation or cognition—is put in question by the advent of the stranger. Consequently, their use becomes no longer a mere technical application of their ordering function within and on behalf of the community, but a test of their responsiveness to the veritable excess of Justice (to use a Levinasian-Derridean term), to which the mere presence of the suppliant stranger attests, and in which both parties to this encounter (native and stranger), however obscurely, are mutually implicated.⁷⁰ That excess is curiously something that Walzer recognizes but does not—cannot?—think through. “At the extreme,” he concedes, “the claim of the asylum is virtually undeniable. I assume that there are in fact limits on our collective liability, but I don’t know how to specify them.”⁷¹ Emmanuel Levinas’s response to this would be a simple and direct one: Walzer cannot specify the limits because in fact there are none. That is the measure of the debt we owe the other.

Estrangement, then, is the mundane and concrete experience of that way of being that we call human, particularly in respect of belonging together with other human beings. Because it is not simply that the advent of the stranger must necessarily arise as a matter of definition with the inauguration of any political community, or ordering of population; their common estrangement is what the advent of every concrete stranger discloses to every native. Just as there is no identity without difference, so there can be no politics without this estrangement; that is to say, without the difference we bear within and in respect of our own selves as well as that between ourselves. It does so because that estrangement is a difference that, in both separating and joining (individuating yet also combining), poses the very problematic of the belonging together of human beings in their

individuation and of the ordering of the relations between individuals so constituted. Quite simply, it poses the issue of human being's belonging together in its very apartness, and so of how it is itself to assume responsibility for that way of being. This is a problem that can no longer be resolved within the boundaries of modern political order alone. And that is also why the political problematic of human estrangement is so evidently exposed within the domain of (inter)national politics.

The very act of delimitation by which a political community defines itself does not, of course, dispense with the issue of the stranger. For the limit, or boundary—the very mark of the actively constitutive process of differentiation that becomes so evident with the advent of every concrete stranger in need—is what also actually brings native and stranger together. What is, therefore, at issue in the domain of (inter)national politics is not only the way in which political space is demarcated; neither is it merely, and simultaneously also, the diverse ways in which the belonging together of native and stranger are addressed through the laws and customs of the political community and of the system of states. What is also fundamentally at issue—and this arises daily, as 1 in 130, at least, would no doubt testify—is how the very inherent otherness and strangeness of human being, as well as of individual human beings, is itself to be respected globally.

The issue of the stranger does more than merely pose the issue of the character of sovereignty and governmentality, and of the relationship between them in the modern order of (inter)national power. It also does more than merely pose the issue of how “we” should respond to strangers. It necessarily also poses the question of the ethical and the political themselves, and of the ethicality of our current politics. That, in turn, raises the matter of what it is that human beings share in, even as they constitute and occupy dwelling places—discrete networks of law, custom, and governance—from which they exclude others.

For just as the creation of a place simultaneously also displaces, so the law that is thus engendered for that place and the cognition that serves also to effect self-government throughout it, is simultaneously obliged to say not only how the stranger is to be received, but also how the strangeness that haunts all human being to which the advent of every concrete stranger calls attention, is to be welcomed. These are not separate and distinct processes. They are intimately related aspects of the same process by which sovereignty inaugurates a political community, even as governmentality orders the conduct of its population. Here, too, however, what Derrida calls “the very secret

duty of hospitality”⁷² is powerfully invoked as well. Even as it is equally powerfully denied, the force of the denial reflects the power of its call. That “secret duty” is not to be equated with Walzer’s “material aid,” which he regards as an obligation and, therefore, a limitation on the right of closure by which a political community is constituted. For the obligation to grant material aid is itself a limited one, governed by prudential policy considerations, whereas Derrida’s Levinasian-inspired “secret duty of hospitality” knows no limits. Rather, it is, instead, the measure of immeasurable Justice against which this material aid would itself be measured. And necessarily, of course, found wanting. But that is not the point. From the ethical, Levinasian perspective, to which Derrida is attracted and which he continuously articulates and develops in his own way, and whose logic I am pursuing here, it is not so much the gap between the claim that the other makes upon us and the reply that we give that matters, so much as the *fact* that, continuously haunted by it, we are human to the degree that we acknowledge and accede to it.⁷³

As we follow the trial of human estrangement, therefore, we come to appreciate and address the issues of freedom, politics, and justice differently, because they come to be posed differently. And we do so precisely because of the different way in which they show up in the truth of the constitutive (and thus ineradicable) hybridity, heterogeneity, and Otherness to which human being bears testament in itself as it is freely disclosed and individuated in the world through the difference to which the foreignness of the individual stranger—officially 1 in 130—inescapably alerts us.

Conclusion

Modern (inter)national politics forcefully recalls

- That the sovereignty of states is a peculiar fiction; that no nation is pure; that no community is complete or self-sufficient
- That no culture is original
- That no subjectivity exists outside the discursive practices that constitute it
- That the practices of subjectivization are simultaneously also practices of objectivization
- That all identity is mutable as well as hybridly heterogeneous.

Daily it discloses, also, that every unadulterated sovereign claim to nationality, community, ethnicity, subjectivity, or identity is constituted

by the most violent of exclusionary practices. Precisely because (inter)national politics repeatedly reinforces these lessons, it demonstrates, in an equally irresistible way, that the very insistence upon a uniform history, the very demand for a singular identity, or the very presumption of sovereignty result in the most extreme forms of internecine as well as international conflict. And this in a world where many state actors are in possession of weapons of species-threatening destruction, and non-state actors aspire to weapons of mass destruction.

Here it is, too, that we are continually taught that the lack of respect not simply for alternative cultures but for alterity as such—that is to say, not only other identities but for the ineradicable hybridity and heterogeneity of identity itself—leads directly to the systematic destruction of peoples. Meantime, the idea of human freedom is reduced to the regulated freedom of governance and consumerism, while the democratic impulse quails before the problem of order and the epistemic technology that promises to resolve it. The problematic of the political in late modern times is thus not staged by the dissolution of the Christian imaginary, but by the radical mutation of the resolutions (political modernity) that succeeded it. That, in turn, now sets the scene for the contemporary study of international relations, because it is an (inter)national issue with global implications.

Notes

1. I use the parenthesized term (*inter*)national in order to emphasize the radical interdependency, and mutually constitutive relationship, that obtains in contemporary politics between so-called domestic and international politics. Politics, among other things, is the boundary-drawing that is necessary for the production of the distinction between inside and outside upon which our modern political vocabulary so largely depends. R. B. J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1992), and David Campbell/Michael Dillon, eds., *The Political Subject of Violence* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1993) all make and pursue this point in various ways. William E. Connolly does so in a more general theoretical manner in his *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiation of Political Paradox* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). I am unhappy even with this way of calling attention to the construction of the inside and the outside that takes place in modern politics, however, because it still allows an unwarranted privilege to the notion of nation. See, from among the vast literature on nationalism, Homi Bhabha, ed., *Nation and Narration* (London: Routledge, 1990), and Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, rev ed. (London: Verso Press, 1991).

2. See, for example, Steven Lukes, ed., *Power* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). Power, discourse, and symbols seem to be most sensitively and persuasively observed by anthropologists. See, classically, Clifford Geertz, *Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), Abner Cohen, *The Politics of Elite Culture: Explorations in the Dramaturgy of Power in a Modern African Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), and Abner Cohen, *Two Dimensional Man: An Essay on the Anthropology of Power and Symbolism in Complex Society* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974).

3. Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things* (Brighton, Sussex, UK: Harvester Press, 1989), p. 312. Where this applies to the subjectivity of the state, I call this process “stat[e]ing states.” See, G. M. Dillon and Jerry Everard, “Stat[e]ing Australia: Squid Jigging and the Masque of State,” *Alternatives* 17, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 281–312.

4. Judith Butler, *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex* (London: Routledge, 1993).

5. See Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Clinic* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1976), and *The History of Sexuality*, Volumes 1–3 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987 and 1990). See also the essays in Colin Gordon, ed., *Michel Foucault: Power/Knowledge* (Brighton, Sussex, UK: Harvester Press, 1980).

6. Notably Campbell, note 1, James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro, eds., *International/Intertextual Relations* (New York: Lexington Books, 1989); and Walker, note 1.

7. This is not to suggest that the phenomenon of forced migration in Eurasia is historically novel. Neither is it meant to suggest that forced migration, asylum seeking, and the growth of the number of refugees is confined to Eurasia. On the contrary, whereas forced migration is a well-established European phenomenon, the incidence of refugee production and consequently also of asylum seeking has, at least since the ending of World War II, and with certain notable exceptions, been a largely non-European phenomenon.

8. See especially Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” *Ideology and Consciousness* 6, Autumn 1979: 5–22, and Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Brighton, Sussex, UK: Harvester Press, 1982).

9. Graham Burchall, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, “Political Power beyond the State: Problematics of Governmentality,” *British Journal of Sociology* 43, no. 2 (June 1992). But see also Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose, “The Tavistock Programme: The Government of Subjectivity and Social Life,” *Sociology* 22 (February 1988); Miller and Rose, “Governing Economic Life,” *Economy and Society* 19 (February 1990); Nikolas Rose, “Calculable Minds and Manageable Individuals,” *History of the Human Sciences* 1, 1988; Nikolas Rose, *Governing the Soul* (London: Routledge, 1990); and Peter Miller, “Accounting and Objectivity: The Invention of Calculating Selves and Calculable Spaces,” *Annals of Scholarship*, forthcoming, 1995.

10. See Pasquale Pasquino, “Theatrum Politicum: The Genealogy of Capital—Police and the State of Prosperity,” in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds., *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp. 105–119.

11. Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, with introduction and notes by George Schwab, trans., and comments by Leo Strauss (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1976).

12. Specifically in a series of courses he gave exploring the discourses of war and peace, and the origins of early modern political theory. See "Society Must Be Defended," "Security, Territory and Population," and "The Birth of Biopolitics" in Michel Foucault, *Resume des Cours, 1970–1982. Conférences essais et leçons du Collège De France* (Paris: Julliard, 1989). Pasquale Pasquino discusses these in his recent essay, "Political Theory of War and Peace: Foucault and the history of modern political theory," *Economy and Society* 22, no.1, February 1993: 77–88.

13. See Gerhard Ostreich, *Neostoicism and the Early Modern State* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

14. Foucault, note 8; see also Norbert Elias, *The Civilising Process*, Volume 1, *The History of Manners* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), and Volume 2, *State Formation* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982).

15. Foucault, note 8, p. 11

16. Eighteenth-century European conceptions of government articulated a notion of statistics, or science of state, in which the operation of government was to be made possible by the accumulation and tabulation of facts about the domain to be governed. From this, a huge labor of documentation and calculation followed. Population was one of the domains to be so governed. See Ian Hacking, *The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas About Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1975); and Ian Hacking, *The Taming of Chance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). See also Albert O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1977).

17. Technology is where Heidegger in effect begins to articulate what might be thought of as his understanding of the question of the political and what has become of it in the modern age. But what Heidegger means by technology can only be clearly established in the context of the entire way in which he poses not only the guiding questions of philosophy—the question of Being—but also by reference to what he says became of that question in the metaphysical history of Western thought. His argument is not only more encompassing than that, for example, of those who see technology and rationalization as a pathology of the Enlightenment; it is significantly different inasmuch as, for Heidegger, technology is integral to how Being more exhaustively withdraws itself in its sending. There is a large literature that both tries to elucidate and to appropriate Heidegger's understanding of technology. John Loscerbo, *Being and Technology: A Study In The Philosophy Of Martin Heidegger* (The Hague: Nijhoff Publishers, 1981) provides the most careful elucidation of the understanding of technology and how it relates to the body of Heidegger's philosophy. Michael E. Zimmerman, *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990) relates it more to Heidegger's politics and to the debate about modernity.

18. Foucault, note 8, p. 13.

19. Rose and Miller, note 16, p. 175.

20. Ibid.

21. See the accounts given by such a diverse range of thinkers as K. Dyson, *The State Tradition In Western Europe* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980), p. 152, Michael Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), especially the chapter on the modern European state, William E. Connolly, *Political Theory and Modernity* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988),

and Hans Blumenberg, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983).

22. Quoted in Foucault, note 8, p. 10.

23. Particularly in the essay "Two Lectures" in Gordon, note 5, pp. 78–108.

24. Foucault, note 5, Volume 1, "An Introduction," p. 144.

25. Foucault, note 12, *Resume*, p. 99.

26. Ibid.

27. Foucault, note 8, p. 19.

28. Dillon and Everard, note 3.

29. See, for example, Marc Raeff, *The Well Ordered Police State: Social and Institutional Change Through Law in the Germanies and Russia, 1600–1800* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); also Reinhard Koselleck, *Critique and Crisis. The Pathogenesis of Modern Society* (Oxford, UK: Berg, 1988).

30. See Michel Foucault, note 3.

31. See also Sheldon Wolin, *Politics and Vision* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961), especially chapters 7–8.

32. The idea of a political imaginary is adapted from Cornelius Castoriadis, *The Imaginary Institution of Society* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1987), with the aid also of Richard Kearney, *The Wake of Imagination* (London: HarperCollins, 1991).

33. See, of course, Friedrich Meinecke, *Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison D'Etat and Its Place in Modern History* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957).

34. Koselleck, note 29, p. 20.

35. Ibid.

36. See G. M. Dillon, "Modernity Discourse and Deterrence," *Current Research On Peace And Violence* XII no. 2, 1989; Dillon, "The Alliance of Security and Subjectivity," *Current Research On Peace And Violence* III, 1990–1991; and Campbell, note 1.

37. See Blumenberg, note 21.

38. K. Dyson, note 21, p. 152.

39. For a further exploration of this idea through the notion of "stat[e]ing states," see Dillon and Everard, note 3.

40. See, for example, Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991) and Stephen Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space 1880–1918* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983). The relationship between cartography and the delineation of political space and thereby of political imagination has, of course, always been an intimate one. It is well illustrated in, for example, Peter Hopkirk, *The Great Game: Unsecret Service in High Asia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) and in Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), especially Chapter 2.

41. Radical hermeneutical phenomenology is meant, here, to refer to Heidegger's reworking of Husserlian phenomenology by reference back to Aristotle. See Michael Dillon, *The Political after Heidegger: Tragic Denial and Politics of Security in the Political Tradition of the West* (London: Routledge, forthcoming, 1996). See also John Caputo, *Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction and the Hermeneutic Project* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987).

42. Rose and Miller, note 16, op. cit., p. 174.

43. See Michael Shapiro, *The Politics of Representation* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988) and Shapiro, *Reading the Postmodern Polity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992).

44. Connolly, note 21.

45. Colin Gordon, "Governmental Rationality: An Introduction," in Burchell, Gordon and Miller, note 10, pp. 1–53.

46. For two exceptions see Maurice Pearton, *The Knowledgeable State: War and Technology Since 1830* (London: Burnett Books, 1982) and Christopher Dandeker, *Surveillance, Power and Modernity: Bureaucracy and Discipline from 1700 to the Present Day* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1990).

47. Connolly, note 21, p. 177.

48. See, especially, the essays in Campbell/Dillon, note 1.

49. Foucault, quoted in Peter Goodrich, *Legal Discourse: Studies In Linguistics, Rhetoric and Legal Analysis* (London: Macmillan, 1990), p. 157.

50. Stephen Gill's Gramscian reading in his *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), could be reinterpreted this way, especially, despite important differences, because of the affinity between Gramscian ideology critique and Foucauldian critical discourse analysis. On this last point, see Michelle Barrett, *The Politics of Truth: From Marx to Foucault* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1991) and Norman Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1992). Gill himself has moved somewhat in this direction also: see his essay, "The Global Panopticon? The Neoliberal State, Economic Life and Democratic Surveillance," *Alternatives* 20, no. 1 (1995): 1–50.

51. See Jessop's review of Jyrki Iivonen, ed., *The Future of the Nation-State in Europe* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1993), in *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 24, no. 1, 1995: 157–158.

52. Jacques Derrida, *Aporias* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 17.

53. In this respect, I sympathize with Hannah Arendt and would speculate about the application of Arendt to this modern ethicopolitical difficulty. See, for example, Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958).

54. See how Jacques Derrida works these themes in three of his more recent works: *Aporias*, *The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), and *Specters of Marx* (London: Routledge, 1995).

55. See, especially, the reviews of the literature in Aristide R. Zolberg, "The Next Waves: Migration Theory for a Changing World," *International Migration Review* 23:3 (Fall 1989): 403–430 and Christopher Mitchell, "International Migration, International Relations and Foreign Policy," *International Migration Review* 23:3 (Fall 1989): 681–708.

56. Plato, *The Republic*, with an Introduction by Desmond Lee, 2nd Edition (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1987), p. 127.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 127.

58. *Ibid.*, p. 128.

59. *The State of the World's Refugees: The Challenge of Protection* (New York: United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 1993), p. 163.

60. Quoted *ibid.*, p. 146.

61. Aristide R. Zolberg, "The Next Waves: Migration Theory for a Changing World," *International Migration Review* 23:3 (Fall 1989): 414. See also the fine range of essays in *International Migration Review*, special issue, "The New Europe and International Migration" 26, 1992.

62. *The State of the World's Refugees*, note 61, pp. 13–14.

63. See A. Zolberg, *Escape from Violence: The Refugee Crisis in the Developing World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

64. This is a necessary corollary of the 1987 Single European Act that came into effect on January 1, 1993. But, since the 1985 Schengen Agreement, nine member states of the European Union have been committed to establishing common external border controls, abolishing internal controls between the member states, and to introducing a shared computer database on asylum seekers, illegal immigrants, and people with police criminal records. Seven of the nine put these measures into effect at the end of March 1995. Other agreements are designed to enable "hot pursuit" by police across borders and to put out surveillance requests on suspects in other countries. The Dublin Convention of June 15, 1990 complemented and extended these developments. Signed as one of the collective measures taken by members of the European Union toward the realization of a single market, and the elimination of controls at internal Community borders, it sets rules for determining the state responsible for examining applications for asylum; elaborates the circumstances and conditions that govern the transfer or readmission of applicants between member states; provides for the mutual exchange of general information and information on individual cases between member states; and provides certain safeguards for the protection of that data. At the same time, member states of the Union reaffirmed their obligations under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol; expressed their determination to guarantee adequate protection for refugees, in keeping with their "common humanitarian tradition"; and made provisions for the coordination of arrangements between them in respect of examining applications for asylum. See *The State Of The World's Refugees*, note 61, Annex II.10. Explaining the politics of the United Kingdom's convoluted and exceptional relation to these developments, particularly its insistence upon maintaining its own intra-Union border controls, would require another essay. See also J. Niessen, "European Community Legislation and Intergovernmental Cooperation on Migration," *International Migration Review*, 24, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 676–684.

65. A considerable amount of research has been done on migration into and out of these countries, as well as documentation of the growth of border controls and the implementation, with the assistance of Germany and the encouragement of the European Union, of strict immigration regimes. Much of it has been sponsored by the International Organisation for Migration; see, for example, *Transit Migration in the Czech Republic*, *Transit Migration in Poland*; *Transit Migration in Bulgaria*; and *Transit Migration in Ukraine* (Geneva: International Organisation for Migration, 1994). See also the essays in *International Migration Review*, note 63.

66. *The State of the World's Refugees*, note 61, p. 37.

67. Claire Wallace, et al., "The Eastern Frontier of Western Europe: Mobility in the Buffer Zone," Migration Project, Central European University: Prague, 1995; B. Schmitter-Heiseler, "The Future of Immigration Incorporation: Which Models? Which Concepts?" *International Migration Review*, 26, 1992.

68. Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983) and Stanley Hoffman, *Duties Beyond Borders* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1981).

69. Heidegger, Derrida, and Levinas.

70. For further discussion of the Levinasian approach to the question of the ethical and its implications for politics, see Campbell/Dillon, note 1, David Campbell, "The Deterritorialisation of Responsibility: Levinas, Derrida and Ethics," *Alternatives* 19: 4, Fall 1994: 455–484, Simon Critchley, *The Ethics of Deconstruction* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), and Dillon, note 43.

71. Walzer, note 70, p. 51.

72. Derrida, note 56, *Aporias*, p. 8.

73. In *Specters of Marx*, note 56, Derrida refers not to the logic but to what he calls "the hauntology" of this claim.