

Introduction to Analytical Thomism

The first question that might occur to someone picking up the present volume for the first time is, what is Analytical Thomism? This is a very good question but one that is not easy to answer. The second part of the phrase is perhaps somewhat easier to respond to than the first, for “Thomism” can more readily be identified as referring to a particular corpus of thought, namely, the thought of Thomas Aquinas and the subsequent interpretation of his ideas. Analytic philosophers, on the other hand, are still relatively unclear about what “analytical” as in “analytic philosophy” is or what its possible connections to Thomism might be. Does analytic philosophy, for example, embrace a particular set of doctrines or beliefs? Most analytic philosophers would answer no. They would insist that whatever analytic philosophy is, and whatever its historical origins, analytic philosophy is today used by philosophers to argue for positions running the length of the philosophical spectrum – from various kinds of realism and idealism in metaphysics, to empiricism and rationalism in epistemology, and to non-cognitivism and utilitarianism in ethics. Is analytic philosophy, then, primarily a philosophical method, a particular way of doing philosophy? Again, most analytic philosophers would say that there is no particular method of doing analytic philosophy apart from giving high priority to rigorous argumentation and clarity of expression. But many philosophers (indeed, one would hope most philosophers) who would not normally be called analytic philosophers have given priority to sound argumentation and clarity of expression.

What, then, could analytical philosophy’s appeal be to Thomists, who certainly, in Aquinas, have a first rate example of a rigorous and disciplined philosophical and theological thinker? Do Analytical Thomists turn to analytic philosophy simply in order to “pick up” helpful techniques for assisting them in the interpretative clarification of specific aspects of Aquinas’s thought or are they more deeply drawn to the wellsprings of analytical philosophy because they hold that an analytical approach to philosophy, can, more effectively than traditional neo-Thomism, illuminate our critical understanding of the deepest conceptual foundations of his thought?

The nature of the relationship between analytic philosophy and Thomism raises, in the minds of many, the following line of questioning: must Analytical Thomists be committed to any of the traditionally framed doctrines of Thomistic thought? Must Analytical Thomists, for example, hold a philosophic commitment to some way(s) of rationally demonstrating (*or at least* defending the possibility of) the existence of God, specifically the God of Christianity? Or, must an Analytic Thomist, at least, be committed to supporting some form of hylomorphism?

These are all legitimate questions that anyone calling himself or herself an Analytical Thomist must, in due course, address, for he or she will, most assuredly, be pressed into addressing such questions *viz.* debate in the various channels of scholarly communication. *Analytical Thomism: Traditions in Dialogue*, was conceived of by us as just such a channel by which to invite well established, as well as newer and emerging scholars, in both Europe and the United States, to reflect on this crisscross of influence between analytic philosophy and Thomism, whether positively or negatively. As the reader will soon find out, the contents of this volume run the gambit of those who view the dialogue as a rapprochement between analytical philosophy and Thomism to those who are lukewarm or decidedly skeptical about the very possibility of a genuinely fruitful exchange of ideas.

Conscious as we are of the need for an introduction, especially in an edited collection, to provide the reader with something of an overview of its terrain, we think that this goal can best be achieved by outlining, albeit very briefly, something of the historical growth of Thomism, turning then to a brief account of how analytic philosophy in the twentieth century can be viewed in relation to that history, before finally turning to a further consideration of what the phrase “Analytical Thomism,” can be taken to mean in light of this brief historical account.

The history of Thomism can usefully be divided into a number of phases. Almost immediately after the death of Aquinas in 1274, parts of Aquinas’s philosophy met with condemnation, first by Bishop Tempier of Paris in 1277, then by the Dominican Robert Kilwardby and later by William de la Mare. Some of Aquinas’s fellow Dominicans came to his defense, however, such as William of Macclesfield and John of Paris and this resulted, fifty years later, in Aquinas’s canonization in 1323. By the time of John Capreolus in the fifteenth century, Aquinas was the favored philosopher of the Dominicans and they began to produce commentaries on the *Summa Theologiae*. These commentaries were written not only to spread Aquinas’s teachings, but also to combat the “rival” philosophies of Scotus and Ockham. Thus began the first phase of Thomism.

One of the consequences of the Council of Trent (1545–63) was the creation of new religious orders like the Jesuits, who, under the influence of Ignatius of Loyola, championed the philosophy of Aquinas. This in turn gave rise, along with the work of the Post-Tridentine Dominicans, to a new phase of Thomist thought, dominated by the commentaries of Cajetan, John of St Thomas, and the Jesuit works of Domingo de Soto, Luis de Molina and Francesco Suarez. By the time Aquinas had been named a Doctor of the Church in the sixteenth century, the two main schools of Thomistic thought were the Dominican in Italy and the Jesuit in Spain. This promising second phase of Thomism would end, unfortunately, in a heated dispute between these two schools over the vexed issue of grace and free will.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Thomism can be said to have fallen on “hard times” and nothing of any real enduring value was really produced by the Thomists of these centuries. By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, however, something of a renewal and revitalization of Thomism began

with the work of such thinkers as Tommaso Zigliara and Joseph Kleutgen, culminating in 1879 in Leo XIII's encyclical *Aeterni Patris*. As John Haldane has noted in "Thomism and the Future of Catholic Philosophy," the rebirth of Thomistic philosophy which *Aeterni Patris* occasioned, looked in two directions: (i) the "problematic" which sought to use the philosophy of Aquinas to respond to the philosophical challenges of the day, such as the idealism stemming from Descartes and Kant or the empiricism of Hume, and (ii) the "historical" which sought to use the latest techniques of textual analysis and historical research to uncover the "true" Aquinas by stripping away the accretions of later interpreters such as Cajetan and John of St Thomas.¹

Neither approach, of course, was without difficulties, but the most daunting task fell to those who wished to use Aquinas's insights to meet the philosophical challenges of the day. For one thing, these Thomists could not help but be influenced by the very philosophies they wished to engage. Though they were convinced of the essential correctness of many of Aquinas's basic philosophical theses, they could also appreciate the many insights of the philosophers and philosophies that they ultimately came to reject. They could see, in other words, that some of these ideas could actually be used to support, clarify and further advance some of Aquinas's basic philosophical and theological positions. Thus in Poland, for instance, the phenomenology of Husserl and his interpreters like Roman Ingarden, along with the work of Max Scheler, were incorporated in various ways into the philosophy of Aquinas, often with fruitful results. The most famous and successful example of this particular marriage was, of course, Karol Wojtyła's *The Acting Person*.²

Trying to effect a rapprochement or even synthesis between different philosophies is something of a "tricky business" and always runs the risk (charge) of distorting the philosophies being synthesized, as happened, in the eyes of many, with the development in the twentieth century, of "Transcendental Thomism." Kant had had a major impact on the thinking of many Thomists, and though most were inclined to reject Kantian idealism, some, such as Pierre Rousselot and Joseph Marechal, embraced the Kantian turn toward the subject. Marechal, in particular, found the starting point for metaphysics in the subject. He claimed, however, that Kant had failed to see that only an Infinite Being can ground or guarantee the phenomenal object. Kant had failed, in other words, to see that the inner dynamism of the operative intellect in the very synthesizing formation of the object of consciousness, required an absolute terminus. In effect, Marechal believed that Aquinas's metaphysical critique of the object could be successfully transplanted into Kant's transcendental critique of the object. Although Marechal's transcendental version of Thomism certainly had some very notable followers, for example, Bernard Lonergan, most Thomists (and Kantians) rejected this amalgamation of Aquinas and Kant as being an unworkable distortion of both philosophies.³

Other Thomists, influenced by continental philosophy, were, perhaps, able to effect more successful engagements between Thomism and other traditions of thought. Names that immediately come to mind here are Jacques Maritain and Étienne Gilson. These two thinkers generated a school of Thomism indebted to late

nineteenth and early twentieth century secular French philosophy (particularly French existentialism) and it became known as “Existential Thomism.”

Working initially under the influence of Henri Bergson and Maurice Blondel, Maritain’s conversion to Catholicism, and his subsequent study of the texts of Aquinas under the guidance of his French Dominican mentor Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, led him to embrace a version of Thomism based to a large extent on the commentaries of Cajetan and John of St Thomas. Maritain’s many books reflected what he took to be the perennial themes of Aquinas’s philosophy, such as the primacy of a metaphysics of *esse* understood as the act of being (*actus essendi*); the necessity for an intuition of metaphysical being as the proper starting point for Thomistic metaphysics; and in epistemology, the importance of the notion of truth as adequation. Though Maritain, in his philosophy, was certainly committed to many of Aquinas’s basic philosophical and theological propositions, he did not hesitate to draw on and adapt the secular philosophies of the day if he felt that they could support, clarify or advance his understanding of Aquinas’s basic positions. This is evident, for example, in his *The Degrees of Knowledge*,⁴ where he repeatedly marshals the instrumentalist views of such philosophers of science as Emile Meyerson, Emile Picard, Pierre Duhem, Arthur Eddington and James Jeans, in support of his perinoetic/dianoetic distinction in the order of knowledge. Maritain did not hesitate to use his knowledge of French existentialism to bolster his interpretation of some of Aquinas’s key metaphysical positions.

Some critics (Gilson among them) insisted that Maritain’s interpretation of Aquinas’s metaphysics, indebted as it was to the Dominican commentators, was too essentialist in tone and therefore missed the existential thrust of Aquinas’s metaphysics of *esse*. For Gilson, faithful to the texts of Aquinas as he believed himself to be, it was not simply Maritain’s use of the commentators that was so troubling, it was Maritain’s reliance on what Gilson took to be a kind of inverted Bergsonian intuitionism. For Gilson, there is no such thing as an intuition of metaphysical being, nor can anything like it be found in the texts of Aquinas. As he strove to argue in *Being and Some Philosophers*,⁵ Aquinas’s metaphysics is built on the understanding that being primarily means *esse* or existence, a being’s act of existing, which is not to be confused with its essence. As such, *esse* cannot be grasped via simple apprehension and so cannot be known through a concept. *Esse* can only be captured or known in judgments of existence. In order to be thought conceptually and raised to the metaphysical level, *esse* must be rejoined to essence and then brought under the operations of (i) abstraction, and (ii) separation in the form of a special negative judgment. For Gilson, our ability to know *esse* is dependent on, and grounded in, pre-conceptual sensory experience. And yet, for all his adherence to Aquinian textual authority, there is no doubt that Gilson wrote *Being and Some Philosophers* with his eye on the growing popularity of French existentialism and was also significantly influenced by it.

Thus by the mid-twentieth century there were at least three well developed schools of Thomism that sought to address the philosophical challenges of the day by effecting a rapprochement or synthesis with Aquinas’s thought – (i) the Lublin school in Poland, (ii) Transcendental Thomism and (iii) Existential Thomism.

Of those who chose the overtly historicist path, in the twentieth century, we can but note here the work of Joseph Owens in Canada, John Wippel in the United States, and in Europe the expository scholarship of the well known “Participation Thomists” – Cornelio Fabro and Louis Geiger.

While renewed interest in Aquinas’s philosophy resulted in the creation of new schools of Thomism, along with the creation of considerable first rate historical scholarship, Leo XIII’s encyclical *Aeterni Patris* also had the unfortunate effect of reinforcing a manualistic style of presenting Aquinas’s thought that had first arisen in the decades following the Council of Trent. The Catholic Church at that time had a strong need to systematize doctrine in the face of the growing challenges of the Protestant faith. To that end, and because Aquinas’s philosophy played a major role in the Catholic Church’s response to Luther and Calvin, Catholic theologians devised manuals that sought to summarize Aquinas’s arguments and conclusions in ways that could be more readily absorbed by Catholic seminarians and deployed apologetically. Useful, perhaps, in their own limited way, these manuals became the standard method of presenting Aquinas’s thought in the post-Tridentine Church.

When Leo XIII made Aquinas the “official” philosopher of the Catholic Church in 1879 (to be utilized, at the time, as an intellectual force against the challenges of modernism), he inadvertently created a need for more manuals of Thomistic instruction. Whatever their value to seminarians, the continued use of manuals, as well as the manual style of instruction in Catholic seminaries and colleges in the twentieth century, did more than anything else to give Thomism and Aquinas a “bad name” among non-Catholic philosophers. These manuals were often decidedly dogmatic, uncritical and dismissive of competing views. Since their primary purpose was to indoctrinate, they, at best, contained little in the way of redeeming philosophical value.

Consequently, in spite of the creation of new schools of syncretic Thomism after *Aeterni Patris*, the manual style of privileged pleading, alas, became all too readily identified with Thomism in general. If that was the thought of Aquinas, non-Catholic philosophers argued, then it was not really worth the trouble of getting to know it any further.

Distrust of Thomism and Thomists was thus widespread among non-Catholic philosophers in the twentieth century. If distrust of Thomists was strong among the continental philosophers, it was even stronger among analytic philosophers. Analytic philosophy had, early on, acquired a reputation for being a tough minded, no-nonsense approach to philosophy, whose practitioners tended to come from backgrounds in logic, mathematics and the hard sciences. It had also acquired a reputation, early on, for being dismissive of metaphysics (at least certain “bad” kinds) as well as being hostile to religion and values.

Although today’s analytic philosophers are quick to point out that such a reputation was only, in part, deserved, both the early Wittgenstein and Russell developed philosophies whose main task was the reductive analysis of ordinary language into what they called its true logical content, which ordinary language obscured. Now the true logical content of ordinary language was comprised of complex propositions and elementary statements of fact. Since the latter were held

to represent the world as it truly is, ordinary language claims that could not be so reduced or re-written, were simply dismissed as being “metaphysical” (in the bad sense) or “value-laden” claims. Of course, Wittgenstein and Russell certainly had their own ontologies, but it was the reductive aspect of these philosophies that most appealed to their positivist successors, who would ultimately give expression to that reductionism in the form of the verification principle of meaning.

By the 1930s, then, analytic philosophy was not inclined to give any sympathetic ear to the voice of Aquinas, dependent as it was on “bad” metaphysics. Whatever their disagreements with Frege’s supposed Platonism, virtually all analytic philosophers of the period agreed with Frege’s assessment of existence, that “An affirmation of existence is in fact nothing other than a denial of the number zero.”⁶ Consequently, no self respecting analytic philosopher of the period could, in good conscience, embrace a philosophy such as Aquinas’s, a philosophy that repeatedly made the mistake of treating existence as a real property, rather than as a second order property of concepts. Nor, of course, were Thomists inclined to give any major thought to analytic philosophy, convinced as they were (wrongly, as it turned out) of analytic philosophy’s hopelessly anti-metaphysical bias.

Breaking out of its short lived love affair with logical positivism, analytic philosophy would, however, soon open up to other influences and these would eventually lead to its becoming the multifaceted philosophical community of discourse that it is today. Perhaps the most important change in this regard was effected by Wittgenstein himself, when he abandoned his earlier view of language as the mirror of reality and embraced instead a multi-functional theory of language where use determines meaning. For Wittgenstein, the task of philosophy was no longer to uncover the structures of the world through a reductive analysis of the logical structure of language, but to describe the history of language’s use. The work of the later Wittgenstein, along with the breakdown of the verificationist principle of meaning, led to the near fall of logical positivism. After the fall of logical positivism, many analytic philosophers, released from this particular philosophical straitjacket, turned to such thinkers as Aristotle, and even Aquinas, for fresh philosophical inspiration and insight. Emerging conditions thus started to arise that would set the scene for the first stage appearances of what would, belatedly, become known as “Analytical Thomism.”

Of course, as historians of analytic philosophy have pointed out,⁷ analytic philosophy, from its very inception, was informed by ideas that Aquinas would have agreed with. Frege, for example (in spite of his take on existence), defended the objectivity of knowledge, and Brentano (in some ways the father of analytic philosophy) championed the intentionality of mental states, a Scholastic idea traceable to Aquinas himself. Hence much of the support for one side of a central debate in analytic philosophy, namely, the realist/anti-realist debate, was indebted to a medieval philosopher with a Scholastic and Aristotelian background.

As analytic philosophy began to “morph” in the 1950s, it’s center of operations began to move from Cambridge to Oxford, with the work of Gilbert Ryle and J. L. Austin. Though typically not associated with Aquinas in any way, both practiced philosophy in the spirit of Aristotle, with Ryle attacking Cartesianism in his *The*

*Concept of Mind*⁸ and Austin undertaking anthropological investigations in his “Plea for Excuses”⁹ that are decidedly reminiscent of Aristotle’s method of approach. Hence these two thinkers, each in his own way, caused analytic philosophers to look more carefully at ancient sources.

One of the most pressing areas where renewal, via a reexamination of ancient sources, was felt to be sorely needed, was in ethics. Logical positivism had left ethics dependent on emotivism, non-cognitivism and utilitarianism. Their only opposition came from proponents of various tired versions of Kantian deontology. It took someone of the philosophical stature of Elizabeth Anscombe to break the impasse. She would do so by bringing virtue ethics back into the mainstream of ethical discussion. Anscombe’s 1958 article “Modern Moral Philosophy,”¹⁰ marked the beginning of a small but influential movement within analytic philosophy to make virtue ethics respectable once again. According to Anscombe, the only way to overcome the limitations of emotivism, behaviorism, utilitarianism and Kantianism, was to seek to rehabilitate the whole notion of virtue.

If Anscombe sought to challenge the general condition that ethical discourse had reached by the mid-twentieth century, instigating something of an analytic shift towards renewed interest in Aristotelian-Thomistic ethics, Peter Geach, Anscombe’s husband, also had a major impact on the analytic turn toward interest in Aquinas. Geach was, like many analytic philosophers, primarily a logician, whose *Mental Acts* (1958)¹¹ attacked both abstractionism and dispositionalism as credible positions governing the structure of mental acts. Geach in particular attacked Ryle’s *The Concept of the Mind*. Here Geach objected, on logical grounds, to Ryle’s seemingly behaviorist account of mental acts. Mental acts, said Geach, are logically distinct from mental events. Geach also rejected what he took to be the standard reading of Aquinas on abstractionism, which, for Geach, boiled down to a kind of psychologis – the mind possesses a “sense” that enables it to consult its own inner experience, from which the “sense” in question then abstracts mental concepts. According to Geach, the mind does not simply abstract concepts that are exact or identical copies of things; the mind in some sense generates concepts. In other words, the mind uses its concept-forming power to know intelligibles, but the intelligibles that it knows are in part due to the power of the mind to know them.¹² *Mental Acts*, then, along analytic lines, can be seen to make a significant contribution to a Thomistic understanding of an important foundational concept in the philosophy of mind.

This does not complete this sketch of Geach’s seminal contribution to the rise of “Analytical Thomism,” for his chapter on Aquinas in *Three Philosophers*,¹³ co-written with Elisabeth Anscombe, is of crucial significance. That chapter represented a selective examination of themes central to Aquinas’s philosophy and sought to clarify mistaken interpretations of Aquinas’s thought in much the same spirit as *Mental Acts*. One of these, which would become a key focus for other Analytical Thomists, following Geach, is the often overlooked distinction that Aquinas makes between *esse*, or being, and existence in the *an est* sense. Confusing the two, argued Geach, is said to lead to a big conceptual muddle about God’s essence being the same as his existence.

Another major figure in the analytic turn toward ancient and medieval philosophy, and Aquinas in particular, was Anthony Kenny. Kenny was a Catholic priest who studied at the Gregorian University in Rome in the 1950s. Among his professors were Peter Hoenen and Bernard Lonergan, whom he says, both aroused his interest in Aquinas's philosophy. His interest in Aquinas was further energized when he went to study with Peter Geach and Herbert McCabe at Oxford. Some of the first fruits of that study were *Action, Emotion, and Will* (1963),¹⁴ *Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays* (1969)¹⁵ and *Will, Freedom and Power* (1975),¹⁶ all of which show, in various ways, Kenny's indebtedness to Aquinas's thought. Aquinas's influence is particularly evident in Kenny's *The Metaphysics of Mind* (1989).¹⁷ In this work, Kenny draws upon many elements whose intellectual roots are to be found in Aquinas's philosophy of mind. Kenny, for example, deftly shows how Aquinas's understanding of the relation between intellect and will, body and soul, has much to offer contemporary analysts grappling with the same problems.¹⁸

Kenny's later work, *Aquinas on Being*,¹⁹ examines Aquinas's theory of being in the light of Frege's philosophy and modern linguistic analysis. Here the contribution Kenny makes now works in the opposite direction, for contemporary analytical philosophy, as Kenny sees it, shows how Aquinas's theory of being is, at bottom, fundamentally incoherent in its basic metaphysical underpinnings.

Finally, the growing interest of a minority of analytic philosophers in the philosophy of Aquinas, following in the wake of Anscombe, Geach and Kenny, caused John Haldane, one of the leading lights of British analytic thought, and himself a Catholic philosopher very interested in Aquinas, to label this approach to philosophy "Analytical Thomism." Haldane, spurred on by the fruits of the labor of Anscombe, Geach and Kenny, has, in effect, called for a fourth renewal of Thomism, which would take its revitalization from a thoroughgoing dialogue with the method and concerns of analytic philosophy. For Haldane, such a renewal is the only way to save Thomism from, (i) useful but limited historical expositions of Aquinas's philosophy, and (ii) the not very rigorous neo-Thomist philosophy coming from the successors to Gilson, Maritain and the transcendentalists. Haldane believes that analytic philosophy has much to offer Thomism, and that were Aquinas alive today, he would in fact be something of an analytic philosopher. To this end, Haldane has published a number of influential papers, helping to generate interest among some philosophers (not all Catholics by any means) as to the importance of advancing this agenda. A significant contribution to this research was made in a 1997 issue of *The Monist*,²⁰ the whole of which was devoted to the subject of Analytical Thomism. It is there, in the Prefatory Note, that Haldane gives us a working definition of Analytical Thomism, one which enables us, at last, to supply the reader with at least a broad working definition of what the phrase "Analytical Thomism" stands for:

Analytical Thomism is not concerned to appropriate St. Thomas for the advancement of any particular set of doctrines. Equally, it is not a movement of pious exegesis. Instead, it seeks to deploy the methods and ideas of 20th century philosophy – of the sort dominant within the English speaking world – in connection with the broad framework of ideas introduced and developed by Aquinas.²¹

That issue of the *Monist* was followed by another of Haldane's articles that also helped promote the call for dialogue between Thomism and analytic philosophy, this time published in *New Blackfriars* (vol. 80, 1999), as "Thomism and the Future of Catholic Philosophy."²² The *New Blackfriars* article, further articulating Haldane's call for a cross fertilization between analytic philosophy and Thomism, is followed by twelve responses from philosophers and theologians who are, for the most part, sympathetic to the broad thrust of Haldane's call.

Our volume, *Analytical Thomism: Traditions in Dialogue*, seeks to further that trend in dialogue by adding to the small list of contributions published in this relatively new field of philosophy. The editors believe that Haldane's project has considerable merit, that analytic philosophy has much to offer Thomists and others interested in the thought of Aquinas, and that Thomists ignore the latest developments in analytic philosophy at their peril. We also maintain that Haldane is "on target" concerning the present state of Scholastic philosophy, for it is once again in need of renewal. That renewal, of course, need not necessarily come from analytic philosophy alone, but surely as one of the dominant approaches to philosophy in the world these past decades, analytic philosophy must surely play a major part in this renewal.

As the chapters in this volume demonstrate, the ensuing dialogue over "future prospects" is lively and spirited. Many of the contributors take various concepts active in analytic philosophy and apply them to problems that are of deep concern to analytic philosophers and Thomists alike. Thus chapters appear on the metaphysics/theory of being; meta-ethics, free will and determinism, natural theology, philosophical anthropology/philosophical psychology, natural law theory, and so on.

There has never been a time when Thomism was not in dialogue with the philosophies of the day and Thomists have always (even the historicists) viewed Aquinas through the interpretative lenses of their own philosophical and cultural milieu. This was true in every historical phase of Thomism; during the time of the earliest commentators combating Scotus and Ockham; during the time of Cajetan and John Poinsett, and the Jesuit appropriators of Aquinas after Trent; during the time of the traditionalists and ontologists in the eighteenth century; during the time of Zigliara and Kluetgen in the nineteenth century, and certainly after *Aeterni Patris*. Far from destroying Thomism, however, we strongly believe that this kind of "mingling" has always eventually brought about a renewal of Thomistic thought updating its contextual relevance as well as furthering its conceptual advancement.

Dialogue, if genuine, ought to go out of its way to include the opinions of those who may dissent from a positive understanding of the need for a fourth Thomistic renewal via engagement with analytic philosophy. Other articles in this volume reflect the response of some neo-Thomists to the work of Analytical Thomists. Needless to say, not all neo-Thomists are convinced of the compatibility of these two philosophical approaches. Few traditional neo-Thomists, as yet, are sympathetic to Haldane's mission, as we see in the chapters by Brian Shanley, Stephen Theron and John Knasas. It has to be noted, here, that most of the interest in Analytical Thomism, so far, has come from the side of analysis, not Thomism. As

its relatively short history shows, most of the people working in this field have found their way into Analytical Thomism from analytical philosophy; few have yet to find their way into Analytical Thomism from neo-Thomism. Given that the dialogue is still in its early stages, perhaps this demographic, given time, will change.

Be that as it may, perhaps the real value of a volume like this lies in its having, at the very least, drawn the attention of neo-Thomists to the work of analysts who use analytic philosophy to argue for many of the positions that Aquinas defended, and who as a result may now decide to look more carefully at the many riches of analytic philosophy itself. Clearly the former have found much that is of value in Aquinas. At the same time, we hope, Analytical Thomists too will consider, more carefully, the objections to Analytical Thomism raised by neo-Thomists and seek, in future, to more fully address them.

Notes

- 1 John Haldane, "Thomism and the Future of Catholic Philosophy," *New Blackfriars* 80 (April 1999), 164.
- 2 Haldane, "Thomism," 164.
- 3 For an excellent overview of the history of the development of Transcendental Thomism, see Gerald McCool, *From Unity to Pluralism* (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 1989).
- 4 Jacques Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge*, Gerald B. Phelan, trans. (New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959).
- 5 Étienne Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute for Medieval Studies, 1952).
- 6 Gottlob Frege, *Foundations of Arithmetic*, J. L. Austin, trans. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), 51.
- 7 For an excellent recent overview of the historical background to Analytical Thomism, see Fergus Kerr's "Aquinas and Analytic Philosophy: Natural Allies?" in *Modern Theology* 20:1 (2004), 123–39.
- 8 Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (London: Hutchinson, 1949).
- 9 J. L. Austin, *Philosophical Papers*, J. O. Urmson & G. J. Warnock, eds. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961).
- 10 Elizabeth Anscombe, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, Vol. III (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981).
- 11 Peter Geach, *Mental Acts: Their Content and Their Objects* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967).
- 12 Kerr, "Aquinas," 134–35.
- 13 Peter Geach, "Aquinas," in G. E. M. Anscombe & P. T. Geach, *Three Philosophers* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1961).
- 14 Anthony Kenny, *Action, Emotion and Will* (London: Routledge, 1963).
- 15 Kenny, ed. *Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976).
- 16 Kenny, *Will, Freedom and Power* (London: Routledge, 1975).
- 17 Kenny, *Metaphysics of Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

- 18 See also Kenny's *Aquinas On Mind* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1993).
- 19 Kenny, *Aquinas On Being* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
- 20 John Haldane, ed. "Analytical Thomism," *The Monist* 80:4 (1997).
- 21 Haldane, Prefatory Note.
- 22 Haldane, "Thomism," 164.