Tuesday, September 06, 2011

Cameron's immigration calamity posted by lenin

In The Guardian on the immigration figures and Cameron's troubles with the Right:

So why did Cameron make a futile promise that he knew would cost him politically? Partly, he is torn between his business allies, who favour a relaxed approach to immigration, and the lower-middle-class Tory bedrock, who would ideally like to inhabit the sort of all-white chronotope of modern Britain purveyed by Midsomer Murders. Cameron has attempted to manage this by triangulating. Thus, his cap on non-EU migration partially made up for his reneging on the "cast iron" guarantee to hold a referendum on the EU treaty. Similarly, he has made concessions to alarmism about immigration threatening "our way of life". Yet, under pressure from big business, he has relented, even promising last year to relax the cap on non-EU migration. Thus, while tending to give business what it wants, Cameron engages in strategic rhetorical tilts to one or other element in an unstable Tory coalition, in an attempt to prevent the whole from collapsing into fragments as it did over Europe in the 1990s.

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Saturday, September 03, 2011

Tower Hamlets: they did not pass posted by lenin


There are a few points that need to be made about the events in Tower Hamlets today, which marks a major defeat for the English Defence League and its supporters.  The EDL did not march in Tower Hamlets today.  A small number of their supporters eluded police control after the 'static' protest was finished, and eventually managed to make their way to Mile End, before being rounded up.  But the EDL did not march, stand, yell, or assault in Tower Hamlets today.  They attacked people, and had some ungainly fights with police officers.  'Tommy Robinson' himself showed up, disguised as an orthodox rabbi (yes), and was nicked for breaching his bail conditions.  Yet they did not set a foot in their intended target.  I did, they didn't.  So, to those points.  I should warn you that I'm about to claim vindication for a particular set of perspectives.  Though I'm aware that this can be boring - when have I ever been proven wrong? - it forms an important part of the analysis for why the EDL were so thoroughly defeated today.

First of all, the EDL suffered some of their worst defeats before they even arrived.  Having been unable to agree a static protest point with police in advance of their planned incursion, they attempted to organise various 'muster' points from which they would proceed.  They were shut out of Liverpool Street station by the RMT.  They were barred by the pubs on Euston after anti-fascists rang the bars up and let them know of the EDL's plans to gather there.  The attempt to offer them a rally in the car park in the Whitechapel Sainsburys fell flat, as both the mayor and Sainsburys objected.  (I should explain that this supermarket overlooks Whitechapel market.  Putting the EDL there to shout their racist filth and lob missiles and fire crackers would certainly have been a provocation.)  In the end, the EDL had to improvise a solution, finding a pub in Liverpool Street in which to get suitably Brahms and Liszt before negotiating a limited protest in a pen at Aldgate, outside the boundaries of Tower Hamlets.  All of their battles with police took place outside the borough. 

The fact that the EDL lost so much before they even started belies the simplistic idea that anti-fascist mobilisation is ultimately oriented toward a set-piece confrontation between fascist and anti-fascist posses.  It's a political argument, and a political struggle, in which anti-fascists are most likely to be successful when they counteract pressures to 'leave it to the police' and treat EDL activism as primarily a 'law and order' problem.  The evidence of UAF placards being hosted on Whitechapel market stalls and in business windows is suggestive of hard work having paid off.  Activists spent weekends giving out thousands of leaflets, holding rallies and meetings, and working hard to consolidate support for this sort of response to the EDL.  One of the major rallies hosted over a thousand people in the East London Mosque just one week after Breivik went on the rampage, and featured Norwegian socialists and trade unionists urging East Enders not to allow fascists and racists to march on Tower Hamlets.  That argument was evidently won among large numbers of people, and it counteracted the pressure to wind down the counter-demonstration and leave it to the police.  This is how racists and fascists are defeated: patient, grassroots work, preparing the ideological terrain, organising coalitions and disorganising the opponents' strategies as much as possible. 

The next point is this.  The victory against the EDL shows that it was right to have a counter-demonstration.  Many of those who campaigned for the ban subsequently asked people to stand down from any counter-protest.  This was for two main reasons.  The first is because they considered the Home Secretary's decision a 'victory' - a remarkably self-deceiving position, given what it actually entailed.  The second is that they feared the potential for violence. This underestimates the seriousness and discipline of those taking part, as no one had any desire to be provoked or allow some youth to be arrested if it could be avoided.  But what it also misses is that the counter-demonstration, by altering the situation on the ground and changing the calculations of the police, had a pacifying effect.  Had people stood down as asked, had the East London Mosque and others acquiesced in this appeal, then the scale of mobilisation would have been much smaller.  Had the counter-demonstration not taken place in Whitechapel, with large numbers of people gathered around the mosque, which was the racists' main target, the EDL would not have had such difficulty negotiating a protest point in Tower Hamlets - and quite possibly near the mosque itself.  This would have been disastrous, and one can all too readily envision how the EDL would have availed themselves of the opportunity presented therein.  In fairness, some of those who called for people to stand down actually participated in the event - not least Mayor Rahman himself, who spoke at the UAF rally.  So the argument against the counter-demonstration was ultimately overcome by the evidence that it was a worthwhile and important event.

Third point.  The Home Secretary used the call for a ban to impose a thirty day ban on marches in five London boroughs.  I think this is a deliberate attempt to set a precedent that can be invoked again in more testing circumstances.  The anti-fascists decided to make a point of defying this ban, in defence of a basic democratic right.  They marched down Whitechapel Road toward Aldgate and formed a barrier to prevent any attack on the mosque.  When it was clear that the EDL had been sent home without reaching their target, the anti-fascists broke through police lines, held a victory march back up the road, and were received in the East London Mosque.  The EDL didn't march in Tower Hamlets today: UAF did. 

As I said before, no one who signed the petition, nor even those who organised it, could have anticipated how the Tories would try to leverage this situation.  But the fact that they did underlines just how flawed the strategy of calling for a 'ban' is.  People naturally want a ban only on the EDL in such circumstances.  This is never what the state delivers.  What it actually does is impose a general ban on protests in the name of public order, which in practise mainly harms the anti-racists, anti-fascists and the Left.  So, now would be a good time to reappraise the strategy, especially given how much energy was subsequently expended on demobilising people in order to defend the 'gain' made in the Home Secretary's march ban.  And those who think it makes most sense to call for both a ban and a counter-demonstration should probably reflect on the fact that, in practise, each demand pulled in the opposite direction.

Here's some footage from today's 'victory' march:

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The Metropolitan Police and the EDL posted by lenin

If you want to understand why the police are not to be relied upon when dealing with the far right, this story offers part of the answer:


Scotland Yard has been accused of underestimating the threat from the English Defence League (EDL) after the head of the unit monitoring hate groups declared it was not an extremist organisation.
In an email obtained by the Guardian, Adrian Tudway, National Co-ordinator for Domestic Extremism, said he formed the view the EDL were not extreme after reading their website.
Today the EDL, accused by Muslims of fostering hate against them, will stage a "static" demonstration in Tower Hamlets, east London, in one of their most potentially provocative displays so far.
The Metropolitan police obtained a ban against a planned march through east London by the EDL, fearing clashes with anti-fascist groups and also the prospect of British Muslim youths taking to the streets to defend their communities against feared racist attacks.
British Muslims have claimed police have not done enough to protect them against the EDL.
In an email sent on 27 April 2011, Tudway told a Muslim group they should try opening up a "line of dialogue" with the EDL, who have been accused of staging attacks and directing hostility at British Muslims.
Tudway wrote: "In terms of the position with EDL, the original stance stands, they are not extreme right wing as a group, indeed if you look at their published material on their web-site, they are actively moving away from the right and violence with their mission statement etc.
"As we discussed last time we met, I really think you need to open a direct line of dialogue with them, that might be the best way to engage them and re-direct their activity?"

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Thursday, September 01, 2011

Not banning the EDL posted by lenin

This weekend, the EDL are attempting another incursion into Tower Hamlets.  Local community groups campaigned for a ban on the racists' march.  This was a miscalculation.  The government was never going to stop the EDL from coming to Tower Hamlets.  At best, they would impose a ban on marches and permit the EDL to hold a static protest.  In such circumstances, EDL members don't tend to have difficulty breaking out of any police pen and causing a ruckus.  But I doubt anyone anticipated that the Home Secretary would actually opt for something as unacceptably draconian as banning all marches in five London boroughs for thirty days.  This is an absolute gift to the government, who know very well that marches are coming up, and they shouldn't be allowed to get away with it.  As it is, my understanding is that the EDL intend to handle this by gathering at their various 'muster points' and 'walking' (ie marching under police protection) to their 'static' protest point.  So, in effect, they get their march through this symbolically important place for them, under police protection.

Let me be clear that from my perspective, this is not a 'free speech' issue.  The EDL are about physically terrorising people.  Their mode of organisation, involving squads of football casuals, is predicated on the expectation of physical violence, and they habitually do all they can to fulfil this expectation.  As Nina Power puts it in this piece: 

"It is clear to everyone that the EDL's motivation for marching in Tower Hamlets is far less about exercising its right to freedom of expression than it is to harass and intimidate the local Muslim population. The EDL itself has no qualms about attacking other protesters. The EDL's leader, Tommy Robinson, explicitly threatened student demonstrators last December, and the group violently attacked an anti-racist meeting in Barking in May, hospitalising a female NHS worker."

Nina's examples are hardly exhaustive, and I recognise and defend no right on their part to do this.  The problem with the banning strategy is not that it's 'illiberal', but that it is ineffective, counter-productive and demobilising.  It never results in a ban on the EDL, but always on all marches.  It never stops the EDL from showing up in the communities they intend to target.  And it undermines counter-mobilisation by local communities, especially if people get the misleading impression that the EDL have actually been banned (which they haven't).  Worse, the government's ban on all marches in five London boroughs, affecting a range of legitimate protests, is not simply a random consequence of the ban call.  There is a wider strategic issue on the Left and in the labour movement about how to respond to a whole range of problems, from cuts to racism.  The call for a ban segues into the broad strategy of 'winning hearts and minds', which in practise means avoiding confrontation or controversy.  This argument is made at length by bat020 here:

Despite all the hype about bans from the home secretary, in both Bradford and Leicester the EDL protests went ahead as so-called “static” demos. All that was banned were proposed marches that the EDL had applied for permission to hold.
In fact, the banning orders made no specific reference to the EDL, instead banning all marches in the city – including any anti-racist ones. So the EDL got to hold their static demos as they had done on every other occasion, including Stoke-on-Trent where they ran riot. In fact, it is common practice for the police to “escort” the EDL to their assembly point – thus creating a de facto march even when the protest is officially a static one.
Moreover, once the EDL has assembled for its rally, police efforts to contain them have been patchy to say the least. On almost every occasion groups of EDL have broken out of their pen and attempted to go on the rampage – in Stoke, Dudley, Bradford and Leicester.

...


Moreover, when legislation is passed giving the state powers to control protests, it is invariably framed in terms of “public order” rather than being deployed against racist or fascist groups. These supposedly “neutral” formulations are then used to crack down on the left and the right, or on the left rather than the right.
We can see this logic at work in the bans on marches mentioned earlier. We can also see it in historical examples. The 1936 Public Order Act banned political uniforms and required police consent for political marches – measures ostensibly directed against the Blackshirts. In practice these measures were deployed primarily against the left, striking workers and Irish Republicans. We can expect an identical pattern today.

...


But there is a deeper problem with the strategy of calling for state bans, above and beyond the documented ineffectiveness of such tactics and the risks of strengthening the state’s repressive apparatus.
The problem lies in the very gesture of appealing to the authorities to “do something”, rather than looking to our class’s own power. Capitalist society tries to structure our lives as powerless individuals, and capitalist ideology encourages us to think of ourselves as powerless individuals. Revolutionaries face a constant uphill struggle to counter these processes and instil collective self-confidence into the working class.
This is why the “common sense” position adopted by much of the left – that of supporting both counter demos and state bans – is problematic. In practice, the first of these works to mobilise a mass movement, while the second demobilises it. That is why those who formally adopt the “common sense” position in practice always tip one way or the other.
Searchlight’s latest policy shift moves from implicit to explicit demobilisation. They are now openly trying to dissuade people from attending counter demonstrations and undermine those who attempt to organise such protests. And Searchlight’s allies in Bradford and Leicester have gone further, branding anti-fascist counter demonstrators as an equivalent threat to the EDL.
The administrator of Hope Not Hate’s Facebook page for Bradford sent out a message on the eve of the demo declaring that “the UAF are just as dangerous” as the EDL. In Leicester, a councillor working with Hope Not Hate told the local paper: “People will have heard about the EDL’s plans to protest in Leicester on Saturday, and about the counter-protest planned by UAF. There is nothing we can do to prevent these demonstrations, but what we can do is to make it clear that any organisation that promotes hatred and fear is not welcome here.”
In fact Searchlight has for some time now been arguing against any anti-fascist tactic that involves mobilising large numbers of people. It opposes anti-racist music carnivals, claiming that such activity “drains and diverts activism away from local campaigning”. It opposes “rallies, marches and pickets” against the fascists on similar grounds – they are, allegedly, “a distraction from the real work required in the communities”. The nature of this “real work” is never very clear. In Bradford it involved getting people to sign a statement against the EDL that did not even mention the word “racism”.
But as the October 2010 issue of Searchlight makes clear, this strategy of demobilisation is not intended to be restricted to anti-fascism. Nick Lowles and Paul Meszaros write: “This debate over strategy reflects a wider debate in the trade union movement over direction and tactics. At the TUC conference there were clear lines of disagreement between those who preferred a strike-based approach to opposing the cuts and those who believed the focus needed to be on winning the hearts and minds of union members and then taking the campaign out into the community.” The tactics being used by Searchlight to demobilise anti-fascist activism are a test case. The intention is to use the same tactics to choke off militant action against cuts and job losses. “Winning hearts and minds” in a nebulous “community” becomes the excuse for scuppering strike action by actual workers.

So, we now have a situation where a very intense 'community' campaign did in fact win many 'hearts and minds'.  A petition calling for a ban was signed by tens of thousands of people.  The local political establishment largely supported the campaign, community groups ditto.  The government responded as they always do, by implementing a ban that seems to be far more aimed at the anti-fascists and anti-racists than the far right.  And now there are people claiming success, and many people believe that the EDL has been banned from 'protesting' in Tower Hamlets, which it hasn't.  The strategy has been a complete disaster.  In fact, the reality is that it has been a gift to the EDL, because the only circumstances under which they were going to be able to march through Tower Hamlets was if the government imposed a 'ban'.  That is why it is so important that the UAF counter-demonstration is going ahead.

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Wednesday, August 31, 2011

All they are saying is give war a chance. posted by lenin

Something I wrote for ABC Australia about Libya:


Libya, the source of so many American nightmares, is fast becoming an American dream. 
Reagan was tortured by Tripoli, and its big boss man, sassing the US. He imposed sanctions, and bombed the country, but had no peace. Bush the Younger was reconciled with the prodigal Colonel Gaddafi, but somehow this alliance seemed, well, un-American.
Obama, though, will have the privilege of being an ally of an ostensibly free Libya that he helped birth into existence. At minimal outlay (a mere $1 billion, which is peanuts in Pentagon terms), and with relatively few lives lost from bombing, a US-led operation has deposed a Middle East regime and empowered a transitional regime that is committed to human rights and free elections.
After the carnage of Iraq, such a simple, swift and (apparently) morally uncomplicated victory seemed impossible.
Lest we swoon too quickly, however, it is worth remembering that there are other ways to look at this.

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Tuesday, August 30, 2011

Libya's revolution disgraced by racism posted by lenin

Myself in The Guardian on the depressing racist killings in Libya:


"This is a bad time to be a black man in Libya," reported Alex Thomson on Channel 4 News on Sunday. Elsewhere, Kim Sengupta reported for the Independent on the 30 bodies lying decomposing in Tripoli. The majority of them, allegedly mercenaries for Muammar Gaddafi, were black. They had been killed at a makeshift hospital, some on stretchers, some in an ambulance. "Libyan people don't like people with dark skins," a militiaman explained in reference to the arrests of black men.
The basis of this is rumours, disseminated early in the rebellion, of African mercenaries being unleashed on the opposition. Amnesty International's Donatella Rivera was among researchers who examined this allegation and found no evidence for it. Peter Bouckaert of Human Rights Watch similarly had not "identified one mercenary" among the scores of men being arrested and falsely labelled by journalists as such...

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Monday, August 29, 2011

The war on terror and the Left posted by lenin

My article for the Australian progressive literary journal, Overland, is a retrospective piece on the impact of the 'war on terror' on the Left, focusing on the US:


The wars go on, interminably, but the ‘war on terror’ is over. Liberties lost have yet to be regained. Secret prisons, kidnapping and torture continue to operate, with the connivance of a post-Bush administration. Still, the war on terror is finished.
Now that it’s over, can we figure out what it was?
Common sense on the Left holds that the war on terror was an adventurist project for reshaping a strategically significant energy-producing region in the interests of the American ruling class. As a corollary, it enabled an authoritarian retooling of participating states in dealing with internal foes, under the rubric of ‘counter-terrorism’ – but the dominant logic was geopolitical, driven by competition between the US and potential rivals such as China and Russia, and centring on the control of energy resources. If the US controlled the oil spigot, then it could reduce the flow of oil to its rivals and impede their ability to grow. However, the wager on military force failed, the argument runs, leaving the US in a weaker position. The termination of the war on terror marks a strategy-shift signposted by the ‘realists’ in the Democratic Party, such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, who favour consolidating US hegemony through tighter alliances with the EU and others.
This analysis has its strengths, but I wish to make a slightly different argument. If the war on terror was a bid to advance US hegemony internationally, it could also be understood as an attempt to restructure relations of force domestically, tilting them in favour of business and a stronger coercive state. The same sequence was repeated in numerous advanced capitalist states, notably those that explicitly allied with Bush, suppressing some of the emerging crises afflicting US-led neoliberal capitalism and decisively weakening oppositional forces for a time.
The Bush administration, however, ultimately rested on a narrow and highly unstable bloc, susceptible to the instability unleashed by its own policy gambles. By 2005, the occupation of Iraq was going badly, and the war was beginning to channel multiple sources of discontent with the administration, both among elites and popular constituencies. The administration that departed in 2008 was a lame duck. Even so, some of the political forces mobilised by the war on terror have had lasting effects that continue to operate in the context of the recession and the Obama presidency.

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Racist vengeance in Libya posted by lenin

"This is a bad time to be a black man in Libya," reports Alex Thomson in this worrying segment:


There is frightening evidence of racist killings taking place across Libya as elements in the opposition-cum-regime now act on the unfounded rumours that "African" mercenaries acted as Qadhafi's fifth column.  As Kim Septunga reports:

Around 30 men lay decomposing in the heat. Many of them had their hands tied behind their back, either with plastic handcuffs or ropes. One had a scarf stuffed into his mouth. Almost all of the victims were black men. Their bodies had been dumped near the scene of two of the fierce battles between rebel and regime forces in Tripoli.

 "Come and see. These are blacks, Africans, hired by Gaddafi, mercenaries," shouted Ahmed Bin Sabri, lifting the tent flap to show the body of one dead patient, his grey T-shirt stained dark red with blood, the saline pipe running into his arm black with flies. Why had an injured man receiving treatment been executed? Mr Sabri, more a camp follower than a fighter, shrugged. It was seemingly incomprehensible to him that anything wrong had been done.

There have been lynchings, mass arrests and beatings previously.  A painted slogan of the rebels in Misrata read, "the brigade for purging slaves, black skin".  But this, taking place as it does in the aftermath of triumph, is a qualitatively distinct phase, and it is a disgrace to the original emancipatory upsurge.  I argued previously that the more conservative, bourgeois elements in the opposition had every reason to promote racist scapegoating.  Since they had no interest in revolutionising Libyan society, it made perfect sense for them to say that the problem is just Qadhafi and some imported mercenaries, that all of Libya was united against the dictator and would throw him off were it not for the fifth columnists.  By mobilising the elements of racism that had thrived under Qadhafi, it displaces social antagonisms that are internal to Libya, reflecting class and other divisions, onto a nationalist plane.  No one need think of expropriating the wealth of the capitalist dissident if they're busy usurping the life of the black worker.  I also argued that this was one area in which the rebels could even do worse than Qadhafi.  If racism was never the dominant motive in the rebellion, it was nonetheless a motive of those dominant in the rebellion.  The prisons of Benghazi and elsewhere would not have filled with black and immigrant workers without the approval of the rebel leadership.  The coming days will tell whether this barbarism is to last.  I suspect the pressure from the new regime's international sponsors will be to come down hard on it, as racist lynch mobs tend to make a fool of anyone calling them - I don't know - "human rights dissidents".  But the new regime does have a promise to keep with the EU, viz. upholding the blockade on immigration from Africa to Europe, which will tend to institutionalise racist practises.

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Sunday, August 28, 2011

Gilbert Achcar and the decent left posted by lenin

Gilbert Achcar separates the decent from the indecent left:


At the onset of NATO’s Operation Unified Protector in Libya, the main justification for it was that Gaddafi’s forces would massacre the resistance and civilians living in the places taken by the resistance, especially Benghazi. What has been learned since then about how likely such a scenario was?
In situations of urgency, there is no better judge than the people directly concerned, and there was unanimity on that score.  Did you ever hear of any significant group in Benghazi opposed to the request of a No-Fly zone made to the UN and advocating another way to prevent Gaddafi’s troops from taking the city?  ... Anyone who from far away disputes the fact that Benghazi would have been crushed is just lacking decency in my view.  Telling a besieged people from the safety of a Western city that they are cowards – because that’s what disputing their claim that they were facing a massacre amounts to – is just indecent.
That’s about the balance of forces.  What about the likelihood that if Benghazi had fallen there would have been a massacre?  Isn’t that still a matter of speculation?
No, not at all.  Let me first remind you that the repression that Gaddafi unleashed in February, from the very beginning of the Libyan uprising, was much greater than anything else we have seen since then.  Take even the case of Syria: today, several months after the protest movement started in March, it is estimated that the number of people killed in Syria has reached 2,200.  The range of estimates of the number of people who were killed in Libya in the first month alone, before the Western intervention, starts at more than that figure and reaches 10,000.  The use by Gaddafi of all sorts of weapons, including his air force, was much more extensive and intensive than anything we have seen until now in other Arab countries.
... When Adolphe Thiers’s forces took back Paris at the time of the Commune in 1871, with much less lethal weaponry they killed and executed 25,000 persons.  This is the kind of massacre that Benghazi was facing, and that is why I said under such circumstances – when the city’s population and the rebellion requested, even implored the UN to provide them with air cover, and in the absence of any alternative – that it was neither acceptable nor decent from the comfort of London or New York to say, ‘No to the no-fly zone’.  Those on the left who did so were in my view reacting out of knee-jerk anti-imperialism, showing little care for the people concerned on the ground.  That’s not my understanding of what it means to be on the left. [Emphases added]

How have we come from "a legitimate and necessary debate" to decrying opposition to NATO intervention as "indecent"?  How has this lifelong anti-imperialist made this symptomatic descent into the trope of decency, the corollary of an attempt to morally browbeat opponents?  It is probably indicative of a certain insecurity in Achcar's position.  Let me explain.  Achcar maintains that Benghazi was facing a massacre on a scale of Thiers' crushing of the Paris Commune - implicitly, by virtue of superior weaponry, it would be an even greater massacre in relative terms.  If Achcar's example holds, then a proportionately similar massacre in Benghazi would have involved the systematic and indiscriminate killing of at least 8,000 people in a short space of time.  Leaving aside the question of decency for a second, and also leaving aside the possibility of non-military resolutions to this crisis (no one else bothered to pursue this, so why should I?), have we any reason to doubt that something like this would have happened in the event of Benghazi being conquered?

We do.  Taking Achcar's example further, a proportionately similar massacre in Misrata would result in the systematic and indiscriminate killing of about 5,000 people in a short space of time.  But Human Rights Watch documents a total of 257 deaths over the first two months of war in the city of Misrata, including both combatants and civilians (though the majority are estimated to be combatants).  Misrata suffered some of the worst, most sustained fighting.  Its recapture by Qadhafi's forces during March would have provided the opportunity for a horrendous, indiscriminate massacre with thousands of executions.  Yet nothing of the kind occured.  Estimates of the total number of deaths vary, of course, and it is unlikely that HRW documented every single death.  The highest estimate I've seen for the city is from a news report in mid-May, where the total number of deaths on all sides, from all war-related causes, was estimated at 1,000+.  This is suggestive of deaths resulting from insurgency and counterinsurgency.  In fact, there do not seem to be any documented massacres approaching the scale Achcar refers to, despite Qadhafi's advances in reclaiming much lost territory during the war.  So, the entire case for the no-fly zone is indeed based on speculation.  There are good grounds on which one may doubt it.

Deferring the question of decency for yet another moment, there is another problem here.  Achcar depicts a range of estimates of deaths resulting from killings in the first month alone as ranging between somewhat higher than 2,200 and as high as 10,000.  It is quite correct that Qadhafi went further, faster in repressing the rebellion than other Arab states had thus far done.  Libyan police forces had opened machine gun fire on protesters.  As the rebellion spread, Qadhafi opted to force a war on the opposition, presumably calculating that he stood a better chance of survival if he shifted the battle onto a terrain where had a clear advantage.  Yet even given this, there is as yet no credible basis for the figure of 10,000 killed in the first month alone.  Achcar has previously attributed this figure to the ICC.  In the interview, the source for the estimates given is a Wikipedia entry, which cites an IRIB report attributing the figure to the ICC.  In fact, the figure originates from a report initially posted on Twitter by the newspaper Al Arabiya, citing the comments of a Libyan ICC member based in Paris who claimed that after just one week of rebellion, the regime had killed 10,000 people and wounded 50,000.  Bear in mind, that's not deaths on all sides and from all causes - it's regime killings during a single week.  And it's not well founded.  At the same time as this claim was being circulated, HRW put the total deaths at about 233.  By the end of February, the UN general secretary estimated about 1,000 deaths.  So Achcar misattributes his claim and gives it a credence it does not merit - the author of The Arabs and the Holocaust is not at his forensic best here, to put it no more strongly than that.

In fact, it was not until mid-June that such a figure was cited by a credible source.  This was when the UN war crimes expert, Cherif Bassiouni, estimated that after four months of fighting including NATO bombing, there were potentially between 10-15,000 dead on all sides, both civilian and combatant.  Parenthetically, Bassiouni's inquiry had presented evidence of war crimes by Qadhafi's forces, including attacks on civilians, as well as some by the opposition.  But he did not allege indiscriminate massacres, and certainly nothing approaching a scale warned of by Achcar.  So, there are yet further reasons to doubt Achcar's case that a massacre of close to ten thousand in one city alone was afoot in late March.  We have not yet broached whether it would be decent to do so, but we'll come to that.

Another problem with Achcar's line of argument is that he refers to a "no-fly zone" as if this was what was under contention.  It is now at the tail-end of August, and the argument over a no-fly zone has long since been passe.  The UN resolution went far beyond a no-fly zone.  NATO's intervention likewise went beyond a no-fly zone, involving a combination of bombardment, intelligence and special forces operations which subordinated the rebel movement to the military and political direction of external powers.  This was precisely what was anticipated by the knee-jerk anti-imperialists.  (Hitchens, much as one hates to cite him in this context, had a point when he used to say that a knee-jerk is a sign of a healthy reflex).  But if there were reasons to doubt the idea of a coming massacre in Benghazi, and if the argument was not over a limited measure to prevent that outcome (a 'no-fly zone'), but rather over a more comprehensive intervention to subordinate the revolt to US interests, then what is left of Achcar's strictures?  As he himself makes clear in the interview quoted above, the figures are important to his case.  "One must compare the civilian casualties that resulted from NATO strikes with the potential civilian casualties that they prevented through limiting the firepower of Gaddafi's forces towards rebel-held populated areas."  If he is right, then the intervention saved lives.  If there is any reason for doubting it, then his position begins to look problematic.  It won't do to pretend that such doubts amount to a claim that Benghazi rebels who supported intervention were "cowardly" - it's possible to understand the terrible position they were in, and the fears that they had of repression at Qadhafi's hands, without ceding the right to make an independent judgment.  On the other hand, if a massacre really was afoot, and NATO intervention the only way to prevent it, is Achcar's critical-non-support and decent-non-opposition as wholesome as his strident posture suggests?  Is anything short of active lobbying to secure the necessary intervention, even with all caveats and criticisms, "acceptable"?  It begins to look like a very unstable, improvised and ultimately mealy-mouthed position.  In fact, despite the strengths of his analysis, I think there are important aspects of his interpretation of events that have been flawed from inception.

For example, he began by asserting that Washington's interests indirectly and temporarily coincided with those of the opposition, in the following way: Qadhafi was likely to perpetrate a massacre to rival that in Hama in 1982.  This would have obliged the US to seek an oil embargo against the regime which, at a time of rising global energy costs, was not sustainable.  The invasion of Iraq notably came just as world oil prices were showing a structural tendency to rise.  The only condition under which the US was prepared to relax sanctions against Iraq would be in the event of Hussein's overthrow.  So, "regime change" became the mantra.  Similarly, when Qadhafi's continued tenure threatened to drive up oil prices further, the US had an interest in overthrowing him.

Achcar continues to support this argument, but it falls down on a number of grounds.  The first, obviously, is the dubious status of this coming massacre, leaving aside how the US would have been 'forced' to respond.  The second is the actual imposition of sanctions affecting Libyan oil companies beginning in February.  The third is the the fact that the US has not shown any sign of being particularly worried by high oil prices - indeed, while Achcar interprets the war on Iraq as an attempt to free up oil and reduce prices, he must be aware that one predictable consequence of the invasion and occupation of Iraq was to drive up energy prices to record highs.  There is one more objection that we'll return to.

The above has some important implications.  The imposition of the oil embargo, for example, was an important aspect of NATO's war, blocking the government's attempts to raise revenues.  It meant that the opposition leadership could gain recognition, trading rights and permission to sell oil and thus survive as a viable material force calling itself a government - provided it satisfied its US and EU sponsors.  So when Achcar asserted that NATO was deliberately drawing out the war and frustrating the rebels' chances of success, in order to give them time to bring the transitional council fully under control, he was arguably in denial about the extent to which the opposition was already fully under control.  (In fact, the NATO strategy stands completely vindicated on military grounds alone.  The targeted bombing, preventing the concentration of Qadhafi's forces and encouraging the fragmentation of the regime, ensured the opposition's ultimate success at minimal outlay and no real risk to NATO forces).  If further evidence that Achcar is in denial on this score is needed, consider that he continued to depict the opposition leadership as "a mix of political and intellectual democratic and human rights dissidents", long after this had become a completely unrealistic and unworldly representation ignoring the multitude of former regime elements, businessmen, military figures, and people like Khalifa Hifter, who have no earthly business being called "human rights dissidents".  It is they, people like General Abdallah Fatah Younes and Ibraham Dabbashi, who were the earliest and most vociferous advocates of an alliance with NATO.  It is those elements whose hand was strengthened by NATO's intervention. 

The biggest problem, though, is that his analysis of US strategy is far too reductionist, taking no account of the serious strategic cleavages evident at the top of the Washington foreign policy establishment.  Some of the realists expressed a fear of being dragged into yet another Middle East 'quagmire'.  Others were convinced that if Qadhafi was overthrown by a popular revolt, there would be a vacuum of authority in which jihadis would thrive.  But the strongest supporters of intervention were 'humanitarian interventionists', whose case was similar to that of the liberal hawk, Anne-Marie Slaughter (who I believe has been an advisor of Obama on foreign policy).  To wit, there's an expanding young and educated population in the Middle East, which has been deprived of political channels and economic opportunity, and which will therefore be a major problem for the US unless American power seems to champion their interests.  The US, it is thus argued, must respond to this revolutionary wave by siding with reform and not just the old guard dictatorships.  Leave aside the empirical basis of this analysis - it is sufficient to note that it is taken seriously by influential sectors of the US foreign policy elite.  As such, the intervention can be seen less as a war for oil than an attempt to cohere a response to a revolution that threatened US control, limited enough to minimise the worries of realists and defence establishment figures like Robert Gates and Carter Ham while giving the US a chance to rebuild its 'humanitarian' credit.

This is what the indecent left opposed: not the staving off of a hypothetical massacre, but the predictable, successful hijacking of a popular revolt by imperialist powers in alliance with the relatively conservative elites dominant in the transitional council.  By moralising about the decency or otherwise of anti-imperialist arguments, and pinning so much of his argument on the invocation of humanitarian emergency, Achcar obscures the politics of intervention.  The question at stake was and is: should the population of Libya rule Libya?  Since intervention ensured that the answer would be "no", it was correct to oppose it.

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