Mazari may refer to:

Mazari tribe, a prominent Baloch tribe settled in Rajanpur and Sindh, Pakistan

Abdul Ali Mazari, Afghan Hazara leader of Hizb-e-Wahdat

A local of Mazar-e-Sharif city in northern Afghanistan

Shireen Mazari, prominent Pakistani political analyst

Cannabis, Strain of Cannabis, Mazar x Skunk1

name	Abdul Ali Mazari
president	Hezbe Wahdat Islami Afghanistan
term start	1989
term end	March 1995
birth date	1946
birth place	Chahar Kint, Balkh, Afghanistan
profession	Politician
party	Hezbe Wahdat
religion	Shia Islam
death date	March 1995
death place	Ghazni, Afghanistan }}

Abdul Ali Mazari () was a political leader of the Hezbe Wahdat during and following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Mazari was an ethnic Hazara, and believed the solution to the internal divisions in Afghanistan was in a federal system of governance, with each ethnic group having specific constitutional rights.

Early life

An ethnic Hazara, Abdul Ali Mazari was born in the village of Charkent, south of the northern city of Mazari Sharif. Hence, the surname, "Mazari". He began his primary schooling in theology at the local school in his village, then went to Mazari Sharif, and later to Qom in Iran, and to Najaf in Iraq.

Political life

In Iran, Mazari was imprisoned and tortured for being accused of conspiracy against the Shah of Iran in assistance with Iranian clerics.

Simultaneously with the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Red Army, Abdul Ali Mazari returned to his birthplace and gained a prominent place in the anti-Soviet resistance movement. During the first years of the resistance, he lost his young brother, Mohammed Sultan, during a battle against the Soviet-backed forces. He soon lost his sister and other members of his family in the resistance. His uncle, Mohammad Ja'afar, and his son, Mohammad Afzal, were imprisoned and killed by the Soviet-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. He also lost his father, Haji Khudadad, and his brother, Haji Mohammad Nabi, in the rebellion and resistance movement.

Hezbe Wahdat

Abdul Ali Mazari was one of the founding members and the first leader of the ''Hezbe Wahdat'' ("Unity Party"). In the first party congress in Bamiyan, he was elected leader of the Central Committee and in the second congress, he was elected Secretary General. Mazari's initiative led to the creation of the ''Jonbesh-e Shamal'' or (Northern Movement), in which the country's most significant military forces joined ranks with the rebels, leading to a coup d'état and the eventual downfall of the Communist regime in Kabul.

Civil War

After the fall of Kabul, the Afghan political parties agreed on a peace and power-sharing agreement, the Peshawar Accords. The Peshawar Accords created the Islamic State of Afghanistan and appointed an interim government for a transitional period to be followed by general elections. According to Human Rights Watch:

The Hezbe Wahdat initially took part in the Islamic State and held some posts in the government. Soon, however, conflict broke out between the Hazara Hezbe Wahdat of Mazari and their archenemies, the Wahabbi Pashtun Ittihad-i Islami of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf supported by Saudi Arabia. The Islamic State's defense minister Ahmad Shah Massoud tried to mediate between the factions with some success, but the cease fire remained only temporary. As of June 1992, the Hezbe Wahdat and the Ittihad-i Islami engaged in violent street battles against each other. With the support of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan Sayyaf's forces repeatedly attacked South Western suburbs of Kabul resulting in heavy civilian casualties. In December 1992, Hezbe Wahdat resigned from the government and entered in an alliance with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and General Abdul Rashid Dostum.

Taliban era and death

In March 1995, the Taliban invited him for a political dialogue on an alliance against the Islamic State but then arrested him along with his five companions in Chaharasyab, near Kabul. At that time, a majority of the Hezbe Wahdat fighters were already questioning Mazari's authority as they wanted to align themselves with the Islamic State against the Taliban. The following day Mazari was killed and thrown out of a Taliban helicopter during flight over Ghazni. The Taliban issued a statement that Mazari had attacked the Taliban guards while being flown to Qandahar. Later his body and those of his companions were handed over to Hezb-e Wahdat, all mutilated and showed signs of torture. Mazari's body was carried on foot from Ghazni in the west to Mazar-e-Sharif in the north of Afghanistan by his followers over a period of forty days. Hundreds of thousands attended his funeral in Mazar-i Sharif. He is regarded a national hero and father of the nation by the Hazara people.

See also

Hazara people

Hezbe Wahdat

References

External links

Tabaro-Baghe-Gole-Sorkh - Poetry about Abdul Ali Mazari at BabaMazary.blogfa.com

Picture gallery at Picasaweb

Category:1946 births Category:1995 deaths Category:Hazara people Category:Hazara politicians Category:Afghan warlords Category:Afghan anti-communists Category:Hezbe Wahdat politicians

de:Abdul Ali Mazari fa:عبدالعلی مزاری fr:Abdul Ali Mazârî id:Abdul Ali Mazari it:Abdul Ali Mazari nl:Abdul Ali Mazari ja:アブドゥラ・アリー・マザリ no:Abdul Ali Mazari ps:عبدالعلي مزاري pl:Abdul Ali Mazari ru:Абдул Али Мазари uk:Абдул Алі Мазарі

Honorific-prefix	General
Name	Muhammad Musa
Order	10th Governor of Balochistan
Term start	17 December 1985
Term end	12 March 1991
Alongside
President	Muhammad Zia-ul-HaqGhulam Ishaq Khan
Primeminister	Muhammad Khan JunejoBenazir BhuttoGhulam Mustafa JatoiNavaz Sharif
Succeeding
Predecessor	Sardar Gul Mohammad Khan Jogezai
Successor	Lieutenant General Khushdil Khan Afridi
Order2	4th Governor of West Pakistan
Term start2	18 September 1966
Term end2	20 March 1969
Alongside2
Vicepresident2
Viceprimeminister2
Deputy2
Lieutenant2
Monarch2
President2	Field Marshal Ayub Khan
Primeminister2
Governor2
Succeeding2
Predecessor2
Successor2
Constituency2
Majority2
Order3	4th Army Commander-in-Chief
Term start3	18 September 1966
Term end3	20 March 1969
Alongside3
Vicepresident3
Viceprimeminister3
Deputy3
Lieutenant3
Monarch3
Primeminister3
Governor3
Succeeding3
Predecessor3	Field Marshal Ayub Khan
Successor3	General Yahya Khan
Constituency3
Majority3
Birth date	October 20, 1908
Birth place	Quetta City, Baluchistan, India
Death date	March 12, 1991
Death place	Quetta City Balochistan Province
Birthname	Muhammad Musa Khan Hazara
Nationality	Pakistani
Party	None (Military Governorship)
Otherparty
Partner
Relations	Sardar Yazdan Khan
Alma mater	Indian Military Academy
Religion	Islam- (Shia Muslim)
Blank1	Chief Minister of Balochistan
Data1	Jam Ghulam Qadir KhanZafarullah Khan JamaliNawab Akbar Khan BugtiTaj Muhammad Jamali
Data5
Allegiance
Branch
Serviceyears	1935−1965
Rank
Unit	106th Hazara PioneersFrontier Force Regiment
Commands	Chief of Army Staff, Pakistan Army
Battles	World War II Waziristan Operation Burma Campaign North African Campaign Indo-Pakistan War of 1947Indo-Pakistan War of 1965
Awards	Hilal-i-JuratOrder of the British EmpireHilal-i-Pakistan
Military data5	}}

General Muhammad Musa Khan Hazara H.Pk., HJ, HQA, MBE, IDC, psc (موسى خان) (1991−1908), was the Commander in Chief of Pakistan's Army. He succeeded Field Marshal Ayub Khan, who assumed the Presidency of Pakistan.

Early Life and Military Career

He was the eldest son of Sardar Yazdan Khan, born in a Shia Muslim, Hazara family hailing from Quetta, Pakistan. Khan was from the Sardar family of the Hazara tribe; a tribe native to Balochistan, Pakistan. He was a "Naek" (Junior Non-Commissioned Officer) in the "106th Hazara Pioneers" who went to train at the Military Academy in Dehra Dun as a cadet and graduated with the first batch of the British King's Commissioned Officer on 1 February 1935. He was posted to the ''6th Royal Battalion'', the ''13th Frontier Force Rifles'' as a "Platoon Commander" in 1936. He took part in the Waziristan Operations in 1936-1938 and in World War II, where he served in North Africa.

Senior Appointments

He served with distinction in the Pakistani Army and rose to the rank of the commander in chief of Pakistani Armed Forces during President Mohammad Ayub Khan’s regime (1958–1969). His promotion to commander-in-chief saw suppression of seniors: Maj Gen Sher Ali Khan Pataudi and Maj Gen Latif Khan, and Maj Gen Adam Khan, all Sandhurst, Berkshire|Sandhurst]] graduates of 1933. GENERAL MUHAMMAD MUSA INTER COLLEGE QUETTA was named after him.

Political career

After General Musa retired from the army, President Ayub Khan appointed him as the Governor of West Pakistan from 1967 to 1969. After serving for a few years, he retired and settled in Karachi. In 1987, he was once again involved in politics. He was appointed Governor of Balochistan Province by the then President General Zia-ul-Haq. In Balochistan, Governor General Musa dissolved the provincial assembly in December 1988. However, the Balochistan High Court restored the assembly amid public condemnation of Governor's move. The step towards dissolving the assembly was believed to have been taken with the consent of the President and Prime Minister.

Career with Pakistan Army

General Mohammed Musa commanded the Army in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, and had overall responsibility for operations throughout the conflict. As Army Chief, he was criticised for not anticipating an assault across the international border. However he was given credit for blunting the Indian offensive towards Sialkot during the Battle of Chawinda. He has narrated the events and experiences of the war in his book "My Version". In the book he has given accounts of the secret war that was going on in Kashmir between the two countries, long before the real war actually began.

General Muhammad Musa is the author of his autobiography, ''Jawan to General'' in which he describes his lifetime experiences from a simple foot-soldier rising to become a general.

Army Chief

Muhammad Musa was the Chief of Army Staff, Pakistan; he succeeded Field Marshal Ayub Khan, who was then President. He was the oldest son of Sardar Yazdan Khan. [ Duplication, see above: ]He was a Naik (junior officer) in Hazara Pioneers and went to the Indian Military Academy in Dehra Dun as a cadet and graduated with the first batch of the Indian commissioned officers. He was posted to the 6th Royal Battalion, the 13th Frontier Force Rifles as a Platoon Commander in 1936. He took part in the Waziristan Operations in 1936-1938 and in World War II, where he served in North Africa. He served with distinction in the Pakistani Army and became the commander-in-chief (C in C) of Pakistan Armed Forces during President Mohammad Ayub Khan’s regime (1958–1969). In the War of 1965, Indian Army attacked West Pakistan from Lahore border, with 600 tanks and 5 time bigger force than Pakistan Army, General Muhammad Musa defended the country with heart and soul. The Wahaga battle field became the graveyard of Indian tanks.

Operation Gibraltar

General Mohammad Musa, who commanded the Army in the 65 War, gave his account of how the Indians surprised the GHQ, the C-in-C and the Supreme Commander Field Marshal Ayub Khan on September 6, 1965. Narrates Musa in his book "My Version":

India launched her ignominious, undeclared and blatant aggression on our homeland at about 0330 hours on 6 September. The Supreme Commander was informed about the invasion by Air Commander Akhtar of the Pakistan Air Force, who was on duty at the Air Defence Headquarters at Rawalpindi on night of 5–6 September. Indian troop movements cross the frontier had been reported to him by the border posts of the PAF Wireless Observer wing. The President then rang me up to ascertain whether or not GHQ had received any information about the Indian attack and the whereabouts of the field army that morning.

General Musa describes the genesis of the surprise Indian attack on 6 September in his own words: The then Foreign Minister Mr Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and the Foreign Secretary, Aziz Ahmed spurred on by Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, who was commander of our troops in Azad Kashmir, pressed the Government to take advantage of the disturbed situation in the valley and direct the Army to send raiders into Indian held Kashmir for conducting guerrilla activities there and to help, on a long term basis, the locals in organising a movement with a view to eventually starting an uprising against the occupying power.

Continues the former C-in-C in his book, the sponsors and supporters of the raids had at last succeeded in persuading the President to take the plunge that led to an all-out armed conflict with India' .......

The concept of sending infiltrators in the Indian held Kashmir, code named Gibraltar was the brain-child of the ministry of Foreign Affairs but General Musa assumed full responsibility for the development of the concept, its planning and coordination of the entire operation. He says:

After the Government finally decided that deep raids should be launched in Indian-held Kashmir, I directed Commander 12 Division, Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, to prepare a draft plan for the operation, code-named 'Gibraltar' in consultation with GHQ and within the broad concept we had specified. GHQ approved it after making certain changes in it. With the help of sand model, he went over the final plan in Murree before it was put into effect on 7 August 1965 under our overall control. The Supreme Commander and his Military Secretary were present. He also agreed with it. I was accompanied by the CGS (Major General Sher Bahadur) and the Directors of Military Operations and Intelligence Brigadiers Gul Hasan and Irshad Ahmed Khan respectively. No civil official attended this briefing.

Broadly the plan envisaged, on a short-term basis, sabotage of military targets, disruptions of communications, etc. and, as a long-term measure, distribution of arms to the people of occupied Kashmir and initiation of a guerrilla movement there with a view to starting an uprising in the valley eventually. The push towards Akhnur was not part of it. However, it was considered as one of the likely operations that we might have to undertake, as we felt our activities would have an escalating effect.

Nevertheless, when the Indians started attacking and capturing Azad Kashmir territory in Tithwal and Haji Pir Pass areas, we decided to hold them in these places and retaliate by threatening Akhnur through the Chamb valley in order to release the pressure in the north.

The simple truth emerging from the preceding statement of General Musa is clear in that, while the concept of 'Gibraltar' did originate from the ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Musa, whatever he might say after the event, went along with it in a half heartedly and non serious manner leading to the downfall of President of Pakistan General Ayub Khan via Tashkent Agreement.

The loser in the final analysis was Pakistan, described so feelingly by General K.M. Arif in an analysis carried by "Daily Dawn", 6 September 1990. How and why Pakistan blundered into war .......... At that time, the policy making in the country was highly personalised. The institutions were weak and by-passed. Pakistan's Foreign Office with Mr. Aziz Ahmed as the Foreign Secretary and Mr. Z.A. Bhutto as the Foreign Minister called the martial tunes. It had miscalculated that despite operation Gibraltar, the fighting was likely to remain confined inside the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Foreign Office is on record to have assessed that India was not in a position to risk a general war with Pakistan......for inexplicable reasons the General Headquarters based its operational plan in Kashmir on a wishful logic. The misplaced ego, the high ambition and the naive approach of a selected few , plunged Pakistan into an armed conflict. The outcome of the war, or the lack of it, eclipsed Ayub Khan's position.

At a briefing arranged at SSG Parachute Training School at Peshawar in the presence of two senior officers, Lt. Col. Abdul Matin, the Commander of No. 1 Commando Battalion, now retired and the brilliant Operations Staff Officer Maj. E. H. Dar, (Later Major General E. H. Dar) the Air Force Chief was told that only a pre-emptive operation like the Israeli crippling raids against the front line Arab State's air bases as in 1956 Arab-Israel War, could have probability of success. To this, the Air Chief observed that a decision to carry out pre-emptive operation as suggested could only be taken by the Government (meaning President Ayub Khan). Technically the observation made was correct but in that case the operation should have been based on the hypothesis of pre-emptive alone. There was also objection by the Military Operations Experts to the dropping of Para commandoes in Kashmir with no equivalent of French Maquis to hide, feed and organise their escape and was tantamount to suicide.

General Musa Khan, Field Marshal Ayub Khan's C-in-C, was the archetype of the loyal commander. But after him Ayub appointed another favorite, Yahya Khan. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto set up a ' Liberation Cell ', which included people like:

Mr Aziz Ahmed

Mr Nazir Ahmed

Mr Ayub Buksh Awan

Mr NA Farooqi

Mr Ahmed

Mr Altaf Goher (although the latter did not attend any of the meetings)

General Musa, Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Army at that time, confirms the existence of this 'Cell', which was set up in August 1964. The majority of the members of this 'Cell' were from the 'Qadiani sect’, he pointed out.

When this ambitious plan was first sent to the GHQ, General Musa opposed it and wrote the following points to the President Ayub Khan:

Guerrilla war in Kashmir can only be successful if the people of Kashmir take part in it, and in my opinion we need more time to prepare people for this.

During the guerrilla war if India realized that it is losing the war in Kashmir, she will attack Pakistan.

As long as Pakistan is not in a position to defeat India militarily, we should not venture such operation in Kashmir.

In order to defeat India we need more army, better arms and better training.

General Musa asked for money to set up two more army divisions to face the challenge. General Ayub in principle agreed with this idea, but the Finance Minister Mr Shoaib persuaded him against this by saying that the Pakistan economy cannot afford it. And this idea was dropped. It is ironic that no such army was raised before the start of the ‘Operation Gibraltar’ or during its operations, but after the war, in the same month, two divisions were set up.

According to Brigadier (R) Farooq, General Musa was a simple man. He gave his opinion about the 'Operation' and then did not make it a matter of pride and remained quiet. If he and General Sher Bahadur who also opposed the idea, had resigned then there would have been no 'Operation Gibraltar'.

A top level meeting was held at the Headquarters of the 12th Division in May 1965. Once again, General Musa opposed the plan, and to this President Ayub Khan said: "Musa I have been assured by the Foreign Office that India would not be involved in a full scale war". When both General Musa and General Sher Bahadur said that if we are to start a guerrilla war at that level, it is very likely that India would react and attack Pakistan. President Ayub Khan reacted by saying: "We will have to take heart sometime".

Apart from the assurance to which President Ayub Khan made reference that India would not attack Pakistan, Pakistani planners of this ‘Operation’ were led to believe that India is not in a position to launch attack against Pakistan until 1966 or 1967. It was emphasized that we do not waste any more time, and start our action as soon as possible.

Musa says in his book, 'My Version' that the Kashmiris of the Valley were not taken into confidence about the ‘Operation’ that was to be started to liberate them. He wrote:

We had not even consulted the public leaders across the cease fire line about our aims and intentions, let alone associating them with our planning for the clandestine war...

The people of the area to be 'liberated' must have to be taken into confidence, if the people organizing this gigantic task really meant business. Without the help of the local people outside army cannot win a war or even survive. Not only the people of Kashmir living on the other side of the cease fire line were not taken into confidence, also the people of Azad Kashmir, even the Azad Kashmir Government was not taken into confidence. When the ‘Operation’ was put into practice then the planners realized the need to have some Kashmiri support. They already had set up a Liberation Council, and compelled by circumstances they announced that Choudhry Ghulam Abbass was leading this Liberation Council.

Choudhry Ghulam Abbass was already very annoyed with this, he immediately rejected that in a news statement in the Daily Nawa E Waqat the following day:

"I have nothing to do with all this, and I did not know anything about an 'Operation'."

General Musa confirms the above position, he said:

"Because of the haste with which the ‘Operation’ was launched, even Azad Kashmir leaders were not taken into confidence by the advocates of Guerrilla raids. Helplessly they remained in the background. Their co-operation was also very necessary and would have been very helpful. They could have assisted the mujahideen in various ways by themselves."

K H Khurshid, who was the secretary to Mohammed Ali Jinnah, and also Prime Minister of Azad Kashmir Government commented:

"I firmly believe that Ayub Khan was not fully aware of the reasons for the war of 1965. Foreign Office, Home Ministry and some senior officers from the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs which included A B Awan, Nazir Ahmed, Aziz Ahmed and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, prevailed on him and assured him that it is only a small programme which would not lead to a war with India. Ayub Khan who offered India ‘joint defence’ would not have agreed to a full scale war with India.... These men wanted to weaken Ayub’s hold on the government, and this is the real reason why he was so angry with them after the war."

Ayub Khan was assured by his advisors and the Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, that India would not cross the international boundary to attack Pakistan. The Indian leaders and ministers were clearly saying that if Pakistan did not stop its adventure in Kashmir, then the conflict could spread to other areas. But Pakistani leaders did not take these threats seriously until the direct Indian attack on the Pakistani cities of Lahore and Sialkot in order to release the pressure on the retreating Indian forces in Kashmir.

Some critics say that the operation was "deliberately mis-planned to topple or weaken Ayub Khan". This has been very controversial, but whatever its real motives, it resulted in a full scale war between India and Pakistan. The Security Council arranged a cease fire on 23 September 1965.

General (R) Musa Khan died on 12 March 1991 in Quetta.

Photo gallery

There is also a college named "General Muhammad Musa Inter College Quetta" in Quetta city of Pakistan

References

External links

Official profile at Pakistan Army website

http://www.hazaralover.ning.com = Iftekhar Hussaini

|-

Category:Chiefs of Army Staff, Pakistan Category:Pakistani generals Category:Pakistani Shi'a Muslims Category:Shi'a politicians Category:1908 births Category:1991 deaths Category:Pakistani autobiographers Category:Governors of Balochistan, Pakistan Category:PHF presidents Category:Hazara people Category:Hazara people in Military Category:People from Quetta Category:Hilal-i-Jur'at

ps:موسی خان sl:Musa Kan Hazara

name	Shireen Mazari
birth date
death date
residence	Islamabad, Islamabad Capital Territory
citizenship	Pakistan
nationality	Pakistan
fields	Political Science
workplaces	Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS)Quaid-i-Azam University
alma mater	London School of Economics and Political ScienceColumbia University
spouse	}}

Shireen M. Mazari, PhD, is a Pakistan political scientist and a prominent geostrategist, currently serving as Director-General of the Foreign Affairs Tank (FAT) of the Pakistan Movement of Justice. She is currently working as the editor of the daily ''The Nation'' newspaper and as the Spokesperson on Foreign Affairs of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf political party. She has also served as the Director General of The Institute of Strategic Studies, a think-tank based in Islamabad and was until recently a regular columnist at the daily ''The News International''. She former served as professor of Military Science at the Quaid-e-Azam University.

Mazari was removed from her position as editor of ''The News'' after charging that journalists and aid workers were operatives for the US Government and the CIA. She cites American pressure in these episodes, a charge that both the government and ''The News'' administration deny.

Education

Mazai attended the London School of Economics and Political Science where she gained a B.Sc. with (Honours), followed by double M.Sc. in Military Science and Political science from the same institution. Mazari then traveled to United States where she attended the Columbia University. At there, she was awarded a Ph.D. in Political Science where her dissertation contained a comprehensive studies on Military history, geostrategic, and the foreign policy of Pakistan.

Career

Academic career

Mazari formerly was an Associate Professor and then Chairperson of the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.

She served as the Director General of The Institute of Strategic Studies, a research think-tank based in Islamabad until 2008. She was removed from this position in May 2008 before the end of her contract in August 2009, supposedly at the insistence of the United States, a point Mazari maintains despite United States denials. Former Foreign Secretary Ambassador Tanvir Ahmad Khan replaced her.

Journalist and editor

Mazari was the Publisher and Editor-in-Chief of ''Weekly Pulse'', from 1993 to 1999. She has also stayed as a regular columnist for ''The News International'' newspaper, writing for the daily as recently as 3 September 2009. She left the paper claiming American intrusion. Addressing a news conference, Mazari said that the US is poking its nose in all affairs of Pakistan, and when she started writing columns critical of the US policies in the region, the US Ambassador exerted pressure on the newspaper's management to suspend her writing.

''The News International'' team, however, denied this allegation, and issued a clarification.

Barely four days after leaving ''The News'', she was offered the editor position at ''The Nation''. She took over this position on 7 September 2009 vice Arif Nizami who was earlier sacked by his uncle and the Waqt Media Group editor-in-chief Majid Nizami.

Controversies

The Nation published a front page article ("Journalists as spies in FATA?") on 5 November 2009, accusing the South Asian correspondent of "The Wall Street Journal", Matthew Rosenberg, of working for the CIA, Israeli intelligence, and the U.S. military contractor Blackwater.

Wall Street Journal Managing Editor Robert Thomson wrote to Mazari soon after the Rosenberg article appeared. Wall Street Journal’s Daniel Pearl, kidnapped and killed in 2002, was labelled a Jewish spy in a similar manner by some sections of Pakistani media.

Twenty-one international news editors from Islamabad’s foreign correspondent community also signed a letter of protest, criticizing the unsubstantiated article for compromising Matt Rosenberg's security.

In a television interview regarding the incident, Shireen Mazari strongly defended her story.

On 20 November 2009, "The Nation" published yet another front page story with a photograph of what it described as "Mysterious US nationals". "According to a source in another investigation agency, the foreigners seemingly belonged to the US spy agency CIA. It was evident from the fact that two police commandos were escorting them, the source added."

However, it turned out that this "Mysterious US National" was in fact the award-winning Australian photojournalist Daniel Berehulak, who works for Getty Images. Hugh Pinney, Getty’s senior director of photography, wrote to Shireen Mazari on 21 November 2009.

Both Rosenberg and Berahulak have left Pakistan.

Political career

Mazari's views are considered to be a form of Pakistan nationalism and strong vocal of the Two-Nation Theory. Outspoken on Pakistan Foreign policy, she remains one of the academic openly criticizing Drone attacks and continue to criticize American-Pakistan relations. She joined Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf on 25 November 2008 after a meeting with the Chairman of the party, Imran Khan.

Views

She is a vocal critic of the United States policies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Mazari said her life has been under threat adding that the Minister of Interior and US diplomats will be responsible if anything happened to her.

Family

She is the daughter of former bureaucrat turned politician Ashiq Mohammad Khan Mazari,known as AMK Mazari. She has two children.

Books

''Pakistan's Lesson from its Kargil War: An Analysis'' (1999)

References

External links

Dr. Shireen Mazari on TV program Islamabad Tonight

Dr. Shireen Mazari joins Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf

Website of the Institute of Strategic Studies

http://www.saag.org/papers13/paper1231.html

http://www.asian-affairs.com/biographies/shireenmmazaricv.html

http://www.nupi.no/IPS/filestore/semi0902_04.pdf%20

"The truth about Kargil" by A.G. Noorani at Frontline

Weekly Pulse

Compilation of her articles

Category:Pakistani academics Category:Pakistani scholars Category:Pakistani journalists Category:Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf politicians Category:International relations scholars Category:Baloch people Category:Pakistani political scientists Category:Political science writers Category:Muslim scholars Category:Columbia University alumni Category:Alumni of the London School of Economics Category:Year of birth missing (living people) Category:Living people Category:Pakistani women Category:Quaid-i-Azam University faculty Category:Pakistani women in politics Category:Defence and security analysts in Pakistan

Saima Mohsin is a British journalist.

Mohsin attended the University of Birmingham and in 1998 gained a BA (Hons) degree in political science with English literature, followed by a postgraduate diploma in broadcast journalism in 1999. After graduating from university, she freelanced for a year at BBC World Service, Greater Manchester Radio, GLR and Five Live.

In 2000 Mohsin gained her first job in television joining ITV Meridian as a producer, and later on became a presenter/reporter for the station. In 2002, Mohsin joined ''BBC Points West'' as a reporter and presenter. In 2004 she moved to BBC One's ''Watchdog'' - the UK's most watched current affairs show as an investigative reporter on consumer issues.

Mohsin went on to freelance as a newsreader and reporter for BBC News 24, Sky News and ITN. She presented a groundbreaking debate show for Channel Four on suicide bombings and the future of British Muslims following the 7/7 bombings in London.

In 2006 Mohsin joined GMTV on which she covered stories around the UK and the world including the plea to free Mirza Tahir Hussain from death row in Pakistan and Glaswegian runaway 12 year old Molly Campbell/Misba Rana. She moved to Pakistan in 2007 to be the face of Dawn News, Pakistan's first English news channel. She presented ''News Eye'', the channel's flagship nightly news programme. She contributes as special correspondent for PBS Newshour in the United States as well as ITN and Daybreak in the United Kingdom.

Mohsin has interviewed world famous celebrities and leaders from Tom Cruise to Tony Blair, Amitabh Bachchan to Benazir Bhutto. She has hosted special programmes with Hillary Clinton, special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, former British foreign secretary David Milliband and Baroness Sayeeda Warsi.

She is currently one of the newsreaders on ''Channel 4 News''.

References

Category:English people of Pakistani descent Category:Living people Category:Pakistani journalists Category:Year of birth missing (living people)