A
veto,or in latin for "I forbid", is the power of an officer of the state to unilaterally stop a piece of
legislation.
In practice, the veto can be absolute (as in the U.N. Security Council, whose permanent members (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China) can block any resolution, or limited, as in the legislative process of the United States, where a two-thirds vote in both the House and Senate may override a Presidential veto of legislation).
Westminster systems
In
Westminster Systems and most
constitutional monarchies, the power to veto legislation by withholding the
Royal Assent is a rarely used
reserve power of the monarch. In practice, the Crown follows the convention of exercising its prerogative on the advice of its chief advisor, the prime minister.
The House of Lords used to have the power of veto. However, reform first by a Liberal government and then by a Labour government has seen their powers limited. The Paliamentary Acts of 1911 and 1949 saw their powers reduced to being able to amend and delay legislation. They are able to delay legislation for up to one year. Under the 1911 Act, money bills may not be delayed, and under the Salisbury Convention, they cannot delay any bills laid out in the party's manifesto.
In Spain, the article 115 of the Constitution provides that the King shall give his assent to Laws passed by the General Courts within 15 days after their final passement by them; the absence of the Royal Assent, although not constitutionally provided, would mean the bill not to become Law.
Australia
Since the
Statute of Westminster (1931), the Crown of the United Kingdom andParliament may not veto or repeal any Act of the Parliament of the
Commonwealth of Australia on the grounds that is repugnant to the laws and interests of the United Kingdom
. Other countries in the
Commonwealth of Nations (not to be confused with the Commonwealth of Australia), such as Canada and New Zealand, are likewise affected. However, according to the
Australian Constitution (sec. 59), the
Queen may veto a bill that has been given royal assent by the
Governor-General within one year of the legislation being assented to
.This power has never been used. The Australian Governor-General himself or herself has, in theory, power to veto, or more technically, withhold assent to, a bill passed by both houses of the
Australian Parliament, and contrary to the advice of the prime minister
. This may be done without consulting the sovereign. This
reserve power is however, constitutionally arguable, and it is difficult to foresee an occasion when such a power would need to be exercised. It is possible that a Governor-general might so act if a bill passed by the Parliament was criminal, illegal or in violation of the Constitution
. One might argue, however, that a government would be hardly likely to present a bill which is so open to rejection. Many of the vice-regal reserve powers are untested, because of the brief constitutional history of the Commonwealth of Australia, and the observance of the convention that the head of state acts upon the advice of his or her chief minister.
With regard to the six governors of the states which are federated under the Australian Commonwealth, a somewhat different situation exists. Until the Australia Act 1986, each state was constitutionally dependent upon the British Crown directly. Since 1986, however, they are fully independent entities, although the Queen still appoints governors on the advice of the state head of government, the premier. So the Crown or UK Parliament may not veto or overturn any act of a state governor or state legislature. Paradoxically, the states are more independent of the Crown than the federal government and legislature. State constitutions determine what role a governor plays. In general the governor exercises the powers the sovereign would have, including the power to withhold the Royal Assent.
United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the royal veto was last exercised in 1707 by
Queen Anne with the
Scottish Militia Bill 1708.
== United States ==
All legislation passed by both houses of Congress must be presented to the President. This presentation is in the President's capacity as Head of State.
If the President approves of the legislation, he signs it (sign into law). If he does not approve, he must return the bill, unsigned, within ten days, excluding Sundays, to the house of the United States Congress in which it originated, while the Congress is . The President is constitutionally required to state his objections to the legislation in writing, and the Congress is constitutionally required to consider them, and to reconsider the legislation. This action, in effect, is a veto.
If the Congress overrides the veto by a two-thirds majority in each house, it becomes law without the President's signature. Otherwise, the bill fails to become law unless it is presented to the President again and he chooses to sign it.
A bill can also become law without the President's signature if, after it is presented to him, he simply fails to sign it within the ten days noted. If there are fewer than ten days left in the session before Congress s, and if Congress does so before the ten days have expired in which the President might sign the bill, then the bill fails to become law. This procedure, when used as a formal device, is called a pocket veto.
Modifications declared unconstitutional
In 1996, the
Congress passed, and President
Bill Clinton signed, the
Line Item Veto Act of 1996. This
act allowed the President to veto individual items of
budgeted expenditures from appropriations bills instead of vetoing the entire bill and sending it back to the Congress. However, this
line-item veto was immediately challenged by members of
Congress who disagreed with it. In 1998, the
Supreme Court declared that the line-item veto was unconstitutional. The Court found the language of the Constitution required each bill presented to the President to be either approved or rejected as a whole. An action by which the President might pick and choose which parts of the bill to approve or not approve amounted to the President acting as a legislator instead of an executive and
head of state - and particularly as a single legislator acting in place of the entire Congress - thereby violating the
separation of powers doctrine. (See
Clinton v. City of New York, .)
In 2006, Senator Bill Frist introduced the Legislative Line Item Veto Act of 2006 in the United States Senate. Rather than provide for an actual legislative veto, however, the procedure created by the Act provides that, if the President should recommend rescission of a budgetary line item from a budget bill he previously signed into law - a power he already possesses pursuant to U.S. Const. Art. II - the Congress must vote on his request within ten days. Because the legislation that is the subject of the President's request (or "Special Message," in the language of the bill) was already enacted and signed into law, the vote by the Congress would be ordinary legislative action, not any kind of veto - whether line-item, legislative or any other sort. The House passed this measure, but the Senate never considered it, so the bill expired and never became law.
In 1982, the Supreme Court had struck down the one-house legislative veto, also on separation of powers grounds and on grounds that the action by one house of Congress violated the Constitutional requirement of bicameralism. The case was INS v. Chadha, concerning a foreign exchange student in Ohio who had been born in Kenya but whose parents were from India. Because he was not born in India, he was not an Indian citizen. Because his parents were not Kenyan citizens, he was not Kenyan. Thus, he had nowhere to go when his student visa expired because neither country would take him, so he overstayed his visa and was ordered to show cause why he should not be deported from the United States.
The Immigration and Nationality Act was one of many acts of Congress passed since the 1930s, which contained a provision allowing either house of that legislature to nullify decisions of agencies in the executive branch simply by passing a resolution. In this case, Chadha's deportation was suspended and the House of Representatives passed a resolution overturning the suspension, so that the deportation proceedings would continue. This, the Court held, amounted to the House of Representatives passing legislation without the concurrence of the Senate, and without presenting the legislation to the President for consideration and approval (or veto). Thus, the Constitutional principle of bicameralism and the separation of powers doctrine were disregarded in this case, and this legislative veto of executive decisions was struck down.
Early federal history
The
Presidents of the
Continental Congress (1774 - 1781) did not have the power of veto. Nor could the President veto an act of Congress under the
Articles of Confederation (1781 - 1789), though he possessed certain recess and reserve powers that were not necessarily available to the predecessor President of Continental Congress. But with the enactment of the
United States Constitution (drafted 1787; ratified 1788; fully effective since 4 March 1789), veto power
was conferred upon the person titled "President of the United States."
The presidential veto power was first exercised on April 5, 1792 when George Washington vetoed a bill designed to apportion representatives among the several states. The Congress first overrode a presidential veto - that is, passed a bill into law notwithstanding the President's objections - on March 3, 1845.
U.S. states and amendatory veto
Most U.S. states also have a provision by which legislative decisions can be vetoed by the governor. In addition, most of these states allow the governor to exercise a line-item veto.
In seven U.S. states, the governor has an amendatory veto. For example, in Illinois, the governor can make specific recommendations for changes to a bill. The state legislature can then approve the changes by majority vote, or override the amendatory veto with a 60% majority. No law is passed if the legislature does not accept the changes.
European parliamentary republics
Presidential veto
Parliamentary republics in Europe, including
Italy,
Portugal,
Ireland,
France,
Latvia, the
Ukraine, and
Hungary often allow a form of limited presidential veto on legislation.
The President of Austria does not technically have veto power. However the president can order a referendum on a bill passed by the legislature if they refuse to sign it.
The President of Iceland can refuse to sign a bill which is then put to universal adult suffrage. The president has only twice refused to sign a bill, and a referendum has only been held once.
The President of Ireland can refuse to grant assent to a bill which he/she considers to be unconstitutional, after first consulting the Council of State; in this case the bill is referred to the Supreme Court of Ireland, which finally determines the matter. This is the most widely used reserve power. The President may also, on request of a majority of the Senate and a third of Dáil Éireann (opposition parties), and after consulting the council of state, decline to sign a bill that he/she believes is "of such national importance that the will of the people thereon ought to be ascertained" in a referendum, or a new Dáil Éireann reassembling after a general election held within eight months. This latter power has never been used due to the fact that the government of the day almost always commands a majority of the Senate preventing the third of Dáil Éireann that usually makes up the opposition from combining with it.
The President of Italy can request a second deliberation of a bill passed by Parliament before it is promulgated. This is very weak form of veto, as the Parliament can override the veto by an ordinary majority. The same provision exists in France and Latvia. While such a limited veto cannot thwart the will of a determined parliamentary majority, it may have a delaying effect, and may cause the parliamentary majority to reconsider the matter. In Italy, the President of Republic can also call new Parliament elections. That makes stronger his position.
The President of Portugal can refuse to sign a bill or refer it or parts of it to the Portuguese Constitutional Court. If the President refuses to sign bill without it being declared unconstitutional, the Assembly of the Republic (parliament) can pass it again and it becomes law regardless of the President's opinion.
The President of Latvia may suspend a bill for a period of two months, during which it may be referred to the people in a referendum if a certain number of signatures are gathered. This is potentially a much stronger form of veto, as it enables the President to appeal to the people against the wishes of the Parliament and Government.
The President of Ukraine can refuse to sign a bill and return it to Parliament with his proposals. If the parliament agrees on his proposals, the President should sign the bill. Parliament can overturn a veto by 2/3 majority. If the parliament overturns his veto, the President should sign the bill. If he fails to do so in 10 days, then the Chairman of the Parliament signs it.
The President of Hungary has two options to veto a bill: S/he may submit it to the Constitutional Court in case of any suspicion that it violates the constitution, or s/he may send it back to the Parliament and ask for a second debate and vote on the bill. If the Court rules that the bill is not unconstitutional or it is passed by the Parliament again, respectively, the President must sign it.
Liberum veto
In the constitution of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
Poland, there was an institution called the
liberum veto. All bills had to pass the
Sejm (Parliament) by
unanimous consent, and if any legislator voted
nay on anything, this not only vetoed that bill but dissolved that legislative session itself. The concept originated in the idea of "Polish democracy", that any Pole of noble extraction was as good as any other, no matter how low or high his material condition might be. It was never exercised in practice under the rule of the strong Polish royal dynasties, but these came to an end in the mid-17th century, and were followed by an elective kingship. As might be expected, the more and more frequent use of this veto power paralyzed the power of the legislature, and, combined with a string of weak figurehead kings, led ultimately to the partitioning and dissolution of the Polish state in the following century.
See also
Constitution of the Roman Republic
Popular referendum
References
External links
Regular Vetoes and Pocket Vetoes: An Overview (report) by Kevin R. Kosar
Senate Reference Webpage on Vetoes, which includes lists of vetoes from 1789 to the current day.
