

JIC Assessment	Draft Dossier 6/9	Draft Dossier 10/9	Draft Dossier 16/9	Draft Dossier 19/9	Published Dossier
<p>Title:</p> <p>Iraqi use of Chemical and Biological Weapons – <b>Possible Scenarios</b></p>	<p>No title</p> <p>Section heading:</p> <p>IRAQI WMD* – <b>PROGRAMMES</b> – THE CURRENT THREAT</p> <p>* crossed out and replaced by chemical biological and nuclear</p>	<p>No title</p> <p>Section heading:</p> <p>IRAQI CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE <b>PROGRAMMES:</b> THE CURRENT POSITION</p>	<p>Title:</p> <p>IRAQ'S <b>PROGRAMME</b> FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION:</p>	<p>Title:</p> <p>IRAQ'S <b>PROGRAMME</b> FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION</p>	<p>Title:</p> <p>IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION</p>
<p><b>we ... know little</b> about Iraq's CBW work since late 1998 (21.8.02)</p>	<p>This section sets out <b>what we now</b> know of Saddam's WMD* programmes, drawing on all the available evidence.</p> <p>* crossed out and replaced by chemical biological and nuclear</p>	<p>This section sets out <b>what we now know</b> of Saddam's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, drawing on all the available evidence.</p>	<p>This chapter sets out <b>what we now know</b> of Saddam's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, drawing on all the available evidence.</p>	<p>This chapter sets out <b>what we know</b> of Saddam's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, drawing on all the available evidence.</p>	<p>This chapter sets out <b>what we know</b> of Saddam Hussein's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, drawing on all the available evidence.</p>

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<p>Intelligence remains <b>limited</b>.... Much of this paper is necessarily based on judgement and assessment.</p>					<p>The intelligence picture that [the intelligence services] paint ... is <b>extensive, detailed and authoritative</b>. (Blair in House of Commons)</p> <p>Intelligence cannot tell us about everything.</p> <p>Intelligence rarely offers a complete account of activities which are designed to remain concealed.</p>
<p>We continue to <b>judge</b> that Iraq has an offensive chemical warfare programme, <b>although there is very little intelligence relating to it</b>. BW work continued throughout the period of UNSCOM inspections and intelligence <b>indicates</b> that this programme continues. (15.3.02)</p> <p>We continue to <b>judge</b> that Iraq has an offensive CW programme... we <b>assess</b> that Iraq has continued with an offensive BW programme (28.10.02)</p>	<p>We <b>judge</b> that Iraq has a covert chemical weapons programme in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687. We <b>judge</b> that Iraq has a biological weapons programme in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687.</p>	<p>Intelligence <b>confirms</b> that Iraq has covert chemical and biological weapons programmes, in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687.</p>	<p>Intelligence <b>confirms</b> that Iraq has covert chemical and biological weapons programmes, in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687.</p>	<p>Intelligence <b>shows</b> that Iraq has covert chemical and biological weapons programmes, in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687</p>	<p>The weapons of mass destruction programme <b>is</b>...up and running now. (Blair Commons)</p> <p>Intelligence <b>shows</b> that Iraq has covert chemical and biological weapons programmes, in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687.</p>

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<p><b>Key Judgement:</b> Iraq has a chemical and biological weapons capability....</p>	<p>Intelligence also <b>confirms</b> that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons.</p>	<p>Intelligence... in the last few weeks... has <b>confirmed</b> that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons....</p>	<p>...intelligence has become available ... which... <b>confirms the JIC assessment</b> that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons.</p>	<p>... intelligence has become available ... which... <b>confirms the JIC assessment</b> that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons.</p>	<p>... intelligence has become available ... which... <b>confirms the JIC assessment</b> that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons.</p>
<p>One intelligence report suggests that <b>Iraq has “lost” the capability to develop warheads capable of effectively disseminating chemical and biological agent</b> and that it would take six months to overcome the “technical difficulties”.</p>	<p>While <b>the successful enforcement of the sanctions regimes and the UN arms embargo have impeded Iraq's efforts to reconstitute its weapons of mass destruction</b>, they have not halted them. Much of Iraq's missile infrastructure has been rebuilt, the nuclear weapons programme is being reconstituted ; and Iraq <b>continues</b> to have the capability to produce chemical and biological weapons, and has probably already done so.</p>	<p>While <b>the successful enforcement of the sanctions regimes and the UN arms embargo have impeded Iraq's efforts to reconstitute its weapons of mass destruction</b>, they have not halted them. Much of Iraq's missile infrastructure has been rebuilt; the nuclear weapons programme is being reconstituted; and Iraq <b>continues</b> to have the capability to produce chemical and biological weapons, and has probably already done so.</p>	<p>(No assessment of Iraq’s general progress on WMD in the face of sanctions)</p>	<p>Intelligence... confirms that despite sanctions and the policy of containment, Saddam has continued to make <b>progress</b> with his illicit weapons programmes.</p>	<p>Intelligence ... confirms that despite sanctions and the policy of containment, Saddam has continued to make <b>progress</b> with his illicit weapons programmes.</p>

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<p>Recent intelligence <b>indicates</b> that Qusai Saddam Hussain has directed the Military Industrialisation Commission to ensure that all sensitive <b>weapons and chemical technology</b> was well hidden in case of further UN inspections. (15.3.02)</p> <p>Recent intelligence <b>indicates</b> that Iraq has <b>probably</b> dispersed its special weapons, including its CBW weapons.</p>	<p>We <b>know</b> that Iraq has begun to disperse its most sensitive WMD equipment and material. Recent intelligence (redaction) <b>indicates</b> that Iraq is still discussing methods of concealing such documentation in order to ensure that it is not discovered by any future UN inspections.</p>	<p>Recent intelligence <b>indicates</b> that Iraq... has begun dispersing its most sensitive weapons, equipment and material, because Saddam is determined not to lose the capabilities developed in the last four years [and] <b>is</b> preparing plans to conceal evidence of its weapons of mass destruction from any renewed inspection, including by dispersing incriminating documents</p> <p>We <b>know</b> from intelligence that Iraq has begun removing sensitive equipment and papers relating to its chemical and biological programmes and dispersing them... Recent intelligence <b>indicates</b> that Iraq is still discussing methods of concealing such documentation in order to ensure that it is not discovered by any future UN inspections.</p>	<p>Intelligence also <b>shows</b> that Iraq is preparing plans to conceal evidence of these weapons from renewed inspections, including by dispersing incriminating documents. Intelligence allows us to <b>judge</b> that Iraq... has begun dispersing its most sensitive weapons, equipment and material.</p> <p>Iraq <b>has</b> begun removing sensitive equipment and papers relating to its chemical and biological programmes and dispersing them ...</p> <p>Recent intelligence <b>indicates</b> that Iraq is still discussing methods of concealing such documentation in order to ensure that it is not discovered by any future UN inspections.</p>	<p>Intelligence also <b>shows</b> that Iraq is preparing plans to conceal evidence of these weapons from renewed inspections, including by dispersing incriminating documents. We <b>judge</b> that Iraq has... already begun to conceal and disperse sensitive equipment and documentation in advance of the return of inspectors.</p> <p>Iraq <b>is</b> already taking steps to prevent UN weapons inspectors finding evidence ... Sensitive equipment and papers can easily be concealed, and in some cases this <b>is</b> already happening... Recent intelligence <b>indicates</b> that Iraq is still discussing methods of concealing such documentation in order to ensure that it is not discovered by any future UN inspections.</p>	<p>Intelligence also <b>shows</b> that Iraq is preparing plans to conceal evidence of these weapons, including incriminating documents, from renewed inspections.</p> <p>We <b>judge</b> that Iraq has... already begun to conceal sensitive equipment and documentation in advance of the return of inspectors.</p> <p>Iraq <b>is</b> already taking steps to prevent UN weapons inspectors finding evidence... Sensitive equipment and papers can easily be concealed and in some cases this <b>is</b> already happening. Recent intelligence <b>indicates</b> that Iraq is still discussing methods of concealing such documentation in order to ensure that it is not discovered by any future UN inspections.</p>

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<p>Recent intelligence casts light on Iraq’s holdings of weapons of mass destruction and on its doctrine for using them. <b>Intelligence remains limited and Saddam’s own unpredictability complicates judgements about Iraqi use of these weapons.</b> Most of this paper is necessarily based on judgement and assessment.</p> <p>Recent intelligence <b>indicates</b> that Saddam attaches great importance to having CBW, is committed to using CBW <b>if he can</b>.... Saddam wants it to dominate his neighbours and deter his enemies who he considers are unimpressed by his weakened conventional military capability.</p>	<p>Recent Intelligence <b>indicates</b> that Saddam attaches great importance to the possession of weapons of mass destruction and that he is committed to using them (“if necessary” is crossed out) to help him dominate his neighbours</p>	<p>Recent intelligence <b>indicates</b> that Iraq: attaches great importance to the possession of weapons of mass destruction and that Saddam Hussein is committed to using them if necessary ; (executive summary)</p> <p>Saddam <b>attaches</b> great importance to the possession of weapons of mass destruction which he regards as being the basis for Iraq’s regional power.</p>	<p>Intelligence... <b>shows</b> that Saddam Hussein attaches great importance to possessing weapons of mass destruction which he regards as the basis for Iraq’s regional power. It <b>shows</b> that he is (sic) does not regard [WMD] only as weapons of last resort. (executive summary)</p> <p>Conclusion: Saddam <b>continues to attach</b> great importance to the possession of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles...</p> <p>Intelligence <b>shows</b> that Saddam attaches great importance to the possession of weapons of mass destruction which he regards as being the basis for Iraqi regional powers. (sic)</p>	<p>Intelligence... <b>shows</b> that Saddam Hussein attaches great importance to possessing weapons of mass destruction which he regards as the basis for Iraq's regional power. It <b>shows</b> that he does not regard [WMD] only as weapons of last resort. (executive summary)</p> <p>Conclusion: Saddam <b>continues to attach</b> great importance to the possession of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles...</p> <p>Intelligence <b>shows</b> that Saddam attaches great importance to the possession of weapons of mass destruction which he regards as being the basis for Iraqi regional power.</p>	<p>Intelligence... <b>shows</b> that Saddam Hussein attaches great importance to possessing weapons of mass destruction which he regards as the basis for Iraq's regional power. It <b>shows</b> that he does not regard [WMD] only as weapons of last resort. (executive summary)</p> <p>Conclusion: Saddam <b>continues to attach</b> great importance to the possession of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles ...</p> <p>Intelligence <b>shows</b> that Saddam attaches great importance to the possession of weapons of mass destruction which he regards as being the basis for Iraqi regional power.</p>
<p>Intelligence indicates that Saddam has already taken the decision that all resources, including CBW, be used <b>to defend the regime from attack.</b></p>	<p>Intelligence confirms that Iraq is committed to using [CBW] <b>in the event of a military conflict.</b></p>	<p>...intelligence indicates that Saddam is prepared to use chemical and biological weapons.</p>	<p>...intelligence indicates that Saddam is prepared to use chemical and biological weapons <b>if he believes his regime is under threat.</b></p>	<p>...intelligence <b>indicates</b> that Saddam is prepared to use chemical and biological weapons <b>if he believes his regime is under threat.</b></p>	<p>...intelligence indicates that <b>as part of Iraq’s military planning</b> Saddam is willing to use chemical and biological weapons.</p>

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<p>It is also <b>possible</b> that Saddam would seek to use chemical and biological munitions against any internal uprising; <b>intelligence indicates</b> that he is prepared to deliberately target the Shia population.</p>	<p>Intelligence... also <b>indicates</b> that Saddam is prepared to use [chemical and biological weapons] <b>against any internal rising</b> by the Shia population.</p>	<p>[Recent] intelligence <b>confirms</b> Saddam's readiness to use these weapons, even against his own people... Saddam <b>would not hesitate</b> to use chemical and biological weapons <b>against any internal uprising</b> by the Shia population.</p>	<p>[Saddam] <b>is ready</b> to use [weapons of mass destruction], including against his own population... (executive summary)</p> <p>We also <b>know</b> from intelligence that as part of Iraq's military planning, Saddam is willing to use chemical and biological weapons <b>against any internal uprising</b> by the Shia population.</p>	<p>[Saddam] <b>is ready</b> to use [weapons of mass destruction], including against his own population... (executive summary)</p> <p>We also <b>know</b> from intelligence that as part of Iraq's military planning, Saddam is willing to use chemical and biological weapons <b>against an internal uprising</b> by the Shia population .</p>	<p>Our intelligence services... are telling me... that Saddam... <b>has existing and active plans</b> for the use of chemical and biological weapons... including against his own Shia Population. (Blair in Commons)</p> <p>[Saddam] <b>is ready</b> to use [weapons of mass destruction], including against his own population... (executive summary)</p> <p>We <b>judge</b> that Iraq <b>has military plans</b> for the use of chemical and biological weapons, <b>including against its own Shia population.</b> (executive summary)</p> <p>... intelligence <b>indicates</b> that <b>as part of Iraq's military planning</b> Saddam is willing to use chemical and biological weapons, including against his own Shia population.</p>

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<p>Other recent intelligence <b>indicates</b> that production of chemical and biological weapons is taking place.</p> <p>We judge that Iraq currently has available, <b>either</b> from pre Gulf War stocks <b>or</b> more recent production a number of biological warfare (BW) and chemical warfare (CW) agents and weapons.</p> <p>...intelligence <b>indicates</b> that [Iraq] has continued to produce chemical agent. (28.10.02)</p> <p>... intelligence <b>indicates</b> that [Iraq] has continued to produce biological agents. We <b>judge</b> that Iraq... currently has available, <b>either</b> from pre-Gulf war stocks <b>or</b> more recent production, anthrax spores, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and possibly plague and ricin. (28.10.02)</p>	<p>We (also) judge that Iraq has some chemical agents and weapons available, <b>either</b> from pre-Gulf War stocks <b>or</b> more recent production. We (also) <b>judge</b> that Iraq has biological weapons available <b>either</b> from pre-Gulf War stocks <b>or</b> more recent production. (body text)</p>	<p>Our judgement is that Iraq has stocks of chemical and biological agents and weapons available, <b>both</b> retained from before the Gulf war, <b>and probably</b> from more recent production.</p> <p>Iraq... is able to add to [its chemical and biological weapons] capability despite sanctions.</p> <p>Iraq has chemical and biological agents and weapons available, <b>either</b> from pre-Gulf War stocks <b>or</b> more recent production.</p>	<p>[Intelligence] allows us to judge that Iraq has <b>continued to produce</b> chemical and biological agents.</p> <p>[Iraq's chemical and biological weapons capability] <b>has included recent production</b> of chemical and biological agents.</p> <p>Intelligence <b>confirms</b> that Iraq <b>has continued to produce</b> chemical agent We <b>know</b> from intelligence that Iraq <b>has continued to produce</b> biological warfare agents.</p> <p>Intelligence <b>confirms</b> that Iraq... <b>has continued to produce</b> chemical and biological agents.</p> <p>Iraq has chemical and biological agents and weapons available, <b>both</b> from pre-Gulf War stocks <b>and</b> more recent production.</p>	<p>We judge that Iraq <b>has continued to produce</b> chemical and biological agents.</p> <p>[Iraq's chemical and biological weapons capability] <b>has included recent production</b> of chemical and biological agents</p> <p>Intelligence <b>shows</b> that Iraq <b>has continued to produce</b> chemical agent. We <b>know</b> from intelligence that Iraq <b>has continued to produce</b> biological warfare agents.</p> <p>Intelligence <b>shows</b> that Iraq... <b>has continued to produce</b> chemical and biological agents.</p> <p>Iraq has chemical and biological agents and weapons available, <b>both</b> from pre-Gulf War stocks <b>and</b> more recent production.</p>	<p>What I believe the assessed intelligence has <b>established beyond doubt</b> is that Saddam <b>has continued to produce</b> chemical and biological weapons. (PM's foreword)</p> <p>We judge that Iraq <b>has continued to produce</b> chemical and biological agents.</p> <p>[Iraq's chemical and biological weapons capability] <b>has included recent production</b> of chemical and biological agents.</p> <p>Intelligence <b>shows</b> that Iraq <b>has continued to produce</b> chemical agent. We <b>know</b> from intelligence that Iraq <b>has continued to produce</b> biological warfare agents.</p> <p>Intelligence <b>shows</b> that Iraq... <b>has continued to produce</b> chemical and biological agents.</p> <p>Iraq has chemical and biological agents and weapons available, <b>both</b> from pre-Gulf War stocks <b>and</b> more recent production.</p>

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<p>Recent intelligence <b>indicates</b> that Iraq has developed for the military, <b>fermentation systems</b> which are capable of being mounted on road trailers or rail cars. These <b>could</b> produce BW agent.</p>	<p>We <b>judge</b> that Iraq has <b>sought to develop</b> mobile facilities to produce biological agent.</p> <p>Intelligence also <b>indicates</b> that Iraq has <b>sought to develop</b> mobile facilities to produce biological agent. (body text)</p>	<p>Recent intelligence <b>indicates</b> that Iraq has acquired <b>mobile laboratories</b> for military use, <b>corroborating</b> earlier report (sic) about the mobile production of biological warfare agents.</p> <p>Evidence has emerged... that Iraq has <b>sought to develop</b> mobile facilities <b>to produce biological agents</b>. Other intelligence <b>confirms</b> that the Iraqi military have <b>acquired</b> such facilities...</p>	<p>[Intelligence] allows us to <b>judge</b> that Iraq has developed <b>mobile laboratories</b> for military use, <b>corroborating</b> earlier reports about the mobile production of biological warfare agents.</p> <p>UNSCOM established that Iraq was <b>planning to conceal from the inspectors</b> the capability to produce biological warfare agents by developing mobile facilities. Recent intelligence <b>confirms</b> that the Iraqi military have developed mobile facilities.</p> <p>Iraq has also developed mobile facilities <b>to produce biological agents</b>.</p>	<p>We <b>judge</b> that Iraq has developed <b>mobile laboratories</b> for military use, <b>corroborating</b> earlier reports about the mobile production of biological warfare agents.</p> <p>UNSCOM established that Iraq was <b>planning to conceal from the inspectors</b> the capability to produce biological warfare agents by developing mobile facilities. Recent intelligence <b>confirms</b> that the Iraqi military have developed mobile facilities.</p> <p>Iraq has also developed mobile facilities <b>to produce biological agents</b>.</p>	<p>The UN inspection regime <b>discovered</b> that Iraq <b>was trying to acquire</b> mobile biological weapons facilities... Present intelligence <b>confirms</b> that Iraq <b>has now got</b> such facilities. (Blair in Commons)</p> <p>We <b>judge</b> that Iraq has developed <b>mobile laboratories</b> for military use, <b>corroborating</b> earlier reports about the mobile production of biological warfare agents.</p> <p>UNSCOM established that Iraq <b>considered</b> the use of mobile biological agent production facilities. ...</p> <p>Recent intelligence <b>confirms</b> that the Iraqi military have developed mobile facilities.</p> <p>Iraq has also developed mobile facilities <b>to produce biological agents</b>.</p>



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(recent) Intelligence also <b>indicates</b> that chemical and biological <b>munitions</b> could be with military units and ready for firing within 20-45 minutes.	Not present	<p>Recent Intelligence ...<b>indicates</b> that Iraq ... could deploy [weapons of mass destruction] within 45 minutes of the order being given to do so. (Executive summary)</p> <p>Within the last month intelligence has <b>suggested</b> that the Iraqi military would be able to use their chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so. (“Chemical and Biological warfare: command and control”)</p>	<p>[Intelligence] allows us to <b>judge</b> that [some chemical or biological weapons] could be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them. (Executive summary)</p> <p>The Iraqi military <b>may be able</b> to deploy [chemical and biological weapons] within forty five minutes of a decision to do so. (“Main Conclusions”)</p> <p>The Iraqi military <b>may be able</b> to deploy chemical or biological weapons within forty five minutes of an order to do so. (“Recent intelligence”)</p>	<p>We <b>judge</b> that [some chemical or biological weapons] are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them. (Executive summary)</p> <p>The Iraqi military <b>are able</b> to deploy [chemical and biological weapons] within forty five minutes of a decision to do so. (“Main conclusions”)</p> <p>Intelligence <b>indicates</b> that the Iraqi military <b>are able</b> to deploy chemical or biological weapons within forty five minutes or an order to do so. (body text)</p>	<p>Chemical and biological weapons... could be activated within 45 minutes (Blair in House of Commons) The document discloses that [Saddam’s] military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them. (PM’s foreword)</p> <p>We <b>judge</b> that [some chemical or biological weapons] are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them. (Executive summary)</p> <p>The Iraqi military <b>are able</b> to deploy [chemical and biological] weapons within 45 minutes of a decision to do so. (Main conclusions)</p> <p>Intelligence <b>indicates</b> that the Iraqi military <b>are able</b> to deploy chemical or biological weapons within forty five minutes or an order to do so. (body text)</p>

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<p>We <b>judge but cannot confirm</b> that Iraq is conducting nuclear related research and development into the enrichment of uranium and <b>could have</b> longer term plans to produce enriched uranium for a weapon. (10.5.01)</p> <p><b>Key Judgement:</b> Iraq is pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. <b>But it will not be able</b> to indigenously produce a nuclear weapon while sanctions remain in place, unless suitable fissile material is purchased from abroad. (15.3.02)</p> <p><b>Although there is very little intelligence</b>, we continue to <b>judge</b> that Iraq is pursuing a nuclear weapons programme ...but <b>we do not know if large scale development work has yet recommenced</b>. (15.3.02)</p>	<p>Main conclusion: Iraq continues to work on producing nuclear weapons.... Effective sanctions are <b>hindering</b> this programme <b>although</b> it is impossible to prevent all technology and materials (“reaching Iraq” written by hand)</p> <p>We <b>judge</b> that Iraq is still working to achieve a nuclear weapons capability.</p>	<p>Main conclusion: Iraq continues to work on developing nuclear weapons.... But sanctions continue to <b>hinder</b> development of a nuclear weapon.</p> <p>We <b>judge</b> that Iraq is still working to achieve a nuclear weapons capability.</p>	<p>Main conclusion: Iraq continues to work on developing nuclear weapons.</p>	<p>Main conclusion: Iraq continues to work on developing nuclear weapons.</p>	<p>What I believe the assessed intelligence has established <b>beyond doubt</b> is that Saddam continues in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons. (PM Foreword)</p> <p>Main conclusion: Iraq continues to work on developing nuclear weapons.</p>

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<p>We continue to <b>judge</b> that while sanctions remain effective, Iraq <b>cannot</b> indigenously develop and produce nuclear weapons; if sanctions were removed or became ineffective, it would take at least five years to produce a nuclear weapon. This timescale would <b>shorten</b> if fissile material was acquired from abroad. (15.3.02)</p>	<p>So long as sanctions continue to <b>hinder</b> the import of crucial goods, Iraq <b>would find it difficult</b> to produce a nuclear weapon. After the lifting of sanctions, we assess that Iraq would need at least five years to produce a weapon. Progress would be <b>much quicker</b> if Iraq were able to buy suitable fissile material.</p>	<p>So long as sanctions continue to <b>hinder</b> the import of crucial goods for the production of fissile material..., Iraq <b>would find it difficult</b> to produce a nuclear weapon. After the lifting of sanctions, we assess that Iraq would need at least five years to produce a weapon. If Iraq acquired sufficient material from abroad we <b>judge</b> it would take <b>at least two years</b> to make a working nuclear device.</p>	<p>In early 2002, the JIC assessed that sanctions were <b>hindering</b> the import of crucial goods for the production of fissile material. <b>If</b> sanctions continued, Iraq <b>would not be able</b> to indigenously produce a nuclear weapon. If they were removed or became ineffective, it would take Iraq at least five years to produce a weapon. This timescale would shorten if Iraq succeeded in obtaining fissile material from abroad. (JIC assessments)</p> <p>...were Iraq to obtain suitable fissile material from abroad, the timeline would be much shorter. In those circumstances, and depending on the effectiveness of Iraqi weapons designs, we judge that Iraq could produce a nuclear weapon in <b>between one and two years</b>. (outside JIC Assessments)</p>	<p>In early 2002, the JIC assessed that UN sanctions on Iraq were <b>hindering</b> the import of crucial goods for the production of fissile material. <b>The JIC judged</b> that <b>while</b> sanctions remain effective, Iraq <b>would not be able indigenously</b> to produce a nuclear weapon. If they were removed or proved ineffective, it would take Iraq at least five years to produce a weapon. But <b>we</b> know that Iraq retains expertise and design data relating to nuclear weapons. <b>We</b> therefore <b>judge</b> that if Iraq obtained fissile material and other essential components from foreign sources, the timeline for production of a nuclear weapon would shorten and Iraq could produce a nuclear weapon in <b>between one and two years</b>. (outside JIC Assessments section)</p>	<p>In early 2002, the JIC assessed that UN sanctions on Iraq were <b>hindering</b> the import of crucial goods for the production of fissile material. <b>The JIC judged</b> that <b>while</b> sanctions remain effective Iraq <b>would not be able</b> to produce a nuclear weapon. If they were removed or prove ineffective, it would take Iraq <b>at least five years</b> to produce enough fissile material for a weapon indigenously. <b>However, we know</b> that Iraq retains expertise and design data relating to nuclear weapons. <b>We</b> therefore <b>judge</b> that if Iraq obtained fissile and other essential components from foreign sources the timeline for production of a nuclear weapon would be shortened and Iraq could produce a nuclear weapon in <b>between one and two years</b>. (outside JIC Assessments section)</p>

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<p>Intelligence <b>indicates</b> that nuclear scientists were recalled to work on a nuclear programme in the autumn of 1998 <b>but we do not know if large scale development work has yet recommenced.</b> (15.3.02)</p>	<p>Intelligence <b>has indicated</b> that specialists were recalled to work on a nuclear weapons programme in the autumn of 1998.</p>	<p>Our <b>judgement</b> is that Iraq <b>has</b> assembled specialists to work on its nuclear programme.</p> <p>Intelligence <b>has indicated</b> that scientific specialists were recalled to work on a nuclear weapons programme in the autumn of 1998.</p>	<p>[Intelligence] allows us to <b>judge</b> that Iraq <b>has</b> assembled specialists to work on its nuclear programme.</p> <p>In Mid-2001... the JIC <b>drew attention to intelligence</b> that Iraq <b>had</b> recalled its nuclear scientists to the programme in 1998.</p>	<p>We <b>judge</b> that Iraq <b>has</b> recalled specialists to work on its nuclear programme.</p> <p>In Mid-2001... the JIC <b>drew attention to intelligence</b> that Iraq <b>had</b> recalled its nuclear scientists to the programme in 1998.</p>	<p>We <b>know</b>... again, key personnel who used to work on the nuclear weapons programme <b>are</b> back in harness. (Blair in House of Commons)</p> <p>We <b>judge</b> that Iraq <b>has</b> recalled specialists to work on its nuclear programme.</p> <p>In Mid-2001... the JIC <b>drew attention to intelligence</b> that Iraq <b>had</b> recalled its nuclear scientists to the programme in 1998.</p>
<p><b>Although there is very little intelligence</b> we continue to <b>judge</b> that Iraq is pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. We <b>assess</b> the programme to be based on gas centrifuge uranium enrichment... (15.3.02)</p>	<p>We <b>judge</b> that the present Iraqi programme is based on gas centrifuge uranium enrichment...</p>	<p><b>Judging on the basis of the available intelligence, it is almost certain</b> that the present Iraqi programme is based on gas centrifuge uranium enrichment...</p>	<p><b>Intelligence shows</b> that the present Iraqi programme is <b>almost certainly</b> based on gas centrifuge uranium enrichment...</p>	<p><b>Intelligence shows</b> that the present Iraqi programme is <b>almost certainly</b> seeking an indigenous ability to enrich uranium to the level needed for a nuclear weapon. It <b>indicates</b> that the approach is based on gas centrifuge uranium enrichment...</p>	<p><b>Intelligence shows</b> that the present Iraqi programme is <b>almost certainly</b> seeking an indigenous ability to enrich uranium to the level needed for a nuclear weapon. It <b>indicates</b> that the approach is based on gas centrifuge uranium enrichment...</p>

JIC Assessment	Draft Dossier 6/9	Draft Dossier 10/9	Draft Dossier 16/9	Draft Dossier 19/9	Published Dossier
Procurement of <b>dual-use</b> items over the last few years <b>could be used</b> in a uranium enrichment programme. (15.3.02)	Intelligence <b>indicates</b> that Iraq <b>has increased</b> covert efforts to acquire technology and materials <b>with nuclear applications...</b>	Our <b>judgement</b> is that Iraq is covertly trying to acquire technology and materials <b>for use in nuclear weapons...</b>	[Intelligence] allows us to <b>judge</b> that Iraq is covertly trying to acquire technology and materials <b>which could be used</b> in the production of nuclear weapons.	We <b>judge</b> that Iraq has tried covertly to acquire technology and materials <b>which could be used</b> in the production of nuclear weapons.	We <b>judge</b> that Iraq has tried covertly to acquire technology and materials <b>which could be used</b> in the production of nuclear weapons.
	There is also <b>compelling evidence</b> that Iraq has <b>sought</b> the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa.	Recent intelligence <b>indicates</b> that Iraq has <b>purchased</b> large quantities of uranium ore...  Uranium <b>to be used in the production of fissile material</b> has been <b>purchased</b> from Africa.  There is <b>compelling evidence</b> that Iraq has <b>sought</b> the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa.	[Intelligence] allows us to <b>judge</b> that Iraq has <b>sought</b> significant quantities of uranium from Africa...  Uranium has been <b>sought</b> from Africa that has <b>no known</b> civil nuclear application in Iraq.  There is <b>compelling evidence</b> that Iraq has <b>sought</b> the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa.	We <b>judge</b> that Iraq has <b>sought</b> significant quantities of uranium from Africa...  Uranium has been <b>sought</b> from Africa that has <b>no</b> civil nuclear application in Iraq.  There is <b>intelligence</b> that Iraq has <b>sought</b> the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa.	We <b>know</b> that Saddam has been trying to buy significant quantities of uranium from Africa. (Blair in Commons)  We <b>judge</b> that Iraq has <b>sought</b> significant quantities of uranium from Africa...  Uranium has been <b>sought</b> from Africa that has <b>no</b> civil nuclear application in Iraq.  There is <b>intelligence</b> that Iraq has <b>sought</b> the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa.