

Liberty

NOT THE DAUGHTER BUT THE MOTHER OF ORDER. PROUDHON

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*"For always in thine eyes, O Liberty!
Shines that high light whereby the world is saved;
And though thou slay us, we will trust in thee."*
JOHN HAY.

On Picket Duty.

In reprinting without credit poetry that originally appeared in Liberty, "The Firebrand," an organ of Communism, proves its faith by its works.

The New York "Tribune" is struck by the resemblance between government building inspectors and bank examiners. It means that the latter do not examine and the former do not inspect, or that the results of their work are worse than useless. The same is true of all government officials, O "Tribune," advocate of lots of government; but the facts are not as glaring in all cases as in relation to banks and building. It is only when buildings collapse and banks fail right after officials declare them entirely safe that even the "Tribune" rubs its eyes and perceives that something is wrong.

It is well known that grand juries have been even more completely stripped of usefulness than petit juries by courts and prosecuting officers. As a rule, they do just what they are bidden to do. A Pittsburg grand jury recently rebelled against the encroachments upon their powers, and submitted a presentment in which they told the court that the institution would be valueless and barren unless the attempt to control the decisions of the jurors ceased absolutely. The only way to terminate the abuses is to refuse to serve. Let those who know the real province of juries, grand and petit, passively resist the orders of the court, and, when tried for contempt, state the reasons for their course. That would be excellent propaganda by deed.

Some of the missionaries in China, it is but just to say, realize the incongruity of forcing an alleged religion of love and forgiveness at the point of the bayonet, and are willing to brave the dangers of their work without the protection of armed bodies. Others, however, join the jingo and brazen American newspapers in clamoring for a "vigorous policy" against China and shrieking for exemplary punishment of the Chinese lynchers and their official sympathizers. Because the Chinese religious fanatics have no use for the "religion of peace and mercy," the fanatical adherents of this religion favor the occupation of China and the establishment of a protectorate over it. Can conscious or unconscious hypocrisy go further?

Here is a sample of the stuff to be found in the "Twentieth Century" these days: "In

the announcement frequently made of the opposition of Pope Leo to socialism immense confusion is created even in the minds of Catholics. It is supposed that the Pope is opposed to Socialism as the word is used in the English language,—that is, to Socialism which aims at economic equality and the public ownership of railways and the means of production. That is a great mistake. The Pope opposes what is called in France '*le Socialisme*' and in Germany '*Socialismus*,'—that is, a reconstruction of society which prohibits marriage and Christian worship. The word 'Socialism' as used in English is something very different." It is not to be supposed that the "Twentieth Century" hopes to deceive enlightened people with this rubbish. Dollars from the fools,—that is the only racket now.

When W. C. Owen, now of Los Angeles, was in New York, he was one of the stoutest pillars in the Communistic church. At that time I supposed him to be acquainted with Liberty's teachings, and that his intellectual sins were committed in the full glare of the light. But the following paragraph from a letter which he writes to the "Firebrand" indicates that such was not the case: "So many socialistic propositions are now before the public, and are antagonized so bitterly by Anarchists in their distrust and detestation of all forms of paternalism, that it surely becomes important for them to make up their minds whether or no they can retain their own Communistic position. For my part, though a great admirer of Bakounine, Kropotkine, Reclus, Jean Grave, etc., I have found myself steadily drifting away from Communism, just as I had been compelled to drift away from State Socialism, influenced partly by Benj. R. Tucker's 'Instead of a Book' and other works that he recommends." One never can tell when his fire will take effect. The only way is to continue the fusillade.

At the last session of the New York legislature a law was passed making Sunday shaving a crime everywhere in the State except New York city and Saratoga. Whether this absurd statute is the product of lunacy or the desire to bring law into contempt cannot be determined, but, since it has been pronounced perfectly constitutional, it would seem that all lovers of law and order ought to insist on its enforcement. As a matter of fact, it has been openly violated from the start, and juries have, in spite of explicit instructions of judges, declined to convict men proved guilty of breaking it. The oaths of the jurymen to obey the law have not stood in their way, and even some

magistrates have denounced the law as too crazy to be treated with any respect. More strangely still, a number of law-abiding editors have applauded this illegal attitude of citizens, juries, and magistrates. We thus can see that a law can be a dead letter immediately after its birth, and that the talk about the sacredness of law as law is pure cant. Laws in which plutocrats and fanatical meddlers are not interested may be ignored safely enough; they rush to the defence of "law as law" only when an important privilege of the Church or plutocracy is endangered.

Many professed anti-religionists have been lamenting of late the neglect of the Bible in English and American homes and schools. As a great storehouse of literary beauties and grandeurs, they say, the Bible is worthy of far more attention than it is now receiving, and the decline of the faith in it as a divine message in a peculiar sense ought not to cause us to do it injustice in its capacity as a great work of literary art. This plea would be sure of almost universal sympathy, did not the pleaders go on to argue in such a strain as to show that, after all, they are unwilling to treat the Bible as pure literature and allow it to compete on equal terms with other great works of literature. Thus the "Nation" claims that "the accumulated associations of childhood, the familiarity with sounding phrases before they are understood, the play of young imagination and even of superstition about the sacred page,—all these things, joined with daily repetition and use of the rich English of King James's version and a sustained acquaintance with Oriental trope and metaphor, parable and vision, seem necessary to the strongest and most enduring grasp of the Bible merely as literature," and that the "surest literary appreciation and mastery of the Bible are to be seen in men in whom that book was a part of the heaven that lay about them in their infancy." This really amounts to a plea for superstition and false education, and admits by implication that the discredit attaching to much of the substance of the Bible necessarily affects the sympathy with its form. Is education to be unscientific merely because knowledge of fact mars the enjoyment of pleasing fiction? There is a good deal in Pagan literature that our critical view of mythology prevents us from appreciating, yet Christians never favored the inculcation of pagan religions in the schools and nurseries. Those who want the Bible to be valued for its true literary beauties must not ask too much, for every irrational demand only serves to strengthen the opposition to its study.

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"In abolishing rent and interest, the last vestiges of old-time slavery, the Revolution abolishes at one stroke the sword of the executioner, the seal of the magistrate, the club of the policeman, the gauge of the exciseman, the erasing-knife of the department clerk, all those insignia of Politics, which young Liberty grinds beneath her heel."—PROUDHON.

The appearance in the editorial column of articles over other signatures than the editor's initial indicates that the editor approves their central purpose and general tenor, though he does not hold himself responsible for every phrase or word. But the appearance in other parts of the paper of articles by the same or other writers by no means indicates that he disapproves them in any respect, such disposition of them being governed largely by motives of convenience.

Competition and Service.

In response to a recent criticism passed by Liberty upon his opposition to competition, Mr. Traubel says in the "Conservator" :

The capacity to free will efface all trivial theories of property and boundaries of individual acquisition. Notwithstanding Mr. Tucker's doubt, I can see beyond the term of years and methods which to him are final. Life will rise out of the ashes of competition to the stature of service.

And this answer—that he can see farther than I can—is the only answer that Mr. Traubel has to offer. Such, to every objector, has always been the transcendentalist's answer, the religionist's answer, the answer of faith to science,—simply the assertion of a greater power of vision. No argument, no reason, no consideration that can be examined and weighed. Fortunately the methods of the soothsayer are no longer acceptable. Modern prophets are called upon to give reasons. And I do not believe that Mr. Traubel's words will have any weight with thinking men until they become something more than unbuttressed assertions.

"Life will rise out of the ashes of competition to the stature of service." Can any one tell me what that means? What is competition if not service? Is there any better servant of mankind than he who furnishes the means of happiness at the lowest price? Jones offers his services to the public at five dollars a day. Competitive Brown offers his at three dollars a day. Along comes communistic Traubel, who has "risen to the stature of service," and offers his for nothing. Wherein does Traubel differ from Brown? Is not Traubel the most "ruinous" competitor of all? And, if Brown and Jones and others do not continue this competition by offering their services for nothing, will not Traubel starve to death? Would that be "life rising from the ashes"? Or, if Brown and Jones and others do offer their services for nothing and Traubel accepts their services, will Traubel then be taking nothing for his services? What is communism but trade without bookkeeping? And why is bookkeeping a bad thing as long as wealth costs effort? And does Mr. Traubel

imagine that I am so wedded to bookkeeping as a finality that I would not abandon it when it had become the only effort expended in the production and distribution of wealth? Competition is bookkeeping; bookkeeping is a service; and it will continue to be a service until wealth costs little or no labor. After that communism will be in order, and there will be no more service in the economic sense. When life rises above competition, it will rise above service also. Mr. Traubel's distinction between them is a mere phrase. T.

The Test of Invasion.

The amplified statement by Mrs. Dietrick of her position regarding the limits of freedom of speech reveals more fundamental misconceptions than I suspected her of entertaining. The disagreement on the special question is seen to proceed from a deeper disagreement touching the nature and test of invasion. Mrs. Dietrick's interpretation of equal freedom is responsible for her erroneous conclusion, and hence it is necessary to inquire into that interpretation.

The essential point under discussion is whether personal abuse is an infraction of equal freedom. If I denounce an adversary as a fool or ignoramus, am I guilty of an invasion? Mrs. Dietrick answers in the affirmative. The third proposition in her statement is that "to call a man a liar is to assault him, and, if he be a man who is incapable of striking back with the same weapon,—that is, with a counter-charge of fool or liar,—it is a breach of equal liberty." Analyzing this statement, I find myself beset with difficulties, for it is extremely loose and inexact. The first half, strictly construed, is contradicted by the second, while the second, taken by itself, implies the application of a fallacious test of aggression. If "to call a man a fool or liar is to assault him," then no further conditions are necessary to constitute the use of either of these epithets a breach of equal freedom, for "to assault" is to attack, invade, or attempt coercion. Yet we are, by implication, warned against this conclusion, for the qualification is added that the use of the epithet fool or liar becomes a breach of equal freedom only in case the victim is "a man who is incapable of striking back with the same weapon." Which proposition shall I debit Mrs. Dietrick with? Does she intend to assert that to call a man a fool is a breach of equal freedom under all circumstances, or that it is only a breach of equal freedom if the party of the second part is incapable of striking back with the same weapon? Ordinary logic would lead to the conclusion that it is the latter proposition which she really intended. But, if so, let us ask what the power of striking back has to do with the giving a thing or act the quality of aggression. Mrs. Dietrick, I think, will admit that it is just as much a breach of equal liberty to strike one who has full power of his arms as it is to strike one who has lost his arms, or that it is just as much an aggression for a man with a well-filled purse to pick a pocket as it is for a penniless tramp. Equal liberty is not satisfied with aggression and counter-aggression, with assault and retaliation, and the power of the invaded to retaliate is entirely immaterial.

Again, what does Mrs. Dietrick mean by the

words "incapable of striking back with the same weapon"? Every living being who uses language in one way or another is capable of "striking back" by calling his abuser fool or liar. Does Mrs. Dietrick allude to the case where the offender cannot truthfully or justly be called fool or liar,—that is, to the case where his use of the epithets was justified in the first instance? Suppose A, who is not a fool or liar, calls B, who is a fool or liar, the name which he fully deserves,—that is, fool or liar,—and B, hurt and angry as he is, is "incapable" of striking back with the same weapon simply because he knows that he would make himself a laughing-stock if he should retaliate by calling A, universally known to be intelligent and truthful, fool or liar. Would such incapability on the part of B make A an aggressor? Then we arrive at the marvellous conclusion that it is an aggression to tell the truth, to call a fool a fool or a liar a liar, and that it is not an aggression to call a wise man a fool or a truthful man a liar, since the wise or truthful man would be capable of striking back by justly calling his detractor a fool or liar.

But perhaps by "incapable" Mrs. Dietrick means too gentle and kind-hearted to descend to the use of such epithets as fool or liar. In other words, it is not aggression to apply these epithets to a man who is himself addicted to their use; while it is an aggression to apply them to those who shrink from using them towards others. If this is Mrs. Dietrick's meaning, then she will have to admit that it is not an aggression to assault a quarrelsome and hot-tempered brawler, whether he has afforded provocation or not, since he is able (and apt) to strike back, and that it is not an aggression to pick the pocket of a man who is himself occasionally guilty of pocket-picking. To such conclusions logic, law, and common sense are equally opposed, and I hesitate to ascribe them to Mrs. Dietrick.

In view of the surprising results of this analysis, it is clear that further discussion of Mrs. Dietrick's proposition would be futile. Until she explains and amends her central contention, argument on other heads must be suspended. A few words may, however, be devoted to two points of hers that are not vitally connected with the unfortunate proposition No. 3. In the first place, she appears to favor the constituting of effects the test of invasion; it seems to her that "the best mode of arriving at a distinction between 'force and suasion' is to make effects the test." She would regard as force every kind of pressure or action that produces injury, and injury, in her view, would comprehend injury to feelings. Influence upon others without any injury to their bodies, pockets, or self-esteem she would define as suasion. A little reflection, however, will show her that the proposed classification is greatly defective and the test utterly misleading. Under which of her categories would boycotting be classed? Boycotting is clearly not suasion, and, equally clearly, it is not force. A boycotter is essentially passive, and it is absurd to say that a passive man uses force. Yet, if we make effects the test of aggression, a boycotter is an aggressor, for he may, and generally does, seriously injure the boycotted person. Boycotting would not be the effectual

weapon it is, if it did not badly cripple the boycotted. Is Mrs. Dietrick prepared to contend that boycotting is a breach of equal liberty? Take another illustration. An inventor, by giving the world a labor-saving device, causes thousands of workmen to lose their employment and entails untold suffering upon helpless families. His invention has caused injury, and, if effects be the test, the suffering workmen, injured by him, have a right to demand redress and hold him responsible. A competitor who, through superior business skill, drives a fellow-tradesman out of the field and pushes him to the wall has clearly caused great injury; yet who will accuse him of invasion? If effects are taken as the test, he is an invader. Mrs. Dietrick will have to abandon both her test and her classification.

Another thing she will have to abandon is the notion that the punishment of invasion by society is unwise, and that all exercise of force reacts disastrously on society and intensifies the evils it seeks to remove. To be sure, Mrs. Dietrick does not expressly say that *all* invasion ought to go unpunished; she merely says, by way of meeting my argument concerning the propriety of punishing abuses of speech from her standpoint, that, while it may be right to punish some invasions, it would *not* be right or expedient to use force against free-speech invaders. But does not my friend see that she is logically bound to go the whole length of the non-resistance doctrine and oppose the use of force against *any* kind of invasion? What reason is there for making an exception in favor of a particular kind of invasion, provided it be as serious as Mrs. Dietrick thinks the "abuse of free speech" to be? Her general argument certainly affords no opening for any such reservation. If, as she asserts, force begets force, then it is just as suicidal to punish theft or murder as it is to punish abuse of free speech. If we are not entitled to punish *all* invasions, we are not entitled to punish *any*. Until Mrs. Dietrick expressly says so, I hesitate to label her as a non-resistance. Non-resistance is a fallacy; it is a doctrine which rests on no scientific foundation, and leads to a denial of the very existence of evil. That all force begets force is not true. Only unjust, gratuitous force begets force; the force which is used to repel and discourage aggression does not beget force, but, on the contrary, acts as a deterrent and helps to create a social atmosphere unfavorable to invasion.

However, I do not intend to dwell on these points at present. I may recur to them when I come to consider Mrs. Dietrick's next article, in which I hope she will restate and amend the third proposition. V. Y.

The Church and the Poor.

It is an acknowledged fact that the church, as a whole, takes very little interest in progressive economic movements. Its members are advised not to read progressive literature. They are taught that it is the declaration of the "divine" lawgivers that "the poor shall not cease out of the land"; that this "applies to all nations and all periods of time"; that "under every form of government, and in every varied state of society, distinctions caused by the unequal distribution of wealth have existed"; that "all denunciations

as unjust and injurious and the frequent efforts, both by legislative interference and during the excitement of political commotions, to remove them, have been unavailing"; that, "whilst one man is weak of body and the other possesses athletic strength; while the intellect of one is dull and inactive, and that of another bright and vigorous; while the energies of one are paralyzed by frequent and long-continued sickness, and another is incited to constant activity by uninterrupted and elastic health,—so long will 'the rich and the poor meet together' in human society, and so long must we acknowledge that 'the Lord is maker of them all.'" They are further taught that "this inequality of condition is essential to the political, the intellectual, the moral and religious improvement of the human race"; that those who have inveighed against this "providential" arrangement have "charged God foolishly"; that those who endeavored to distribute happiness more equally among men, by equalizing their outward condition, were generally impelled by "inordinate and unprincipled ambition," and were eager to catch the ear and secure the favor of an "unthinking" multitude, by flattering their "ignorant prejudices" and inflaming their "unhappy jealousies" against those they esteem more favored by fortune than themselves; that these "false and pernicious doctrines" should occasionally be brought forward to keep in general circulation the "important considerations" by which they are "refuted"; that they should uniformly be "reprobated," not simply because they are "speculatively untrue," but because they are "at war with the permanent interests and the true happiness of society."

Thus the human race is doomed forever to groan under the load of evils and miseries heaped upon society in consequence of exorbitant, heartless, and luxurious wealth on the one hand and abject and squalid poverty on the other. The picture of "the rich man clothed in purple and fine linen, and who fared sumptuously every day, and the beggar Lazarus, laid at his gate, full of sores and desiring to be fed with the crumbs which fell from the rich man's table" is thus destined to find its prototype, sooner or later, in all countries and in all succeeding generations.

And this is the decree of a "wise and merciful superintending Providence"! Can anyone conceive of a stronger argument against the wisdom and goodness of that "great Being" who "created man" "and hath determined the bounds of his habitation"?

Now, as the legislative bodies of this country acknowledge the "truth" and "excellency" of religion, when they open their sessions with prayer, they are bound to recognize and sanction the principle of inequality in the distribution of wealth among men, and to declare, either in express terms or in the particular duties they enjoin on the rich and on the poor, that this is to be acquiesced in as a permanent condition of society. Their legislation can, therefore, only be such as will "make the poor content and the rich secure," to use the words of ex-President Harrison.

But is it not a fact that the Christian religion recognizes and sanctions many other things, which, in the present advanced state of knowledge and morals, are admitted to be either not

essential to the welfare of civil society or else absolutely detrimental to its true interests, as, for example, a monarchy or the condition of slavery?

Now, there must be a reason for making a distinction between the institution of poverty and that of a monarchy or of slavery,—for endeavoring to make poverty permanent, while the others were allowed to become non-essentials and detriments.

One of the main reasons, I think, for the favor with which the church views poverty is that poverty is the bulwark of the church. The church is supported mainly by the poor, as the latter generally seek in religion what they cannot find in their temporal affairs,—happiness. "Adversity is the school of virtue" has ever been the favorite maxim of sophists and preachers. Religious fervor has always been strongest in ages and countries where the distinctions in the outward condition of man, and the painful consequences that follow them, have been most marked. Indeed, this state of society has furnished the church its great principles of morals, which, therefore, is adapted to none but just such a condition of society. Equality of condition was never intended to be the element in which the Christian was to be trained, although there was, for a short period, a community of goods among a few of the early disciples of Jesus! The cardinal virtues of Christianity—as charity, self-denial, "humility" in prosperous circumstances, patience in adversity—can be cultivated only in a state of society where "the rich and the poor meet together," and where it is devoutly acknowledged that "the Lord is maker of them all." Were "the bounty of God" equally bestowed upon all, not only would many of the "most amiable" virtues be unknown, but many of the "most delightful" feelings of the Christian's heart would be dormant. Where would be the "glowing sensation" which springs from a consciousness of having "relieved" the necessitous, shared our bread with the hungry, clothed the naked, and made the widow's heart to sing with joy? And where, also, would be the "delight" of "unburdening" a grateful heart in warm thanks to a kind "benefactor," and the more "calm and permanent joy" which the pious poor have in "looking forward" to that "future reward" which is promised to a "patient endurance of affliction"? Under the influence of "piety," the relations of rich and poor are some of the most interesting and most profitable to the Christian's "spiritual improvement." While the hand is extended to afford relief to the poor, the heart is "softened with the purest Christian love," and it "swells with grateful emotions to that Being from whom alone its abundance is derived." And, while pious poverty receives the proffered bounty, the same "love" to man is promoted by "gratitude" to the "beneficent" individual, and the same "piety" by the consideration that "it is God who sends the kind messenger to relieve the necessitous."

Thus the church must uphold the inequality in the distribution of wealth, in order to have a field in which it can display its virtues. Great virtues they are that must feed upon want, misery, and privation! If equality was attained; if there were no poor to be "re-

lieved," no beggars to give alms to, no hungry to be fed, no naked to be clothed,—the "usefulness" of the church would be greatly diminished, and ninety-nine per cent. of the "ministers" would be compelled to learn some useful trade. There would be no poor to seek comfort in its doctrines, and no rich to keep up the virtues of charity and benevolence.

And yet these people hold out to the unthinking believer a happy life in a world to come, where "God shall wipe away all tears," where "there shall be no more death, neither sorrow nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain, for the former things are passed away." All will be equal. There will be neither rich or poor. No suffering of any kind will be known there. And yet they expect to be extremely happy, while here, they claim, equality would deprive man of every stimulus to activity, ingenuity, and enterprise,—of every animating impulse to the exertion of his bodily or mental powers. There they expect a "great diversity of tastes, of labors, and employments," and a marvelous development of their faculties and powers; here they would make no advance in the sciences and arts, and would rapidly lose what they possess. There social distinctions, poverty, and its attending evils are unknown and unnecessary to eternal happiness; here social inequality is the only system by which happiness and improvement can be promoted. What a paradox!

JOHN LEUTHOLD.

L'Enfant Terrible.

Judging by the rumpus which I have all unsuspectingly kicked up by my assertion of the parental ownership of children, evidence of which rumpus is to be found on other pages of this issue, the child is likely to prove a very troublesome member of the Anarchistic family, especially in Queen Victoria's realm, whence most of the criticism showered upon me has thus far come,—this latter fact being to me the more singular because such opportunities for observation (very limited, to be sure) as I have enjoyed have tended to convince me that in no other of the highly-civilized countries, or even in these semi-barbarous United States, are children so contemptuously ignored, when not brutally bullied, as in England. But of course I am not concerned at present with national customs or characteristics; the matter in hand is the application of the Anarchistic principle to that perplexing social factor, the infant.

My critics seem to be under an impression that in this matter I arrive at my conclusion by a special test of expediency. Such is not the case. It is, to be sure, only on egoistic and utilitarian grounds—that is, grounds of expediency—that I believe in equal liberty. But, having concluded that equal liberty is expedient, my application of the principle in the matter of children is, like my application of it elsewhere, as rigid as my analytical faculties can make it. Mr. Byington does not state my view with perfect accuracy when he represents me as holding that "it is better that children be owned by their parents than by the community." True, I do think that parental ownership is better than community ownership; but Mr. Byington's form of statement tends to leave an impression that in my view an Anarchist, weighing the respective merits of

the two methods, could, consistently with his Anarchism, decide in favor of community ownership. My distinct declaration, on the contrary, was that, "if we are Anarchists, we shall decide in favor of the parent." I do not believe that it is better that children should be owned by their parents than by the community in any other sense than that in which I believe that it is better that potatoes should be owned by their producers than by the community. Such portions of my critics' arguments, then, as proceed upon the idea that I apply a specifically utilitarian test to this particular matter are not pertinent to the issue between us, for which reason I dismiss them.

Though I, as an Egoist, agree with Mr. Fisher that "even ownership in general is but a means to an end," and that I am in no wise bound to respect property (except as I bind myself by contract), and that we "tolerate appropriation because no better basis for industrialism has been or seems likely to be invented," it is none the less true that, having fixed upon appropriation as the best basis for industrialism that we know of, we combine to protect and maintain it; and the principle of equal liberty allows us to thus combine, if we do so voluntarily. We combine, moreover, to protect, not only property, but also life and liberty. But the life, liberty, and property of whom? So far as the child and its status are concerned, this is the crucial question. And I answer it that we combine to protect the life, liberty, and property only of those who have reached a stage of development which enables them to form at least some crude conception of such a combination and its purpose,—in other words, only of those in whose minds the idea of contract has taken shape. If we protect the life and liberty of organisms that are outside this limit, we do so only in the interest of their owners; we do not protect them against their owners. As for the property of such organisms, they have none; they are themselves the property of others. Were we to protect organisms outside this limit in their own interest and against everybody, we should by that very act cease in a measure to protect the property right of organisms inside the limit. All this is but another way of saying what I said in No. 316,—that sociological material consists of two categories, the owners and the owned, and that the possession or lack of the power to contract, of the power to consciously and deliberately undertake to serve another in return for another's service and respect another in return for another's respect, determines the category in which any given organism belongs. No animal has this power; therefore all animals fall into the category of the owned, and are not entitled to social protection. There is a time in the life of every child when it lacks this power, and there is also a time in the life of every normal child whom death does not cut off in infancy when it acquires this power. As long as the child lacks this power, it remains in the category of the owned, and should not have social protection, because that would be injustice to its owner; as soon as it acquires this power, it becomes an owner, emancipates itself, and may contract for social protection. But this emancipation does not consist, as Mr. Fisher and Mr. Byington seem to think, in the mere manifestation of a recognizable will. Animals have

will and can make their volitions known, but they do not thereby become owners, and members of society. The necessary qualification for social membership is the power to entertain the simple idea of the social contract.

Now a second question arises: if the unemancipated child falls within the category of the owned, who is its owner? I answer that I can see no clearer property title in the world than that of the mother to the fruit of her womb, unless she has otherwise disposed of it by contract. Certainly the mother's title to the child while it remains in her womb will not be denied by any Anarchist. To deny this would be to deny the right of the mother to commit suicide during pregnancy, and I never knew an Anarchist to deny the right of suicide. If, then, the child is the mother's while in the womb, by what consideration does the title to it become vested in another than the mother on its emergence from the womb and pending the day of its emancipation? I think that no valid consideration can be shown; and, if such is the case, then it is established that the unemancipated child is the property of its mother, of which, by an obvious corollary, she may dispose as freely as she may dispose of any other property belonging to her.

It seems to me that in the foregoing paragraphs I have formulated the principles that settle the status of mother and child, and the relations of third parties to both. I accept in advance any conclusions that can logically be drawn from them, no matter how startling they may seem. It rests upon my critics, not to point out these startling conclusions (for I can think of none that would constitute a *reductio ad absurdum*), but to overthrow my argument. And so I have no occasion to consider the special considerations and questions and instances brought forward by Mr. Byington, Mr. Fisher, and Mr. Gilmour. My argument cuts under all of them. I have no more occasion to refute Mr. Byington's contention that parental treatment of children should be passed upon by a court of appeal than I should have to refute a proposition to empower the courts to prevent me from throwing my morning newspaper into the stove. The latter proposition could be sustained only by a fundamental revision of accepted theories of property, and I hold that this is equally true of the former proposition, unless my claim that the unemancipated child is property can be overthrown.

It remains, then, only to point out to Mr. Gilmour that the contradiction between my present position and that which I took in "Instead of a Book" is not of the nature that he supposes it to be. If I had previously held that parental cruelty is indubitable invasion and therefore to be prohibited, my present argument would indeed show a complete revolution in my opinion on this subject. But Mr. Gilmour will find, on re-reading the articles from which he quotes certain sentences, that I explicitly stated therein that I considered it a matter of doubt whether parental cruelty is invasive, and that I justified interference with it in extreme cases only on the ground of that necessity which arises in the face of disaster immediately impending. The change, then, which my opinion has undergone consists simply in the substitution of certainty for doubt as to the non-invasive character of paren-

tal cruelty,—a substitution which involves the conclusion that parental cruelty is not to be prohibited, since third parties have not to consider the danger of disaster to organisms that are outside the limits of social protection. Such a change of opinion as this is not the reversal of an Anarchistic principle, but, if well founded, an evidence of progress in the work of reducing the doubtful area lying between invasion and non-invasion. It strengthens the foundations of Anarchism, and therefore should be welcomed by every Anarchist.

In conclusion I may add, to reassure those who shrink from reason when it seems to do violence to their sympathies, that I have the welfare of children as sincerely at heart as any of my critics, and that I believe that an observance of the principles here formulated would secure to children, on the whole, greater happiness than they have ever enjoyed, or than they ever can enjoy in any society neglectful of these principles. T.

Since Roosevelt took it into his head to enforce the law against Sunday saloons, the New York "World" has been shouting for liberty and decrying the tyranny of law. It created a sensation among the injudicious by publishing recently a "Liberty" number, in which it gave long quotations from Jefferson, Mill, Spencer, and others defining the sphere of government and setting forth the benefits of individual freedom. Does the "World" imagine that open saloons on Sunday is all that liberty means and requires? If the "World" accepts the guidance of libertarian philosophers, it will find far greater invasions of liberty than Sunday closing, and its present fight will appear to it as highly ludicrous in the disproportion between the great effort put forth and the small object in view. If, however, the "World," in spite of its pretended faith in liberty, finds nothing but Sunday closing to oppose in its name, its attitude is much less intelligent and consistent than that of the fanatics who exult over the enforcement of Sunday laws.

How lame is the position of those New York papers which are fighting Roosevelt's Sunday-closing policy! No wonder they have comparatively little influence and are treated contemptuously by the more intelligent of Roosevelt's sympathizers. As a matter of fact, they do not understand the difference between fighting Roosevelt and fighting the Sunday law. Opposition to Sunday laws must be based on general reasons, while opposition to Roosevelt can be rational only if based on special reasons. The fact that a law is bad, tyrannical, and absurd is irrelevant to an executive official. If he is to discriminate between classes of laws, he must have other reasons than injustice. The only excuse he can have for failing to enforce a certain law is that his employees and masters have tacitly killed it and do not want it revived by him. Seeing that so many laws on the statute books are dead beyond resurrection, and that no one but a lunatic would ever venture to attempt to enforce all of them, it is reasonable for people to argue that a given law should be put away and treated as dead, if there is evidence to show that the law really is a dead letter. Such a line of argument must succeed with every rational

executive official, but no other will or ought to succeed. Yet most of the appeals addressed to Roosevelt are appeals of a general character, which should be reserved for the voters and the legislators. Liberty has little to hope from such champions as those sitting in the editorial chairs.

The Boston "Herald" notes the fact, which it apparently deems rather significant, that the Christian Endeavorers, who lately held their convention in that city, "did not disturb" its "good order or the good morals" in any way. After all the sickening twaddle that has been written *à propos* of this ordinary excursion of worldly men and women, even the "Herald's" unconscious sarcasm is grateful to all whose scent for humbug has been aroused by the suspicious zeal of the lay editors suffering from lack of sensations in the dull season.

Socialism's Showpiece.

[Journal of Commerce.]

The post office department is the stock example of efficient government management invariably cited by persons who desire to enlarge the field of public and restrict the field of individual enterprise. The financial statement of the New York office, just issued, will assist one to understand how little the management of the postal service warrants a general extension of the functions of the government in the field of transportation, construction, and production.

The total receipts of the office in this city in the late fiscal year were \$7,264,984, and the total expenses were \$2,972,126, including nearly a million and a third for the free-delivery service; this afforded to the government a net profit in operating the post office in this city of \$4,292,857, or about four-sevenths of the gross receipts.

The first reflection suggested by these figures is that the profit was extortionate. No business open to competition can make anything approaching this rate of profit. If the government would withdraw from the field, or would at least waive its monopoly, private companies would render the service for half the present scale of charges, and would expedite the service and would assume responsibility for losses,—a thing the government will not assume, even when its customers pay a registration fee. So far as this city, and in fact this section of the country, goes, it is suffering from a monopoly which in private hands would not be tolerated for twenty-four hours. Repeated efforts have been made to evade the government monopoly and carry letters in this city at a one-cent rate. Private companies would jump at the chance of collecting letters at people's houses and offices and delivering them for one-half the charge made by the government, but the government monopoly is securely guarded, and we must pay more than double what the service costs.

The government, however, makes no profit on its postal service. It carries letters and newspapers on the philanthropic principle on which the Populists desire it to carry wheat and corn and cotton. There are a few States in which the government makes a profit out of its post office. But in the great majority it does its postal business at a loss. The profit made in New York is used to fill the deficit in the postal business of many western and southern States; not every eastern State, even, shows a profit for the post office. The government exercises the right of charging vastly more than private carriers would for doing a postal business here, and of using the profit to enable it to do a postal business in Nebraska for very much less than any private carrier would,—for much less, in fact, than it costs to do it.

This is a process of equalization which doubtless meets the approval of many persons in the west and south who cannot imagine any reason why the east should not be taxed for their benefit, and who argue plausibly that the east makes money out of the other parts of the country, and should meet a good part of the expenses of carrying on the other parts. But the philanthropy of the post office does not stop here. It does not have to live on its income. It is in the happy position of the young man who earns what he

can, but whose unpaid bills are annually settled by his indulgent father. For the current fiscal year the appropriation for the postal department is \$89,545,997, made up of all the revenues of the department and whatever additional sum may be needed to meet expenses. This is estimated to be two and a half millions, but is quite likely to be more, for the appropriation is a million and a half less than the estimates of the department, which is very well informed as to its liabilities. The deficit is made good out of money raised by taxation. The postal service is conducted at less than cost to the people who use it, but the deficit must be made good from some quarter; it is made good out of other people's pockets, or out of the pockets of the people who use the post office, but at times when they do not know what they are paying for. A man gets a letter carried for one cent less than the cost; and then, for every five glasses of beer he drinks, the government takes a cent out of his pocket to make good the cent it lost in carrying the letter.

The political importance of rapid communication between all points in the country is sufficient to justify the government in carrying letters without profit, and even at some loss; the deficit will never become unmanageable. But, if it did a telegraphic service on a like plan, the aggregate deficit might become serious, for the postal deficit has been seven or eight millions. The fact that the government charges nothing for the service of carrying country papers within the county of publication in order to conciliate the "palladium of our liberties," though it has to pay for this as for any postal service, affords a glimpse of the dead-head service that would be exacted of the government by political influence, should the government extend its philanthropic operations to the telegraphic field, the railroad field, or the factory field. It is well known that much of the financial embarrassment of the Australian colonies is due to the fact that, to please this constituency or that, the colonial governments have extended the railroads, nearly all of which are public property, or reduced charges below the cost of rendering the service. There is now at large in this country a Californian named Lubin, who is trying to get people to demand that the government shall defray a part of the cost of shipping grain abroad. This cost cannot be eliminated, though the ordinary competition of trade has wonderfully reduced it. But whatever the government disburses on that account it must get from somewhere; it must raise by taxation. Probably the farmer is quite willing that the cost of exporting his grain shall be paid by some one else. But it is quite clear that every one cannot get his expenses shouldered off upon some one else. If those who dance do not pay the piper, the "wall flowers" must, and it is not likely that they will long consent to.

That the government does the postal service economically is a common assertion which will not bear any examination. In the populous east it charges a rate which yields profits that only the most avaricious and successful trusts ever dreamed of. No private company was ever robbed on its contracts as the government was in the days of "star route" frauds, and, though these days are over, no one familiar with the contract office of the post office department will pretend that the government gets this branch of mail-carrying done as cheaply as express companies would. Far the largest item in the cost of the postal service is the payment to the railroad companies, the rate governing which has not been reduced for seventeen years, though, for all other services rendered, the railroad companies are getting much less,—in fact, not much more than half. Monopolies as they are said to be, the railroad companies have reduced their passenger rates and their freight rates in the most radical fashion, while the government goes on paying the same rate per hundred pounds for carrying postal matter that it paid seventeen years ago; and it is paying to the large railroad companies, which carry the heavy mails, a rental for the use of postal cars which annually exceeds the cost of building the cars, and which is additional to the payment by weight.

Instead of justifying an extension of government activities in transportation and production, the facts of the postal service constitute a warning that the nation would be bankrupted in five years if the government undertook to carry on the freight business upon the principles which govern the carriage of the mails.

"The Abuse of Free Speech."

Mr. Yarros observes that I do not draw a "distinction between abuses of freedom and offences against propriety or taste," and explains that, when he uses the phrase "abuse of free speech," he means "invasion." Taking the position that "we are entitled to proscribe and punish all invasive acts," Mr. Yarros affirms: "It follows that those against whom the charge of abusing free speech is preferred are liable to be declared transgressors of equal liberty. . . . The right of criticism would be very shadowy, indeed, if society could employ censors to regulate our modes of expression and prescribe or prepare legal 'forms' for use in discussions. It would be absurd to say that, while a man ought to be allowed to cull an opponent an ignoramus, he ought not to be allowed to call him a fool. Yet, if Mrs. Dietrick does not mean to advocate such arbitrary restriction of speech and criticism, what force and pertinence are there in her remark that 'abuse of freedom of speech is force,' and that a word often has the same physical effect as a blow?"

Mr. Yarros then declares: "No, words are not force, no matter what, in given cases, their effect may be. Boycotting often has the same effects as force, but it is not force. If effects are to be taken as the test, all distinctions between force and suasion, between coercion and passive resistance, are obliterated." But, a little farther on, Mr. Yarros himself speaks of "men who can be reached only by a word which has the effect of a blow." If this does not mean that a word is force under certain circumstances (which was all that I claimed), what does it mean?

It seems to me that the very best mode of arriving at a distinction between "force and suasion" is to make effects the test; but, I should say, here, that, in my mind, no distinction exists "between abuses of freedom and offences against propriety or taste." They are synonymous terms, in my opinion. I affirm that:

1. An abuse of freedom of speech is such a use as itself defeats the object of speech, except in the one case where the object is an indulgence in a display of a spirit of anger, hatred, or revenge.

2. Such abuse of freedom of speech is an offence against propriety or taste.

3. It is "invasion," as invasion is attack, or assault, or attempt at coercion. To call a man a fool or a liar is to assault him, and, if he be a man who is incapable of striking back with the same weapon,—that is, with a counter charge of "fool" or "liar,"—it is a breach of equal liberty, and the person instituting the attack is a transgressor.

4. But it does not follow that "society" should be advised, or permitted, to employ censors to regulate our modes of expression, because some rude individuals use words that are brutal as blows, and for the following reason. *The remedy is worse than the disease.* It would be like beating wife-beaters with intention to discourage wife-beating. Long experience has demonstrated that such punishment only aggravates the evil it seeks to cure. Just so it would be with a policy of forcible attempt to interdict and punish the abuse of force. Force begets force, and the more mankind relies upon violence, the less chance is there for the reign of reason, suasion, agreement. Libel and slander are peculiarly cruel, for the reason that, from its very nature, a widely-published libel cannot possibly be obliterated. As well might a man who scatters thistle-down on the wind hope to overtake, gather it in, and take it out of sight as society to imagine that slander can be undone by retraction, or mitigated by punishment. Only the revengful could care for punishment of such an offence.

5. Therefore, all that is left us is the effort to convince society—to persuade public opinion—that volleys of vituperation, stinging epithets which attack personal character, cutting terms which malign personal motives, burning charges which brand one as unworthy of fair argument at the hands of self-respecting men,—all these are abuses of freedom of speech. If a man really be believed to be a fool or a liar, it is pure waste of time to bestow any notice upon him. A "conspiracy of silence" is by far the most effectual method of dealing with fools and liars; but, if it seem positively necessary to notice the words of a fool or a liar, it should be perfectly easy to make his own words convict him without the use of one offensive epithet of a personal character.

6. A proper use of speech in argument is to meet the words of your opponent with your own words, in the same spirit with which two gentlemen play chess. Each believes in himself; each seeks to marshal his powers in such manner as to overcome the powers of his opponent; neither takes unfair advantage by exciting his adversary with taunting words which beg the question between them; and, no matter how complete the defeat of either, it is possible for them to maintain friendly relations, for the defeated stands convicted of deserved defeat.

But, however appropriate between savages or children (whose power of intellectual wrestling is exceedingly limited), violent personal abuse is entirely out of place in any sort of a brain contest between civilized persons of mature age. In resort to such displays of force, it is the most brutal, not the best, side which wins. It is undoubtedly true, as Mr. Yarros charges, that "we are all equally prone to 'sin';" in this respect, I, certainly, do not pose as a "meek and lowly moral non-resistant." On the contrary, when time and need require, I resist with all my might, and it is exceedingly probable that specimens of my own shortcomings in argument could be resurrected from my past.

Yet I still maintain that, if abuse does not "alienate and disgust impartial outsiders," it is evidence of monstrously bad taste and meanness of disposition on the part of outsiders who can enjoy such debate, when mutually abusive, or it convicts them, at once, of partiality when they can enjoy abuse emanating only from one side. Mr. Yarros says that abuse is resented "by third persons only when it appears to them to be gratuitous and unjust, and what they resent in these instances is, not the abuse, but the injustice." But my whole contention in this question is that abuse, in argument, is *always* unjust. Just speech cannot possibly be abusive. Here is where I distinguish between use and ab-use, or misuse. In argument, all that we have to do with our opponent is to confute his words, and far more skill is shown in accomplishing this task: without a syllable against his personal character than by making the air black with the brutal terms "liar," "wretch," "miscreant," and so on. If his words in one place effectually confound his words in another, it is only necessary to set one of his own phrases against the other. If he reveals misapprehension of his subject, all that is needed is to state the subject clearly. If he be hopelessly unreasonable, any sort of ridicule of his argument is legitimate. In short, I conclude as I began,—that the only line to be drawn about use of speech in argument is at *personal* abuse, attack upon personal character and motives.

To resort to this is to attempt to enter another person's mind and sit in judgment upon the secret workings of the heart,—an utterly impossible undertaking.

ELLEN BATTELE DIETRICK.

Children as Chattels.

To the Editor of Liberty:

The editorial headed "A Sound Criticism" in Liberty, No. 316, takes up a startling and surely a novel position.

The material with which the sociologist deals may be divided into two classes,—owners and owned. Now, under this classification the child presents a difficulty; for, while unquestionably belonging in the category of the owned, he differs from all other parts of that category in the fact that there is steadily developing within him the power of self-emancipation, which at a certain point enables him to become an owner instead of remaining a part of the owned. But I am unable to see that this singularity can alter his technical status pending the day of self-emancipation.

This theory of "technical status" and sociological category has a flavor of artificiality which ought to raise suspicion. "The principle originally chosen for our guidance" must be sound and well founded in itself, or all the arguments built upon it are unsupported.

The hypothesis of the appropriation of children, so far as the article is concerned, rests solely upon assent to the contention that parental control of children is so excellent, useful, and obviously proper that no superior right of an outsider can be admitted, even where children suffer from parental abuse of parental authority (or, as it is quite wrongfully stated, superior right of the community in case of abuse of parental liberty).

The supposition of the chatteldom of the child, if

based upon the utility, excellence, and propriety of parental control, surely implies, among its benefits, an advantage to the child. This must recognize that, during the whole period of control, the parent is not an owner at all, but, if legal jargon can solve a sociological question, a trustee. If he be an irresponsible owner, he can kill his property as a man may kill a horse. If, on the other hand, it be admitted that he is a trustee and was *ex officio* entitled to a preference in selection for the post, it is surely inconsistent to argue that his appointment is based upon a sacred and inviolable claim. Sexual constancy and the family life, it is now pretty generally admitted, can be bought too dear, if the union be held to be inviolably sacred.

Even ownership in general is but a means to an end. The title of one individual to certain wealth is not axiomatic, nor can it be based upon any abstract principle. People, or the community (if this faulty term be preferred), tolerate appropriation because no better basis for industrialism has been or seems likely to be invented.

What better basis can be discovered for the control of children than that elaborated in "Social Statics"? Infants are dependent. Their sustenance is a gift or wage which involves conditions. When the child can make known volitions in opposition to those of the donor of its maintenance, its supporter has no right to assert property. He is justified only in arguing that he will withhold his gifts unless his terms be accepted. If no one cares anything for the child, then neither will any nurture it, nor will any defend it against injustice. No one will give to an absolutely hateful immature animal, unless from fear that some other will cause him a suffering greater than would arise from the donation of food and attendance. Non-human animals do not excite such a quantity or degree of sympathy as can secure them from servitude, mutilation, castration, depilation, milk robbery, chastisement. But these invasions may be resisted by the animal, and may as rightly be resisted by an association of the animal with one or more human animals. The same equally applies to irrational human beings, but here, sympathy being more powerful and more general, an almost universally recognized distinction is made, and becomes the basis of a set of more or less artificial rules. The individualist creed is that the maximum of liberty is the most useful treatment for all rational beings, and it is jealous to extend a generous significance to the formula, and to suppose rationality to pertain to each anthropoid individual taken at random, at least until some evidence is forthcoming to the contrary.

J. GREEVZ FISHER.

LEEDS, ENGLAND, JULY 6, 1895.

The Status of the Child.

To the Editor of Liberty:

You say that children must be owned till they are of age to become owners, and that it is better that they be owned by their parents than by the community; therefore we should not interfere with a father's pounding his child as much as he thinks discipline requires.

I rise to ask why a child should not be its own owner in all matters wherein it has a recognizable will. Of course, if the baby goes to fooling with my razor or my sugar-bowl, it is invading my property, and I am justified in resisting the invasion, and, if it seems useful, in punishing the invader. If my main reason for objecting to such use of my property was my regard for the child's health, that makes no difference. But even the fact that the child is an invader does not justify an unreasonably severe punishment.

Of course, again, if I have a baby and move to another town, I take the baby along without asking its leave; but I have no reason to suppose that the baby objects to what I am doing; therefore I do not consider myself an invader.

But as to the parent's right to whip his child for non-invasive disobedience, it is not, to my mind, "too excellent, too useful, too obviously proper a thing to warrant" a dispute. Grant that good is often done by the exercise of this alleged right: it does a tremendous lot of harm too, not only in temporary black and blue spots, but in assisting almost every known form of mis-education.

It is reasonable enough that a parent be the primary

judge and summary executioner with regard to his child's misdemeanors, and that the parent be not punishable for slight abuses in the exercise of this office; but that his most severe judgments should be without appeal, and his greatest malfeances without punishment or redress, seems to me unreasonable.

STEPHEN T. BYINGTON.

An Apparent Contradiction.

To the Editor of Liberty:

Am I to understand from your article, "A Sound Criticism," in No. 316 of Liberty, that you no longer adhere to the position you took up on p. 136 of "Instead of a Book"? Or do you consider that the latter position is in harmony with your latest utterance in a "Sound Criticism"? Personally I am driven to the conclusion that your latest opinions *re* the child question are antagonistic to the opinions expressed by you in "Instead of a Book." For example, in answer to the question: "If a parent starves, tortures, or mutilates his child, thus actively aggressing upon it to its injury, is it just for other members of the group to interfere to prevent such aggression?" you said: "If, instead of 'Is it just?' he (the questioner) should ask, 'Is it Anarchistic policy?' I would make reply as follows: Yes."

And, again, in answer to the second question of the same series: "If a parent neglects to provide food, shelter, and clothing for his child, thus neglecting the self-sacrifice implied by the second corollary of the law [would you say "guiding principle"?] of equal freedom, is it just for other members of the group to interfere to compel him so to provide?" you replied (with the proviso: "Is it Anarchistic policy?"): "Yes, in sufficiently serious cases." ("Instead of a Book," pp. 134-6.)

Now, in No. 316 of Liberty you say: "I hasten to say that his ('H.'s) main contention that parental control of children is too excellent, too useful, too obviously proper a thing to warrant the setting-up of a superior right of the community [or group?] in the premises, *even in the interests of those who suffer* (italics mine) from parental abuse of parental liberty, appeals to me as entirely sound." At this point, I think, if I put the first sentence of a paragraph you quote from Mr. Fisher's article in "Personal Rights" in an interrogative manner, without perceptibly injuring the context, it will be on all-fours with the question put to you in "Instead of a Book," thus: "If a person, male or female, alleging parentage, beats, enslaves, or defrauds a child, has the Individualist [or group] a right to interfere?"

Further, I cannot, in the meantime, agree with you when you say: "The only question is: Who shall own him—the parent or the community?" and for the reason that I think that *guardianship, not ownership*, is the real question at issue. In the article already referred to in No. 316 you hold: "Till that day (of self-emancipation) he must remain in the category of the owned, and, as a matter of course, till that day he must have an owner." I should like you to justify the "must have an owner." But admitting, for the time being, such ownership, another question presents itself to my mind. May the parent (I know you have a warm side to the mother in this matter)—that is, the owner—sell the child if he, or she, as the case may be, can find a purchaser? If not, why not?

I confess freely that I agree, rightly or wrongly, with Comrade Badcock when he says that, "in defending others against aggressors, we lessen the chances of being attacked ourselves," and that "any child must be allowed to accept such outside help whenever its own parents forfeit their position as guardians by neglect or cruelty. To deny such liberty to the child would be an aggression upon the child." ("Slaves or Duty," p. 20.) In conclusion, I take the opportunity of saying that I have endorsed and quoted as Anarchist policy your attitude in "Instead of a Book," and, if I have wrongly charged you with contradicting your self, I am prepared to take the usual drubbing,—but with it the reasons annexed. My work here in Scotland, as you are aware, is of a pioneer character, so to speak, and I must, as far as possible, give chapter and verse for all that I advocate in the propagation of Anarchism.

Yours cordially,

WILLIAM GILMOUR.

26 ST. CLAIR ST., GLASGOW, JULY 31, 1895.

Mr. Whittick's Version.

To the Editor of Liberty:

About two years ago I listened to a lecture relating to money delivered before the Friendship Liberal League of this city by Arthur Kitson, and in the public discussion that followed I criticised Mr. Kitson in such a manner that (as he has repeatedly told me) he was led to change his views, very materially, as to that important branch of economics. This was his conversion.

I next heard of Mr. Kitson by his sending to me for a copy of my pamphlet on the "Money Question."

In a few days he requested me (by messenger) to give him twenty-five copies of the pamphlet to send to a prominent United States senator. Then Mr. Kitson appeared in person. I welcomed him with enthusiasm as my first crumb of comfort in a fight against tremendous odds.

From the panic year of 1873 I had laboriously studied the money question, once writing a book called "Pecunia" from a greenback standpoint.

When the holy spirit of Anarchy took possession of my being, I tore up my manuscript, to my subsequent regret; as it was a considerable reservoir of pertinent facts.

I have also lectured frequently on this subject, and written from time to time in many papers.

The conversion of Mr. Kitson was "manna to my hungry soul, and, to the weary, rest," and made me feel that perhaps it was not so much my inability to demonstrate my theories as lack of capacity in the ordinary mind to comprehend them. In fact, I lost a little of my natural modesty.

Thus commenced my close communion with Arthur Kitson, who was clever enough to see in my theories a vital and revolutionary truth in economics, and a reputation, ready made, for himself in their appropriation and elaboration.

In the guise of a friend he had a straw in my brains for over a year, steadily sucking out and trying to elaborate my ideas in his own way.

I trusted implicitly to his protestations of friendship, and we were inseparable. We stood side by side at lectures and discussions; we sat together at meals; in our respective offices we patted one another's backs; in the country and by the sea-side we aired our sublime conceptions, and flattered ourselves that we had discovered the philosopher's stone, the quest of ages.

This certainly justifies me in saying that our relations were much more intimate than his reference to me in his preface would indicate.

Mr. Kitson is wrong when he says that he wrote his Single Tax lecture prior to calling upon me, in his hunt for "some radical."

His apparent appreciation of my lectures and poems led me, more than anything, to publish them in "Bombs," which accounts for my voluntary tribute to him in the dedication.

He just as freely offered to dedicate his contemplated book to me, but he subsequently changed his mind, and promised me a notice in his preface in lieu thereof.

I have no fault to find with that notice; it is his conduct since his book appeared that has outraged my feelings, and turned, by retrospection, friendly actions into gross insults.

I have never denied that Mr. Kitson wrote his book. As I behold his work now, I should indeed be sorry to claim any collaboration in actual composition. But I do claim that his incoherent work is a vain attempt to elaborate my ideas, which, so far as any originality goes, all hinge upon my conception of the ideality of money; the "conflict between money and specie," which, Mr. Kitson admits, I first led him to see.

The error in my hastily written pamphlet as to gold being a possible standard of value does not indicate my "original position" as to value referred to by me, and Mr. Kitson willfully falsifies when he claims that it does. My letter (No. 316) says exactly what I mean and what my original position was.

It is amusing to find Mr. Kitson captiously harping on my error, proudly claiming credit for its elimination, and then on page 178, in his "Scientific Solution, etc.," asserting identically by inference the same thing,—*viz.*, that gold can be a standard of value. He says: "For this reason [fluctuating value] no commodity, whether it be gold, silver, or diamonds, can be a permanent standard of purchasing power."

The inference is that a commodity (gold) may be a temporary standard of value. How now, Horatio?

Value being, as Mr. Kitson quotes, "the cornerstone of the economic edifice," and Mr. Kitson's conception of value (borrowed from Jevons and foolishly adopted by me,—Jevons being no mean authority) being entirely wrong, his book is worthless,—a punishment that neatly fits the crime of *ideo kleptomania*.

His "invariable unit of purchasing power," claimed as "novel" in the body of his preface, and surreptitiously, in a foot note, as being "new and original," is my "ideal dollar," my "common denominator of values," my "ideal measure of ideal values," which I have contended for at various times in "Our Country," "John Swinton's Paper," "The Individualist," and Philadelphia "Justice," covering years of propaganda long prior to my conversion of Mr. Kitson.

Simple facts and the bare truth will satisfy me perfectly, Mr. Kitson; you may have all the notoriety.

Since I fully realized what a hole Mr. Kitson had dragged my theories into, I have been perfectly candid with him, and told him that I would not interfere in the discussion, if he would manfully admit his blunders and give me credit for pointing them out to him before Liberty's criticisms appeared.

But Mr. Kitson had begun to show signs of "swelled head." Press notices were *unwarily fillin'* and bad for his memory.

Before writing to Liberty, I waited until I saw that his policy was one of evasion and jugglery, and then I entered the arena with reluctance, as Mr. Tucker can testify.

Let me conclude by reminding Mr. Kitson of his quotation from Proudhon, heading his "Introduction" to his book: "I will not cease to pursue the truth through the ruins and rubbish"; which should be borne in mind by every reader of Mr. Kitson's (his own) book.

WM. A. WHITTICK.

886 N. 25TH ST., PHILADELPHIA, AUGUST 12, 1895.

From Nietzsche's "Morgenroethe."

[Translated from the German by George Schumm.]

EGOISM VERSUS EGOISM.—How many still reason: "Life would be unendurable if there were no God!" (or, as the idealists put it: "Life would be unendurable if it were basically wanting in ethical significance!")—consequently there *must* be a God (or ethical significance of life)! In truth, the matter resolves itself simply into this,—that he who has become accustomed to these conceptions does not desire life without them; that for him and his survival these may be necessary conceptions. But that presumption to decree that everything which is necessary for my survival must also really exist! As if it were necessary that I should survive! How if others entertained contrary feelings? if they would rather not live under the very conditions of these two articles of faith, and find life no longer worth living then? And this is the case at present!

THE VANITY OF MORAL TEACHERS.—The on the whole poor success of moral teachers is explained by the fact that they have been desirous of accomplishing too much at once,—that is, that they have been too ambitious; they have been too eager to publish commandments for all. But this is equivalent to moving in a fog and calling upon the animals to turn into human beings; what wonder that the animals found this proceeding tiresome! One ought to seek limited circles and discover and develop morality for them,—for instance, exhort the wolves to become dogs. But, above all, the great success will fall to him who wishes to educate neither all or limited circles, but one only, and who in so doing will look neither to the right or to the left. The last century is superior to the present in that it had so many individually educated men, beside as many educators who had in this found the calling of their life, and with the calling also *dignity*,—in their own esteem and in that of all other "good society."

AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE OF THE STATE.—All the political and social relations are not of sufficient importance that, above all men, the most gifted spirits might and should concern themselves with them; such an expenditure of spirit is at bottom worse than a calamity. They are and will remain the fields of labor

for lesser minds, and other than lesser minds ought not to be at the service of these workshops. May the machine rather go to pieces once again! But as it is now, when not only everybody daily thinks he must *know* concerning these matters, but when also everybody wishes to busy himself with them at all hours, and thereby neglects his own work, it is a great and ridiculous piece of madness. We pay much too dearly at this price for "general security"; and the maddest thing about it is that the very opposite of general security is thereby achieved, as our dear century is about to demonstrate,—as if it had never been demonstrated! To secure society against theft and make it fireproof and infinitely comfortable in every direction, and to change the State into a providence of the good and evil sense,—these are low, moderate, and not necessarily indispensable ends, which ought not to be pursued at the cost of the highest means and instructions that we know of,—means which ought to be *treasured up* for the loftiest and rarest ends! Our age, notwithstanding its talk about economy, is a spendthrift; it squanders what is most precious,—spirit.

WAR.—The great wars of the present are the results of historical study.

GOVERNING.—Some govern from the pleasure of governing; others in order not to be governed. To these it is only the lesser of two evils.

Anarchist Letter-Writing Corps.

The Secretary wants every reader of Liberty to send in his name for enrolment. Those who do so thereby pledge themselves to write, when possible, a letter every fortnight, on Anarchism or kindred subjects, to the "target" assigned in Liberty for that fortnight, and to notify the secretary promptly in case of any failure to write to a target (which it is hoped will not often occur), or in case of temporary or permanent withdrawal from the work of the Corps. All, whether members or not, are asked to lose no opportunity of informing the secretary of suitable targets. Address, STEPHEN T. BYINGTON, 108 W. 13th Street, New York City.

Target, section A.—The "World," New York City, recently said:

Personal liberty includes the right to think as we please, to eat and drink what we please, and to do that which pleases us, if, as Herbert Spencer puts it, we "infringe not the equal freedom of any other man."

This was said, I understand, with reference to the liquor question. Point out the applicability of the principle in some field where the "World" neglects to apply it, such as money or taxation.

Section B.—Bolton Hall, 111 Broadway, New York City, editor of "Tax Reform Studies," asks for attacks from an Anarchist standpoint on the license system. As his columns deal only with taxation, he will want letters dealing with the use of licenses to raise revenue, or with the use of the license fee to restrict objectionable trades, rather than with those aspects of the system in which the fee is not prominent. Better avoid the word "Anarchist" in writing for this target. STEPHEN T. BYINGTON.

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