Entries Tagged 'Russia' ↓

In the previous two parts of this short series (here and here), we saw that the Jordanian radical ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and his website, Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad, have been closely involved in efforts to support the mujahidun in the Caucasus by offering advice, translating books into Russian and encouraging and praising their efforts. We still don’t know why this is the case, however. In this final part of the series, we will try to answer that question.

The Shari’a Committee

To understand why al-Maqdisi and his website are so interested in the mujahidun in the Caucasus, we need to go back a few years to an interview that al-Maqdisi gave to the Jordanian newspaper Al-‘Arab al-Yawm, which was published on 5 July 2005. As regular Jihadica readers know, al-Maqdisi used his week-long release from prison in that year to criticise his former pupil Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi and to scold other jihadis for their – in his view – extremist and sometimes plain stupid actions in conflicts that they could never win anyway. He also mentioned that he wanted to set up a committee of religious scholars that could guide jihadi youngsters all over the world by giving them advice and fatwas. Although this latter piece of information was not widely reported at the time and was not acted upon by al-Maqdisi - he was quickly rearrested in 2005 and not released until 2008 - it is nevertheless highly interesting because he seems to have realised this goal of setting up such a committee in 2009.

Since September last year, Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad has had a forum on which readers can ask al-Maqdisi and ten other scholars all kinds of questions related to Islam. Although many of these questions (collected in ten volumes so far) are about issues that have nothing to do with jihad, such as wearing trousers (vol. 5, p. 25) or determining the first day of Ramadan (vol. 2, pp. 5-6), many of them do deal with fighting and violence. Considering the context given above (i.e. that this forum was perhaps partly meant to prevent young jihadis from using too much violence), it is not surprising that several of these fatwas actually discourage questioners from using force. A question on Hamas’ Qassam Brigades in the Gaza Strip is answered with the advice to radical jihadis to remain patient and not to seek any confrontation with Hamas (vol. 1, pp. 1-2), notwithstanding the Shari’a Council’s strong disagreements with that movement. Another reply to a Belgian group called Shariah4Belgium advises that group’s members to support jihad elsewhere, but to refrain from using violence in their own country because of their weakness there.

So what is the Minbar doing in Moscow then?

The Minbar’s communique about the subway bombings in Moscow earlier this year, its interest in the Caucasus and its efforts to translate certain books into Russian should probably be seen as part of this wider plan by al-Maqdisi and certain like-minded scholars to support and encourage mujahidun who try to wage a “clean” jihad and to advise others on how to do that. In fact, if one were to take a look at the communique with which this series started as well as al-Maqdisi’s epistle about the Islamic Emirate in the Caucasus, it is striking that so much of these texts is spent praising the mujahidun for their eagerness to obtain knowledge, their supposed purity of arms, the situation in which they allegedly had no other choice than to use violence, their correct choice of victims etc., while hardly any attention is paid to their military prowess. The praise, in other words, seems to be caused not by the mujahidun’s firepower but by their careful and considered use of violence and appears to be directed not just at the mujahidun in the Caucasus but also at other aspiring jihadis as if to tell them: “Take a good look guys, this is how you wage a proper jihad.”

The Shari’a Committee is only less than a year old and consists of relatively unknown scholars (apart from al-Maqdisi) and it remains to be seen whether its fatwas actually have the kind of influence that its authors want them to have. Still, throughout the past year, several new scholars have been added to the committee - sometimes with much fanfare - and if others (perhaps Abu Basir al-Tartusi?) join too, al-Maqdisi’s and the Minbar’s efforts to stem the extremist tides of unlimited violence could pay off and have the potential to become an influential ideological force.

In part 1 of this short series of posts, we saw that the Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad website published a communique by the leader of the Islamic Emirate in the Caucasus, Dokku ‘Umarov, claiming responsibility for the attacks in Moscow on 29 March 2010. This was slightly odd since the Minbar mostly publishes books, articles and fatwas, not claims of responsibility for attacks committed anywhere. Although a quick glance at the website may give the impression that this is indeed an exception, a more detailed look reveals that it is part of a broader trend.

It appears that the Minbar has been involved in the conflict between Russia and the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus for some time. For instance, the Jordanian owner of the website, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, has written an epistle in support of the mujahidin in the Caucasus. In it, al-Maqdisi praises the supposed ideological purity, leadership and righteousness of the fighters in the Caucasus and writes that this group can serve as an example for other jihadi groups in the Muslim world. He speaks highly of their acts but especially of what he describes as their knowledge, their carefulness in applying takfir (excommunication of Muslims) and their unwillingness to deviate from tawhid (the unity of God) and compares them favourably with Hamas, another group fighting a non-Muslim enemy.

Advice

The group’s qadi (judge), Abu ‘Imran Anzur b. Aldar, has also asked al-Maqdisi for advice about Muslims working for the Russian government and to what extent the fighters in the Caucasus are allowed to co-operate with them. Abu ‘Imran observes that some Muslims are not very pious or fear for their lives but nevertheless sympathize with the fighters in the Caucasus and therefore use their positions in the Russian army or governmental circles, which Abu ‘Imran believes to be forces of unbelief, to secretly help the Islamic Emirate and wants to know how he should deal with this phenomenon. Al-Maqdisi’s rather general answer is that Muslims should show their true faith to others but their unwillingness to do so because they are weak or scared should not automatically lead to their excommunication. In fact, he maintains that these Muslims may be able to help further the cause of Islam as a whole and that this could be a good thing in certain situations.

The “mujahid leader” Abu ‘Imran also asked al-Maqdisi for advice about Muslim participation in the Olympic Games or the football World Cup. Interestingly, his question does not deal with the tight shirts and short trunks that athletes wear but concentrates on whether it is allowed to participate in sports while wearing clothes that prominently display the word “Russia” as well as Russian symbols. He also wonders whether the pagan Greek origins of the Olympic Games are acceptable in this respect and complains about youngsters who refuse to wear Nike clothes because that brand derives its name from a Greek goddess but who have no problem wearing shirts with the name of the “false god” Russia on it. One may wonder how relevant this question is for people who are busy waging a war against Russian troops, but al-Maqdisi treats it as a serious matter. He states that while participation in sports is not wrong in itself, it is in this context, although he is again careful not to brand those who do participate in the Olympic Games as infidels.

Russian

These two questions mentioned above are reportedly not the only times Abu ‘Imran asked al-Maqdisi for advice since he is said to been in touch with him about other things and has also asked for the latter’s books to be translated into Russian (see here). The Minbar’s involvement with the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus is not limited to al-Maqdisi, however, since those running the website have been busy translating not just some of al-Maqdisi’s books but also some by ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam and others into Russian.

So now we know that the communique about the Moscow bombings was not an exception but was actually part of a greater involvement by the Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad in the Caucasus. This still leaves one question: why?

To be continued…

Although I’m awfully late in paying attention to it, there is an interesting dimension to the Moscow metro attacks that occurred just over a month ago that is relevant for jihad watchers but has not been dealt with in the media or blogs as far as I know.

While attention has obviously focused on the attacks themselves and on the video claim of responsibility by the leader of the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus, Dokku ‘Umarov, I have not seen any references to a written statement by the same man posted on the online jihadi library Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad (the Pulpit of the Unity of God and Jihad).

This statement – and particularly the fact that it was posted on the Minbar, the largest jihadi online library – is interesting. It indicates a development of potentially great significance to the future of jihadi ideological production. This post is the first in a short series of posts I intend to write on this subject for Jihadica. First, let’s look at a translation of the communiqué itself, which is preceded by a statement by the Minbar:

Communiqué by the leader of the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus Dokku Abu ‘Uthman about the Moscow Explosions

In the name of God, praise belongs to God and prayers and peace upon the messenger of God.

In support of our mujahidin brothers in the Caucasus, we publish this communiqué of which news agencies and satellite channels have not spread anything except that the mujahidin accepted responsibility for the operations. The reasons and justifications the mujahidin mention for perpetrating these operations – the most important of which is the massacre that the Russian intelligence apparatuses have committed with regard to the poor civilians in Chechnya, who do not have anything to feed themselves with nor earn anything except some wild garlic from the woods, where the criminals of the intelligence apparatuses executed a number of them with knives, abusing, maiming and disfiguring their corpses without [their having committed any] offence or crime – all of this and more of the crimes of the Russian regime that the media have not mentioned in the news on the Moscow explosions nor have been mentioned in the communiqué of the emirate [are reasons and justifications for the Moscow attacks]. On the contrary, [the media] were certainly content with the acknowledgement of the explosions by the mujahidin and avoided the justifications [given by the mujahidin] that reveal the crimes of the Putin regime.

That’s why we at the Pulpit of the Unity of God and Jihad see it as our duty to spread this translation [from the original Russian] of the communiqué by the leader of the mujahidin of the Caucasus, Dokku Abu ‘Uthman – may God protect him.

And God prevails in his purpose, but most people do not realise it [Q. 12: 21]

The Shari‘a Committee of the Pulpit of the Unity of God and Jihad

16 Rabi‘ II 1431 AH [1 April 2010 AD]

————————————————————————————–

Praise belongs to God, the lord of all being, prayers and peace upon our Prophet Muhammad, on his family and his companions and on those who follow his right guidance to judgement day.

Peace to all the mujahidin who wage jihad to establish the shari‘a of God in this world.

I am the leader of the mujahidin of the Emirate of the Caucasus, Dokku [Abu ‘Uthman] ‘Umarov. I announce this communiqué on 29 March 2010.

Everyone knows that on 29 March 2010 two operations took place in Moscow. They led to ruin for the unbelievers and they were a special message to the Russian intelligence.

These two operations were done on my specific order and – God willing – they are not the last operations.

With regard to these operations, I want to make clear why we did it:

As we all know, on 11 February, intelligence troops in Chechnya – more specifically, in the district of the village of Arshti – annihilated Muslims from among the poorest and weakest who were gathering wild garlic to keep themselves barely alive and to feed their families, where the criminal special forces of the FSB [the Russian Federal Security Service] killed these innocent civilians with knives and subsequently disfigured their corpses.

These people were indiscriminately annihilated by the Russian intelligence troops, maiming, abusing and ridiculing their slain bodies.

I believe that the operation that was done on my order was not committed against the poor and the weak of the unbelievers because they lived in the heart of Moscow.

That’s why any politician, journalist or person who accuses me of terrorism today because of this act stirs up disapproval and ridicule because I have never heard – not even once – that they accused Putin of terrorism, of killing innocent people and of other crimes like those that took place on 11 February.

I assure all Russians who send their troops into the Caucasus and support the security services that perpetrate bloodbaths that these operations will not be the last.

These operations will continue on your land.

We also declare that another operation will take place in answer to the killing of a group of mujahidin, also on 11 February. God willing, you will hear and see that soon.

That will be done in a different way and on a different scale, God willing.

That’s why I’m letting you know that the war will not be limited, nor will it continue to be watched quietly on your television screens, secluded from the crimes your troops led by Putin have committed on the land of the Caucasus. On the contrary, I am warning you that the war will reach your streets. You will feel it in your lives, in your families, in your spirits and in your skins, God willing.

God is great

The question that arises after reading this communiqué is: why is the Minbar posting a claim of responsibility about metro attacks in Moscow? In fact, why is it posting this statement at all? Isn’t this usually done on jihad forums? To be sure, the Minbar posts communiqués sometimes about various issues, such as statements eulogising “martyrs” (including Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir), but posting claims of responsibility is not the site’s specialty at all. What is going on?

To be continued…

[Mike Honcho]  The Ingush State of the Caucasus Emirate released a statement last week via Kavkaz Center highlighting some its failures and successes since the 2^nd Chechen War. While it contained the usual lip service to mujahidin unity and the need to expel the Russians from the Northern Caucasus, it also detailed how, even though outnumbered and outgunned, the establishment of Special Operation Groups (SOG) proved tremendously effective in eliminating apostates, hypocrites, and traitors.

The message begins with an admission of bad judgment, stating that the mujahidin realized they had been too lenient on some of their fellow Ingush who were employed in the Republic’s security and military services. Allegedly there was an unwritten agreement between the mujahidin and local security forces. The agreement was that as long as Muslims and resistance fighters were left alone, the focus of mujahidin attacks would be on the Russians and that state employees would not be bothered. However in 2002, the Ingush collaborators began to target, detain, kill, rape and torture Muslims. Even after these transgressions, the mujahidin claimed that they approached the local authorities to stop such policies, but the abuses continued. The mujahidin then discontinued the gentlemen’s agreement and actively pursued all enemies, Russian and Ingush.

The Ingush mujahidin also state that what has been most effective for their operations is the establishment of special intelligence units, called Special Operation Groups (SOG), which were responsible for collecting information and infiltrating the Ingush security apparatus. One of the groups successful initiatives is that they have also started (or stolen) a database full of the names of collaborators who work with the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. Apparently these units have served their purpose so well that they have Ingush police and politicians shaking in their boots. The local forces are now reportedly resorting to bribing the mujahidin with money and information in order for guarantees of personal security.

Interestingly, the message also refers to a centralized “Mukharabat of the Caucasus Emirate.” It now appears that this is the central command for all intelligence units throughout the Emirate, but with each ‘state’ in charge of its own collection efforts.

What is striking about this message and others written recently is that all of elements of the Caucasus Front seem to be in-lock step with their “unity” message. Both the Chechen Front and the Dagestani Front (Jamaat Shariat) released similar messages last week, detailing support for Dokku Umarov’s declaration and highlighting the preparedness and high morale of their forces. It looks as if Umarov is really pushing to retool the Caucasus Emirate into a highly effective fighting force, at least in word.

Although Umarov’s upbeat prognosis of the Emirate needs to be taken with a dose of salt, it make you wonder if the FSB’s declaration of imminent “al-Qaeda” attacks is, perhaps, somewhat credible.

8-29-08-Ingush-Front-SOG-kavkaz-center

The consensus on the forums is that Russia’s war with Georgia in South Ossetia is a boon for the Caucasus Emirate, a Jihadi group that seeks rule over the North Caucasus. According to its founder and self-proclaimed amir, Dokka Umarov, the emirate includes:

“Dagestan, Nokhchiycho (Chechnya), Ghalghaycho (Ingushetia), Iriston (North Ossetia), the Nogay steppe (includes parts of northern Chechnya, Dagestan and Stavropol district) and the combined areas of Kabarda, Bulkar and Karachay.” (see his proclamation)

Basically, all of these regions are north of Georgia in Russia.

On Ekhlaas, Shamil `Abd Allah opines that Russia’s incursion into Georgia will take pressure off the mujahids and turn Russia’s attention away from the Georgia-Chechnya border.  Quraysh1 cryptically observes that the war will “open the door of help to the mujahids by means of Georgia.”

On his website, popular Jihadi scholar Hamid al-`Ali writes that the war is really between the West and Russia.  American ambition crept up to Russia’s door and Russia responded.

The U.S. is interested in Georgia, `Ali argues, because it protects the oil pipelines that run from the Caspian Sea to Turkey.  Bush even sent Green Berets there in 2002 with the ostensible purpose of helping Georgia fight al-Qaeda elements in the Pankisi region.  But the real reason, `Ali maintains, was to train forces loyal to Washington so they could protect the pipeline.  If Russia now threatens this vital U.S. interest, then the war is a good thing.

As for the Caucasus Emirate, it has decided to wait and see how the war unfolds.

Document (Arabic): 8-8-08-ekhlaas-discussion-of-significance-of-war-between-russia-and-georgia