Shenouda Hearts Mubarak

Pope Shenouda III of the Coptic Orthodox Church has definitely chosen sides:

"Pope Shenouda III, head of the Coptic Church, expressed support for Mr. Mubarak in an interview with Egyptian state television Monday. 'We have called the president and told him we are all with you and the people are with you,' he said, according to a transcript of the interview on the state television's website."

Does he actually think Mubarak is likely to last, or is he really convinced that the Mubarak regime is good for the Copts?

Generals and Protestors

Steven Cook comes to some similar thoughts to those I posted yesterday about what is going on with Egypt's regime and the military. He attributes the military's declaration today that they would not fire on protestors in part to concerns at the elite levels that junior officers would not follow orders to do so. This is an important additional perspective to Matthew Axelrod's interpretation of the military, in which they see themselves as guardians of the nation rather than the regime, but also look out for their own interests:

"Senior military officers are believed to benefit handsomely from the revenues generated by military-owned corporations, private contracts with foreign companies, and post-retirement postings in the private and public sectors. General Ahmed Mohamed Shafik, former head of Civil Aviation and now Egypt's new Prime Minister, is the most prominent example. During my research in Cairo, foreign diplomats told me that Egyptian military officers regularly supplemented their incomes by receiving cash for routine military services, including Suez Canal passage. Some of those funds are believed to be held in Switzerland, where General Magdy Galal Sharawi, head of Egypt's Air Force from 2002-2008, currently serves as Ambassador...

"There is a tension between the military's interests -- maintaining its credibility by siding with the people on the one hand, and maintaining its vast economic apparatus on the other. Maintaining stability is a given, but that stability will shake if the military is seen by the protesters as siding with Mubarak's attempts to retain power. A middle solution is conceivable, where the military would not stand in the way of a transition government should it receive assurances that its affairs will remain untouched from reform. Mohamad El Baradei has said he will reach out to the Army, and such a discussion is not hard to imagine. For the Egyptian military it will be a huge, existential break from a symbiotic relationship with President Mubarak, but that break is looking to be inevitable."

As I commented yesterday, the military leadership can get what they want even with greater political openness.

Cook also describes what I think is the strategy:

"To contain and control the protests for as long as possible and play for time. From the perspective of Mubarak, Vice President Omar Soleiman, the chief-of-staff General Sami Annan and the others now clinging to power every day provides an opportunity to try to weaken the opposition and peel the less committed from the demonstrations. Is it any wonder that Soleiman started talking about constitutional change today? The senior command believes they can save the regime. Delusional? Perhaps, but not surprising given their deep links to the regime."

The regime, whatever that term means in this fluid situation, has clearly not given up. Al-Jazeera English just interviewed a woman who reported that police were attacking demonstrators in Luxor, away from journalistic attention. In addition, cell phone and train service will reportedly be disrupted tomorrow in an attempt to limit the size of what demonstrators hope will be a crowd of millions marching through Cairo.

If millions do march, however, it will be hard for regime elements to think they have a chance.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Military Opportunity

Just as a follow-up to what's below, the more I think about this, the more I suspect the military leadership is seizing the opportunity to install Omar Suleiman now and forestall the possibility of a Gamal Mubarak presidency. It definitely will not be that easy. Many of the protest leaders have drawn lines that won't walk away from easily, but even if Suleiman can win temporary acceptance as a transitional leader, remaining regime elements can manipulate the system as they go. The two key pillars are economic corruption and foreign aid rent, and neither is incompatible with a period of greater political openness.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Egypt Resources

Basic Egypt resources are becoming more accessible. Noor Khan's introductory primer is here. Juan Cole has also posted an analysis with more attention to economic and social cleavages. Finally, Issandr El-Amrani has charts of the regime's military and political leadership.

Egyptian Uncertainties

Today, Husni Mubarak met with the military:

"President Hosni Mubarak, clinging to power despite unprecedented demands for an end to his 30-year rule, met on Sunday with the powerful military which is widely seen as holding the key to Egypt's future.

"Mubarak held talks with Vice President Omar Suleiman, whose appointment on Saturday has possibly set the scene for a transition in power, Defense Minister Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, Chief of Staff Sami al-Anan and other senior commanders...

"In surreal scenes, soldiers from Mubarak's army stood by tanks covered in anti-Mubarak graffiti: 'Down with Mubarak. Down with the despot. Down with the traitor. Pharaoh out of Egypt.'

"Asked how they could let protesters scrawl anti-Mubarak slogans on their vehicles, one soldier said: 'These are written by the people, it's the views of the people.'

"Egypt's sprawling armed forces -- the world's 10th biggest and more than 468,000-strong -- have been at the heart of power since army officers staged the 1952 overthrow of the king. It benefits from about $1.3 billion a year in U.S. military aid."

Opposition leaders led by Muhammad el-Baradei have also expressed a desire to negotiate with the military. What is happening within it? Publicly they have sided with the demonstrators, using force mainly to try and bring order by rounding up looters, as just reported a few seconds ago by al-Jazeera English from Alexandria. They may be hoping that if their credibility increases, they can work a transition to the military-friendly Omar Suleiman rather than risk the unknowns of a non-NDP government following a successful revolution.

At the same time, regime moves bear scrutiny. The curfew, widely ignored, has been extended, and police are expected to return to the streets. I believe that the withdrawal of the police was part of a broader plan to defuse the protests through generalized instability, a plan which failed. It also seems like the police are still supporting the NDP, especially away from the Cairo/Alexandria/Suez trio that has dominated television coverage. Will the police crack down again, as the cameras fade away with the press crackdown?

I don't think we are out of the woods yet on possible repression. One possible scenario is an attempt by various security services to manage some sort of transition to Suleiman. The overwhelming majority of protesters will not accept this. On the other hand, maybe the military is trying to maintain its command structure by not risking a revolt of foot soldiers and the lower officer corps if they give protest suppression orders which are not followed. An assumption could also be that they could be a power in any new regime that is formed, simply by threatening a coup.

This is far from over.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Introductory Background on Egypt

Noor Khan, a colleague from Colgate University, has written an excellent primer for those new to contemporary Egyptian politics.

Coptic Hierarchy and Mubarak

The Coptic Orthodox's Church's decision to discourage people from participating in protests may surprise some, but is entirely consistent with that body's focus on the preservation of its religious mission in a nation accustomed to dictatorship. Al-Azhar, the most prestigious source of authority in Sunni Islam, has at its top levels become a branch of the Mubarak regime. The current Coptic Pope, Shenouda III, was briefly deposed by a decree of President Anwar Sadat for taking too strong a stance against his government, and only restored by Husni Mubarak a few years later. Given that churches see their mission as transcending politics, it is unsurprising that they have taken such an accommodationist line to preserve their ability to serve that mission. Fears of what might happen after Mubarak are also a factor.

Despite this, however, many Copts are on the streets protesting.

UPDATE: From Ian Lee: "A man made a point of asking me to distinguish who was from what religion in the group, I couldn't. That was his point."

Mubarak's Survival Efforts

Husni Mubarak has tried to defuse some of the protests by redoing his government:

"Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak has appointed the country's head of intelligence to the post of vice-president, in a move said to be a reaction to days of anti-government protests in cities across the country.

"Omar Soliman was sworn in on Saturday, the first time Mubarak appointed a vice-president during his 30-year rule. Ahmad Shafiq, a former chief of air staff, was also appointed prime minister.

"But Al Jazeera's correspondents in Egypt have said that many of those on taking to the streets have demanded a total change of guard, as opposed to a reshuffling of figures in the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP).

"Tens of thousands of people in the capital Cairo gathered on Saturday, demanding an end to Hosni Mubarak's presidency.

By appointing Omar Suleiman as vice president, Mubarak is giving him important advantages for an eventual succession, perhaps reassuring some whose main concern is having the presidency handed to his son Gamal Mubarak. This has not, however, had much impact on the streets, where protestors are demanding Mubarak's resignation and a complete end to his regime.

I'm watching al-Jazeera English, and military leaders are trying to clear the streets without shooting by playing the looting card. I suspect their hope is that, with the communications crackdown, it will be difficult to reconstitute the protests if they dissipate, and forces are able to crack down on what remains under the banner of combating thuggery. I'm certain those hopes are in vain.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

How Time Flies

Has it really been so long? Yasser el-Shimy says that, "Two weeks ago, no one could have predicted the overthrow of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali's repressive regime in Tunisia." Actually, two weeks from tomorrow is the day Ben Ali fled, and many were predicting that.

Protests in Yemen

Today also saw anti-government protests in Yemen:

"In Sana, at least 10,000 protesters led by opposition members and youth activists gathered at Sana University, and around 6,000 more gathered elsewhere, participants, lawmakers and activists reached by telephone said. Many carried pink banners and wore pink headbands.

"The color was both a unifying symbol and an indication of the level of planning underlying the protests. Weeks ago, as the Tunisian protests were still escalating, a committee from an umbrella group of six opposition parties settled on an escalating scale of color to accompany their own plan of action, starting with purple for lawmakers to show their opposition and moving to pink for the street protests. Red, said Shawki al-Qadi, a lawmaker and opposition figure, would be the final color, though he said the opposition had not yet decided what actions would correspond with the move...

"Part of Mr. Allaw’s worries sprung from the inability of the opposition to forge a unified message. Some are calling for secession, he said, while others are looking to oust the president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, through popular protests. Yet others, he said, simply wanted Mr. Saleh to undertake a series of reforms before elections in April...

"The demonstrations on Thursday followed several days of smaller protests by students and opposition groups calling for the removal of President Ali Abdallah Saleh, a strongman who has ruled this fractured country for more than 30 years and is a key ally of the United States in the fight against the Yemeni branch of Al Qaeda."

As far as I can tell, this is nothing like the situation in Tunisia and Egypt. What you see instead is opposition leaders trying to incorporate Tunisia into their own narratives. It also sounds like these protests were concentrated in southern Yemen, where many people see themselves as having been "conquered" by the north in the country's 1990 unification. President Saleh was the leader of North Yemen prior to that unification, and many feel he and northern interests have been exploiting the south for the past two decades.

Tunisia's Transition Issues

Bowing to protests, Tunisian Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi dropped former members of the ruling RCD party from key posts:

"Ghannouchi, also a key figure in the previous administration, said he would stay in his post as the country prepares for parliamentary and presidential elections which are expected to be held in the coming months.

"The new cabinet includes 12 new ministers and keeps nine from the previous set-up. Among those replaced with independents were the ministers of interior and defence.

"Earlier on Thursday, Kamel Morjane, the foreign minister, resigned saying he was leaving 'so that the popular revolution can bear fruit'.

"Ghannouchi said the new foreign minister will be Ahmed Ounais, a 75-year-old career diplomat who studied at the Sorbonne University in Paris and served as Tunisia's ambassador to Moscow and New Delhi.

"The new lineup had been agreed after consultations with all political parties and civil society groups, the prime minister said."

The very lack of leadership that was probably a critical factor in the success of Tunisia's protests poses a challenge now, as there is no clear power center to replace Ben Ali's regime. This means that, in practice, second-tier members of that regime with little popular support are trying to manage a delicate transition.

Earlier this week, I read Christopher Alexander's Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb, which at 124 pages is a good, quick introduction to Tunisian politics for those interested. Aside from whatever unknown level of strength the Islamist al-Nahda party has, I would expect the major political fissure in post-Ben Ali Tunisia to be between socialists and a strong business community, with the latter having been favored by the old regime's policies. According to the al-Jazeera story, the UGTT, Tunisia's major trade union, has been working with Ghannouchi on the interim government, but is currently upset by the lack of UGTT-friendly ministers in the new government. This is an issue to watch.

Egypt, Tunisia, and the Qualities of Revolution

I've been extremely busy this week, and so am just catching up on things, but the ongoing protests in Egypt represent the most significant challenge ever faced by President Husni Mubarak. While on a research trip to the District of Columbia Tuesday, I attended this panel on Tunisia, and the question arose as to whether Tunisia would inspire similar uprisings elsewhere. Someone, I don't remember whom, suggested that Tunisia could act to increase the appeal of anti-government activism among marginal potential participants in other countries by showing what was possible. This has clearly taken place.

Hossam el-Hamalawy says it this way:

"In Egypt we say that Tunis was more or less a catalyst, not an instigator, because the objective conditions for an uprising existed in Egypt, and revolt has been in the air over the past few years. Indeed, we already managed to have 2 mini-intifadas or 'mini Tunisias' in 2008. The first was the April 2008 uprising in Mahalla, followed by another one in Borollos, in the north of the country.

"Revolutions don't happen out of the blue. It's not because of Tunisia yesterday that we have one in Egypt mechanically the next day. You can't isolate these protests from the last four years of labour strikes in Egypt, or from international events such as the al-Aqsa intifada and the US invasion of Iraq. The outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada was especially important because in the 1980s-90s, street activism had been effectively shut down by the government as part of the fight against Islamist insurgents. It only continued to exist inside university campuses or party headquarters. But when the 2000 intifada erupted and Al Jazeera started airing images of it, it inspired our youth to take to the streets, in the same way we've been inspired by Tunisia today."

El-Hamalawy also calls attention to the role of independent trade unions in mobilizing the Tunisian working classes, and the gap Egypt has in that area. El-Hamalawy calls them youth protests, which it should be emphasized means a lot in a country where "youth" probably encompasses the majority of the population. Jonathan Wright also notes that in Cairo, a city of 17 million, what's happening can't really be considered a mass uprising, though the vast working class neighborhoods may be at a tipping point. The situation may be different in Suez, which looks like a war zone, though I'm having trouble finding details, as I am also with a lot of other cities around the country.

Starting tomorrow, however, the stakes will be higher, as Muhammad el-Baradei and the Muslim Brotherhood will join in. Both matter for different reasons. El-Baradei is a leader, but not one who generated the protests. Going after him will not remove the protest leadership, but his presence as a credible transition voice should Mubarak go the way of Ben Ali. The Muslim Brotherhood brings further numbers and organization, and I noticed that a senior leader quoted by The National said that, "We are not pushing this movement, but we are moving with it. We don't wish to lead it but we want to be part of it." This is well calculated to hinder regime attempts to portray this as a clash between itself and Islamists.

Will Egypt become the next Tunisia? I will not hazard a prediction until this weekend. Twitter traffic suggests the government is trying to sever communications links, but if they do face a mass movement, they can't do much about the word of mouth within neighborhoods, nor are they likely to interfere with mosque and church attendance. (Many Egyptian Christians attend weekly services on Friday.)

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Libya's Reform Chill

While the Tunisian Revolution was getting under way, Libya was reining in its semi-official reform movement:

"In a surprise move, the board of trustees of the Qadhafi International Charity and Development Foundation, the NGO that Saif al-Islam Qadhafi has chaired since its creation, resolved in mid-December 2010 that it would no longer promote human rights and political reform in Libya. This abrupt change in the Foundation’s direction has significant ramifications for reform efforts in Libya. Whether Saif was forced out or withdrew voluntarily, he has had to acknowledge that his work came up against insuperable obstacles in the form of the old guard surrounding his father.

"For much of the last decade, Qadhafi’s son Saif was the public face of human rights reform in Libya and the Qadhafi Foundation was the country’s only address for complaints about torture, arbitrary detention, and disappearances. The Foundation issued its first human rights report in 2009, cataloging abuses and calling for reforms, and a second report released in December 2010 regretted 'a dangerous regression' in civil society and called for the authorities to lift their 'stranglehold' on the media. In the interim, Saif assisted Human Rights Watch in conducting a groundbreaking press conference which launched a report in Tripoli in December 2009...

"The recent decisions of the Qadhafi Foundation constitute an admission of defeat for Saif, who has been forced to retreat publicly from earlier positions and to bow out of politics for a time. Whether his banishment is permanent and affects leadership succession plans remains to be seen. Saif has withdrawn from politics before, notably in the fall of 2008, but he has never fully disengaged. Moreover, his father is a recognized expert at balancing opposing forces, and Qadhafi is unlikely to allow conservative elements – or any other faction – to dominate the political scene for long. It remains the case, however, that at least for now Libyans have lost one of their few avenues to pursue human rights improvements and political reform."

Tunisian Openings

Tunisia's government may have been based largely in the old ruling party, but it is acting quickly to open the political system:

"Tunisia's transitional cabinet has decided to recognise all banned political parties and agreed on a general amnesty for all political prisoners.

"The interim government, appointed earlier this week, held its first session on Thursday amid an outcry over its inclusion of members of the regime of the ousted president...

"Tayyib Al Bakouchi, the government spokesman, said the multiparty government pledged to make security its top priority, to prepare for new presidential elections and speed up political reforms.

"The ministers also vowed to restore goods and real estate appropriated by the ruling party under Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the former president who fled into exile in Saudi Arabia last Friday after weeks of anti-government protests.

"The cabinet declared three days of national mourning starting on Friday following the country's deadly unrest. The government has said 78 people have been killed since the uprising started in December but the United Nations has put the toll at about 100."

Yesterday I spoke with a colleague who was in Tunisia around ten years ago when her husband was a Fulbright scholar there. She commented that at that time, there was democratic participation in Tunisia in the form of the parents' association of her local daycare and school. Such a grassroots democratic spirit has also been seen in the neighborhood security organizations which sprung up following Ben Ali's flight, and may be related to the critical stance taken by the country's military. As Steve Cook notes, the way they stepped in against Ben Ali heightens the expectations that they may again if an open political system does not emerge. This makes me optimistic for the future.

(Crossposted to American Footprints)

Tunisia Notes

Tunisia moves more clearly into revolutionary territory, as plans for a unity government dominated by the old regime fall through:

"On Tuesday, the interim prime minister and president resigned from the former ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party of the deposed president in an attempt to keep the fragile coalition together.

"Mohamed Ghannouchi and Fouad Mebazaa were forced into the move after four ministers refused to sit in a cabinet that contained eight high-ranking memebrs of Ben Ali's government, which many Tunisians see as corrupt...

"The announcement of the new government was also met with anger by some of the Tunisian public."

Juan Cole reports that protests against the new government also took place in rural areas. Kal explains a bit of the split between army and police:

"Numerous reports of armed gangs of Ben Ali loyalists, many of them former police, have circulated on the Internet in recent days which is likely related to this. The rapid decline in the prestige of the police forces as a result of their handling of the protestors and the increase in the army’s could set up for more serious competition. Ben Ali, a long time operator in the security services, had favored the the police to the military and it makes very good sense that his partisans are coming from the parts of the deep state he helped create and sustain. Through the whole crisis it is the Tunisian military and not the police that appear professional and worthy of some kind of public trust. A great many Tunisians view the military as having “saved” them from the police during the crisis, though some news reporting has translated this as some desire for military rule or guidance. One does not get that sense from talking to Tunisians or from viewing the Tunisians on Twitter or in web forums. In any case, a major task for a future Tunisian government will be restoring respect and professionalism to the police, making law and order legal — no small fix. The looting and gangsterism displayed by police and RCD party militias (this is how they have been described by Tunisians and by news reports) represents fear of a loss of privilege and position one can expect to see if a similar overthrew took place in any of the other Arab countries. One wonders what sort of social base these people command (for perspective)."

One important element of the situation, not only now but going forward, is the organization of neighborhood security forces. Such local organization could prove useful to a democratic transition, despite state's temporary loss of its monopoly over the use of force. Some sort of local committees to give the revolution a grassroots base, at any rate, could help ensure the people's voices continue to be heard.