In contemporary history books, the Maginot Line, the series of fortifications build by the French Army in the 1930s to repel a German invasion, symbolises the folly of defensive thinking.
The standard narrative is that the backward-looking French chose a static means of defending themselves from attack and so succumbed to a simple bypassing maneuver by the more mobile and progressively-minded Germans.
This idea that defensive tactics are impractical and outdated ties in nicely with contemporary, progressive thinking in general.
Trying to contain a potential pandemic is costly and unrealistic. Building a wall to stop illegal immigration isn’t a viable option. Containing an unpleasant dictator without regime change won’t work. Joining a superstate is the best way to unsure peace. Turning away foreign labour will destroy a country’s economy.
The way to deal with todays’ international problems is simply accept them, reinterpret them as positives, or go on the attack. Only a backward-thinking, WWI-era reactionary would think problems can be tackled through defensive measures.
Given the dominance of anti-defensive thinking in the modern West, perhaps we should consider how stupid that supposed showcase of defensive thinking, the Maginot Line, actually was.
Certainly the Maginot Line strategy was a questionable one, and the failure to built defenses in the Ardenne sector was a foolish oversight. However, the most foolish aspect of the Maginot Line strategy wasn’t so much the building of the line itself, which made reasonable sense, but the failure of the French to follow their defensive strategy to its logical conclusion.
Contrary to popular belief, the French did not originally intend to leave the border with Belgium undefended. The Maginot Line was intended to link up with a series of Belgium defenses to provide a defensive line running all the way to the coast.
In the event of the line being breached, the French had built up a large defensive Army, well-equipped with heavy tanks and artillery, which they believed was capable on taking on a German army with more mobile, but lightly-armoured tanks.
In 1936 though, the Belgians declared neutrality, which seriously comprimised the original strategy. Taking advantage of the division between France and Belgium, the Germans launched an attack in May 1940 which pierced the unsupported Belgium defensive line and enabled the Germans Army to roll on towards France.
Meanwhile instead of leaving Belgium to its fate, the French rashly decided to advance into Belgium with their large, lumbering, defensive Army, leaving a gaping hole in their rear. The Germans then launched a second attack through the Ardenne sector, leaving the over-stretched French cut-off from their supply lines and badly exposed to German air attack.
The logical response from the French, would have been to dig in, leave Belgium to its fate and reinforce the Ardenne sector. This would have narrowed the front and allowed them to engage the Germans using familiar defensive tactics on ground of their own choosing. In 1944, the Germans themselves used such tactics against the Allies, with the hedgerow country of Northern France proving ideal terrain for mechanised defensive warfare using heavy tanks and artillery.
The folly of the French decision to advance into Belgium was highlighted by the fact that they fought much better in the later stages of the campaign, when they were able to use their heavy tanks and guns defensively in prepared ambush situations. However, by this stage it was too late as most of their forces had already been overwhelmed in the German blitzrieg through the Low Countries.
Also forgotten by the critics of the Maginot Line, is that the Germans couldn’t have launched their daring attack through the Ardenne without their own defensive line, the Seigfried Line, which protected them from a French counterattack to the south.
Given the Germans superiority in air power, organisation and morale, it’s likely that the French would probably still have lost eventually, but by succumbing so easily, they gave Hitler a popular mandate for the invasion of Russia, a decision that lead to the unnecessary deaths of millions of people.
The Germans in 1940 weren’t too keen on another costly war with a major power but, like most people, were perfectly willing to go to war for an easy victory against a long-time adversary.
The fallout from Hitler’s fateful decision to invade Russia of course still haunts us today, through the hysterical anti-nationalism it’s helped to engender among the modern liberal left.
Rather than being an example of the superiority of progressive thinking, the failure of the Maginot Line in 1940 symbolises the importance of old-fashioned common sense and prudence – if in doubt, then stick with tactics that you already know.
Posted by mikecourtman 