With the recent death of South African far-right leader Eugene Terreblanche, the curtain seems to have closed on white South African nationalism.
While Terreblanche may have played a part in his own downfall, he isn’t exactly the only White farmer to be killed in South Africa in recent years – since the end Apartheid at least 3000 white farmers have been murdered. Things aren’t much better for most Blacks either, with AIDs, high crime rates and economic inequality making life for most Blacks at least as bad as it was in the 1980s.
This raises the question as to whether South African after WWII could have chosen some kind of middle-path between the impractical, radical traditionalism of Apartheid and the utopian egalitarianism of western-style democracy.
While there may have been some advantages to the Apartheid system, the attempts to control people’s movements and recreate defunct national homelands was both highly disruptive and economically unsustainable. Since the Black workforce was unable to move to where the work was, it became necessary to import large numbers of Blacks from other parts of Africa to do the jobs than South African Blacks couldn’t get to. This not only made life more difficult for native Blacks, but it made the demographic situation of whites even more precarious. Another big problem with Apartheid was the fact that it created unnecessary division between Whites and Asians, with disaffected Asians becoming a key part of the liberal and socialist opposition to the Apartheid regime.
One alternative to Apartheid was that hinted at by moderate South African conservatives like Smuts – a form of limited demographic government with freedom of movement and association but with a restricted franchise to protect the White and Asian minorities from the tyranny of the masses.
By allowing people to live and work where they wished it wouldn’t have been necessary to import cheap labour and Blacks would have been able to obtain higher wages and better access to land for housing. Instead of limiting the franchise along ethnic lines, the South African government could have restricted the franchise to those owning property or holding a tertiary education. This would have ensured that the majority of Whites, and most educated Blacks and Asians, would have been able to vote, and that fewer Blacks and Asians would have reason to want to undermine the government.
With genuine freedom of association (not the watered-down post-60s kind) liberal whites would have been able to mix with affluent Blacks and Asians in the cities, while poor whites and Boer farmers would have been free to form white nationalist communities to protect themselves from the Black underclass.
Admittedly, such as a system would still have drawn opposition from a lot of Blacks activists and western leftists. It’s also unlikely such as system would have kept crime under control as well as the Apartheid system did. However, it would have been much more sustainable from an economic perspective, would have been arguably less prone to corruption, and would have been easier for western centre right governments to politically defend. As it was, the ideological gulf between the South African government and the centre-right parties of other Western countries made it too difficult for them for them to make a reasonable case for maintaining trade and sporting links with South Africa in the face of widespread centre-left opposition.
While it’s no longer possible to turn back the clock and radically change the current political system in South Africa, this example illustrates the potential for a workable middle path between traditionalism and liberalism and the dangers in implementing radical traditionalist solutions that are totally out of sync with modern liberal values.