Immigrants can’t find jobs, so increase immigration

May 24, 2009

The Press reports that a visiting international economist Philippe Legrain has told New Zealand that it shouldn’t cut immigration during the recession

At a Department of Internal Affairs-sponsored meeting in Christchurch, Mr Legrain spouted the usual Economist-style arguments about immigrants boosting creativity and being essential to economic growth, without providing any evidence of how such growth is supposed to boost the living standards of existing citizens.

Instead of trying to protect their jobs by calling for a slowdown in immigration, he said local workers should take it on the chin and direct the blame on “the bankers in the United States,” (I wonder if that includes those who lent too much money to recent minority immigrants).

He also said that New Zealand needed more Asian immigration so it could take advantage of the expanding markets in East Asia, while overlooking the fact that the country already has thousands (if not hundreds of thousands) of well-educated Chinese, Japanese and Korean speakers, should our export companies require their services.

To illustrate his total disregard for the concerns of local workers, he even admitted that thousands of recent skilled immigrants are struggling to find work as it is:

“During the two weeks he has been in New Zealand, Legrain said he had heard a lot of stories that highly-skilled migrants were unable to get jobs in New Zealand either because their qualifications were not recognised here or companies wanted people with New Zealand experience.”

If recent immigrants are already being passed over by local employers, then maintaining high immigration levels during a recession will only make it even more difficult for them to find jobs.

What I think Mr Mr Legrain is really saying here is that because many immigrants are failing to find suitable employment, the country needs to bring in more immigrants to compensate for these lost “units of production,” so as to maintain a high rate of economic growth that enriches our elites and avoid any empty berths in Auckland’s yacht marinas.

Of course immigration-based economic growth doesn’t increase per capita income unless it also lead to an increase productivity levels, and there’s little evidence that productivity levels have increased much since National’s neo-expansionist immigration drive began in 1990. This can be seen most starkly in the relationship between house prices and wages – since 1990 median house prices have almost tripled, while the average wage has only increased by about 40 percent.

Unfortunately while most people probably aren’t particularly impressed by Mr Legrain, John Key apparently is. Recently he announced that National won’t be aiming to cut immigration during the recession, and will be sticking with its expansionist target of 45,000 immigrants per year.

That may not sound a lot to overseas readers, but for a small country of 4.2 million, it represents a higher figure than most other developed countries, particularly for one which has little labour-intensive industry and derives most of its income from primary production and tourism.


The anti-Maginot mentality

May 21, 2009

In contemporary history books, the Maginot Line, the series of fortifications build by the French Army in the 1930s to repel a German invasion, symbolises the folly of defensive thinking.

The standard narrative is that the backward-looking French chose a static means of defending themselves from attack and so succumbed to a simple bypassing maneuver by the more mobile and progressively-minded Germans.

This idea that defensive tactics are impractical and outdated ties in nicely with contemporary, progressive thinking in general.

Trying to contain a potential pandemic is costly and unrealistic. Building a wall to stop illegal immigration isn’t a viable option. Containing an unpleasant dictator without regime change won’t work. Joining a superstate is the best way to unsure peace. Turning away foreign labour will destroy a country’s economy.

The way to deal with todays’ international problems is simply accept them, reinterpret them as positives, or go on the attack. Only a backward-thinking, WWI-era reactionary would think problems can be tackled through defensive measures.

Given the dominance of anti-defensive thinking in the modern West, perhaps we should consider how stupid that supposed showcase of defensive thinking, the Maginot Line, actually was.

Certainly the Maginot Line strategy was a questionable one, and the failure to built defenses in the Ardenne sector was a foolish oversight. However, the most foolish aspect of the Maginot Line strategy wasn’t so much the building of the line itself, which made reasonable sense, but the failure of the French to follow their defensive strategy to its logical conclusion.

Contrary to popular belief, the French did not originally intend to leave the border with Belgium undefended. The Maginot Line was intended to link up with a series of Belgium defenses to provide a defensive line running all the way to the coast.

In the event of the line being breached, the French had built up a large defensive Army, well-equipped with heavy tanks and artillery, which they believed was capable on taking on a German army with more mobile, but lightly-armoured tanks.

In 1936 though, the Belgians declared neutrality, which seriously comprimised the original strategy. Taking advantage of the division between France and Belgium, the Germans launched an attack in May 1940 which pierced the unsupported Belgium defensive line and enabled the Germans Army to roll on towards France.

Meanwhile instead of leaving Belgium to its fate, the French rashly decided to advance into Belgium with their large, lumbering, defensive Army, leaving a gaping hole in their rear. The Germans then launched a second attack through the Ardenne sector, leaving the over-stretched French cut-off from their supply lines and badly exposed to German air attack.

The logical response from the French, would have been to dig in, leave Belgium to its fate and reinforce the Ardenne sector. This would have narrowed the front and allowed them to engage the Germans using familiar defensive tactics on ground of their own choosing. In 1944, the Germans themselves used such tactics against the Allies, with the hedgerow country of Northern France proving ideal terrain for mechanised defensive warfare using heavy tanks and artillery.

The folly of the French decision to advance into Belgium was highlighted by the fact that they fought much better in the later stages of the campaign, when they were able to use their heavy tanks and guns defensively in prepared ambush situations. However, by this stage it was too late as most of their forces had already been overwhelmed in the German blitzrieg through the Low Countries.

Also forgotten by the critics of the Maginot Line, is that the Germans couldn’t have launched their daring attack through the Ardenne without their own defensive line, the Seigfried Line, which protected them from a French counterattack to the south.

Given the Germans superiority in air power, organisation and morale, it’s likely that the French would probably still have lost eventually, but by succumbing so easily, they gave Hitler a popular mandate for the invasion of Russia, a decision that lead to the unnecessary deaths of millions of people.

The Germans in 1940 weren’t too keen on another costly war with a major power but, like most people, were perfectly willing to go to war for an easy victory against a long-time adversary.

The fallout from Hitler’s fateful decision to invade Russia of course still haunts us today, through the hysterical anti-nationalism it’s helped to engender among the modern liberal left.

Rather than being an example of the superiority of progressive thinking, the failure of the Maginot Line in 1940 symbolises the importance of old-fashioned common sense and prudence – if in doubt, then stick with tactics that you already know.


Ethnic clashes in Papua New Guinea

May 20, 2009

Despite its intense coverage of events in Fiji, New Zealand’s mainstream media has been noticeably quiet about the latest clashes between Chinese immigrants and ethnic New Guineans in Papua New Guinea.


Population density and disease

May 17, 2009

The Neuropolitics website has an interesting article on the difference between European and Asian people in regard to living space, which has got me thinking about cultural and evolutionary differences and diseases.

Historically, the population densities of Asian civilizations have been much greater than their European counterparts, and this pattern is also found in countries where Asian and Western immigrants live side by side.

While population densities in some European countries like Holland and Denmark rival those found in densely populated Asian states like Vietnam and Japan, most European countries, and countries colonised by Europeans, have relatively low population densities.

On one level the ability of people to live in densely populated areas, can be seen as an evolutionary advancement, since those who live in densely populated areas make better use of land, and tend to use less resources than those who live in lightly-populated areas. Cold, sparsely populated Canada for example has the world’s highest per capita level of energy use, and warm, densely populated India one of the lowest.

From an evolutionary perspective the downside of high population densities is disease.

Modern history books tend to be full of stories about western oppression of indigenous people, but it’s often forgotten that the main cause of death among indigenous people have been introduced diseases that were largely Asiatic in origin.

Influenza, bubonic plague, smallpox, and cholera for example, first came to Europe via trade with more densely populated Asian cultures, and were then passed on to indigenous people in America and Australasia during colonisation.

Cholera, which originated in India, is still continuing to spread around the world, with Peru being hit for the first time in the early 1990s.

Some historians now think that smallpox actually arrived in Australia before Europeans through Aboriginal contact with Indonesian traders.

Although most diseases of Asian origin were caused by close contact with domesticated animals, it seems population density must also have played a significant part since, although Europeans and Africans also lived in close proximity to livestock, few diseases have spread in the opposite direction – from Europe and Africa to Asia.

The native Indian population of the Americas are an interesting case because while they are of Asian origin, they had little or no resistance to modern Asian-derived diseases bought in by Western immigrants. Before European contact, the population densities of most Indian settlements were also relatively low, reflecting a predominantly hunter-gatherer way of life, although a few densely-populated civilisations did emerge in areas like Southern Mexico. In the Americas there were also fewer domesticated animals to pass on diseases.

When Eurasian diseases arrived in the 16th Century, the Native Americans living in the most densely populated areas, such as the Mississipi Valley and Cuba, also suffered the highest mortality rates.

In the modern era population densities in some Latin American cities are now rivaling those found in Asia, and Eurasian livestock is now widely dispersed throughout the Americas. Not surprising, Latin America is now changing from somewhere that suffers from introduced diseases, to a potential source of infectious diseases that may threaten other parts of the globe.

With increasing population densities, the same pattern in also emerging in Africa, with AIDS being one of the first instances of an African-sourced disease going on to kill significant numbers of people in other parts of the world.


Immigration agencies in the firing line

May 17, 2009

An inquiry into the business practices of New Zealand immigration advisors for Immigration NZ has revealed many instances of immigration advisors exploiting clients, and insufficient regulation of the industry.

According to the Immigration Advisors Authority only 171 of the estimated 1200 immigration advisers in New Zealand are licensed.

Immigration NZ says it will no longer accepted migrants applications lodged by unlicensed agents.


Fertility rates up, but whites still lagging

May 14, 2009

According to a recent article in the Press, New Zealand has had a “baby blip” in the last few years, with 64, 340 babies born last year. This is 10 per cent higher than the average for the previous decade of 58, 380 and has raised the annual fertility rate to just under 2.2 births per woman.

However, there’s a fair amount of ethnic variation in fertility rates. The article doesn’t list the latest percentages for fertility rates per ethnicity, but here’s the ethnic breakdown in registered births for last year. I’ve added the approximate population share of the respective ethnic groups in brackets:

44, 530 European New Zealand ( 73 percent)
18, 840 Maori (14 percent)
10, 120 Pacific Islander ( 5.0 percent)
7260 Asian (5.5 percent)

Without the latest population figures for the different ethnic groups I can’t properly work out fertility rates by ethnicity but , It’s pretty clear from the number of births that Maori and Pacific Island women are continuing to have more children that women of European and Asian origin.

The most recent figures for ethnic differences in fertility rates I could find at the Statistic New Zealand site were for the 2006 census, and indicate a slight overall increase from 2001:

2006 Fertility rates:
1.92 NZ European
2.78 Maori
2.95 Pacific Island
1.52 Asian
All groups: 2.18

2001 Fertility rates:
1.77 NZ European
2.59 Maori
2.94 Pacific Island.
1.67 Asian
All groups: 2.05

Fertility rates for European New Zealanders are increasing, but they still seem to be below the replacement level of 2.1 percent, while Asian fertility rates are still below the replacement rate.

The ethnic differences in fertility rates are highlighted by the differences in fertility rates by region. Among areas with a high Maori population, Northland had a fertility rate of 2.67, and Gisborne 2.68. By contrast, whitebread Canterbury and Otago had fertility rates of 1.88 and 1.59 respectively.

When it comes to reproduction rates, Maori and Pacific Islanders don’t seem to be put off much by high living costs. Housing costs in Northland for example, are generally higher than in Otago, but that doesn’t stop Northlanders from having more significantly more children. Otago’s particularly low rate fertility, even by white standards, is probably connected to economic decline in Dunedin and the chronic housing shortage in Queenstown.

Despite having a high Pacific Island population, Wellington has the country’s second lowest fertility rate at 1.81, but this low rate could also be due to its high percentage of single White and Asian professionals.

Interestingly, the only high fertility areas with a low Maori population are Southland (2.18) and Tasman (2.16) – both areas with relatively cheap housing (Southland has the cheapest housing in the country) and low unemployment.

Relative to Maori and Pacific Islanders, Whites and Asians seem to be more sensitive to economic conditions when it comes to having children. If housing is expensive or unemployment is high, then they will either put off having children or move to a cheaper area with reasonably low unemployment and have kids there.


Coming to terms with low growth

May 11, 2009

The apathetic response of U.S authorities and the WHO to the Mexican Flu virus, highlights the modern Anglosphere’s obsession with making sure nothing gets in the way of short-term economic growth.

Despite the flu being containable (with only two deaths outside Mexico) Gywnne Dyer points out that the US and Canadian government’s response has been pretty lax compared with Japan and Europe.

Even the modest sacrifice of losing a few weeks tourism income and spending a little extra on flu medications seems to be just too much for America’s commerce-obsessed elites.

Probably the flu won’t turn out to be as serious as the media’s hyped it up to be, but the fatalistic U.S attitude typifies the short-term thinking that’s pervaded the Anglosphere since the early 70s.

Economic growth in Continental Europe and Japan has been stuck in the 0-2 percent range for 20 years now, yet it still hasn’t dawned on the English-speaking West that 3 to 4 percent growth just isn’t sustainable in a post industrial economy.

Take for example the Obama administration’s extravagant 1930s-style stimulus plan, which started out as a way to stabilise the banking sector, but has now turned into a full-blown
Keynesian attempt to stimulate consumer spending in the face of unprecedented private debt. Instead of rationing out the methadone, the Democrats are continuing to dish out the Chinese-supplied heroin.

Canada and Australia have taken a slightly more long-term view, but only slightly – the Commonwealth resource kings may have a greater concern with fiscal solvency, but their focus on sustainablity high growth rates can be seen in the on-going commitment to expansive immigration policies in the middle of the biggest recession since the end of WW2.

Industrially speaking, the English-speaking West has pretty much been in recession since 1973, when they passed the baton of industrial growth on Japan, Germany and Korea, who then passed it onto China in the early 90s.

The recent bankruptcy of Chrysler is just the latest in a long series of Anglo-American industrial setbacks starting with the ill-fated nationalisation of the British car industry in the 1970s.
From the late 70s to the early 80s there was at least an attempt to face the bad news and revive the old protestant values of thrift and prudence that took a battering in the late 60s.

President Carter warned Americans about the cost of debt, waste and dependence on foreign oil, while Reagan and Thatcher went someway to down-sizing the state and rolling back the unions.

However, by the mid-80s, voters had had enough of bad news and the baby boomers “live for today” philosophy was once again the dominant theme on Wall Street.

When the share market inevitably crashed in the late 80s the focus turned to real estate, as Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the U.S stoked-up the housing market by bringing in large number of immigrants and building houses for them (or in the U.S case simply selling the land and getting the immigrants to build their own houses).

Naturally, running an economy by selling land was only a temporary solution to economic decline and the long housing boom has now finally come to an end. For many Australians and New Zealanders is has also meant the end of the colonial dream of affordable housing for the masses.

Continental Europe of course, has had it’s own share of denial since it’s post-war peak in the 1980s.

In a age of low growth, intense industrial competition and demographic decline, Europe’s extravagant income-related welfare programs are like a heavy ball and chain on the ankles of its shrinking workforce.

On the plus side, most of Europe has at least resisted the temptation to make things worse by joining the Anglosphere’s orgy of debt-driven pseudo prosperity. This was highlighted by Angela Merkel’s curt dismissal of Obama’s stimulus appeal during his recent European visit.

The challenge now is to somehow get the Anglosphere to follow Continental Europe’s fiscal realism, while getting Europe to par-back it’s bloated welfare state and poor record in family formation.


Neuropolitics

May 9, 2009

Neuropolitics certainly has to be one of the more original websites on the Internet – where else will you find article titles like, “Barack’s Brain – The politics of the Right Prefontal Context,” or “The Thermodynamics of Conservatives and Liberals.”

As a source of new, inventive theories about the political views of mainstream voters in the U.S, it’s possibly without compare. Once this kind of neuro-biological analysis makes it into the mainstream, it could have a significant influence on the future of politics and how it is studied.

However, the site seems to be a lot more limited when it comes to analysing the political views of voters who don’t fit into the mainstream.

As alternative right wing analysts points out, mainstream politics isn’t really a clash between liberals and conservatives, but between rival visions of liberalism, with right liberalism seen as a tough, practical and positive ideology for the rugged individual, and left liberalism seen as an enlightened, inclusive and progressive ideology for the easy-going urbanite.

Thus the masses follow whichever of the two camps best appears to fit their values, and their vision of where society should be heading.

But knowing Republican voters tend to be extroverts, and Democrat voters are more likely to suffer from depression, doesn’t lend much light on the biological and psychological makeup of alternative political supporters like nationalists, anarchists, populists and paleoconservatives.

Neuropolitics does have some interesting information about differences between libertarians and mainstream centre-right voters, but again, this is only a comparison between groups that fit within the mainstream liberal paradigm.

In the case of the alternative right, it’s likely that many voters may well tendencies usually identified with liberals, since to hold an alternative right wing view in a liberal society, you need to be independently minded or interested in arcane or unfashionable cultural perspectives – a trait Neuropolitics says is more usually associated with “creative” novelty-seeking left-liberals.

It also doesn’t offer much help in analysing the politics of special interest groups – does knowing Democrat-voting liberals are more likely to be late-night owls example, tell up anything about the average supporter of say, the Sierra Club? Since outdoor people are more likely to be larks, then that would suggest they were ore likely to be Republicans, but conventional wisdom says most environmentalists are liberals. Similarly, since immigration restrictionism tends to cross party lines, what can we biologically deduce about your average Numbers USA voter?

Another question mark is whether psychological and biological information about mainstream U.S voters is of much use in analysing politics outside the U.S.

Certainly there are a lot of similarities between mainstream parties in the U.S and those in other English-speaking countries. In New Zealand and Australia for example, most right wing voters tend to espouse the free market, low tax, pro-Israel views held by mainstream U.S conservatives, while most Labor/Labour voting urban liberals can be compared to U.S Democrat voters, albeit with slightly more left-wing views on taxation and welfare.

Continental European politics presents more of a challenge. Most conservative European voters would be considered economically left-wing Greenies by U.S standards, but they’re often further to the right of U.S voters in relation to immigration policy.

Continental immigration restrictionist parties also vary a lot in both social and economic orientation. Some like the Danish Peoples Party are economically and socially right-wing, others like France’s Front National, are economically left-wing and socially right-wing, while Holland’s Pim Fortuyn List party was economically right-wing and socially left-wing.

To find out if the voting differences between Continental and American voters, are due to structural differences in the political systems, or fundamental differences among the voters themselves, it would be necessary to conduct of values surveys which go beyond political allegiance to a particular party.


Declining returns from uni education

May 7, 2009

In a New York Times article on university education there’s a useful rule of thumb for students contemplating how much to spend on tertiary courses – don’t spend more on a degree than you are likely make in your first full year of post-graduate employment (hat tip: Randall Parker).

For example, if you’re likely to make $40, 000 in your first year as an English teacher, then try not to accumulate more than $40,000 of student debt in your four years of training.

While wages for some jobs do increase substantially with experience, for most graduates they don’t increase enough to make up for high debt levels and interest payments. You’ve also got to factor in that you may not even get work in your chosen field of work, and that even if you do, you may grow to hate it and want to do something else.

This should of course be something that governments take into account in formulating education policy, which at the moment seems to be about what’s best for university marketing departments.

Rather than continuing to promote a quantitative bums on seats attitude to education, it’s time western governments were honest and up front with students about the pros and cons of university education.