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RESISTANCE STUDIES NETWORK



Preface

This book is the result of the first year of published articles within the framework of the Resistance Studies Magazine. All authors contribute in their own specific way to the field of resistance studies. Simultaneously as they connect to well known themes in the social sciences and humanities, they produce something new and valuable, departing in the experiences, problems and consequences of different forms of resistance.

It would be an act of hubris to summarise these approaches, trying to make them conform to a single narrative or a programmatic declaration. Rather, the reader is invited to find his or her own way through the articles, to make connections, make use of concepts, start up new discussions, or simply enjoy the richness of approaches laid out on almost two hundred pages of interesting texts.

In order to facilitate these conversations, to make them spread and multiply, this book wants to be shared among friends and colleagues. This is why an electronic version may be downloaded for free at <http://rsmag.org> in a variety of formats. Sometimes the best connections are the unexpected ones. Thus, you should never hesitate to pass along a copy of this book to someone else!

Christopher Kullenberg & Jakob Lehne

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From jamming the motor to hacking the computer: The case of Adbusters

by Karl Palmås

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In the past few years, concepts such as “hacking”, “open source”, “protocols” and “peer-to-peer” have begun to circulate in settings that bear little relation to actual computers. Using Adbusters as an example, this article will explore how social activists are developing strategies of resistance on the basis of a nascent computer-inspired worldview.

Conceptual models and machinic eras

The conceptual models that underpin our worldviews are tightly intertwined with the everyday technologies that surround us. Michel Serres¹, whose thoughts have more recently been picked up by Manuel DeLanda², theorised this very relation. As DeLanda explains:

“Serres was the first to point out that the transition between the clockwork age and the motor age had more profound implications than the simple addition of a new brand of machines to the technological ‘races’ already in existence. He sees in the emergence of the steam motor a complete break with the conceptual models of the past. [...]”

¹ Serres, M. (1982)

² DeLanda, M. (1991)

When the abstract mechanism [of a motor, such as the so-called ‘Carnot cycle’ of the heat engine] had been dissociated from its physical contraption [the actual motor] it entered the lineages of other technologies, including the ‘conceptual technology’ of science³.”

Thus, Serres argues that as new types of machines enter the social world, they may end up changing our ways of seeing the world. The logic of the motor did not only appear in the contraptions studied by engineers and natural scientists: it also shaped the theories of modern social scientists, philosophers and artists. In their introduction to the English edition of Serres’ book *Hermes*, Josué Harari and David Bell state that Serres charted how the motor emerged as “the universal model of knowledge in the nineteenth century, a construct that always functions in the same way in all cultural domains – from Marx to Freud, from Nietzsche to Bergson, or from Zola to Turner.”

In order for the motor “logic” to spread from the physical, actual motor to the minds of social scientists and authors, the operational diagram of the machine had to be formulated in generic, abstract terms. As DeLanda points out, this process was slow in the making:

“In 1824, a century after it was born as a concrete assemblage, the steam motor was given a completely abstract description by Carnot and began to influence other technologies⁴.”

However, we are now living in a world in which motors are no longer the dominant everyday technology. During the 20th century, computers have become more pervasive, leading the way to a new machinic era. Thus, the “abstract mechanisms” of computers are now making their way into contemporary practices of social activists. So, in what ways can traditional modes of protest be seen as motor-inspired?

Motor activism

Michel Serres describes motor-like conceptual models in the same way as Carnot described the heat engine. They draw on a “reservoir” of fuel, creating a “energy differential”, generating “circulation” and “motion”. In the case of modern social theory:

“...the reservoir is capital, the quantity of energy, the constancy of force, the libidinal reservoir, [...] the pattern of general circulation [...] is language, speech, words, vocabulary, values, money, desire⁵.”

Thus, Serres’ remarks apply specifically to Marx (capital as reservoir, money circulating) as well as Freud (libido as reservoir, desire circulating). Thus, the politics of these apparatuses concerns issues like “What blocks circulation? What stimulates it? Who or what governs or forms the reservoir?”.

³ DeLanda (1991), p. 140-141

⁴ DeLanda (1991), p. 142

⁵ Serres (1982)

This characterisation of Marx and Freud is noteworthy, as these authors have been hugely influential in founding modern social critique, and still feature prominently in activist circles. In *The Rebel Sell*, Joseph Heath and Andrew Potter argue that since 1968, a “Marx-plus-Freud” world view has dominated social critique and activism – in other words, “counterculture has almost completely replaced socialism as the basis of radical political thought”⁶. Hence, activists have tended to prefer the countercultural political strategies of the situationist, hippie and culture-jamming movements, rather than engaging in traditional social reform. Incidentally, the same phenomenon is also observed by Boltanski and Chiapello, who argue that “artistic critique” (of capitalist inauthenticity) has usurped “social critique” (of capitalist exploitation)⁷.

Back in 1968, Theodore Roszak related “the making of a counter culture”⁸ to Herbert Marcuse’s blend of Marx and Freud. Crucially, this worldview highlighted the ways in which culture – mass media, advertising and contemporary modes of thought – undermined productive critiques of capitalism. Hence, Marcuse’s industrial capitalism can thus be modelled as a closed system of adjoined motors. The motor-like capitalist society described by Marx is married to the motor-like civilisation described by Freud⁹, creating a stable, repressive engine. The Marxian motion towards revolution generated by the reservoir of capital is counteracted by the Freudian motion generated by libidinal reservoir.

Heath and Potter uses blockbuster movie “*The Matrix*” to illustrate this view of culture and society. To lead a true existence, free from exploitation, one has to opt for the red pill that ejects the lead character Neo from the simulated world that is “*The Matrix*”, enabling him to see the monstrosity of its underlying reality. Thus, countercultural activism and protest strategies can be seen as efforts to act as this red pill.

Adbusters: Jamming the motor...

For the countercultural youth, the only way out of this total motor was to throw gravel into the machinery, jamming its modes of operation, thus baring the monstrosity of the machine for all of the world to see. Public demonstrations, sit-ins, subversive art and various ways of “dropping out” mainstream culture were all different approaches to achieve this effect. Here, the obvious reference was the critical strategies – notably de-tournement – of Guy Debord and the Situationist International. More recently, culture jamming has served the same end:

⁶ Heath, J. & A. Potter (2005)

⁷ Boltanski, L. & E. Chiapello (2006)

⁸ Roszak, T. (1971)

⁹ Freud, S. (1989 {1930})

“The goal of culture jammers is quite literally to ‘jam’ the culture, by subverting the messages used to reproduce this faith and blocking the channels through which it is propagated¹⁰.”

Through the paramount success of Naomi Klein’s No Logo¹¹, a new generation of activists have been introduced to the “culture jamming” strategies of Adbusters magazine. Incidentally, the magazine is also one of the key targets for Heath and Potter’s criticism, as the magazine can be viewed as “the flagship publication of the culture-jamming movement”¹².

Heath and Potter’s criticism revolves around the fact that Adbusters hark back to countercultural rhetoric, while their actual practices now include the manufacturing and sale of fairtrade goods such as the “Blackspot Sneaker”. Thus, “cultural rebellion, of the type epitomised by Adbusters magazine, is not a threat to the system – it is the system”.

Nevertheless, Adbusters has since then departed from the rhetoric of detournement and culture jamming. In the “Big ideas of 2006” issue and onwards, the magazine started celebrating a new activist hero – “the antipreneur”.

“While giant corporations run roughshod over our lives, we whine and complain, protest and boycott. For too long we’ve ignored the market, written it off as enemy territory. Yet, what do mega-corps like Walmart and Coke fear most? Competition. We’re talking about a new breed of bottom-up enterprise that runs differently: promoting ethics over profit, values over image, idealism over hype. A brand of grassroots capitalism that deals in products we actually need – and believe in. No sweatshops. No mindfucking ads. Just fair trade from sustainable, accountable companies. Run by us, the antipreneurs¹³.”

Thus, the hallmark of the countercultural worldview – the view of capitalism as a motor-like system, only to be transformed through jamming strategies – was no longer adhered to. The market – no longer a space for natural law-guided domination – emerged as a field of bottom-up, grassroots politico-entrepreneurial action. Capitalism – no longer a closed, motor-like machine that circulates capital and desire – was increasingly described as an open structure, potentially subject to rearrangement.

... or hacking the capitalist operating system?

One of the key components of Adbusters’ antipreneur strategies is the notion that, as activists share knowledge and ideas, their chances of building robust alternatives to large corporations increase considerably. These shared ideas and strategies “will trans-

¹⁰ Heath & Potter (2005)

¹¹ Klein, N. (1999)

¹² Heath & Potter (2005)

¹³ Adbusters Magazine, “The Big Ideas of 2006” issue

form the antipreneurial movement, along with open-source counter-brands like the Blackspot, into a real economic threat to top-down corporate capitalism – through the next year, the next ten, and well into a saner, more democratic future.”¹⁴

The focus on creating networks of knowledge-sharing, and the direct reference to “open-source”, indicates that Adbusters – just like the innovation theorists mentioned above – have gained inspiration from the success of the FLOSS (Free/Libre Open Source Software) movement.

Just like hackers sharing knowledge in order to collectively hack a system – “given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow”, as programmer Eric Raymond phrases it¹⁵ – the collective of antipreneurs share ideas in order to modify capitalism. Thus, concepts from the world of computer networks seem to have seeped into the ex-culture jammers’ understanding of the world. Notions of “open source” and hacking no longer apply just to computer networks as such – increasingly, they are applied to other social apparatuses.

The move towards understanding the economy as a computer was finalised in the September/October issue of Adbusters. Here, the main feature article explicitly depicts capitalism as an operating system:

“Capitalism is the almighty operating system of our lives [...] But who is in charge of this operating system? Who wrote it? Who maintains it? Who protects it from viruses? Who reboots it when it crashes? So here’s the big question: can we the people – civil society – take charge? Can we rewrite the capitalist code? [...] In other words, can we turn capitalism into an open source design project and make it more sustainable and responsible to our and future generation’s [sic] needs?”¹⁶

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Adbusters’ recent move to promote antipreneurship is its commitment to the hacker ethic. In the quote above (on building “a real economic threat to top-down corporate capitalism”) the long-term strategy of the antipreneurship strategy is to build robust competitors to large corporations – alternative structures that can latch onto the current market settings. Unlike their previous countercultural imperative to de(con)struct the societal machine, Adbusters’ new imperative is to experiment with its possibilities, rewriting its underlying code. Here, Adbusters is joining a growing number of writers who argue that the hacker is the ideal artist/critic of the 21st century. For instance, the philosopher Manuel DeLanda has stated that activists:

“need to adopt a hacker attitude towards all forms of knowledge: not only to learn UNIX or Windows NT to hack this or that computer system, but to learn economics,

¹⁴ Adbusters Magazine, Ibid.

¹⁵ Raymond, E.S. (2001)

¹⁶ Adbusters Magazine, September/October 2006 issue

sociology, physics, biology to hack reality itself. It is precisely the 'can do' mentality of the hacker, naive as it may sometimes be, that we need to nurture everywhere¹⁷."

In other words, as an alternative to Heath and Potter's interpretation of "The Matrix": The point is not that we need to "swallow the red pill" in order to become enlightened critics. The point is that by getting access to, understanding, and rewriting the code that underpins this world (as Neo does towards the end of the film), we can "hack reality itself".

The rise of the hacker ethic is not only apparent within social activism, but also within contemporary art. In *Postproduction. Culture as screenplay: how art reprograms the world*¹⁸, art critic Nicolas Bourriaud argues that the hacker and the "deejay" are today's cultural and political heroes. Like DeLanda, Bourriaud evokes Deleuze in his account of how the hacker-/deejay-inspired ethic leads us towards a new form of critique, which is an attitude, an ethical stance more than a recipe:

"The postproduction of work allows the artist to escape the posture of interpretation [as assumed by the post-1968 critic]. Instead of engaging in critical commentary, we have to experiment, as Deleuze asked of psychoanalysis: to stop interpreting symptoms and try more suitable arrangements¹⁹."

Bourriaud argues that this experimental approach to the re-use of existing art differs from previous modes of Situationist-inspired art: "While the detournement of preexisting artworks is a currently employed tool, artists use it not to 'devalorize' the work of art but to utilize it".

A new research agenda

Adbusters is just one example of activists who are realigning their strategies. Indeed, in the past decade or so, several cultural spheres have adopted the abstract mechanisms of computers in their understanding of the world²⁰. For scholars interested in protest and social activism, this opens an interesting research agenda: Where else are "abstracted" hacktivist practices being deployed? Are they solely a novel phenomenon, or did they exist before the advent of computers? Moreover, are these approaches effective, and if so, in what contexts?

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¹⁹ Bourriaud (2002), page 37

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Resistance : Under what Grace

by Tim Gough
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Abstract

There is an apparently paradoxical nature to resistance. Resistance is resistance against something, towards which it appears inimical. This resisted thing, however, requires such resistance in order to define itself and keep itself safe. Should it fail to do so, that which succeeds it will require resistance in turn. This paradox – a prevailing order requires that which is opposed to it, and that which overcomes is resisted in turn – occurs within time thought as a successive order of past, present and future moments. Two temporal displacements (those of simultaneity and reversal) are evoked, not in order to resolve the paradox but to displace it and hint at an other strategy of resistance.

...the very possibility of resistance: that which comes before. Within a common – that is to say philosophical – concept of time as a series of successive moments, resistance will be regulated (given its order and its orders) – even in its aspirations for the future (itself conceived as a series of moments beyond the present) – by its reaction against the pre-existing and its order. Resistance and counter-resistance, resistance and counter-move, resistance and incorporation are the means by which this pre-existing order will maintain itself and neutralise that which opposes it. It will maintain itself, more or less successfully, and will neutralise resistance, more or less successfully, but will never, for strategic reasons, do so too well.

Either that prevailing order which is resisted needs the resistance, maintains the resistance in its position, desires and needs the risk of resistance to prevent complacency, stimulates risk or leaves itself vulnerable at a critical moment in order to provoke resistance, provokes risk up to a limit of imagination and sometimes beyond it, has to have a force against which it can act in order to justify its existence, retains and maintains such a force in order to itself be a force, an energy, the disposal of this order not that.

Or else the prevailing order fails and falls, resistance triumphs, prevails²¹; and in that moment – or perhaps the one after – becomes itself a prevailing order itself requiring the resistance of the other, the poignancy of this implacable logic outdone in turn by the cunning of a schema whereby only that which no longer requires to be resisted, which no longer poses a “true” threat, remains successfully resisted; thus consigning resistance to impotency, or rather to a potency regulated by the orders which were to be called into question.

These political strategies of and against resistance are deployed – we do not say necessarily intentionally - today to extreme extents. We may recall that a limit of imagination was reached at 9/11 when the invulnerability of the world’s most sublime (that is, absolutely large, *schlechthin gross*²²) and provocative war machine was nonetheless left vulnerable. This vulnerability consisted in, amongst other things, the non-existence of effective air defences for the country’s very body; and resulted in an arguably sublime – absolutely large – event, directed at sublime constructions. Yet this act of counter-provocation, in the murderous effectiveness of its resistance, bolstered the political order it wished to destroy. More generally, we can say that the framing and staging of the resister - the enemy within or without – by an existing political order is an ancient strategy constantly and effectively reused in order to cement political power; and that this staging is effected both by the resister and the resisted power.

It is against the logic of this structural cunning that resistance would have to work. Resistance beyond resistance, resistance without work, since these terms receive their authority within such a structure. Yet we have no choice but to use such old words, and find ourselves needing to resist at each step their re-absorption.

The operations within which a resistance beyond resistance might occur will happen without the prevailing order. The cunning structure itself will need to be solicited, and since it is a question of order, this solicitation will extend to the philosophical structure of time thought conventionally as the line of past, present and future²³. This will not be

²¹ We posit here no agency or criteria of failure (or success); we point rather to the necessary structure of resistance.

²² See section 25 of Kant’s *Kritik der Urteilskraft* – explication of the term “sublime” (Kant, I. (1963) “*Kritik der Urteilskraft*”, Stuttgart: Reclam)

²³ See, for instance, Kant’s *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* section 6 “we represent the time-sequence by a line progressing to infinity” (“wir... stellen die Zeitfolge durch eine ins Unendliche fortgehende Linie vor”), (Kant, I. (1933) “*Critique of Pure Reason*”, Lonon:

work or resistance by means of philosophy; more a working on philosophy itself. To resist a political order calls for a resistance to philosophical-temporal order, which implies that the task is at least one of thought beyond philosophy, since philosophy posits its time in this manner and calling this definition of time into question means, of necessity, going beyond or before philosophy and those those discourses dependent on it.

An order is necessary²⁴. There is no necessity without order. Within an order, a proof can be made, an economy can move, authority is disposed, politics occurs. An economy allows authority to be disposed, politics to occur, a proof to be made, philosophical order to be analysed. The disposal of authority is the occurrence of politics, implying a philosophical order, the availability of proofs, and the workings of an economy. The founding and refounding of one implies, necessitates and generates the founding and refounding of all. Any attempt at analysis of their interplay, preparatory or not to a resistance against it, faces the force of this order and the cushioning counter-force of its sprung fabric, but also the order of time, the order of the succession of time, which is part of the overall ordering and that which gives it its possibility. It would be wrong to say that the concept of time as succession has been created by this philosophical-political-economic ordering, but if for the sake of simplicity (and acceding momentarily to the logic of the order it would be our desire to question) we were to take it as such, then a sort of logic of types would determine that time as result or a sub-set of the political-philosophical order cannot itself dominate it. Nor could any strategy of resistance which remained held to the ordering of time. Thus the ever-present appeal by that which we are to resist to the concept of nature, an appeal nowhere more powerfully and quietly disposed as in the characterisation of time - commonly thought - as "natural", not-get-roundable, not questionable except in a thus-neutralised moment of madness, mysticism or myth. Not primarily to give time an unquestioned authority but rather, in positing it as natural, leading that which resists into believing that action within its scope could possibly be effective.

Only a bastard logic could work against this. A logic outside philosophy proper; at least thought rather than metaphysics; the excess of a general economy of thought.

Yet any such general economy will always apparently fall, destroyed by means of proofs brought against it by the restricted economy just described, since it is only within and as a tool of such restriction that a proof can be disposed. There can be no

Macmillan)

²⁴ We take "order" here both as ordering in time and as political order. The dual meaning is bespeaks an intimate relation between them. In relation to the necessity for political order, see, for instance, Jo Freeman's classic pamphlet 'The Tyranny of Structurelessness', Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 1970. As Barbara Epstein has pointed out in respect of Freeman's argument, "antileadership ideology weakened the women's movement by permitting crippling attacks on the very activists who had helped the movement find its direction." (Political Protest and Cultural Revolution, University of California Press (1991) p. 169)

counter-proof for a general economy, since such a counter-move would be counter to the non-structure to which that general economy is appealing. Proofs are not available whilst appealing to or “working” within a general economy; for the a-logic of a general economy does not and is not capable of working with or founding proofs. Under what grace are your victims innocent and ours dust, your blood blood and our blood water?”²⁵

In this question we hear - from the position of those privileged by the current world order and its disposal of energies - the cry of a resistance whose reticence in answering might appear motivated by a strategy of respect for the question as question, the question as opening. In leaving the question hanging, this text destroys the fundament as fundament; any definitive answer would co-posit the authority under which the question has been or should be decided, and the lack of such answer leaves open the possibility that no such authority is acknowledged. The question of the authenticity of this non-fundamentalism is answered not at the level of the text, but at that of the author, bin Laden; there, we intuit an answer, and the question becomes the apparatus of a resistance propagating that archi-authority which in turn is to be resisted.

The logic of question and answer shares the reciprocal structure of resistance and counter-resistance, act and revenge, all again operating within but at the same time positing as a condition of their possibility the order of time, the time of order. By contrast, it is a strategy which posits and gives to itself as its possibility an other time, an other order of time, a time not of order or a time not of time, which could escape this trap of resistance as counter-thrust caught within the prevailing orthodoxy. This would require a thought of the “new” which, in its act, would re-cast time and rethink it otherwise than as the succession of past-present-future.

This recasting might operate with respect to the “at the same time”. The possibility of the wholly new can only be thought at the moment where the successive order of the concept of time is arrested, whence two things which are inextricable and which co-posit themselves – such as something “new” and the “at the same time” – occur, precisely, at the same time; not one and then the other, but both hyper-simultaneously so as to be outside the order of successive time as that event occurs. It is the new, that which is created in an event entirely separated from what went before and thus wedded to a simultaneity of actuality and potentiality – giving it its potential at the moment that it gives itself its actuality – it is in this event of creation that a resistance beyond resistance could act, unwarned, against a prevailing order.

This recasting might operate by means of a kind of reversal of the order of time. If representational politics collapses into a strategy of the prevailing order, a strategy intended at heart (thus quietly, cunningly) to disrespect and control those who could resist, then this operates within a structure where that which does the representing comes

²⁵ Osama bin Laden, April 2004, tape released to Arabic speaking television networks. For a full transcript see www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1118204/posts. Refer to Paul’s Letter to the Romans 6:14 “you are not under law, but under grace”

after that which it represents. It not only operates within it; the privilege and the power of this democratic structure (guaranteed by its supposed natural quality as the end point of political evolution) also co-posit and mutually legitimises the order of successive time which gives it its possibility. The effect of this, constructed and deployed within our tradition, is to fix that which is prior – those who are represented – in position as political subjects, subject to the taming of a representational structure. It would be by means of a warping or distortion of this order – an order where the subject as political participant comes first, followed by her democratic representation – that a voice which escapes the counter-resistance of the existing order might have a chance to be heard. Democracy gives us first the people, clear in their supposed identity, then the representation of them. By contrast, we ask for no pre-positing people, multitude or subject to be represented. Instead, such representation would be understood as that which enables and requires the defined political subject to exist – an effect both benign and malicious, a gift and a poison – an understanding which, at the same time and as condition and result of this understanding, sees that that which is represented is not to be fixed in its nature by a disrespectful order.

These two strategies, of hyper-simultaneity and apparent reversal, cannot operate without the event they give possibility to.

Unless the thought of the simultaneous or reverse-action effect occurs at the same time as that to which it gives its possibility – namely, the irruption of the new, the unwarned impact against the existing order, the destruction of the pre-determined subject of representation – it will not be what it is since it will immediately itself be respecting order, sequence, the “this then that”. This event does not act once within the “at the same time”. The possibility of the “at the same time” allows the new to irrupt²⁶ and it does this – in a peculiar folding-back-upon-its-own-idea – at the same time or it will not be what it is; and it is only by means of this potentiality for the “at the same time” that this whole irruption can event itself. This event occurs in multiple fashion – hence its given name of “hyper-simultaneity” – or it happens not at all. Likewise the reverse-action effect on a representational order is given its possibility by a distortion of time’s order, but the thought of time’s reversal by and of itself would remain ineffective unless that to which it gives possibility occurs at that moment of apparent reversal.

These abysmal logics give the possibility of a strategy outside that of resistance and counter-resistance, outside the representational structures they use. It is by the deployment of something like an en abyme rule that this could occur. Nonetheless, we have seen that the pre-existing order has been constituted or has constituted itself with sim-

²⁶ Conventional time, as past-present-future, is not merely a container within which causality can be thought, but implies causality (be that divine or, latterly intramundanelly thought, mechanically) from the outset. Causality – the connection of this with that across past-present-future – precludes the utterly new. Hence any thought of the new must call “time” into question. We desire, indeed, “a new refutation of time” (in the words of Borges).

ilar cunning, and if an effective resistance-beyond-resistance and the pre-existing order both deploy, necessarily, the cunning strategy of a *mise en abyme*²⁷, of the simultaneity of the potential and its corresponding occurrences, by what grace could we separate them?

This question cannot be answered directly, and there is no time now for even an oblique approach to it. It has become not so much a question of what a text could say on the issue, but rather of the effect it would have. This effect will not be that of a faith this way or that, a hope (or non-hope) for the future, a pledge one way or the other for the sake of good conscience or bad, a wager one way or the other. Rather, it will hinge on the awareness of what is occurring, an awareness which in the context of this cunning and its simultaneity becomes the act of a being which, in its difference, makes that difference an issue for it; this folded characteristic being the very possibility of resistance....

²⁷ "Placing into infinity", "placing into the abyss"

Anarchist Futures in the Present

by Jeffrey Shantz
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“The bourgeoisie may blast and ruin their own world before they leave the stage of history. But we carry a new world in our hearts.” (Buenaventura Durruti)²⁸

“We must act as if the future is today.” (Howard J. Ehrlich)²⁹

The idea that the form of post-revolutionary society must be foreshadowed in the form of the “revolutionary” organization has been a primary feature of anarchist theory, at least since Michael Bakunin’s famous disagreements with Marx over the role of the state in the transition to socialism. Bakunin’s central conflict with Marx was related precisely to the former’s conviction that an authoritarian revolutionary movement, as Marx espoused, would inevitably initiate an authoritarian society after the revolution. For Bakunin, if the new society is to be non-authoritarian then it can only be founded upon the experience of non-authoritarian social relations. The statement produced by Bakunin’s supporters in the IWMA during his battle with Marx in 1871 asked: “How can you expect an egalitarian and free society to emerge from an authoritarian organization?”³⁰. This conviction was repeated a century later by participants in the Paris in-

²⁸ The document produced by Bakunin was the Sonvillier Circular

²⁹ This statement comes from the Situationist International whose most prominent writers were Guy Debord and Raoul Vaneigem.

³⁰ (Joll, 1964: 216)

surrection of 1968: “The revolutionary organization has to learn that it cannot combat alienation through alienated forms”³¹.

Recent anarchist initiatives have gone well beyond Bakunin's preoccupation with pre-figuring the future society in contemporary revolutionary forms to creating the future immediately. As James Joll noted with respect to the activities of participants of the May 1968 uprising in Paris:

*“For these young people, the revolutionary movement is not only the pattern of future society which Bakunin believed that it should be: it is future society. Their Utopia is realized here and now in the process of revolution itself”*³².

Perhaps the most significant form of contemporary anarchist futures-present is the “autonomous zone” or more simply @-zone. These sites, often but not always in squatted buildings, are home to diverse types of activity. Autonomous zones are used primarily as community centres organized around anarchist principles of mutual aid, providing meals, clothing and shelter for those in need. @-zones also serve as gathering places where community members can learn about anarchist theory and practice, both historic and contemporary. Because of their concern over the dangers of insularity, organizers try to build and nurture connections with residents of the neighbourhoods in which the @-zones are situated. Their intention is to create broadened free zones which may be extended, from block to city to region to nation, as resources and conditions favour.

These are the building blocks of what Howard Ehrlich refers to as the anarchist transfer culture, an approximation of the new society within the context of the old. Within it anarchists try to meet the basic demands of building sustainable communities.

A transfer culture is that agglomeration of ideas and practices that guides people in making the trip from the society here to the society there in the future. As part of the accepted wisdom of that transfer culture we understand that we may never achieve anything that goes beyond the culture itself. It may be, in fact, that it is the very nature of anarchy that we shall always be building the new society within whatever society we find ourselves³³.

In this sense, anarchist autonomous zones are liminal sites, spaces of transformation and passage. As such they are important sites of re-skilling, in which anarchists prepare themselves for the new forms of relationship necessary to break authoritarian and hierarchical structures

Participants also learn the diverse tasks and varied interpersonal skills necessary for collective work and living. This skill sharing serves to discourage the emergence of

³¹ Marshall 1993: 658)

³² (Joll 1964: 217)

³³ (Ehrlich, 1996: 329)

knowledge elites and to allow for the sharing of all tasks, even the least desirable, necessary for social maintenance.

Gift economies and anarchist transfer cultures: Anarcho-communism, from DIY to self-valorization

In his compelling and provocative essay, *The High-Tech Gift Economy*, Richard Barbrook argues that the gift economy provides a starting point for thinking about social relations beyond either the state or market. More than that, the gift economy provides the basis for an incipient anarcho-communism, visions of which, have inspired a variety of recent community media and “do-it-yourself” (DIY) cultural activism. Despite the contributions Barbrook’s article makes to a rethinking of both emergent social movements and alternatives to statist capitalism, his emphasis on gift exchange leaves his analysis at the level of consumption and exchange, rather than addressing crucial issues of production. Yet it is predominantly questions of production, and especially the transformation of production relations, that have motivated anarcho-communists historically. In this short discussion I attempt to look more closely at the contestatory and transformative aspects hinted at by DIY production within the anarchist gift economies. Such production, more than issues of how exchange occurs, suggests possibilities for eluding or challenging relations of capitalist value production. Crucial for understanding the liberatory potential of the “new economy”, beyond the practices of consumption or exchange, is the notion of self-valorization, or production which emphasizes community (use) values rather than capitalist value.

As Barbrook suggests, for participants in a diversity of contemporary affinity groups, DIY activities offer a context for coming together, a shared opportunity for mutual expression and unalienated labor. Contemporary usage of the term DIY in underground movements comes from punk rock and its visceral attack on the professionalization of rock and the related distance between fans and rock stars. This anti-hierarchical perspective and the practices that flow from it are inspired by a deep longing for self-determined activity that eschews reliance on the products of corporate culture.

As an alternative to the market valorization and production for profit embodied in corporate enterprises, anarchist DIYers turn to self-valorizing production rooted in the needs, experiences and desires of specific communities. In place of a consumerist ethos that encourages consumption of ready-made items, anarchists adopt a productivist ethos that attempts a re-integration of production and consumption.

It is perhaps highly telling that in an age of multinational media conglomerates and gargantuan publishing monopolies a number of younger people have turned towards artisanal forms of craft production in order to produce and distribute what are often very personal works. Even more than this, however, are the means of production, involving collective decision-making as well as collective labor in which participants are involved, to the degree that they wish to be, in all aspects of the process from conception through to distribution.

While cultural theorist Walter Benjamin spoke of disenchantment in the “age of mechanical reproduction”, DIY projects offer expressions of re-enchantment or authenticity. This authenticity is grounded at least in the sense that such works help to overcome the division between head and hand that reflects the division of labor in a society of mass-produced representation. As attempts to overcome alienation and address concerns with overly mediated activities, DIY activities suggest a striving for what an earlier era might have called control over the means of production and what has now come to include control over the means of representation. Perhaps ironically this has been aided by the availability of inexpensive desk top publishing and other means of “mechanical reproduction” since the 1980s (though not all anarchists choose to use it).

Along with DIY production often comes the collective production of alternative sub-activities. For many the content as well as the process of DIY production expresses a confrontation with the cultural codes of everyday life.

While such activities express a variety of styles and viewpoints, they tend to present a vision of a desired society which is participatory and democratic. In production, content and, often through distribution in gift economies, they advocate active production of culture rather than passive consumption of cultural (or even entertainment) commodities. Self-production provides an opportunity for producers to act against the proprietorship of information. Most DIY communications, whether literature, music, videos or broadcasts, for example, are produced as anti-copyrights or as “copylefts” and sharing of material is encouraged. Indeed as a key part of gift economies, DIY takes on an important place in experimenting with communities that are not organized around market principles of exchange value. They help to create a culture of self-valorization rather than giving creativity over to the logics of surplus value.

The notion of self-valorization, as used by contemporary anarcho-communists and libertarian socialists builds upon Marx’s discussion of use value versus exchange value. While under communist social relations there will be no exchange value, what is produced will still retain use value. People produce things because they have some kind of use for them; they meet some need or desire. This is where the qualitative aspect of production comes in. Generally people prefer products that are well-made, function as planned, are not poisonous and so on. Under capitalism, exchange value, in which a coat can get two pairs of shoes, predominates use value. This is the quantitative aspect of value that does not care whether the product is durable, shoddy or toxic as long as it secures its (potential) value in sale or other exchange with something else.

And capitalism’s driving focus on the quantitative at the expense of the qualitative also comes to dominate human labour. The quality (skill, pleasure, creativity) of the particular work that people do is not primarily relevant for the capitalist (except that skilled labour costs more to produce and carries more exchange value). That is partly because exchange is based on the quantity of ‘average-socially-necessary-labour-time’

embodied in the product human labour produces. That simply means that if some firm takes a longer time to produce something on outdated machinery they can not claim the extra labour time they take, due to inefficiencies, compared to a firm that produces more quickly using updated technology, and that is one reason why outmoded producers go under).

Capitalist production is geared towards exchange as the only way that surplus value is actually realized rather than being potential; the capitalist can not bank surplus as value until the product has been exchanged. Use value plays a part only to the extent that something has to have some use for people or else they would not buy it; well, if the thing seems totally useless the bosses still have advertising to convince people otherwise. Under other non-capitalist “modes of production”, such as feudalism, most production is geared towards use value production rather than exchange value.

Surely if, under communism, people are producing to meet their needs, they will continue to produce use values (and even a surplus of them in case of emergency) without regard for exchange value (which would, certainly, be absent in a truly communist society anyway). Unless one is talking about a communism of uselessness perhaps. Certainly people would value their work (qualitatively) in ways that cannot be imagined now since they would be meeting their community’s needs and would try to do so with some joy and pleasure in work, providing decent products without fouling up the environment.

The new subjectivities emerging from the transition to neo-liberalism have sought to contest and overcome the impositions of productive flexibility within regimes of capitalist globalization. Rather than accepting the emerging socio-political terrain or, alternatively and more commonly, attempting to restrain it within the familiar territories of the welfare state, recent movements have “appropriated the social terrain as a space of struggle and self-valorization”³⁴.

For many contemporary activists and theorists the concept of self-valorization offers an important starting point for thinking about “the circuits that constitute an alternative sociality, autonomous from the control of the State or capital”³⁵. Originating in autonomist Marxist reflections on the social movements that emerged most notably in Italy during the intense struggles of the 1970s, the idea of self-valorization has influenced a range of libertarian communist and anarchist writers. As Hardt suggests:

*“Self-valorization was a principal concept that circulated in the movements, referring to social forms and structures of value that were relatively autonomous from and posed an effective alternative to capitalist circuits of valorization. Self-valorization was thought of as the building block for constructing a new form of sociality, a new society”*³⁶.

³⁴ (Vercellone, 1996: 84)

³⁵ (Hardt, 1996: 6)

³⁶ Ibid (1996: 3)

Twentieth century notions of self-valorization echo the arguments made by classical anarchist communists such as Kropotkin and Reclus, regarding the construction of grassroots forms of welfare developed through mutual aid societies. Self-valorization is one way by which a variety of recent theorists have sought to identify social forms of welfare that might constitute alternative networks outside of state control³⁷. As Del Re³⁸ suggests, part of the new parameters for change includes “the proposal to go beyond welfare by taking as our goal the improvement of the quality of life, starting from the reorganization of the time of our lives.”

For radical political theorists in Italy, the experiences of the social movements “show the possibilities of alternative forms of welfare in which systems of aid and socialization are separated from State control and situated instead in autonomous social networks. These alternative experiments may show how systems of social welfare will survive the crisis of the Welfare State”³⁹. These systems of social welfare, however, are based on social solidarity outside of state control through practices of autonomous self-management. Beyond providing necessary services these practices are geared towards freeing people from the necessity of waged labour, of valorization for capital. In this, self-valorizing activities challenge the limits even of the gift economy and shift emphasis again towards that great concern of anarcho-communists historically - the abolition of the wage system.

Re-visioning anarchy

While some commentators question the pedigree of contemporary anarchism, I would suggest that there are clear precedents in the works of classical anarchist writers. Bakunin, for example, viewed trade unions not merely as economic institutions but as the “embryo of the administration of the future” and argued that workers should pursue co-operatives rather than strikes⁴⁰. Recognizing the impossibility of competing with capitalist enterprises he called for the pooling of all private property as the collective property of freely federated workers' associations. These ideas would serve as the intellectual impetus for anarcho-syndicalism and its vision of the industrial syndicate as the seed of the future society.

Perhaps most influential in the current revisioning of anarchy has been the work of Gustav Landauer. Influenced by the writings of the sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies, Landauer identified himself as an “anarchist socialist” to distinguish himself from popular currents of Stirnerist egoism. Drawing upon Tönnies distinction between *Gemeinschaft* (organic community) and *Gesellschaft* (atomized society), Landauer desired the rebirth of community from within the shell of statist and capitalist society.

³⁷ (Hardt, 1996; see Vercellone, 1996 and Del Re, 1996)

³⁸ (1996: 110)

³⁹ (Vercellone, 1996: 81)

⁴⁰ (Marshall, 1993: 627)

The forms within which the new society would gestate were to be the bundle, local, face-to-face associations.

The anarchist-socialist community, for Landauer, is not something which awaits a future revolution. Rather it is the growing discovery of something already present: "This likeness, this equality in inequality, this peculiar quality that binds people together, this common spirit is an actual fact"⁴¹. In as much as anarchism would involve revolution, this "revolution", for Landauer, would consist of elements of refusal in which individuals withdraw co-operation with existing state institutions and create their own positive alternatives.

*"The state is a condition, a certain relationship among human beings, a mode of behaviour between them; we destroy it by contracting other relationships, by behaving differently toward one another... We are the state, and we shall continue to be the state until we have created the institutions that form a real community and society of men."*⁴²

Landauer thus advocated the development of self-directed communities which would permit a break from institutions of authority. Revolution, reconceptualized by Landauer as a gradual rejection of coercive social relations through the development of alternatives, was not a borderline between social conditions (marking temporalities of "pre-" and "post-") but a continuous principle spanning vast expanses of time⁴³.

This view of revolution as a process of constructing alternative forms of sociation as models of a new society is largely shared by contemporary anarchists. Revolution is a process, and even the eradication of coercive institutions will not automatically create a liberatory society. We create that society by building new institutions, by changing the character of our social relationships, by changing ourselves - and throughout that process by changing the distribution of power in society. If we cannot begin this revolutionary project here and now, then we cannot make a revolution⁴⁴.

For Paul Goodman, an American anarchist whose writings influenced the 1960s New Left and counterculture, anarchist futures-present serve as necessary acts of "drawing the line" against the authoritarian and oppressive forces in society. Anarchism, in Goodman's view, was never oriented only towards some glorious future; it involved also the preservation of past freedoms and previous libertarian traditions of social interaction. "A free society cannot be the substitution of a 'new order' for the old order; it is the extension of spheres of free action until they make up most of the social life"⁴⁵. Utopian thinking will always be important, Goodman argued, in order to open the

⁴¹ (Landauer quoted in Marshall, 1993: 411)

⁴² (Landauer quoted in Marshall, 1993: 411).

⁴³ (Marshall, 1993: 412)

⁴⁴ (Ehrlich, Ehrlich, DeLeon and Morris, 1996: 5)

⁴⁵ (Goodman quoted in Marshall, 1993: 598)

imagination to new social possibilities, but the contemporary anarchist would also need to be a conservator of society's benevolent tendencies.

As many recent anarchist writings suggest, the potential for resistance might be found anywhere in everyday life⁴⁶. If power is exercised everywhere, it might give rise to resistance everywhere. Present-day anarchists like to suggest that a glance across the landscape of contemporary society reveals many groupings which are anarchist in practice if not in ideology. Examples include the leaderless small groups developed by radical feminists, coops, clinics, learning networks, media collectives, direct action organizations; the spontaneous groupings that occur in response to disasters, strikes, revolutions and emergencies; community-controlled day-care centers; neighborhood groups; tenant and workplace organizing; and so on⁴⁷.

While these are obviously not strictly anarchist groups, they often operate to provide examples of mutual aid and non-hierarchical and non-authoritarian modes of living which carry the memory of anarchy within them.

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⁴⁶ See Ward *Anarchy in Action*, Goodman, *Drawing the Line* and Ehrlich, *Reinventing Anarchy, Again*.

⁴⁷ (Ehrlich, Ehrlich, DeLeon and Morris, 1996: 18)

The Hillsmen of Gangpur: A Discourse on Resistance Movements.

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The present paper makes an endeavor to study the social structure and discontent among tribals leading to resistance movement in the ex-princely state of Gangpur, India. The tribals ranged from Zamindars and village chiefs to the agricultural laborers. There was considerable social differentiation in the social structure. The policy of colonial Government in replacing the tribal chiefs with outsiders resulted in depeasantisation. The movement collapsed after the arrest of the leaders. But the failure of did not lessen its historical importance. A dynamism was generated in the tribal society because of its reaction to changing situation, both internally and externally.

The changing socio-economic situation and resistance struggles of the tribals have drawn the attention of social anthropologists and historians. The tribals constituted about 65 per cent of the population of the princely state of Gangpur, Orissa in eastern India. The rulers of feudatory states were effectively acting as agents of British imperialism. They tended to demand excessive revenue from their subjects and the king of Gangpur was not an exception. The result was “depeasantization” and landlessness among tribals, leading to their discontent. Similar developments were also found in the other feudatory states of Orissa⁴⁸.

⁴⁸ Eschmann, A., H. Kulke and G.C. Tripathi (1978)

Raja Raghunath Sekhar Deo introduced a new revenue settlement in 1874 and transferred some villages by auction to the highest bidders who came from the neighboring states. With the influx of Brahmins, Agharias and Telis, there was a change in social structure. Many tribal chiefs lost their earlier privileges. The land revenue policy of the colonial government was another cause of tribal discontent. Starting from the new settlement of the king in 1874, the misery of tenants, poor peasants and agricultural laborers increased. From an amount of Rs.5,200 in 1865, the revenue was increased by Rs.15, 000 along with increased supply of paddy and cereals⁴⁹. The rent paid by fief-holders and gauntias (village chiefs) was not sufficient for the ruler, who was engaged in constructing a magnificent palace. The leases to chiefs was discontinued, then auctioned, and the highest bidders, usually from outside the state, received the lease agreement.

This led to revolt. A tribal gauntia named Madro Kalo rallied some chiefs behind him and rose in rebellion. With assistance of the British government, the revolt was suppressed. Edward Gait, Chief Secretary to government of Bengal reported in 1897 that the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum had intervened with an armed police force and that the leaders were arrested⁵⁰. A new settlement was imposed on the cultivators in 1900 after an agreement between the king and gauntias. There was augmentation of rent on all types of land⁵¹. The increase in land revenue demand further continued in 1911 and 1936. The discontent among tribals, which had been growing since the last decade of the nineteenth century, flared up at this latest increase in land revenue demand. A converted Christian; Nirmal Munda led the aggrieved tribals and demanded a revision of the land settlement. It may have been more than a coincidence that the movement was led by a Christian. In 1870, a Lutheran mission had started its activities in Raiboga and set up a station there, while a German Evangelical mission had opened in Kumukela. The missionary activities played an important role in spreading education among Munda tribals. Thus political consciousness developed. Christianity became an instrument to fight the oppressors and it became the rallying point of the anti-feudal struggle. But we should not overemphasize the importance of religion in the movement as Hindu tribals also joined later.

There was a campaign for refusing to pay any rent to the state under the leadership of Nirmal Munda. Dahijira village became the nerve-centre of the agitation and non-Christian tribal leaders like Bahadur Bhagat and Yakub Gudia joined hands with Nirmal Munda. The administration sought the help of the Church Council of Ranchi to appease the tribals, but the efforts of the delegation proved futile⁵². A petition was submitted to the queen Regent Janaki Rathnaya Amarjee at a meeting held at Sargipali on February 9, 1939. About 5,000 people from 30 villages articulated their anti-establishment feeling by demanding free transfer of land, establishment of a co-operative credit society, freedom to sell lac, silk, wax etc., and abolition of forcible contribution in cash

⁴⁹ Senapati, N. (1975)

⁵⁰ Ibid

⁵¹ Mukherji, I.B. (1978)

⁵² Pati, S. (1987)

or kind and an end to the bethi (forced labor) system. The nonchalant attitude of the queen gave a fillip to the no-rent campaign, and the Mundas refused to pay revenue dues. Following a carrot and stick policy, the administration issued arrest warrants. The situation was viewed seriously by the colonial government. On April 25, 1939, about 80 tribals had gathered around the village Simko facing the house of Nirmal Munda. The attempt to arrest him led to a police firing, in which 28 tribals were killed, according to the official report⁵³.

After the arrest of the leaders, the movement collapsed. But the Prajamandal movement was organized in Gangpur in 1946, and the state merged with Orissa two years afterwards. The tribal society had experienced internal social differentiation, but it had also experienced external pressure due to diminution of forest land, increase in land revenue demand, influx of outsiders and the oppressive policy of the king. The failure of the tribal revolt did not lessen its historical importance, for it generated dynamism in the tribal society because of its reaction to the changing situation.

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Claims to Globalization: Thailand's Assembly of the Poor and the Multilevel Resistance to Capitalist Development

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For centuries, groups and individuals have continually resisted unjust social processes and structures by asserting their political agency through sustained collective actions. While these actions have varied depending on particular circumstances and locations, they have always been greatly determined by the historical context in which they have occurred. Thus, as the world was organized through the construction of modern nation states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, localized actions against immediate authorities diminished and modern forms of social movements emerged within a national context (Tilly 1984). In turn, transformations that have occurred on a global scale in the latter half of the twentieth century have begun to alter the ways in which collective action is carried out. In the context of an integrated and increasingly pervasive global economy, many social movements have recognized the extent to which overarching global economic processes can exert influence over social, political, economic, and ecological circumstances in local and national realms. In contrast to past movements that operated solely within the nation state and international state system, several movements have responded strategically to the transnational practices of global capitalism by fostering connections with an expanding web of transnational networks that allow for interactions with globally dispersed allies and opponents. As

such, their political activities have expanded beyond the state to include actions at transnational and global scales.

In this paper I seek to examine forms of multilevel resistance to capitalist development in Thailand that have been carried out by the social movement network, the Assembly of the Poor (AOP). Following a brief discussion of Thailand's development agenda as occurring within the context of neoliberal globalization, I will focus on the ways in which the AOP has advanced its efforts to oppose the adverse social and ecological ramifications of capitalist development through actions at local, national, and global scales. In analyzing such actions I hope to argue that the AOP's transnational extension has allowed its members to confront multiple areas of power and authority that exist within the global economy while including them in broader arenas and networks of resistance that are spreading throughout the world. Lastly, I hope to raise questions about the potential that emergent forms of grassroots globalization and global politics may have in challenging the hitherto dominant system of neoliberal globalization.

Globalization and Capitalist Development in Thailand

Understood in its most general sense, globalization refers to "the widening, deepening, and speeding up of global interconnectedness" (Held et al. 67). While this interconnectedness manifests itself in various social, cultural, political, and ecological forms, in practice, the economic processes of neoliberal globalization have significantly defined the concept. In this form, globalization is "arguably the politics of instituting a corporate market on a global scale" (McMichael 596). Demonstrating such politics, the global capitalist economy was constituted throughout the late twentieth century by national policies of deregulation, privatization, and liberalization of trade and investment that were implemented worldwide with varying pressure from supranational institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Defined as "...an economy whose core components have the institutional, organizational, and technological capacity to work as a unit in real time, or in chosen time, on a planetary scale," the global economy serves to connect capital, savings, and investment from national economies throughout the world (Castells 311). Accompanying the development of this economy has been the emergence of new global actors – particularly transnational corporations and global economic institutions – who have gained considerable influence over policies and overall development agendas of individual nations. The emergence of such actors has resulted in the transfer of vast amounts of decision-making authority from individual states to the governors of the global economy and helped to transform capitalism from its previously international system into a globalizing one in which "there are hardly any places now left outside of market influences" (Harvey 67).

A key component of such a transformation has been "the restructuring of states to facilitate global circuits of money and commodities" (McMichael 596). Thailand's development agenda, beginning in the 1950s and accelerating in the late 20th century, is one example of many across Asia, Africa, and Latin America that reflects such restructuring. Largely backed by a World Bank plan of rapid industrialization, this agenda was initially characterized by substantial economic investment in urban

infrastructure, a strong market orientation, and a leading role for the private sector and foreign investment (Bello et al. 6). The military dictatorship of Sarit Thanarat (1958-1963) set the course by promoting capitalist development as "both an economic goal to be pursued and an ideology on which the legitimacy of the government was based" (Keyes 76). Showing a comprehensive departure from Thailand's pre-1960 agricultural-based economy and society, succeeding governments maintained this goal and ideology by seeking urban-based industrial growth through a liberal, market-oriented approach (Falkus 15). Subsequently, the National Economic and Social Development Board in the Prime Minister's Office began to focus on export-oriented manufacturing policies that were accompanied throughout the 1980s by "the tremendous infusion of foreign capital" (Bello et al. 6). By the 1990s foreign capital had contributed so much to Thailand's growth that the World Bank, IMF and many mainstream economists regarded it and other countries of Southeast Asia as "exemplars for the rest of the developing world" (Rigg 3). However, perpetually overshadowed by the immensity of this economic development was its unevenness across the country. Largely left out of the success stories of Thailand's development during this time was the subordinated position of the country's rural regions to the capital city of Bangkok. Put simply, the government strategy of the late twentieth century was "consistently a lopsided, short-sighted one of milking and permanently subordinating agriculture to urban commercial-industrial interests" (Bello et al. 137). Exploitation and transfer of wealth from the country to the city persisted throughout the 1960s and 1970s as agricultural exports provided the manufacturing sector with capital to acquire imported machinery (Supachalasai 67). By the 1990s the agricultural sector had declined heavily in relation to manufacturing, bringing the most poverty and despair to small-scale farmers and peasants (Bello et al. 135). In the context of economic growth predicated by participation in external markets, such populations have been rendered insignificant and thus vulnerable to exploitation by and exclusion from the rapid changes occurring within Thailand.

Associated with such subordination has been the environmental degradation, and associated human consequences, caused by several aspects of Thailand's development agenda. For example, the country's earlier integration into the world economy as a resource and agricultural exporter entailed heavy deforestation that has continued throughout the decades, resulting in Thailand's northeast region to lose nearly 30% of its forests between 1961 and 1997 (Bello et al 183). Such deforestation has caused multiple and lasting problems for those living in the countryside, foremost of which include droughts and destructive floods induced by watersheds that are destabilized by industry logging (Bello et al. 176). Contributing greatly to hastened deforestation, while presenting a set of ecological problems of its own, has been the construction of dams that have been "developed fundamentally to provide electricity for the country's rapid industrial growth, centered disproportionately around Bangkok" (Glassman 519). In addition to contributing to the disappearance of an estimated 2,000 square kilometers of forest, hydroelectric dams have displaced thousands of rural families (McCully 83-85) and significantly reduced water and fish availability for those living in various river basins (McCully 53). Furthermore, the proliferation of shrimp farms in southern Thailand, implemented to increase supplies for global food markets, is hav-

ing damaging effects on the coastal environment as well as the communities whose livelihoods have been dependent on the area's deteriorating mangroves (Barbier and Sathirathai 2004).

Considering these damaging consequences, ecological degradation and its concomitant human suffering have proven to be inherent features of Thailand's economic development agenda. Moreover, as this agenda continues to be greatly influenced, if not determined, by an increasingly powerful and invasive global economy, those who traditionally subsist outside of it face serious threats to their fundamental means of survival and ways of living. Thus, it is easy to see why rural resistance movements have developed alongside these projects. During periods of parliamentary democracy in the 1970s, groups such as the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and the Peasant's Federation of Thailand (PFT) built strong memberships for their respective resistance movements, only to be systematically repressed in the lead up to and after the 1976 military coup (Missingham 22-24). With such repression, rural protest was temporarily contained until the parliament replacement of the military dictatorship provided the context for a reemergence of protest activity beginning in the mid-1980s (Baker 13). While protests were initially localized during this time, in the late 1980s political organization of villagers began to redevelop in ways that would lead to the creation of a new political space within which rural agency could be asserted into the national discourse on development and progress. As will be discussed, this discourse has been greatly influenced by members of the AOP who have proclaimed crucial concerns of Thailand's marginalized rural populations in national and, more recently, global political arenas.

Contested Development in the Global Economy: The Case of the Assembly of the Poor

Amid the vast social and environmental transformations that were occurring within the context of Thailand's economic development, community leaders and NGO activists saw an increasingly urgent need for a broad umbrella organization able to fight for community rights at the national level (Missingham 38). Thus, on December 10th, 1995 a conference entitled, "Assembly of the Poor: The Consequences of Large-scale Development Projects" was held at Thammasat University in Bangkok and attended by representatives of such village organizations as the Northern Farmers' Network, the Network of People Affected by Dams, and a network of urban slum dwellers (Missingham 38). During the conference, villagers, NGO activists, academics, and university students participated in panels and gave speeches about the negative social and ecological impacts of industrial development. After days of discussion, participants drafted the "Mun River Declaration," which served as a manifesto announcing the formation of the AOP and attacking "state policies that promote industrial development at the expense of the environment, the small-scale agricultural sector, and urban laborers" (Missingham 39). Most importantly, the Mun River Declaration signified the refusal of the most excluded and ignored sectors of Thai society to remain passive subjects of the rapid changes taking place within the country. Days after it was prepared, hundreds of

AOP members introduced themselves to the state and public by marching through Bangkok and submitting the declaration and list of demands to the Thai government.

In the years following the Mun River Declaration, the AOP greatly expanded its membership through the development of an extensive and diverse network of the country's poor populations. By 1997 six villagers' networks representing over 36,000 families from all regions were incorporated into the AOP and broken down into "problem groups" that included Forest and Land, Dams, State Development Projects, Slum Community, Work-Related and Environmental Illness, Alternative Agriculture, and Small Fishers (Missingham 45-46). The inclusion of urban slum dwellers and laborers into the network is significant because these groups consist largely of farmers and other rural inhabitants who moved to Bangkok to address worsening conditions at home through the demand for service and manufacturing labor in the city. Thus, the diffuse nature of poor populations throughout both rural and urban sectors has provided an extensive grassroots base for the AOP's emergence and progression as a broad-based national movement of the "poor" who are "victims of development" (Missingham 44). In addition, the AOP's network consists of multiple alliances with the urban middle class, academics, media, and NGOs who have added much logistical support to this grassroots base (Banpasirichote 237).

Through its networked organizational structure, the AOP has been able to develop a movement that is continually progressed by democratic cooperation among community groups and their allies. In contrast to a hierarchical structure that concentrates authority at the top and dictates an agenda to a rank and file, the decentralized AOP network allows representatives from several villagers' organizations, NGOs, and academics to share information and agree upon the best courses of action for the movement (Missingham 53). As such, the movement is motivated by a diverse collection of immediate grievances that are specific to particular communities, and taken together, these grievances comprise a united opposition to common processes and practices of development. In addition, they assert a historically marginalized discourse about rethinking and resisting the capitalist development paradigm that the Thai government has adhered to. How this growing discourse has translated into political practice within and between local, national, and increasingly global scales is a topic of further examination.

Political Actions in the National Arena

Though problems stemming from Thailand's capitalist development program inevitably emerge as local manifestations, most of the AOP's political actions have occurred in the national arena in which several of the movement's local groups have converged to collectively assert their respective claims. As one NGO adviser explains, "After many years of protest by different villagers' groups at local sites of conflict...villagers have repeatedly encountered the plea that the officials in those [local authority] positions do not have the authority to act on their demands" (Missingham 139). Thus, in March of 1996, after dissatisfaction with government inaction towards their original petition, the AOP staged their first mass protest in front of the Government House – the center of state power and authority. The rally of 12,000 people lasted for five weeks

and gained public recognition as well as a promise by Prime Minister Banharn to take action on all grievances listed in the petition (Missingham 129). Though, after months of government negligence, the late-1996 collapse of Banharn's Chart Thai Party, and the reluctance of the new Prime Minister, Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, to implement his predecessor's promises, the AOP began planning their next action. It was their following protest that would fully assert them into the national political arena as a diverse yet unified social movement seeking immediate changes in the ways in which the state carried out its development projects.

On January 25th, 1997 thousands of villagers from all regions traveled to Bangkok by bus, train, and shared vehicles to converge on the capital in a show of force outside of the Government House. The villagers, along with hundreds of urban slum dwellers who joined the rally, amounted to over 25,000 protesters who refused to move until the government responded to their petition (Missingham 121). Immediately upon entering the city, a "Village of the Poor" was constructed directly outside of the Government House within which villagers shared their experiences with each other and the urban public through speeches and performances. River community representatives spoke of the damage that dams have caused to their fishing practices, forest communities expressed concerns over harmful forest management projects, and other villagers from several areas throughout rural Thailand similarly asserted grievances and claims specific to their local circumstances. In addition, talks about the government's neglect of these populations were given by NGO activists and academics at various venues across the city, including parks and college campuses, serving important purposes of public education on the lives and experiences of perpetually ignored segments of Thai society. As a whole, the globalized capitalist development paradigm was admonished while public support for community-based sustainable development was sought.

Central to the demonstration's contestation of the Thai government and its policies were efforts to generate necessary support from the urban public. As such, protesters framed their demands within the popular discourse of "Nation, Religion, and King." Reference to such ideologies helped to "undermine the ideology of difference and otherness that is attached to poor protesters" while "underscoring shared identity and suggesting common citizenship rights with other sections of Thai society" (Missingham 158). Such framing indicates a concerted effort by villagers to introduce themselves as a constitutive yet neglected part of Thai society. Furthermore, because the protest included several urban laborers and slum dwellers, the ever-present rural/urban divide was challenged with pleas for recognition of the diffuse poverty that had been increasing as a result of development projects in all regions of the country. The protest was presented as a series of claims towards the Thai government to be included within the unfolding of the development process rather than as a threatening resistance to mainstream Thai society.

Throughout the 99 days of the demonstration, increased support from the Thai public helped to put pressure on the government to consider the demands of the AOP. Negotiation meetings were held between AOP members and government representatives, including Prime Minister Chavalat (Missingham 131). With the help of a mostly sympathetic media, these negotiations were presented to a national audience in

such a way that garnered further support from most of the country's middle-class and NGO sector. This backing was decisive in prompting the government to accelerate its efforts to address the villagers' demands. Eventually, the government agreed to all 122 grievances put forth by the AOP, which included the establishment of a 1.2 billion baht fund to compensate communities harmed by dams and other development projects (Missingham 131). In addition, one dam project was cancelled while five others were put under review, and resolutions that allowed for long-settled groups to remain in forest zones were passed (Baker 23). Though the protest was an immediate success, the ensuing economic crisis that hit Thailand and Southeast Asia later that year would have a devastating impact on these concessions as they collapsed along with the Chavalit government.

Nonetheless, the demonstration did make a valuable impression on Thai society that would not have been achieved if their actions had remained local and dispersed. Most importantly, the construction and maintenance of a makeshift village within Bangkok proved effective in presenting to the public the continued hardships of those populations largely neglected in the popular discourses on economic growth and development. Throughout the three-month-long protest, the site functioned like an actual village with daily routines of domesticity, sustenance, and survival. As anthropologist Bruce Missingham observed first-hand, "...domestic activities became symbolic, signifying the protesters' persistence and resistance to the destructive effects of development and their intention to endure here in the rally site until the state responded" (Missingham 142). Such a display of the lives of villagers from across the country served as a distinct contrast to the signs of wealth and prosperity that had been growing rapidly in the country's urban center and proved effective in dispelling inaccurate depictions of the Thai hinterland as "a place where nothing significant happens" (Askew 102-103). In contrast, the protest represented a nationally dispersed "community in crisis" that was "threatened by the very development and economic growth the city both symbolized and depended upon economically" (Missingham 141). Thus, it served to educate the urban public and Thai government about the lesser-known impacts that capitalist development projects were having on rural populations. As the immediate results indicate, public response to the demonstration was favorable enough to force the government to recognize these communities.

Significantly, such a protest at the national level was necessary for perpetually neglected issues of development and environmental justice to be heard by national political leaders. Though environmental concerns have been growing in Thailand since the later decades of the twentieth century, issues linking environmental changes to social justice concerns have been marginalized by the mainstream "consensus-dominated civil society discourse" that has tended to stay clear of controversial issues related to poverty (Banpasirichote 234). In addition, as Thailand's historically precarious democracy has been characterized by varying levels of corruption, mainstream environmental campaigns have been susceptible to interference by vested business and bureaucratic interests (Banpasirichote 237). Thus, issues of great importance to AOP members, including those related to dams, community forest management, depleted fisheries, the suppression of local knowledge systems, and so on, are most often trumped by powerful interests. Such political marginalization is a main reason why street protest –

long designated as the “political resource of the powerless” (Della Porta and Diani 170) – was utilized in the 1997 Bangkok protest as well as others that followed. As is the case in several countries, a severe lack of democratic participation in Thailand’s policy process has led grassroots environmental movements such as those of the AOP to become increasingly contentious (Banpasirichote 237). Thus, the use of protest at the state level proved to be a necessary political act of resistance for those suffering from local manifestations of national policies.

By seizing the urban space surrounding the Government House and asserting their claims to the Thai government and society, the AOP established itself as a national social movement in direct contention with the Thai state rather than a loose collection of dispersed local struggles. Importantly, such action at the national level transformed the political consciousness of many villagers into one characterized by “lack of fear, confidence, determination, and collective solidarity” (Missingham 158). As villagers were able to meet and share stories with other members of the network, the collective solidarity of the movement was fostered. In addition, these interactions as well as the unprecedented interactions with government officials created a learning experience for villagers who were educated on different aspects of national politics (Missingham 160). Most importantly, the immediate results of the protest added to the confidence of rural communities and individuals as they came to realize that they were not completely vulnerable to seemingly uncontrollable systemic changes. However, because the contested development projects were carried out to bolster Bangkok’s, and thus the entire country’s position within the global economy, the protest can be seen as a reaction to development in a globalizing context. As such, the site of protest existed not only on the national level, but also within the global economic space of Bangkok. Though the bulk of the AOP’s political activity has continued to exist at the national level, the transnational and global dimensions of their actions have proven to be increasingly important, especially after the Asian economic crisis that began in Thailand in mid-1997.

Transnational Activities of The Assembly of the Poor

When the collapse of the Southeast Asian economy began in Thailand on July 2nd, 1997, causing the Thai baht to lose a fifth of its value, almost everyone was surprised (Rigg 25). Two key features of the Thai development model – heavy dependence on a fragile export sector and even more dependence on foreign capital – proved also to be the main causes of the collapse (Bello et al. 36). Immediately, Bangkok suffered as the many construction projects throughout the city came to a halt and thousands of workers lost their jobs. In addition to increased unemployment and poverty within the city, “much of the pain of the crisis was displaced to rural areas, in spite of the origins of the crisis in the urban-industrial economy,” further intensifying the “sense of the injustice of the system which had not served rural areas that well during the boom yet made them pay heavily during the bust” (Glassman 522). Moreover, the collapse made frighteningly clear the degree to which the lives of many Thai citizens were vulnerable to unpredictable changes of the global economy. The economic crisis also gave way to political crisis as the Chavalit government collapsed along with several others in the region.

Though the 1997 collapse generated much anger and resentment towards the IMF and the World Bank for their hand in orchestrating the failed development model (Tadem 379), the crisis actually caused the Thai state to become much more dependent upon the institutions of the global economy. Within weeks IMF rescue packages amounting to \$17 billion were granted to the state (Rigg 25), though much of this fund was used to pay off foreign creditors rather than saving the local economy (Bello 2006). In addition, as the new Chuan Leekpai government began implementing crisis-management policies they quickly reversed all of the major concessions the AOP gained in their 99-day protest as part of an “aggressive determination to suppress the rising demands of organized rural groups” (Missingham 201). In the context of the economic crisis and a hostile Chuan government, during 1998 and 1999 the AOP resorted to a “scattered-star” approach consisting of setting up protest villages in various locations, such as near the continually contested Pak Mun dam, to resist development projects at the local level (Chalermripinyorat 546). Yet, as these projects were increasingly recognized as occurring within a global economic and political context, the AOP began to adapt their national struggle to the global context in which Thailand was undeniably entrenched, opting to expand its network across national borders and shift the scale of its politics to include activities at transnational and global levels.

The concept of “scale shift” has been defined in social movement literature as “the spread of contention beyond its typically localized origins” (Tarrow and McAdam 125). In many cases this shift has occurred back and forth from the local and national levels to transnational and global realms. One significant way in which the AOP has carried out such a shift has been their involvement in transnational protests. The first example of such activity was their participation in a demonstration in Bangkok during the tenth meeting of the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD X) in February 2000. Though this protest was held in Thailand’s capital, the AOP’s actions may be seen as constituting a scale shift in that, for the first time, the main targets of contention were global institutions and not the Thai government. During this conference, leaders representing the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the IMF were planning to make up for the meetings that failed to occur as a result of mass protests that took place against the WTO in Seattle two months earlier (Glassman 517). Arguably influenced by Seattle’s unprecedented display of heterogeneous disapproval towards neoliberal globalization, AOP members joined the group of national and transnational protesters at the UNCTAD meeting and delivered a statement that “excoriated the type of development pursued in Thailand and its effects on people such as these villagers” (Glassman 518). Since this event, AOP members have been key participants in protests during meetings of other regional and global economic institutions that include the Asian Development Bank in Chiang Mai in 2000, and the 2005 Hong Kong meeting of the WTO. Though a lack of resources has limited the AOP’s mobility to the Asia Pacific region, in the past decade they have demonstrated a clear effort to expand the targets and reach of their protest activities to include opponents beyond the Thai state. Importantly, involvement in protests against supranational targets can be looked at as signifying the assertion of the AOP’s social movement discourse within global political arenas while simultaneously adding to an expanding worldwide critique of neoliberal globalization.

Participation in such arenas has been greatly aided by the AOP's involvement with transnational networks and organizations that operate on a global scale. For example, the AOP now serves as the Southeast Asia convener for People's Global Action (PGA) Asia, a network that facilitates communication and political coordination between a variety of social movements in various locations. In addition, the AOP is a member of La Via Campesina, a movement that has brought together millions of landless peasants, small farmers, agricultural workers, rural women, and indigenous communities in their global campaigns for biodiversity and food sovereignty (McMichael 604). Moreover, the AOP's continual fight against large dams has been greatly aided by its relationship with the International Rivers Network (IRN), an organization that collaborates with a global network of local communities, social movements, and NGOs to "protect rivers and defend the rights of communities that depend on them" by opposing "destructive dams and the development model they advance" (IRN 2008). Such transnational coordination has greatly enhanced the AOP's ability to shift the scale of its movement activities beyond local and national levels while demonstrating clear manifestations of this shift.

The AOP's connection to groups who operate at transnational and global levels has allowed for the use of tools and resources that are provided for the purposes of protesting global targets and building mutual solidarity with other movements affected by similar processes of globalization and development. For instance, PGA has fostered an extensive network "to offer an instrument for coordination and mutual support at the global level for those resisting corporate rule and the neoliberal capitalist development paradigm..." (Routledge et al. 2578). In particular, the AOP has benefited much from PGA's ability to mobilize resources and people for transnational protests. In addition, PGA and other groups such as La Via Campesina have acted as valuable support systems during these protests. For example, when 79 representatives from the Assembly were detained during the 6th WTO Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong in 2005, La Via Campesina publicized the incident and widely circulated a solidarity statement urging the release of all detainees (La Via Campesina 2005). Moreover, through participation in transnational protests as well as conferences facilitated by such groups, members of the AOP have taken part in "solidarity-building efforts" that are based on notions of shared fate with communities in other countries (Smith 2002). For example, in recent years there has been continued exchange of information between Thailand's dam-affected communities and India's anti-dam activists who have been involved in their own struggle over the Narmada Valley dams for decades (Glassman 526). Thus, by forging connections with transnational movements and networks, the AOP has been able to confront more political targets while greatly expanding its diverse social movement network through solidarity with communities who are also making claims to their respective national governments and common global powers.

Importantly, increased coordinated action and mutual solidarity has translated to strengthened issue-based transnational campaigns in which the AOP has increasingly taken part. For example, AOP members have recently linked with La Via Campesina's campaigns for food sovereignty and shared their experiences of poverty resulting from WTO, IMF, and World Bank promoted programs of export-oriented rice

production and monopoly control by transnational corporations (La Via Campesina 2006). Such participation has added to a growing discourse that exposes the devastating effects of the corporate-driven global food system and offers suggestions for the implementation of food sovereignty worldwide. In addition, through ties with the IRN, communities who have long fought against the Nam Choan, Pak Mun, and other dams in Thailand have been able to contribute to global campaigns against World Bank-funded dams. Such campaigns have been influential in forcing the World Bank to adopt new policies on resettlement, environmental assessment, indigenous people, and information disclosure (McCully 308). Thus, by drawing from strengthened connections with transnational allies, the AOP has simultaneously transposed its own movement agenda to global arenas while contributing to broader social movement campaigns in resistance to particular aspects of neoliberal globalization.

In addition, members of the AOP have been able to utilize groups who enjoy greater access to, and recognition by, national and global institutions to further their immediately local goals. For instance, the World Commission on Dams (WCD), an independent body of scientists, academics, politicians, anti-dam activists and dam-industry professionals commissioned by the World Bank to assess the environmental and social impacts of large dams (McCully xix), has proven to be a valuable resource. In particular, the 2000 WCD report, *Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making* “vindicates many of their [dam opponents] arguments and proposes a progressive decision-making framework for future water and energy planning which echoes many of the demands of anti-dam campaigns” (McCully xxv). As such, the communities struggling against the Pak Mun dam used the report to assert the validity of their local knowledge of ecology that had long been ignored by the Thai state and global economic institutions. Bolstered by the report, in June of 2001 these communities and their allies were able to put enough pressure on the Thai government to open the dam’s floodgates for a year to study its social and ecological impacts (Drinkwater 2004). Within the year over a hundred local fish and numerous plant species returned to the Mun River and local communities were able to “return to fishing, farming and other longstanding practices central to their culture” (Drinkwater 2004). Eventually a compromise to leave the dam gates open for four months of the year was agreed upon. This example demonstrates both the unfortunate lack of credence given to the knowledge claims of local communities and the potential of these communities to validate their knowledge and strengthen their negotiating power by utilizing information from more institutionally respected sources.

Sociologists Doug McAdam and Sidney Tarrow state, “What we normally see in transnational contention is the transposition of frames, networks, and forms of collective action to the international level without a corresponding liquidation of the conflicts and claims that gave rise to them in their arenas of origin” (McAdam and Tarrow 123). Thus, it is important to recognize that the various ways in which the AOP has shifted the scale of its political activities has been for the purpose of enhancing its members’ original struggles. They have not replaced local and national protest with actions on a global level, but have utilized a variety of strategies involving numerous alliances in maintaining a multilevel approach to political action. Such an approach seems necessary considering the diffuse character of political and economic power in a

globalized world. As David Schlosberg argues in his study of environmental justice movements, "Citizen action is necessary on the regional and local level, because it is where much of the control remains lodged; it is necessary on the global level because the institutions of global governance there are so limited (and undemocratic). And it is necessary to network across each of these levels, as political power flows through them simultaneously" (Schlosberg 136). As the above analysis has shown, the AOP recognizes the necessity of such multilevel strategies and has exhibited them through several acts of resistance at local, national, and global scales. Moreover, such resistance has allowed for the inclusion of the AOP in a constantly growing and connected collection of diverse oppositions to the dominant processes of neoliberal globalization.

Conclusion

The development paradigm that has been adhered to by the Thai state "...offers the world a single vision that flattens its diversity and sponsors an increasingly unsustainable monocultural industrial system" (McMichael 589). Since the mid-nineties the members of the Assembly of the Poor have challenged this vision by building a network of Thai communities and allies in resistance to local injustices, constituting a national social movement to resist ecologically and socially damaging development projects at the state level. However, such projects have never been insular national events. Initial industrialization agendas were formulated and encouraged by the World Bank, and liberalization of the national economy was continually predicated upon the country's emergent position within the global economy. Furthermore, the financial crisis of 1997 made it clear that the various global forces impinging on the state called for a multilevel approach to political action. In response, the AOP has taken actions similar to other grassroots movements who are, as Arjun Appadurai writes, "finding new ways to combine local activism with horizontal, global networking" (Appadurai 25).

Though the transnational expansion of its originally national network has been helpful in challenging state policies, the extent to which such developments will further the goals of Thailand's poor amid powerful state and global forces is yet to be determined. Nevertheless, the AOP's cross-border connections reveal emergent possibilities for political action and resistance in the contemporary era of globalization. By involving themselves in transnational campaigns and presenting their concerns within such frameworks as environmentalism, food sovereignty, and biodiversity, the AOP has been able to connect to broader frames of reference and larger spheres of action. This suggests that movements that may otherwise be dismissed as insular groups of stubborn peasants unable to adjust to globalization and development can present themselves as being involved with broad issues of global concern. Moreover, their participation in a growing array of transnational social movement networks demonstrates the ways in which grassroots movements might gain access into global political arenas and potentially influence global politics. In addition to making claims to the state, these movements are increasingly asserting claims to global institutions and other powers that attempt to dictate and define the ways in which globalization transpires. Thus, by presenting their local problems on a global stage and offering alternatives to harmful capitalist development projects, movements such as the AOP are contributing

to an expanding global resistance to dominant practices and processes of neoliberal globalization.

Lastly, the proliferation, increased interconnection, and collaboration between a diversity of movements throughout the world points to new possibilities for the realization of alternative forms of globalization that are developing through bottom-up processes of collaboration and understanding. When activists from different areas of the globe share information, develop common goals, cooperate in political action, and offer alternatives, our understanding of globalization as consisting of much more than integrated markets is enhanced. Thus, transnational social movement processes are adding to a constantly growing vision of globalization from below – a vision that counters the homogenizing logic of neoliberalism with its diversity and global pervasiveness. How alternatives to neoliberal globalization manifest themselves is continually unfolding, and the extent to which such processes may challenge dominant capitalist ideologies is yet to be seen.

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Becoming Power Through Dance

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Social scientific research is a world-making process (Mol 1999, Law 2004). We have options in choosing between which reality to enact from a variety of versions (Mol 1999: 74). So what we need to ask for, are the whereabouts of these options in terms of their situatedness and what are the forces that bring us to decide between the other alternatives (ibid). This notion of choice brings in an actively choosing actor who potentially may not be disentangled to how s/he is enacted (ibid). The ancient magical incantation *abracadabra* is derived from the Aramaic word meaning 'I create as I speak' therefore in choosing what we are going to talk about, we are also creating which version of realities to enact:

Working on the ways in which we are situated in various culturally and materially specific ways of thinking, feeling and doing opens up possibilities of transformation, of insight and political action: not in order that we in any absolute way can escape being acted upon by external forces, but in order that we may find more freedom of choice in just what external forces we would like to be expressed in our embodied perceptive actions (Marcussen 2006: 294).

Feeling is a way of apprehending the world (see Ahmed 2004 and Marcussen 2006). During my ethnographic research on dance I experimented with dancing in the middle as a way of knowing. I was constantly 'experiencing, experimenting, not interpreting but experimenting' with actuality, therefore the matters of process, affect and sensation, what is new, coming into being, taking shape in movement and transition,

rhythm, creativity, imagination, vitality became practical and therefore theoretical centers in my research (Deleuze 1995: 106). As a result while translating⁵⁴ and representing the 'reality' of dance in writing, I tried hard to resist to fixing and reducing dance to 'culture', 'economy', 'gender', 'class', 'race', 'power', because it is 'apart' of and 'a part' of all these aspects and it is between and beyond them too (Cooper 1998: 120). It is beyond them because in its play it has a potential to create another 'reality' in itself and this is precisely why it is so interesting. I tried to avoid imposing a conceptual framework that will frame dance within power relations (race, class, gender and so on) or as spatiality across (transgressive, resisting, counter-movements and so). Rather, I tried to dive into the spatiality of this middleness (of rhythm, of dance, of time, of space, of body and of reality).

Reality is multiple, and it is 'culturally, historically and materially located' (Mol 1999: 75). The metaphors that Mol uses to define the character of multiplicity of realities are 'intervention and performance' and through them it is implied that "reality is done and enacted rather than observed" (Mol 1999: 77). I am overfilled with joy in dance and that is why I choose to bring in dance in relation to joy, rather than race or gender. I choose to enact this reality of dance, rather than the others and it is a political choice⁵⁵. I choose to speak about the things in the ways in which I was affected and which may indeed be 'absent' rather than 'present'⁵⁶. Because speaking about them, is a way of creating them and making them real.

In movement, the closed and rigid modes of thinking and ideas as well as feelings that derive from past experiences are dissolving and changing shape, they become liquefied. In that sense 'dance' is a force of transformation and when enacted as a way of looking at the world (a method of realizing), it may have a similar effects on our ways of understanding what is in and around us. "Working on our affective stance (including both the feeling state of our bodies and the ideas or thoughts we have of that stance) is thus a process that enables us to transcend that stance, so that we may

⁵⁴ "To translate is to betray. To translate is to connect, to displace, to move, to shift from one place, one modality, one form, to another while retaining something. Only something. Not everything. While therefore losing something. Betraying whatever is carried over" (Law 2002: 99).

⁵⁵ This is about 'ontological politics' that John Law (2004) and Annemarie Mol (1999) suggest in making a choice about which version of reality to enact in social scientific research.

⁵⁶ Absence works at multiple levels, first it has a direct meaning, the figural absence of dance in the dance events in general. And I argue that may be the reason why I dance all the time. The absence of dance is indeed the challenge to bring it into presence. If everybody danced deeply with passion around me, I would probably not be dancing with such a powerful passion. This actually brings to think about the second level of absence that is about how presence derives from and is constituted in absence. This figural absence of dance and my passion to enact it applies to something other than itself; it shows me something more, at a deeper level, that our understandings of things and our enactments actually occur through things that are absent. In this sense absence can be a triggering and creative force in our enactments of practical living and also theoretical thinking (Derrida 1976, 1994, Serres 1991, Beer 1992, Gordon 1997, Law 2004).

better perceive the complexity of realities we are researching.” (Marcussen 2006: 299). From this perspective, I aim to think on power and resistance in context of playful dance in everyday life in this article. I suggest going back to Baruch Spinoza in considering the power question in relation to dance. Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza’s ethics involves a ‘philosophical nomadism’ (Braidotti 2006: 146) and draws it as politics of resistance (Deleuze 1978, 1988). This theoretical framework will give me insights to rethinking the particular role that dance may enact in terms of politics of everyday life. Overall, I will offer to situate dance as a power that may create a joyful energy, therefore an ethically empowering option in Spinozian terms. The joy of dance may generate in us a power that operates as a force of life, and therefore that dance could enact as the power of acting.

Dance and Power

Conventionally we conceptualize and imagine ‘power’ through a framework that builds itself under the weight of negativity as an obstructive force or kind of hindering process. More clearly, we imagine a process in which we are being subjected to ‘power’ and precisely this is the moment in which we build the negative sense of power and this imagination derives from our habits of thinking through binary oppositions which in this case appears as the self is opposed to socio-political mechanisms (see Braidotti 2006). However, power is multiple and heterogeneous and poststructuralists bring this into question through generating power in its positive sense of ‘enabling’ as well as its negative sense of ‘hindering’ (Braidotti 2006: 85-86).

The analyzes on dance in relation to politics come from different perspectives, such as: a form of transgression or resistance (Jackson 1989, Hall and Jefferson 1993, McRobbie 1994, Redhead 1993, Reynolds 1998, Rietveld 1998, Gilbert and Pearson 2002, Wilson 2002); an infusive negotiator of power relations (Saldanha 2002, 2005, 2007); as a play that ‘eludes’ power (Thrift 1997) or; a possible generating force of a resistance to ‘micro power’ that operates within us (Malbon 1999). Overall, there is more emphasis on power as a hindering force that is external and imposed upon us or infused in us, in all these representations of dance in the literature. In that context power is seen as a force that needs to be escaped from or be opposed to or to resist against. Dance is best analyzed as the bringer of ‘escape’, however the potentials in it for generating power (of enabling kind) widely escapes from all of these imaginations.

For example, in an analysis of the party scene in Goa, dance and music are seen as forces that create a feeling of belonging to an “escapist, psychotropic nowhere” (Saldanha 2002: 59, 60). Dance is elaborated as a temporary illusion that has no use and, “it is precisely the potential for escape that can turn [...] into [...] a narcissistic revolution changing nothing to overall systems of domination” (Saldanha 2002: 59, 60). Since we are all a part of the world and continuously enact and therefore make it through our existence and becomings, we have an effect in making the world as process. Playing with the world through dance can not be reduced to a ‘narcissistic’ aspect only. Although narcissism may be involved in it, it is not the sum of it. Dance or party scene in Goa for example could be infused and located within the networks of power and exploitation (of cheap local labour) and re-establishing the relations of domination and racism in overall (Saldanha 2002, 2005, 2007). However, the more we (researchers

and social scientists) choose to see and emphasize 'systems of domination' only as the main determining character; indeed we are re-establishing and re-making them (even more strongly) through our writings. This is of course not to suggest that we should keep our eyes closed to them or simply ignore them, but to suggest a more detailed look to the event of dance from the middle of it⁵⁷ and maybe to see the spatio-temporal potentials of disruption or possibility of momentous freedom and the feature of change within the larger mess. The enjoyment of the dancing space maybe constructed 'on top of other people's suffering', as the cheap labor of cleaners (Saldanha 2002: 17), that is undeniable; however it does not reduce the significance of the emancipatory possibilities that may occur in there. Otherwise, we may be freezing and fixing things in the field of 'existing systems of domination' on and on and may end up in making 'moralistic judgments' in interpreting the world. There may be a moment in which the cleaner may join dance for example, or a dancer and a 'chai mama' (ibid) can share a moment in which they become united in a productive way through playful dance. Such a moment is indeed significant in terms of our relations to networks of power and how we enact the reality, the world making process and this possibility is what I am particularly interested in⁵⁸.

The world and its relations are complex and we are all a part of this complexity. Because we are all indeed parts and actors, we make this world and affect one another. In arguing this, I am situating my arguments in a 'baroque' way of understanding complexity (Kwa 2002). We are in need of enacting a 'baroque' complexity in social science by looking at minuscule mundane swarming instants, state of affairs and affects. More clearly, when someone steps on my feet on purpose in the dance floor or when another one wants to share her gum with me and takes it out of her mouth, these all matter, because: the ways in which these "epiphenomena of corporeal causal interactions" affect "the responses and actions of agents" (Patton 1997: 2). The change in a body's relations or its status during its encounter to other bodies and the body's subjection to a new account through this encounter, more clearly the 'incorporeal transformations' (Deleuze and Guattari 2004) that bodies continuously enact, matters. In that context enactment of social scientific research is one of the ways in which we enact realities and therefore how we describe and elaborate events matters in determining what kind of worlds that we are going to live in (Mol 1999, Law 2004). Baroque complexity draws on Leibniz and looks down to "mundane, crawling and swarming of matter" (Kwa 2002: 26):

⁵⁷ In terms of situatedness: I dance in the middle and enact a knowledge that derives from the affections of the experience of dance. I do not pretend that I "see everything from nowhere", rather I 'feel, see and hear some things when I dance in the middle', the former is actually not possible according to Donna Haraway and in doing so scientist are either irresponsible or in delusion (Haraway 1991a: 189 in Law 2004: 68). The irresponsibility derives from attempting to play the 'god-trick', whereas there is always somewhere where you see the world from and you need to accept and demonstrate it (ibid).

⁵⁸ This is about enacting a more uncertain, uncategorized, under-determined approach to the world by reflecting on dance in our daily lives and also in the theories of social science, it is not about universalizing dance as a single, strategy, if you do not enjoy the actual dancing you can still read it as a metaphor for playful flexibility.

Every bit of matter can be conceived as a garden full of plants or pond full of fish. But each branch of the plant, each drop of its bodily fluids, is also such a garden or such a pond (Leibniz 1986 in Kwa 2002: 26).

The unity of his (Leibniz's) "body is political in form"; it is a body of a "free republic of monads". Thus it is "the direction of looking" that matters (ibid):

First, historic baroque has a strong phenomenological realness, a sensuous materiality. Second this materiality is not locked within a simple individual, but flows in many directions, blurs the distinction between individual and environment (ibid).

Which means that whatever I do in here and you do over there affects and touches each other in many ways and from many directions. A smile we give to a stranger in the street, or a bad look matters for the making of the world in every moment passing. What we write, what we eat, how we interact, they all matter. There are possibilities of inventiveness in baroque, "the ability to produce lots of novel combinations out of a limited set of elements (ibid). However:

Individual monads are not linked at all, they don't even communicate. But they are connected in the sense that, in the material aspect, they affect each other. If one individual had not existed the whole universe would have been different (Kwa 2002: 26).

Therefore, we (things, wind, people, landscape, fashion and everything) are a part and apart of all that is around and affect each other in complex ways. Someone dancing here, another one joking there, you now are reading this article all these matter in affecting and making life and reality. It is all (life, word and reality) in a process and it may move in several ways and directions in each passing minute, through 'inventive abilities' internal to us and life within this kind of complexity. Therefore matters of everyday life and our ontological politics in living is the spatiality that we need to consider in looking at issues of power and resistance or thinking on how to change the world.

Joy and sadness

All that is frightening in ordinary life is turned into amusing or ludicrous monstrosities. Fear is the extreme expressing of narrow-minded and stupid seriousness, which is defeated by laughter. Complete liberty is possible only in the completely fearless world.

Mikhail Bakhtin (1984: 51)

Joy is an inextricable element in play which moves between frivolity and ecstasy (Huizinga 1980: 21). Spinoza thinks that we are 'spiritual automata' that are left to the chance of encounters (Deleuze 1978: 5). As spiritual automata we have a continuous

state of good or bad encounters that increase or diminish our power of acting and most of us live all our lives like this; left to the consequences of random encounters with ideas (Deleuze 1978: 4):

As such spiritual automata, within us there is the whole time of ideas which succeed one another, and in according with this succession of ideas, our power of acting or force of existing is increased or diminished in a continuous manner, on a continuous line, and this is what we call affectus, it's what we call existing. Affectus is thus the continuous variation of someone's force of existing, insofar as this variation is determined by the ideas that s/he has...it increases my power of acting or on the contrary diminishes it in relation to the idea that I had at the time, and it's not a question of comparison, it's a question of a kind of slide, a fall or rise in the power of acting (ibid: 5).

In here, 'affectus' refers to affect in English as determined by Deleuze and it is different to 'affectio', which he translates as 'affection'. The difference between them is that affect refers to 'continuous variation' as he determines above, whereas affection is the condition of a body when it is acted upon by another body (the condition of our body when it is subject to cigarette or a lover etc.). More clearly:

...it's a state of a body insofar as it is subject to the action of another body. What does this mean? "I feel the sun on me," or else "A ray of sunlight falls upon you"; it's an affection of your body. What is an affection of your body? Not the sun, but the action of the sun or the effect of the sun on you. In other words an effect, or the action that one body produces on another, once it's noted that Spinoza, on the basis of reasons from his Physics, does not believe in action at a distance, action always implies a contact, and is even a mixture of bodies. Affectio is a mixture of two bodies, one body which is said to act on another, and the other receives the trace of the first. Every mixture of bodies will be termed affection (ibid).

Spinoza formulates idea as a mode of thought that represents something, a representational mode of thought whereas an affect (affectus) is any mode of thought that does not represent anything, a pain, a love, a sorrow are non-representational (Deleuze 1978: 1). Every mode of thought that is non-representational is termed as affect in Spinoza and thus he concludes that the idea is primary to affect; "in order to love it's necessary to have an idea, however confused it may be, however indeterminate it may be, of what is loved" (ibid: 1-2). Ideas constantly chase and replace each other and we are a sort of 'spiritual automata' in which these ideas are affirmed. Deleuze calls this 'a regime of variation' which means that during the succession of two ideas, a perpetual variation operates in us, which determines our 'force of existing' or 'the power of acting' and this non-stop operating variation is "what it means to exist" (ibid: 3). In other words "there is a continuous variation in the form of an increase-diminution-increase-diminution of the power of acting or the force of existing of someone according to the ideas which s/he has" (ibid: 4). This passage in-between affects is determined by ideas (that constitutes them) (ibid). And there are two basic passions according to Spinoza which are 'joy' and 'sadness'. All other affects that operates in us derive from these

two passions of joy and sadness as a source (ibid). When we encounter things we get affected by joy or sadness and we do not usually recognize what happens, we just have an increase or decrease in our power of acting, more clearly we live the results of our encounters (as becoming weak or becoming powerful in acting) and we mostly do not realize or consider the reasons behind. Deleuze gives the following example for our existence in daily life and explains it as follows:

In the street I run into Pierre, for whom I feel hostility, I pass by and say hello to Pierre, or perhaps I am afraid of him, and then I suddenly see Paul who is very charming, and I say hello to Paul reassuredly and contentedly... When I pass from the idea of Pierre to the idea of Paul, I say that my power of acting is increased; when I pass from the idea of Paul to the idea of Pierre, I say that my power of acting is diminished. Which comes down to saying that when I see Pierre, I am affected with sadness; when I see Paul, I am affected with joy. And on this melodic line of continuous variation constituted by the affect, Spinoza will assign two poles: joy-sadness, which for him will be the fundamental passions. Sadness will be any passion whatsoever which involves a diminution of my power of acting, and joy will be any passion involving an increase in my power of acting..What is important is that you see how, according to Spinoza, we are fabricated as such spiritual automata. As such spiritual automata, within us there is the whole time of ideas which succeed one another, and in according with this succession of ideas, our power of acting or force of existing is increased or diminished in a continuous manner, on a continuous line, and this is what we call affectus, it's what we call existing (ibid: 4-5).

The dance floor is obviously a space in which these two main passions are in a continuous coexistence and are being transferred from person to person in a contingent manner. Let's assume, I find a little place to dance and I see two people there who start dancing and this affects me with joy, then someone comes and offers me her/his beer and right after that takes my space in return of this favour. I loose my space, I am affected by sadness and my dance diminishes, I change my space and so on. When I change my place, I indeed, enter into having an 'adequate idea' in Spinozian terms (ibid 14). We are affected with the consequences of our encounters, rather than their reasons and these are just 'inadequate ideas' (ibid). Spinoza argues that we need to develop levels of awareness and the first level of awareness is passing from 'inadequate ideas' to 'adequate ideas' by realising what gives us joy, and by organizing good encounters for ourselves we enter into the spatiality of ethics. Thinking through the example above, when my body is affected with this unpleasant⁵⁹ encounter, I perceive the affect of it on me rather than the reason or the content of this idea as a decrease in my power of acting. But if I realize that dance and music gives me joy and I stick with it, and look for some good encounters with the sounds that will combine with my ele-

⁵⁹ It is unpleasant for me because I indeed accepted the beer offer in order to be receptive, despite the fact that I don't enjoy beer in general (maybe I was expecting that later on this person will share dance with me). However it becomes apparent that indeed s/he was looking for a place to stand and this affects me with sadness.

ments in a good way and eventually increase my joy and power of acting. By doing this, I enter in the sphere of having an 'adequate idea' according to Spinoza:

You undergo a joy, you feel that this joy concerns you, that it concerns something important regarding your principal relations, your characteristic relations. Here then it must serve you as a springboard, you from the notion-idea: In what do the body which affects me and my own body agree? In what do the soul which affects me and my own soul agree, from the point of view of the composition of their relations, and no longer from the point of view of their chance encounters...You leave joyful passions, the increase in the power of acting; you make use of them to form common notions of a first type, the notion of what there was in common between the body which affected me with joy and my own body, you open up to a maximum your living common notions and you descend once again toward sadness, this time with common notions that you form in order to comprehend in what way such a body disagrees with your own, such a soul disagrees with your own. At this moment you can already say that you are within the adequate idea since, in effect, you have passed into the knowledge of causes. You can say that you are within philosophy (ibid: 14).

In this context, the 'adequate idea' for me would be (since I am affected with joy when I dance), is to run towards, dancing and combining my elements with the elements of music. In this 'partially located' and 'situated' case, dance might become a power of a different kind or of another order (Law 2004, Haraway 1991).

To dance could be to live and not submitting yourself to sadness. Dance could enact in us the power of acting, the joy, and make us able to laugh at ourselves and the world. However, dance enacts in heterogeneous forms too, only the joyful, playful, vital dance could be a force, a power of life. Space enacts as a sum of all our relations and connections and it is continuously being made, all the encounters create affects and contribute to making of the event and the space (Lefebvre 1991, Thrift 1996, Massey 2005). Those encounters could be friendly or antagonistic. However, some people may derive their joys from the sadness of others, but these are 'compensatory', 'indirect' joys, in Spinozian terms, they are the poisoned joys of hate (Deleuze 1978: 9). Instead of doing that we need to take a local point of joy for a departure and try to increase it by opening it up and putting our labour in it by organizing pleasant encounters for ourselves.

Dance space is not homogenous, there are contestations of affects in there and sadness and joy are encountered through the bodies of people, music and other effects. In those encounters via dance there may be a possibility of submission to sadness rather than joy by summing up the effects that make us feel weak and make us afraid. Passions of a different kind of joy and sadness, of love and hate enact a simultaneous coexistence and they are affirmed in us in multiplicity or plurality of ways in this space of encounter. This is where we come into play with others, and the 'Other'. This process is ultimately under construction; it is never closed or fixed for there are always further permutations of relations amongst the multiple players. So a space and the happenings in there is more about what we make of it, bodies are in a continuous world making process and they are open to all options within the limits of their own possibilities of conditions. Space and politics are inter-dependent shared imaginaries

founded on relations (see Lefebvre 1991, Thrift 1996, Massey 2005). Submission to sadness in that sense will decrease dance in us through decreasing our power of acting. There may always be killjoys in a dance space and they may affect us with sadness which in a way will contribute to their exercise of power (that hinders) on us, whereas the more we enact ethics and organize good encounters (with people, objects, music etc.) and enact a labour of movement in dance the more we are likely to be filled with joy and therefore become more powerful.

Conclusion: Dance is a power

Dance could enact as a form of play, as an undetermined creative force, it could enact by itself and for itself as a transformative force and a form of power that is of a different kind, as the power of acting. In that context identifying dance as 'elusive' (Thrift 1997) and the characterization of it as a resistance to 'micro power' (Malbon 1999) will avoid seeing the possibilities that may occur in dance as a transformative force. Indeed these identifications derive from a hierarchical understanding in which the 'real' world is more seriously 'real' than the 'reality' of playful dance and as long as we think in those terms, we enact this as the 'reality' in social science and life at general. Then, this is not about dance as externally engaged with transgression or escape. Rather, I suggest placing it elsewhere as a force of departure that has an effect of a different kind as well as another power that enacts elsewhere and that is equally important. This is about imagining another universe as a possibility and enacting the play of the world, in there we indeed can play with the killjoy effects.

Imagining is a way of enacting the world; therefore I argue that we need to enact a more positive imagination. We need to sum our joys rather than sadness and therefore increase them and this will be a way of enacting a better world within and out of us. Only then we may realize that stupid serious sadness is about fears and it may indeed disappear through enactment of joy in ourselves. In arguing this, Spinozian vocabulary gives a base, to see how power (or authority) needs sadness of people in order to enact, because when people are sad they are indeed weak (diminished in their power of acting) and therefore it is easier to control them (Deleuze 1978). Thus power needs the sadness of people in order to operate. If we increase our joy inside, we increase the joy of the world, and we do this through our writings, chats, arguments, dances, music, friendships and all our enactments in general, which all matter in creating affections, thus the mundane matters (Kwa 2002).

How we live (the reality that we enact) is about, how we imagine, dream and enact our stories. Cemtan, for example (a music and dance lover) is someone who has extended those imaginations and moments (of dance and joy) as his ontological politics in overall to his everyday life. He is Peter Pan from 'Neverland'. He was looking for ways in which to build a tree-house in central Istanbul to live in. He always has some interesting projects through which he performs and transforms the world and our lives in general. He started 'şuur 6 (subconscious) LimiSeD company' that takes action in the parks by inviting the young men of the neighbourhood (who usually play cards in coffee houses all day, attend football events or join nationalist movement party's youth clubs) to play drum and percussion circles. He was once on an acid trip and he encountered big trouble in the street, with five angry men. I don't know how it

started, but he really looks like 'Peter Pan', even his appearance can be a target to reflect upon the accumulated sadness of a group of men from a certain social economic political and cultural backgrounds (imagine some neo-Nazi's attacking a gay or a dark coloured person in a narrow street somewhere in England for example). In this event they beat him and then threw him in a big garbage container. He was lying in garbage with one arm and leg out, after sometime he hears a rhythm. He raises one arm and joins the rhythm and slowly pulls himself out of the container by holding to and following the rhythm. He starts dancing and marching towards the club or bar, enters inside and dances the pain. This is a good example how rhythm may pull us towards life. The way Cemtan perceives dance is as such:

CEMTAN: ...dance err it raptures from within you really, I mean something born from inside you...like joy...yeah you give birth to it and spread it to the universe...like err... the things that we do here...our movements, the words that we say, the music that you do, somehow, err... well when you move your arm like this, it goes, it expands around the world and when it expands it widens and spreads and gets even bigger in waves, for example you do like this in here, when it goes 100 km it becomes... buooooahh... a movement, a bigger one...so to say when you dance the energy that expands from your movement travels around the world...err...think of it in this way, you are sending a wonderful thing to the world...a beautiful energy and a power yes... err... how should I say, there are bad energies...yes you send your joyous power aside to the black hole energies, which again derive from people. I don't know why, but usually black hole energies derive from people, and you... yes you send a very big energy of joy against them, not against in fact, aside to them... It is all spontaneous...and it is pure...yeah you send a primarily spontaneous and a good and really beautiful energy...well to dance is, yes...it is to war...in that sense...to dance is to war... Because in all of these things, for example you dance in here and someone else dances in Africa, and another one dances in America, and all these dance séances that these people do...it has a network...you know what I mean...these energies they know, recognize each other and of course they like and sympathize each other...well man... the dance wave in there and the dance wave in here recognize and love each other in wave length/dimensionthat energy has its own network and they recognize each other...yeah it is Love...you got it?

Cemtan relates dance first to joy and then to power. Related to that he situates this 'beautiful energy' and 'power' not 'against', but 'aside' in relation to the dark forces of sadness. This is a critical distinction and a crucial moment. The way in which Cemtan visualizes and maps those affects of life and death as networks of joy and sadness in a simultaneous coexistence, gives me a key and it indeed illustrates my argument in establishing dance as a power to act. In that context, dance is not about eluding power it is about creating and becoming another power. And the first kind of power indeed feels threatened by the kind of power that dance generates, because it increases our power of acting and therefore the first kind can not operate in us.

When and if we are overfilled with joy we see how ridiculous is the conventional modes of ordering and how stupid seriousness can be. We may become elsewhere in another form that is no longer controllable and weak. This is possible by or is a matter of passing from 'inadequate ideas' to 'adequate ideas' (Deleuze 1978).

Spinoza assigns a fundamental political and ethical problem to power. He asks "how does it happen that people, who have power (pouvoir), in whatever domain, need to affect us in a sad way?" (Deleuze 1978: 4). When we feel weak, our power of acting diminishes and therefore we are potentially controllable. Sad passions are necessary for the exercise of power (ibid: 4-12). Thus, we need to increase our joy by all means. However, there is no golden standard we need to search and find what or which bodies combines well with our principal relations. This means that dance gives me joy, something else will give joy to you, what matters is to realize what it is that body that combines well with your elements and increases your power of acting. In doing that we need to be careful about the character of joy, it should not be a poisoned or mistaken one that derives from sadness, however that kind is 'compensatory' and 'indirect' (ibid: 9). When we are sure that it is not such a joy and it truly concerns us, we need to take this local point for departure and try to open it up by putting labour in it and increase it locally. It will no longer be a 'regime of variation', but rather a 'bell curve' and we need to apply it to sadness too by eliminating our common notions with 'bodies that disagrees with our own' (ibid: 14). This simply is about the labour of life, enacting vitality from within and therefore in world in general. Dance, here is a way in which I and possibly some others may enact as a source of joy, it can not be generalized to all, however it will be some other form of play for others. The last words I bring in-here will be from Cemtan again:

This is not about 'dancing' or 'not-dancing', as an actual situation and as two different conditions. Let me put it in this way, you also dance in your mother's grave, when you are burying her. There is indeed no difference between your dance in a party and in your mother's grave, but there is a bond. There are differences between 'here' and 'there', but what matters is the states of affairs. Being aware of the phenomena itself is an affair of 'being there'. Then every single breath that you take becomes a dance in that dimension that you do not perceive the phenomena of death as pain.

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Changing the system from the outside – an evaluative analysis of social movements opposing the 2007 G8 summit

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"Even a purely moral act that has no hope of any immediate and visible political effect can gradually and indirectly, over time, gain in political significance".

Vaclav Havel

This essay examines the large-scale social protests surrounding the 2007 G8 summit in Heiligendamm, Germany. Based on a discussion of social protests surrounding the 2007 G8 summit with respect to their goals and objectives and the exploration if and how they are related to public policy changes, it is argued that contextual factors surrounding social movements' intents to change public policy outweigh content-related issues on the activists' agendas. A document analysis of the summit and its environment leads to the following conclusions: (1) The government will evaluate how to deal with social protest depending on factors not directly related to social protest. (2) The logistics of the G8 summits are highly influenced by the anticipated protests. (3) Selective media coverage and the self-representation of assorted movements minimize the movements' struggles. (4) Organized social movements intend to increase the salience on issues that differ from the objectives of the G8 summit participants. (5) Violence by splinter groups justifies violent countermeasures by authorities against larger groups of

social protesters. (6) By using the ‘instantaneity of the internet’⁶⁰ as a platform, social movements can act as educators and address their issues and objectives in an in-depth manner and reach a virtually unlimited audience. (7) Contextual factors determine the extent to which social movements act.

Introduction

The 2007 G8⁶¹ summit in Heiligendamm, Germany once again brought social protest into the international spotlight. In fact, the social actions surrounding the meetings seemed to have received at least the same amount of attention as the actual meetings among the heads of state of the eight most powerful economic nations in the world. During a time which, most generally, is depicted as the ‘age of globalization’ the study of social movements needs to be revisited. Globalization as such has led to a myriad of campaigns opposing this phenomenon⁶². Many of these movements are made up of grassroots social activists engaged in a struggle against the political and economic elites. With this in mind the question arises as to which extent social movements can draw on social protest to achieve sustainable changes of public policy on the national and international level.

The impact of social movements is a widely studied issue. In very general terms the main arguments regarding the impact can be divided into two groups – the ones claiming that “social movements strongly influence public policy, and that they do not” (Burstein, 1999, p. 4). Within this debate I argue that contextual factors surrounding the intents of the social movements to change public policy outweigh content-related issues on the activists’ agendas. In other words, policy-makers and government authorities place emphasis on how to deal with the manifestation of social protest, i.e. the context/environment, as opposed to addressing the topics, i.e. the content/demands set forth by social movements aim to address. To support my argument, I discuss the social protests surrounding the 2007 G8 summit with respect to their goals and objectives and explore if and how they are related to public policy changes.

This article hopefully will stimulate further research and understanding regarding the dialogic interaction of social movements and public policy (makers). First I will review literature discussing the forms, tactics and impacts of social protest in relation to public policy. Then I will show how social protest specifically was applied at the 2007 G8 summit followed by a discussion of the results.

Social movements have been defined in numerous ways. Frequently, and for the purpose of this article, these movements are considered as grassroots movements. According to Tilly (1999, p. 257, italics in original) social movements consist of “a sustained challenge to power holders in the name of population (groups or individuals) living

⁶⁰ I refer to this notion as it previously has been discussed by Linstroth (2002).

⁶¹ G8 stands for “Group of Eight”, which is made up by the countries of France, United States, United Kingdom, Russia, Germany, Japan, Italy, and Canada.

⁶² I am using the term ‘globalization’ in a very loose way that often is used by the so-called anti-globalization movements targeting transnational organizations such as the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank.

under the jurisdiction of those power holders by means of repeated public displays of that population's worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment". For the purpose of this article I will use a slightly revised definition of social movements that has been developed by Goodwin and Jasper (2003). A social movement is a collective, organized, sustained, and non-institutional challenge to authorities/powerholders aiming at a change of public policy through the means of social protest. Social protest will be defined as an act or acts of "challenging, resisting, or making demands upon authorities, powerholders, and/or cultural beliefs and practices by some individual or group" (Goodwin & Jasper, 2003, p. 3). Public policy is defined as "political agreement on a course of action (or inaction) designed to resolve or mitigate problems on the political agenda – economic, social, environmental, and so on" (Fischer, 1995).

Social movements, social protest and public policy

A major reason for the emergence of social movements in democratic societies is the perceived failure of the implementation of public policies or the policies per se. I consider this as relative deprivation within the political realm. The theoretical notion of relative deprivation is defined as "actors' perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities" (Gurr, 1970, p. 24). Value expectations have to be understood as goods and necessities for living to that people believe they are justifiably entitled. In this case, these goods and necessities are public policies and/or services. Value capabilities are the values members believe they are capable of maintaining, both in the present and in the future. Value capabilities can be further subdivided into value positions, which have been attained or provided for by the government (present), and value potentials, which are the skills that society or governments will allow them to attain (future). Within this notion there are personal, societal, and political opportunities for achieving and/or maintaining desired value positions. Inherited and value-enhancing actions are considered as personal opportunities (e.g. admission to an Ivy League school through family connections). Societal opportunities are said to be found in the normal course of action (e.g. a strong economy providing employment security). Political opportunities are considered as political actions as a means for providing satisfaction (e.g. social protest against perceived injustices) (Gurr, 1970).

Social movements, as discussed in this article, act outside the political realm. In other words, they form no part of official political and administrative bodies in the executive, legislative or judiciary branches of states. There are virtually no limits to the types of actions they undertake in order to achieve their goals. Social movements are an important feature of the contemporary national and international political landscape. Scholars argue that there is a firm link between institutionalized politics and social movements (e.g. McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). The major activities of social movements with respect to public policy are: "(1) agenda-setting - identifying a problem of international concern and producing information; (2) developing solutions – creating norms or recommending policy change; (3) building networks and coalitions of allies; and (4) implementing solutions – employing tactics of persuasion and pressure to change practices and/or encourage compliance with norms" (Price, 2003, p. 584). According to Offe (1985) this notion implies that the actors in the movements do

not negotiate or compromise as it is done in the political arena. Instead, Offe (1985) argues that they apply tactics with sharp antinomies yes/no, them/us, now/never or victory/defeat. This is an oversimplified, merely theoretical argument. I maintain that a form of negotiation and compromising generally takes place when social movements emerge and act. While the open rhetoric and manifestation often contain the antinomies stated by Offe (1985), there is a constant negotiation taking place within the movements and between them and the political structures they address. These negotiations do not necessarily have to be direct if the mere interaction, often carried out through mass media, is considered as negotiation. It is my contention that the media coverage, regardless if the emphasis is placed on the movements' contents or actions, creates an environment of negotiation between the social movements and public policy makers as well as the broader public in general.

A myriad of transnational anti-globalization movements challenge neoliberal policies and institutions. The framing and understanding of the contemporary economic globalization process and with it associated policy making has led to collective action that needs to be given as much attention as the socio-economic process per se. It is argued that "the mobilization of beliefs and interpretations critical of neoliberal globalization had been central to the eruption of a protest movement that achieved global proportions by 2003" (Ayres, 2004, p. 27). Ayres (2004) provides an overview of contested interpretations of the globalization process. The actors in the anti-neoliberal protest movements are identified as civil society activists, national/transnational social movement organizations, independent media centers, and internet websites. The neoliberalism proponents are identified as states, multi-national corporations, currency speculators, financial media outlets and supra-national financial and trade bodies such as the IMF, World Bank and WTO. The protest movements' policy proposals include de-ratification and reform of existing treaties, debt relief, strengthening of state sovereignty, deglobalization, and return to a more local orientation. The proponents of neoliberalism propose policies of liberalized trade and investment, deregulation, tax cuts, privatization, and the reduction of public expenditures. Ayres' (2004) succeeds in creating a general picture. Its strength lies in the fact that the presentation and self-presentation of numerous anti-globalization movements is based on these or similar content-related categories. However, I argue that this approach needs to be elaborated by examining the variable 'social environment' within which both sides are embedded.

Regardless of the form or impact of social movements, one has to view the national, political, and social context of the respective protest actions to assess their implications. Rucht (1996) conceptualizes the impact of a social movement's structural context. Briefly stated, the conjunction of the political, social, and cultural context has structural implications with regard to the movement's themes. Within this context, the movements' structures, their strategies, and other internal factors lead to the protest activities. The outcome of these activities then can bring the process back to the conjunctural context with newly created opportunities or constraints. I maintain that Rucht's (1996) conceptualization is a useful analytical tool for the study of social movements within different contexts.

Social protest can be displayed in forms such as public meetings, demonstrations, marches, creation of special associations and commissions, mass media statements, pamphlets, petitions, posting or wearing of identifying symbols, the adoption of distinctive slogans, sit-ins, and/or the celebration of difference (Bernstein, 2003; Morris, 2003; Sharp, 1973; Tilly, 1999). According to Offe (1985) positive aspects of protest demands are framed in grammatically negative forms by using key words such as never, stop, freeze, ban, and end. Consequently, one might consider the mobilization of public attention as one of the main objectives of social protest in general.

It is argued that governmental concern about the mobilization potential of opposing groups (social movements) has grown during the last years (Cleave Jr., 1998; Linstroth, 2002). Modern communication technologies, especially the internet, have created an atmosphere surrounding social movements called the "Zapatista Effect", referring to the internet's ability in having brought the struggle of the Mexican Zapatista movement from the geographical and ideological margins to the center (Cleave Jr., 1998, p. 622). Contemporary social movements are faced with the concept of "instantaneity with the advent of the Internet" (Linstroth, 2002, p. 212). The internet has linked struggles "challenging dominant policy and ideology in ways that often bypass the nation state" (Cleave Jr., 1998, p. 637), thereby allowing the capacity for action sought by social movements to become more concrete (Cleave Jr., 1998). Furthermore, I argue that coordination of actions, exchange of ideas, and calls for solidarity, are additional factors which social movements draw from on a pragmatic level of social protest. The creative use of modern communication technologies, especially the internet, has broadened the spectrum for protesters.

The impacts of social movements on public policy can extend over a period of time, from winning a specific state policy decision to providing continuing leverage over a political process. In general it is argued that most social movements aim at benefits to flow to a constituency (Amenta & Young, 1999) in the forms of changed laws, policies, regulatory practices and administrative (Goodwin & Jasper, 2003). Social movements can create social change by changing the salience of the issue. Burstein (1999, p. 16) hypothesizes that "the greater the impact of interest organizations on an issue's salience to the public, the greater their (indirect) impact on legislative action, provided that there is a discrepancy between the public's preferences and public policy". Briefly stated, Burstein (1999) maintains that social movements potentially can change public policy if they are able to change public preference and issue salience, as legislators acting outside of their own self-interests in an electoral agenda will most likely act according to the wishes of the majority of their constituency.

Institutional change as a consequence of social protest has been examined by numerous scholars. According to Kriesi and Wisler (1999) frames of political institutions have been purposely designed to make it difficult to challenge and change them from the outside. However, the authors further assert that social movements can transform political institutions under certain conditions. First, there has to be a societal crisis, typically of economic character. Second, a master frame must exist that provides citizens with credible alternatives. Third, a movement's success depends on institutional

vulnerability. Fourth, a movement can create a momentum for change only if the established elites cannot maintain control over the masses (Kriesi & Wisler, 1999).

Burstein (1999) argues that social movements can influence public policy under the constraints of electoral competition and the limited ability of citizens and legislators to simultaneously deal with many issues. Burstein's (1999, p. 14) public preference hypothesis states that "the greater the impact of interest organizations [i.e. social movements] on the public's preferences on an issue currently framed or as reframed, the greater their (indirect) impact on legislative action". While this hypothesis seems appealing, Burstein (1999) admits that there is a lack of data to support this hypothesis. The author follows the assumption that public opinion often influences policy; however, the empirical link between social movements and their ability to frame public opinion still is rather weak.

Contemporary anti-globalization movements collectively act within international norms to restructure world politics, where they are "emerging as a powerful new force in international politics and are transforming global norms and practices" (Khagram, Riker, & Sikkink, 2002, p. 4). It can be further argued that these non-state actors have actively become parts of "de-facto global governance" (Khagram et al., 2002, p. 4). Edelman (2001, p. 311), for example, posits that "the new anticorporate activism ... employs an action repertoire that combines decidedly postmodern elements (informational politics, cyber-attacks, and 'swarming') with others that hark back to early nineteenth-century forms of direct action, albeit with global rather than local audiences". In this line, Meyer's (2003) dialogic model on the mutual influence of social protest and policy shows that policy processes are not only the sources of social protest mobilization but also the outcomes.

Social movements act as educators for populations through their protest actions. Public policy makers do not necessarily share information on certain topics with the public for a variety of reasons. For example, they can intentionally suppress information to maintain their self-interests or the interests of powerful groups. On the other hand, given the fact that policy makers often have to deal with a myriad of issues they will hardly ever have all the necessary information to make informed choices on certain issues (see also Burstein, 1999). The dissemination of information by a social movement thus potentially brings topics to the public agenda - topics that would have otherwise remained unknown (Grant, 2004). Consequently social movements potentially can inform and educate not only the public but also the policy makers.

The above review has shown that social movements act outside official political channels to challenge and/or change public policies and entire political, administrative and economic institutions. To convey their messages and achieve their goals the movements rely on a myriad of tactics. In order to explore if and how social protest is successful regarding the goals and contents and what the impact of the protest environments have in relation to the goals and content, I will now turn to an analysis of the social protests surrounding the 2007 G8 summit.

Clashing agendas at the 2007 G8 summit

The 2007 G8 summit in the German city of Heiligendamm followed an agenda set forth by the organizing government of Germany. The summit and the preceding time period were accompanied by numerous organized and unorganized violent and non-violent protests following an alternative summit agenda. According to the German government⁶³, the key foci of the 2007 summit were shaping globalization and aiding development in Africa. The summit's agenda included the two main topics of growth and responsibility in the global economy and growth and responsibility in Africa. Within this framework the focal areas with respect to the global economy were: (1) global imbalances and the agenda for global growth, (2) promotion and protection of innovation, (3) investment, (4) transparency of the international capital markets (Hedge Funds), (5) social shaping of globalization, (6) climate protection, (7) energy efficiency, and (8) raw materials. With respect to the focus on Africa the focal areas were: (1) good governance, (2) sustainable development, (3) peace and security, and (4) strengthening the health care system, fighting HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria (German Federal Government). Within these categories a myriad of issues were to be discussed by the summit participants. The focal areas do not bare any surprises. The global leading economic powers have discussed similar topics throughout the preceding G8 summits. For example, the focal areas of the 2006 G8 summit in St. Petersburg, Russia were global energy security, infectious diseases, and education. The main issues on the agenda at the 2005 G8 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland were climate change, Africa and development, global economy, oil and trade, regional issues and proliferation⁶⁴.

Protest organizers used existing alliances and the internet as an information platform for summit related protests. The following actions took place within the provided "choreography of resistance"⁶⁵. The organizers called for a march against precarization, caravans for refugee rights, bicycle caravans, regional actions against G8, occupation of "Bombodrom" (an area used by the German military which is supposed to be established as a air-ground bombing range for German, EU, and NATO forces), a demonstration in the city of Rostock, an anti-Nazi demonstration in the city of Schwerin, a concert "Move against the G8", a day of action on global agriculture (a rally with stops at supermarkets, laboratories for genetically modified animals and crops), a day of action on migration (with panel discussions on activities at refugee camps, deportation authorities, etc.), an action day for education, actions against militarism, war and torture, mass blockades of the access roads to the summit in Heiligendamm, marches to Heiligendamm, and an alternative summit.

⁶³ Information retrieved from <http://www.g8.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2007/03/Anlagen/2007-03-01-g8-schlaglichter-en.property=publicationFile.pdf>, July 7, 2007

⁶⁴ Information retrieved from <http://www.g8.gov.uk/> and <http://en.g8russia.ru/> , July 7, 2007

⁶⁵ Information retrieved from <http://de.indymedia.org/2007/05/175755.shtml>, <http://www.g8-2007.de>, <http://antig8.tk/>, <http://www.heiligendamm2007.de>, and <http://www.g8-alternative-summit.org/en/>, July 7, 2007.

Outcome of social protest at the G8

There is no doubt that the protest accompanying the 2007 G8 summit in Heiligendamm received extensive media coverage. However, coverage emphasized the violent nature of the protests and the clashes between police forces and protesters rather than the agenda set forth by the protest organizers. With this in mind one has to question whether the objectives of these organizers aimed at affecting the policy decision-making of the summit leaders were undermined or strengthened. The following part will provide the findings and practical and theoretical interpretations of my analysis of the 2007 G8 summit and the protests surrounding it.

The government will evaluate how to deal with social protest depending on factors not directly related to social protest. One must not assume that the government agents act in the best interest of the people. The state actors' self-interest outweighs the interest of protest, even if the concerns brought up are legitimate. The examined material reveals that policy-makers are more concerned with the manifestations of social protest than with the content of what the social movements addressed. For example the German chancellor Angela Merkel repeatedly emphasized that she was open for any type of nonviolent protest but would take a strong stand against violence. Even though these statements can be understood as obvious political rhetoric, this position was taken by government authorities. The social protests that have been analyzed for this study often have very clear but at the same time limited objectives in regard to potential satisfactory resolution through policy makers. As mentioned above, the addressed issues were for example agriculture, migration, education, militarism, war and torture. Regardless of the relevance of their claims, the protesters were not speaking the language of the policy-makers. Policy-makers are aware that the mere fact that they are meeting and discussing the issues on their agenda is strongly opposed by the anti-globalization movement. I argue that these movements are of no concern to policy-makers as long as the general public-opinion, i.e. the policy-makers constituency, does not shift. Thus the "danger" for policy-makers stemming from the anti-globalization movement is the conscientization of the larger, silent public. In other words, the conditions for social change (see discussion of Kriesi and Wisler, 1999) were not in place.

The logistics of the G8 summits are highly influenced by the anticipated protests. After extremely violent clashes at the summit in Genoa 2001 leading to the death of a protester, the meetings have been held in rather isolated rural areas. The demonstrations have drawn attention away from issues on the agenda. Weeks before the summit, mass media was more focused on the preparation by police authorities and the construction of a security fence isolating the entire city of Heiligendamm rather than on the issues to be discussed by the G8 members. The summit itself took place out of public view only allowing the media to cover the summit in a controlled environment.

Selective media coverage and the self-representation of assorted movements minimize the movements' struggles. A German government official was quoted: "I don't think they [the protesters] had any influence at all on the summit. They only influenced the media coverage" (Kirschbaum, 2007). A content analysis of media coverage during the

G8 summit shows that the focus indeed was partly taken away from the summit's objectives. However, the focal areas of the organized social movements were lost as well. Headlines such as *Protesters fight police, block roads to G8 summit*, *Protesters attack police after Rostock anti-G8 demo*, or *Germany warns of left-wing terrorism at G8 summit* outweighed the content-related issues of the G8 participants and their protesting counterparts⁶⁶. The analysis of the organizers' websites revealed that numerous activities indeed had strong content-related messages of social concern. Panel-discussions and informative events of social/public concern were held but not given the necessary public attention. The examination suggests that the forms and objectives of social protest at the G8 summit did not strongly reflect the underlying issues that the protesters wished to address.

Organized social movements intend to increase the salience on issues that differ from the objectives of the G8 summit participants. The issues set forth by the organizers touched upon contents of the G8 summit. However, the call for mobilization was framed rather negatively by keywords such as *against*, *stop*, *anti*, *fight*, or *no* (see earlier discussion of Offe, 1985). I maintain that such negative media coverage contributes toward depicting these social movements in a negative light, thus associating them with anarchistic, destructive movements with no interests in the advancement of constructive dialogue with policy makers. The negative frame distracted from the issues that also differed from the ones discussed by the summit participants. Thus again I argue that the demonstrators did not speak the language of the summit participants.

Violence by splinter groups justifies violent countermeasures by authorities against larger groups of social protesters. As the discussion has revealed, numerous social movements created platforms to create nonviolent social actions throughout the G8 summit. Self-declared anarchistic groups disrupted protest events and engaged in violent clashes with the police. As it has already been discussed, these clashes detracted from the true objectives of the organized nonviolent demonstrations. Furthermore, police authorities used the violent encounters to gain control over the violent groups and the entire protest surroundings. Protest organizers strongly condemned the violent clashes between "police and a hardcore group of militants" (Armitage, 2007). I maintain that the differentiation between nonviolent protesters and the violent groups shrunk in the public perception, and along with it, the moral legitimacy of the organized nonviolent social movements. The violence surrounding demonstrations against the G8 will de-legitimize any attempts to raise awareness on issues of global concern that social movements intend to bring to the public through their protests.

By using the 'instantaneity of the internet' as a platform, social movements can act as educators and address their issues and objectives in an in-depth manner and reach a virtually unlimited audiences⁶⁷. The anti-globalization movements are linked through websites, web-blogs, and email communication. Large unrelated groups can be mobil-

⁶⁶ The media analysis took place by examining the reports by the international news agency Reuters which were re-printed in national and international news media. The archives can be found at <http://www.reuters.com>.

ized for joint protest actions. The process of conscientization of the public can be taken to more profound levels by providing in-depth information on the movements' objectives with regard to public policy. Through the internet, social movements can create an alternative 'news' outlet not covered by the dominant media. According to Sharp (cited in Ameglio, 2006, n.p.), "a basic principle that the logic of nonviolent action entails is that of political judo and jujitsu". This principle implies that "the adversary's apparent force and errors are used against him, which demands a public construction and in the medias of some epistemic ruptures in people (and if possible in authority)" (Ameglio, 2006, n.p.). The news media depicted the demonstrations and social movements surrounding the G8 summit in a rather negative light. While the movements' organizers do not have equal access to the mass media platform, they can use the internet as an alternative news outlet to construct a discourse using the force of the media against their adversaries, the G8 leaders. The 'instantaneity of the internet' allows social movements to contest moves by the media or government authorities that would have remained undiscovered during earlier times.

Contextual factors determine the extent to which social movements act. In general, the environment surrounding social movements has to be taken into consideration, i.e. no social protest takes place in a political vacuum. The discussed displays of social protest in Germany took place within a protest-friendly environment, as has been shown by the official acceptance of nonviolent protest constantly reiterated by German Chancellor Merkel. Protesters following a creative nonviolent agenda did not have to fear persecution from state authorities. In contrast, social protest challenging the recent election results of the 2008 Presidential elections in Kenya and Zimbabwe took place in threat-laden, violent environments, where manifestation of discontent was dealt with through oppressive manners. I follow Goodwin and Jasper's (2003) contention that the uses of tactics in social protest are structurally determined by the resources, threats, opportunities and daily lives of the social activists. Factors such as timing, location, participants, and resonance have to be taken into consideration when trying to examine the outcome (Moore, 1999). I am arguing from a social contextualist perspective set forth by Goodwin and Jasper (2003, p. 222) that "protestors in different societies face different political structures within which they must operate ...". Nevertheless, I maintain that the repertoire of action of social movements has many similarities even though the struggles might be completely disconnected.

Conclusion

The paper has shown that governments will evaluate how to deal with social protest depending on factors not directly related to social protest. The G8 summit's logistics were largely determined by the anticipated social protest. Throughout the meetings the media coverage minimized the movements' struggles on a content-basis. The viol-

⁶⁷ It must be noted that not all social movements have the financial and technical resources to draw from these newly existing information outlets. I am not implying that social movements who cannot make use of the internet cannot spread their information, and create networks or act as educators for the public.

ent splinter groups had a negative impact on the organized nonviolent movements, since the focus was taken away from the content related issues. Nevertheless, social movements use the internet as an instrument for practicing “political judo” by allowing them on a pragmatic level to organize their actions and on a content-level to create an alternative news outlet. In general, the German social context was supportive of social action. Any study of social movements needs to carefully examine contextual factors.

The findings of this study certainly do not mark the end of the road. The empirical data is based on ongoing processes, thus the long-term outcomes are unknown. However, I maintain that every finding as such deserves follow-up research and a more profound analysis with which the assertions can be tested for accuracy. The protest surrounding the 2007 G8 summit can be seen as an opening for elaborative studies on the dialectical relationship between social movements and public policy. One might seek the connection between the literature review that extensively deals with nonviolent social protest and the discussion of the protest surrounding the 2007 G8 summit. Briefly stated, I argue that it is crucial for social movements to create salience of issues through strictly nonviolent action. It is essential for movements to act reflectively and organize themselves guided by the philosophy of nonviolent action. Moral authority and legitimacy can be reached within the larger public audience which then can lead policy makers to consider the claims the social movements share in their protest actions.

If one follows the position that “the rise of the protest movement against neoliberal globalization represents one of the most significant illustrations of social conflict and contentious political behavior of the past several decades” (Ayres, 2004, p. 11), then it becomes clear that social movements need to be studied in the same way as their political counterparts have been studied – as actors in shaping the social and political landscape of any given society.

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Multinational Corporations and Human Rights Abuses: A case study of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People and Ijaw Youth Council of Nigeria

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The paper examines the increasing connections between oil extraction and human rights violation in the Niger Delta of Nigeria especially with the transition to democracy which began in 1999. The transition to democracy in 1999 inadvertently unleashed centrifugal pressures on the Nigerian state as exemplified, for example, in the exacerbation of the struggle over the sharing of oil revenues between the oil-producing states and the central government. The Niger Delta has witnessed violent confrontations between the oil-bearing communities and the Nigerian state and between these communities and multinational corporations (MNCs) with attendant gross violation of human rights in the region. Suffice it to say that the attention of the international community has been drawn to the human rights situation in the region (partly)

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through the activities of social movements. In fact, the formation of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) and the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) in the 1990s marked a watershed in the internationalization of the Niger Delta crisis as well as addressing human rights violations in the region. Within this milieu, the fundamental question is the extent to which democracy (civilian regime) has changed anything for the people of the Niger Delta.

Introduction

The Niger Delta, one of the world's largest wetlands, is one of the most richly endowed on the continent with abundance biodiversity with large proportions of Nigeria's oil reserves. The area is the main oil-producing region in the country thus generating more than 80% of national revenue. At the same time, the Niger Delta has been an enclave of youth militancy and unmitigated violence on a large scale. It has been more conflict-prone than any other region in Nigeria. The region has been the epicentre of conflicts between oil bearing/host communities and oil companies (mainly over land rights or compensation for ecological damage); between oil producing communities and the government (over increased access to oil wealth); and between and among ethnic groups (over claims to land ownership and sharing of amenities).

The long-standing Niger-Delta crisis has led to serious consequences, including the loss of lives, wanton destruction of property, and disruption of oil activities. The Nigerian state is seemingly overwhelmed by the complexity of this quagmire in spite of successive governments' efforts to address the structural dynamics that underpin the region's problematique. And the democratic opening (since 1999) seems to have provided an outlet for increased militancy by the youth of the region thus posing an immense challenge to national stability.

This paper highlights the causes of the perennial violence in the Niger Delta, as it is one of the main reasons that informed the upsurge of social movements in the region in the 1990s. The paper also assesses the activities of MOSOP and IYC in challenging the state and oil multinationals (especially Shell) on the issue of human rights violations in the region. In this regard, the paper highlights how the activities of these social movements have internationalised the human rights situation in the Niger Delta.

Theoretical framework

Scholars have proposed several theories to explain the occurrence of conflict, especially resource-based conflict. Some of these theories explain the bases of conflict, the motivations of belligerences and the dynamics of conflict. To properly understand the Niger Delta conflict and the gross violation of human rights, this paper situates itself within the framework of the Frustration-Aggression theory. This theory posits that frustration increases the likelihood of aggression, akin to what the people of the Niger Delta have exhibited over four decades against the state and the major oil multinationals operating in the region. According to the Frustration-Aggression theory, all aggres-

sion has its origin/ root causes in the frustration of one or more actors as a result of another actor's achievement of a goal. Therefore conflict is as a result of the lack of fulfilment of an individual's or group's objectives and the frustration that this breeds. Generally, human needs have always been insatiable and the failure to meet all these demands informs series of conflicts between political actors.⁷⁰

Over the years, oil-bearing communities in the Niger Delta have had to endure neglect by the government and the negative effects of environmental practices by multinationals. The attempts by these communities to ensure greater control of their resources have yielded little results, resulting in the quest for the restructuring of Nigeria's federal system, especially the fiscal aspects of the system. Furthermore, local communities have deemed the performance of multinationals in the area of corporate social responsibility as less than satisfactory, leading to environmental activism which often assumes violent dimensions. The failure of both the state and the multinationals to meet the expectations of the people of the Niger Delta has bred frustration and aggression in the region as illustrated by the forms of violence ranging from hostage taking and attack on oil facilities to conflict between ethnic militants and government forces.

Hence, the Frustration-Aggression theory vividly illustrates why the ethnic militias in the Niger Delta have resorted to violence as a form of response to the state of affairs in the region. It is not uncommon for activists, leaders and ethnic militias in the region to predicate the violent behaviour associated with the politics of the Niger Delta on (pent-up) frustration induced by the policies of the state and those of oil multinationals. The people of the region have been disgruntled by what they perceive as the deliberate policies of marginalization, alienation, environmental degradation on the part of the state and the oil multinationals. Indeed, it is plausible to locate the Niger Delta crisis, especially the recent upsurge in violent behaviour by militants, within the context of the frustration arising from unfulfilled expectations.

Oil Multinationals in the Niger Delta

As Robert Gilpin has commented, no aspect of international political economy has generated more controversy than the global expansion of multinational corporations since the end of the Second World War.⁷¹ This is so because the impact of their activities on host states is interpreted differently and in most cases their operations in developing countries are linked to the perennial crisis of underdevelopment. While some view MNCs as "boon to mankind... diffusing technology and economic growth to developing countries, and interlocking national economies into an expanding and beneficial interdependence"⁷² others view them negatively for they do not always engage in

⁷⁰ Barker, Dembo and Lewin, *Frustration and Aggression: An experiment with Young Children*, University of Iowa Studies in Child Welfare, Vol.18, No.1, 1941.

⁷¹ R. Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, Princeton University Press, USA, 1987, p. 231.

⁷² R. Gilpin, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

best practices in their areas of operations as the case of the Niger Delta shows. Notwithstanding these divergent views of MNCs in less developed countries (LDCs), it is quite clear that LDCs have actually welcomed the idea of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) partly as an extension of the commitment to liberalisation and partly because they see in such investment by foreign MNCs the hope of achieving the modernization and economic growth of their countries. In short, in the initial post-independence years, the enthusiasm of the leaders of most LDCs was basically oriented towards the interest of the western world. Many LDCs at independence endorsed the idea of FDI as integral to the actualisation of their development aspirations.

Nigeria was not an exception in this regard, as the head of government in Nigeria at independence extended an open invitation for economic relations to firms of the colonial overlords. He said: "I sometimes doubt whether your business men here in England are fully alive to the extent of possibilities available to them in Nigeria and whether they would take full advantage of the potential enormous market waiting to be overtaken by other more enterprising of the western world."⁷³ Without much hesitation foreign investors responded in order to gain, extend or protect their access to Nigeria's market.

However, the involvement of oil multinationals in the Nigerian economy predates the country's independence. The granting of mineral oil concession to the Shell-d'Arcy Petroleum Development Company by the colonial government in 1938 marked the origin of MNCs' operations in the country. The discovery of oil in commercial quantities by this company kindled the interests of other oil companies in the late 1950s including Mobil Exploration Nigeria Limited, an affiliate of the American Socony-Mobil Oil Company. Other MNCs were to join with the independence of the country in 1960. These included Tennessee Nigeria Inc. (1960), an affiliate of the American Tennessee Gas Transmission; Nigerian Gulf Oil Company (1962), an affiliate of American Gulf Oil Company; and Nigerian AGIP Oil Company (1962), an affiliate of the Italian government-owned ENI.⁷⁴

The Nigerian oil industry is dominated by the major oil multinationals operating a joint venture with the state through the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). These multinational companies are Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), Chevron Nigeria Limited (CNL), Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited (MPNU), Nigerian Agip Oil Company Limited (NAOC), Elf Petroleum Nigeria Limited (EPNL), and Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company of Nigeria Unlimited (TOPCON). Apart from these oil companies that operate joint ventures with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) there are others that also operate in Nigeria's oil industry. These include Pan Ocean Oil, British Gas, Tenneco, Deminex, Sun Oil, Total and Statoil, all of which operate alongside numerous other local firms.⁷⁵ It is pertinent to state that the joint venture between the six oil multinationals and the Federal

⁷³ This position was expressed by the first Prime Minister of Nigeria, Sir Tafawa Balewa on his state visit to the United Kingdom. Apart from him other subsequent governments have adopted series of policies that sought to encourage foreign investors to do business in the country.

⁷⁴ L. H. Schatzl 'Petroleum in Nigeria', NISER, Nigeria, 1969, pp. 3-4.

Government operates under a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which stipulates that “the operating company in a joint venture receives a fixed sum per barrel provided the price of oil per barrel remains within certain margins.”⁷⁶ This arrangement illustrates the partnership between the state and oil multinationals in Nigeria.

Having said that, it is instructive to clarify the generally inaccurate perception about the oil industry in Nigeria. It is assumed that the oil industry is a single industry with exclusive focus on the extraction of oil. However, this notion is wrong, as the industry is made up of many sub-sectors. According to Popoola, “the more important of the industries are exploration and production, transportation, processing, marketing and distribution”⁷⁷ but for the purpose of this research emphasis will be placed on exploration and production because of its impact on the host communities of the Niger Delta and secondly, it impacts so much on the subject matter of this paper. Given this background, the operations of the oil companies have generated harmful consequences in the form of environmental degradation and pollution which in turn, have resulted in militant resistance from the host communities. But it is noteworthy that such grievance has been induced not only by the activities of multinationals but also by the perceived deficits in Nigeria’s federal arrangement and government policy. For example, legislation has stripped the local people of the necessary benefits they would have derived from these oil companies in the event of environmental damage emanating from oil production. A case in point is the Land Use Act of 1978 which vests ownership and control of all land in the government. Hence, local communities cannot claim to have any vested interest in the use and the consequences of the use of their land. As a result of this legislation, oil companies usually deflect the responsibility for the environment to the government. The government in turn, more often than not, passes this responsibility to the multinationals, as it argues that this duty constitutes part of the social responsibility profile of MNCs. In any case, this buck-passing does not address the concerns of the oil-bearing communities regarding environmental governance, leading to activism and militancy on the part of the people of the region.

According to Frynas, there are indications to suggest that there was a sort of cooperative relationship between the oil companies and the local people before the upsurge of violent struggles in the area. Frynas further asserts that this new twist in the relationship between the local communities and MNCs might not be unconnected with the issue of “compulsory land acquisition and subsequent low compensation payments”⁷⁸ as clearly demonstrated in the court case between *Nzekwu v. Attorney-General East-Central State*:

The Ogbo family sued the government over the compulsory acquisition of 397 Acres of their land near Onitsha in the then Eastern Region of Nigeria. From the beginning the family had cooperated

⁷⁵ This information was gathered during field work in the Niger Delta in 2002. Also see Human Rights Watch, www.hrw.org, for further details.

⁷⁶ Human Rights Watch, *op. cit.*

⁷⁷ A. O. Popoola, *op. cit.*

⁷⁸ J. D. Frynas, “Corporate and state responses to anti-oil protests in the Niger Delta”, *African Affairs* (2001), 100, pp. 27-54.

*with the oil companies. In 1957, they leased 3.2 acres of land to Total Oil for ninety-nine years at a rent of 945 pounds per annum. In the same year, they let out land to Shell-BP for a ferry ramp at a rent of 200 pounds.*⁷⁹

Given this agreement between the family and the oil companies, the Nigerian government in 1960 indicated its intention to acquire about 800 acres of land in that area including the 397 acres at 10 pounds per annum for twenty years. The government's offer was considerably lower than what the oil companies initially offered the family. This was the basis of the court case and the Supreme Court awarded the family the sum of 252,600 pounds for the land and houses thereon.⁸⁰ Therefore this case pointed out how government intervention was partly responsible for the breakdown of peaceful relationship between the oil companies and the local people of the area. Government intervention in oil production through the NNPC and the disempowerment of the local communities through environmental legislation meant that the oil companies have had to deal directly with the government. More importantly, the oil multinationals are guided by primarily by the logic of profit maximisation; the needs of the communities are not exactly on the priority list. These companies are also accountable to their headquarters in Europe and America and not the Nigerian state. This scenario undermines the ability of the people to make demands on MNCs operating in the region, especially in effecting policy and attitudinal changes that are deemed harmful to the environment.

That said, MNCs' involvement in the Niger Delta portrays a somewhat ambivalent character. With the eruption of persistent violence that translates to the disruption of oil production, these companies have had to support state repression. On the other hand, MNCs have been involved in community development programmes and projects in the realm of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to launder their image. In either case, MNCs' motivations have been to maintain their production levels in the region. Nevertheless, the companies' involvement in CSR is not simple and clear-cut as it seems. As Davies notes, "[g]iven the Federal Government's position on oil and other minerals, the oil companies have in most cases agreed that it is the responsibility of the state to meet the demands of the local people in view of their agreements in regard to oil production."⁸¹ Although MNCs undertake initiatives that ostensibly seek to facilitate the development of their areas of operations, Davies contends that "all the oil companies are deeply and structurally connected to the repressive apparatus of the state."⁸² All oil companies are required to pay the salaries and expenses of a special armed and uniformed national police force tasked with guarding oil industry facilities. These are not company security guards but national security forces answerable to the Nigerian government. In addition, after years of public denials, Shell was finally

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Strategies for Transnational Civil Society Business: Target or Partner in Promoting Positive Economic Political Change Presented by Jennifer Davis, Africa Fund, Director at the Council on Foreign Relations Conference on Nigeria, January 30, 1998.

⁸² Ibid.

forced to admit that it had purchased thousands of guns and millions of rounds of ammunition for its police contingent, known among the people as the "Shell Police". The company's "Mobile Police Force (MPF)" is equally well known in the region.⁸³ The apparent culpability of the MNCs in the operation of these forces shows the oil companies' 'structural connection to the repressive apparatus of the state'.

A sore point in MNCs' operations in the Niger Delta has been (debate over) the responsibility for the development of the region. Some analysts believe that the responsibility to develop the Niger Delta rests with the Federal Government. For example, the former British High Commissioner to Nigeria, Sir Graham Burton once argued that the Federal Government, rather than multinational oil companies, was responsible for the marginalization of Niger Delta and its people. In this regard, he implored the Nigerian government to live up to its responsibilities towards the people of the region the government receives the bulk of its earnings from oil business, even as the government earns more than the oil companies with which it has joint venture agreements.⁸⁴ He further substantiated this position by pointing out that "Shell Petroleum Development Company – the ubiquitous whipping outfit for Niger Delta crisis – for instance, earned only 75 cents per barrel of oil when the price was \$20, against \$15.37 being credited to Government through the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)."⁸⁵ On the basis of such arguments, some advocate greater commitment on the part of the government towards resolving the crisis in the Niger Delta.

On the other hand, not a few people in the Niger Delta believe that it is the responsibility of the oil companies to protect the environment where they operate and that they should demonstrate their commitment to the people of the region as much as the government is expected to do. Those who subscribe to the view predicate their argument on the negative effects of oil exploration on the communities. For instance, one of the impacts of oil production on the people of the region is the devastating effect of oil spillage, and in most cases, these companies do not live up to their responsibilities to the environment and to the people. It is on record that the communities affected by oil spillage have witnessed much of violent resistance in recent times. This is the case in the Ijaw and Ogoni communities:

*Rivers state of Nigeria which is most affected by incidences of oil spillages has in recent times recorded the highest number of agitation for the equitable distribution of oil wealth and demands for self determination, as witnessed with the activities of the Ogoni movement.*⁸⁶

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ The Guardian, 17 November 1999. Some oil-bearing communities and staff of non-governmental organisations expressed similar sentiments during field work in the Ijaw and Ogoni communities in the Niger Delta.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ O. Agbu, "Oil and the National Question in Nigeria: the External Dimensions", Nigerian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 26, No. 1, 2000, pp. 105-106.

It goes without saying that the spectre of violent resistance does not bode well for the oil companies as it disrupts their operations. On the basis of this, it is argued that the oil companies have to implement measures in reducing the negative impact of oil spillage on the people. And:

*[g]iven the overwhelming role of oil in the Nigerian national economy, the policies and practices of the oil companies are important factors in the decision making of the Nigerian government. Because the oil companies are operating joint ventures with the government they have constant opportunities to influence government policy...*⁸⁷

In view of the above, multinational oil companies are expected to contribute to the socio-economic development of their host communities. The former British High Commissioner to Nigeria, quoted earlier, opined that “multinational companies certainly have a developmental role within the community.” He was however quick to add that “other partners too must face up to their responsibilities.”⁸⁸ Certainly, the debate about the level of the culpability of government and MNCs in the Niger Delta crisis, as well as their contributions to solving the region’s problems, will remain a subject of intense debate in Nigeria’s oil industry.

A recurring issue in the debate about the operations of the oil multinationals in the Nigerian state and the Niger Delta in particular is the question of the degree of collusion between these companies and the domestic power brokers. Such collusion is not restricted to the local elite who might perceive and/or receive some benefits in colluding with foreign oil companies but it lies more especially with the successive governments that have been accused of encouraging the penetration of Nigeria by foreign capital and failing to compel MNCs to comply with environmental laws. The double standard on the part of oil companies (in terms of non-adherence to ethics of business in Nigeria but compliance elsewhere) is cited to buttress the argument that there is some form of collusion between the government and MNCs. For example, it is argued that the operations of Shell elsewhere ensure that it does not degrade the environment but it does not take such precautions in Nigeria. The following observation is therefore apposite here:

*[With regard to] Shell’s pipeline from Stanlow in Cheshire to Moss Moran in Scotland, 17 different environmental surveys were commissioned before a single turf was cut ... A detailed Environmental Assessment impact covered every measure of the (pipeline) route ... Elaborate measures were taken to avoid lasting disfiguring and the route was diverted in several places to accommodate environmental concerns... [but] the Ogoni have never seen, let alone been consulted over, an environmental impact assessment.*⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Human Rights Watch on Nigeria Niger Delta

⁸⁸ The Guardian (Lagos) 17 November 1999.

⁸⁹ TED Cases, Ogoni Vs the Nigerian government.

Notwithstanding the agreement between the oil multinationals and the Nigerian state over the provision of necessary infrastructural facilities it is the duty of the oil companies to exhibit corporate responsibility towards their host communities. This will enhance their operations and promote a peaceful relationship in the course of their operations in these areas. It is to this concept that is so integral to resolving the Niger Delta crisis that this paper now turns attention.

Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from the Niger Delta

Although there is no universally or generally acceptable definition of the concept of corporate social responsibility, it enjoys wide acceptability in international economic relations. Simply defined, CSR implies the demonstration of certain responsible behaviour on the part of governments and the business sector towards society and the environment. The importance of this concept has made international institutions to support the idea. As Natufe notes

Three important international institutions have underlined the need for governments and companies to adhere to the principles of corporate social responsibility. These are the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes (DJSI).⁹⁰

The concept has been promoted through the initiatives of two international organizations as a measure of drawing global attention to the necessity by governments and business to demonstrate a degree of responsibility toward society. (The Business Council for Sustainable Development (BCSD) and the World Industry Council for the Environment (WICE) later formed WBCSD (which comprises about 140 international companies) in 1995, as a driving force behind CSR globally). The WBCSD defines CSR “as the continuing commitment by business to behave ethically and contribute to economic development while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their families as well as of the local community and society at large.”⁹¹ WBCSD’s definition of CSR focuses essentially on major issues such as human rights, employee rights, environmental protection, community development, supplier relations, and monitoring.⁹² It is possible to determine the extent to which companies exhibit CSR in their areas of operations by evaluating their performance vis-à-vis these major issues.

This paper uses Shell as a case study to assess the extent to which its activities reflect CSR. It is worthy of note that of all the oil companies operating in Nigeria, Shell is the only oil company with WBCSD membership. Furthermore, the company’s former Chief Executive in Nigeria (1991-1994) and Managing Director of Royal Dutch/Shell Group, Mr. Phil Watts, is an executive member of the WBCSD and co-chair of the Working Group that produced the Corporate Social Responsibility Report for the

⁹⁰ O. I. Natufe, op. cit.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

WBCSD.⁹³ Therefore, these factors should put the company in good stead to implement CSR in its host communities in the Niger Delta.

Despite the fact that Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) is a prominent member of WBCSD and given the environmental guidelines established by the Nigerian State through Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) and the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA), the company has witnessed more protests than other oil companies that operate in the region. This might not be unconnected with the inability of the Nigerian government to implement the environmental laws as they are established. It is also interesting to note that the Nigerian environmental regulations and standards through DPR and FEPA compare favourably with those of advanced western countries such as Canada and the United States but the issues of implementation as mentioned above remains a challenge. Given this limitation, the oil companies have not always addressed in a satisfactory manner the impact of oil production on the environment and the local people. And in some cases these companies find it convenient to claim sabotage as the cause of oil spills even if available evidence suggests something contrary to the companies' claims:

Shell admitted that there were 815 oil spills between 1997 and 1999, out of which 170, an alarming 20.85%, were caused by its corrosive pipelines. It should be stressed that, Shell did not include the volume spilled at Ekakprmre, Delta State, in its calculation of the 1999 volume. It blamed that oil spill on "sabotage", just as it has always done in cases of massive oil spills caused by its corrosive pipelines.⁹⁴

The charge of sabotage comes in handy for oil companies as it potentially exonerates them from blame and frees them from the responsibility to lean up the environment. It is instructive to note that MNCs and local communities are almost always embroiled heated debate over the cause(s) of oil spills and the responsibility for the clean up process.

The table below shows Shell's oil spills between 1997 and 1999 and their causes thereof:

Table: Shell's oil spills

Year	Number of Spills	Volume (in barrels)	Caused by Corrosion	Volume
1997	254	76,000 barrels	63	11.533
1998	242	50.200	59	21.548
1999	319	23.377	48	NA

⁹³ O. I Natufe, op. cit.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

The many cases of oil spills resulting from corroded pipelines illustrate negligence on the part of both the Nigerian state and the oil companies. Such negligence is to the detriment of the local people of the region. Therefore, the policies of oil multinationals in the Niger Delta have been a major source of prevailing violence in the region.

Generally, transnational oil companies have shown rhetorical commitment to the Niger Delta, as they have at different times restated/defended their “commitment” to the Niger Delta and the principle of “corporate/social responsibility.” The former Managing Director of Chevron Texaco Nigeria Limited, Mr. Jay Pryor, once said that the company was committed to corporate responsibility in the country, noting that the multinational had a set of values guiding its operations. He explained that “the events of the past 25 years including political democratization in many countries, economic liberalization and information technology revolution, have changed people’s perception about the roles of business.”⁹⁵ He listed the expected roles of business as: sustenance of the business enterprise; and sustenance of people and the society and sustenance of the environment.

Pryor also stressed that “the six pillars of corporate responsibility are:

- business ethics
- employee welfare
- local business development
- community engagement
- human rights and safety and environmental stewardship.”⁹⁶

What is clear from the above is that issues of human rights, protection of the environment come last in the operational calculus of ChevronTexaco, and by extension, all oil multinationals operating in the Niger Delta. Given this scenario, the resolution of the conflicts between the oil multinationals and the host communities is one yet for the future, at least not until there is a convergence of interests between the actors in the Niger Delta.

Human rights violations

The centrality of oil to Nigeria’s economy cannot be overemphasized; oil is the mainstay of the economy. The government depends heavily on the revenue generated from the sale of oil. Any activity that disrupt oil supplies, say activism by oil-bearing communities, is viewed by the government as a threat to the survival of the state and this elicits responses (sometimes military repression) that infringe on the rights of the people of the region. Therefore, it can be said that the politics associated with oil is responsible for gross violation of human rights by both the Nigerian government and the oil multinationals in the region. As noted earlier, the enactment of certain laws meant the disempowerment of the people as far as having a say in the use of the environment was concerned. To this must be added the cases of physical assault on the

⁹⁵ Daily Independent (Lagos) 3 September 2004, p. B1.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

people of the region by state security forces (sometimes in collaboration with MNCs and their agents). For instance, the most serious case was that of Umuechem in 1990, where a Shell manager made a written request for a detachment of MPF to protect the company's facilities during a protest by the people of the oil-bearing community. The request of the manager and the subsequent deployment of mobile policemen led to the loss of about eighty lives and the destruction of about one hundred homes. There is another well-known case: between January and December 1993, Ken Saro-Wiwa and other prominent Ogoni leaders were arrested and detained several times, with criminal charges brought against them⁹⁷ for leading the cause of the Niger Delta against the state and MNCs operating in the Niger Delta.

The other dimension to this crisis needs to be given attention here. This is government's method of 'divide and rule' which was intended to break the Ogoni struggle in a number of ways. In fact, available evidence suggests that the government actively sought the implosion of MOSOP. A case in point was the Giokoo Accord of March 1994, which called for the Gokana people to pull out of MOSOP. Government had allegedly induced some conservative Gokana chiefs to sign this accord. However, Gokana people demonstrated spontaneously against this accord on May 19, 1994 in many Gokana villages.⁹⁸ The government also encouraged violent conflicts between the Ogoni and their neighbours, which resulted in ethnic and communal clashes. The attempt was to dub the clashes as purely ethnic, indicting the MOSOP leadership in the process. The use of sophisticated weapons and standard military tactics in all these ethnic clashes is evidently enough to prove the involvement of the military.⁹⁹ For instance, Human Rights Africa (HRA) reported that soldiers were recruited from Liberia to fight and kill Ogoni people under the pretext that they were going to fight in Cameroon.¹⁰⁰

Following the shooting and killing of about eleven Ogoni people by security agents at Bara, old Rivers State in April 1993, the Ibrahim Babangida-led military government promulgated a decree which stipulated death penalty for all acts of treason. The Ogoni responded with increased mobilization and media campaign, with a possible option of violent demonstration. However, this strategy later became a divisive factor in the rank and file of MOSOP and its leadership. After the controversial MOSOP boycott of the June 12, 1993 presidential election, it became clear that there had been a division of its leadership into two – the moderates led by Dr Leton, and the militants led by Ken Saro-Wiwa. Apart from accusing Saro-Wiwa of being too confrontational, militant and authoritarian, the moderates also alleged that he was planning to kill thirteen Ogoni leaders, among whom four were eventually killed in May 1994.

⁹⁷ Human Rights Watch, "Nigeria: The Ogoni crisis A case study of Military Repression in South Eastern Nigeria", Human Rights Watch/Africa, 7 (5), 1995.

⁹⁸ Gokana is one of the several villages that comprise the Ogoni kingdom.

⁹⁹ R. A Sha'aba, "MOSOP and the Ogoni Struggle", in Omotoye Olorode et al, Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Crises of the Nigerian State (Lagos: CDHR, 1998), p. 82. Also see MOSOP, Ogoni Bill of Rights (Port Harcourt: Saros International Publishers, 1992).

¹⁰⁰ The Punch (Lagos), 9 November 1997.

As part of his environmental advocacy, Ken Saro-Wiwa had campaigned from village to village on the need for the government to address the problems of the Niger Delta, especially the marginalisation of the Ogoni nation in the national scheme of affairs. This campaign took him to Giokoo village on May 21, 1994, where some conservative chiefs (allegedly being sponsored by government) were meeting. The attempt by soldiers to turn him back culminated in violent confrontation in which the youths in the village killed four chiefs. This incident led to the immediate arrest and detention of Ken Saro-Wiwa and many other Ogoni activists. They were later arraigned before a special military tribunal, which sentenced Saro-Wiwa and eight others to death by hanging. The execution was carried out in November 1995 against all entreaties both from within and outside the country. This development (coupled with leadership bickering and state repression) sounded the death knell for the Ogoni struggle. However, this is not to say that the struggle completely fizzled out, but it lost the vibrancy and militancy associated with it in its early stages.

The Ijaw, through the IYC, took the centre stage of activism in the Niger Delta following the implosion of MOSOP. Since 1997, when Ijaw youths called for an end to Shell activities in the Niger Delta, Ijaw people have resolved to lead the struggle against the state and oil companies with a view to liberating the region from perceived exploitation, neglect, and marginalization.¹⁰¹ Bayelsa State, which is wholly inhabited by the Ijaw people, became a hotbed of Ijaw militancy between 1998 and 1999. The militant and self-acclaimed invincible Egbesu Boys came into limelight in 1998 when they were able to set free their detained leader from government House in Yenagoa, having disarmed the guards. The emergence of the Egbesu warriors since then has demonstrated the militarisation of local conflict in which sophisticated arms have been freely employed by militant youths.

After the death of General Abacha in 1998, the new political climate made it possible for Ijaw youths to be more vigorous in their demands. To drive home their grievances, the youths started hijacking oil installations. In December 11, 1998, the youths convened at Kaiama town, where they made a landmark declaration, now made popular and known as the Kaiama Declaration. In the document, they requested for more local control of oil revenues and better environmental policies. More importantly, the statement gave a December 30th ultimatum to both the government and the oil companies to respond positively to their demands. It added that if the deadline was not met, all multinational oil corporations operating in Ijaw lands and territorial waters, and indeed in the larger Niger Delta, should leave the region.¹⁰²

To actualize their threat, Ijaw youths and other people who joined them marched in peaceful demonstration towards government House in Yenagoa, the capital city of Bayelsa state. Their main purpose was to convey their grievances through the state governor, Lt Colonel Paul Obi to the Federal Government. The protest turned out to be one of the bloodiest in the Niger Delta as soldiers shot at the protesters, leaving some

¹⁰¹ See *The Guardian* on Sunday (Lagos), 5 November 2000, pp. 38-39.

¹⁰² Ima Niboro, "Bloodbath", *Tell* (Lagos), No. 3.

of them dead and many others injured. This marked the beginning of hostilities between Ijaw youths and the security forces.

The Ijaw communities of Warri North Local government area (Apia and Kenyan) also experienced state repression on the 4 January 1999 when about hundred armed soldiers from the military base next to Chevron's escravos terminal attacked them. At the end of this operation virtually all the houses in the two communities were destroyed, canoes were sunk and dozens of people lost their lives.¹⁰³ There are other numerous examples of state repression against the local people. In most cases oil companies collaborated with the Nigerian state in perpetrating human rights abuses. For instance, Shell has been accused of maintaining its own police. The company is also allegedly responsible for the importation of arms:

*Shell admits to purchasing 107 handguns for the supernumerary police more than 15 years ago. Shell argues that it does not own these guns, which remain the property of the Nigerian police force, the body that regulates the conditions for their use and storage.*¹⁰⁴

Apart from this, it was alleged that in 1995 the company negotiated to purchase up-graded weapons worth almost a million dollars for its own police. At another level, Shell has given assistance to the Nigerian Police in brutalizing the local people of the Niger Delta. Shell helicopters and boats have transported members of the Nigerian security forces during these operations against the local people. In 1987, for example, the company transported members of the MPF to a demonstration at Icon in Akwa Ibom State.¹⁰⁵ The MPF killed two people and destroyed about forty houses in this operation. In most cases the company accepted the use of its equipment by MPF while at the same time refuting the allegation that the company used the MPF to suppress dissent. It is not uncommon for news reports to highlight instances MNC collaboration with the Nigerian government and its security forces to suppress the local communities in the Niger Delta.

In another incident, Friends of the Environment (FoE) accused NAOC of culpability in the killing of 16 youths from Olugbobiri and Ikebiri communities in the southern Ijaw Local Government Area of Bayelsa state by security operatives manning Agip's facilities for merely agitating for a sense of belonging. FoE argues that such a measure is genocidal and constitutes a systematic cleansing of the human resources of the region needed for development.¹⁰⁶ Friends of the Environment (FoE) also condemned the insensitivity of the oil companies to the plight of their host communities. Among others, FoE accused the transnational oil companies of manipulating the people of the oil and gas rich region.

Given the political, economic and social dynamics of the Niger Delta crisis, the people of the region have had to engage the oil companies and the Nigerian gov-

¹⁰³ B. Manby, op. cit.

¹⁰⁴ S. Pegg, "The Cost of Doing Business: Transnational Corporations and Violence in Nigeria", Security Dialogue, Vol. 30 (4), 1999, pp. 473-484.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ See Vanguard (Lagos) 6 August 2004, p. 7.

ernment in a fierce battle to gain access to oil wealth. This has informed the recent struggle by the Governors of the Niger Delta states to control the resources in the region. The Governors seem to be finding a support base in the communities. Recent history shows that the relationship between oil-bearing communities and MNCs has been largely acrimonious. Due to the frustration of these communities, which stem from MNCs indiscriminate activities and state insensitivity to their plight, they have often had to press home their point through protests and shut downs. The table below illustrates how oil-bearing communities have disrupted Shell’s operations because of perceived insensitivity to the plight of the local people.

Table: Alleged community disruptions to Shell’s Niger Delta operations

Year	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Number of incidents	34	95	102	85	169	84	77
Total project days lost	28	28	243	407	1432	1316	NA

Source: J. G. Frynas, See Shell at <http://www.Shell.com/>

A look at the activities of MNCs in Africa shows how oil exploration has engendered environmental and social problems including instability. The use of divide and rule tactics by different governments from the 1960s in Nigeria is equally a pointer that no government in Nigeria has been willing to address the problems of the oil producing areas in the country. Therefore the only option (though not to be interpreted as being justified by the authors) open to the people is to be confrontational in their approach. Looking at the activities of the Nigerian state, oil multinationals and different communities in the Niger Delta region one can tentatively conclude that the crisis and politics inherent in oil production are a complex one.

As noted above, oil politics and the Niger Delta crisis continue to attract international attention. The internationalisation of the crisis has brought into focus the need for the Nigerian state to redress the perceived contradictions arising from the provisions of the Land Use Act of 1978 as a prelude to promoting sustainable development in the region. From the observations during field work, it is very difficult to substantiate that the government and MNCs have the interests of the local people at heart. The deplorable situation of most oil-bearing communities presupposes that the government and MNCs need to be more alive to their responsibilities towards the communities. This would surely work both ways, if not in three ways – for the Federal Government that relies on oil wealth, the MNCs that seek to maximise profit and the oil-bearing communities who want a ‘share of the pie’. In the long run the attitudes of the government and oil companies in not addressing the effects of pollution and other associated problems of oil exploration will continue to affect their operations and undermine their interests; the same will equally perpetuate increase in government spending on security at the local level.

The military and human rights in the Niger Delta

All modern nation-states have incorporated into their fundamental documents or constitutions, the security and protection of their territorial integrity and independence – a function that is performed statutorily by the armed forces. Hence it is evident that the military is an indispensable part of any collectivity (which needs protection) and by extension, nation states. The experience of Nigeria over the years shows that the military had not kept faith with this role but had intervened in the country's politics. The country had witnessed military rule for much of its post-independence years. Indeed, from January 1966 to May 1999, not less than eight military heads of state ruled Nigeria. The road to long period of military rule began on January 15, 1966 when a group of young army officers toppled the first democratically elected government. Since then, it had been one coup after another and Nigeria became infested with what was later known as the "Nzeogwu Virus."¹⁰⁷

Aside the fact that the military in Nigeria had not stuck to its traditional role, it had acted as an aggressor to the people, especially in the Niger Delta. At different times military forces in collaboration with oil companies have held the civil society in disdain and contempt. Beyond this, the local people have been subjected to military repression, an unpleasant reality that has further impoverished the oil-bearing communities. The Egbema operation of July 11 and 12, 2004 was one of the many instances of military invasion of the Niger Delta communities. Security personnel on Operation Restore Hope, the military task force in charge of security in the Niger Delta, on the aforementioned dates raided Ijaw communities in the Warri North Local Government Area of Delta State under the guise of search for killers of two American expatriates and other oil workers killed in the area.¹⁰⁸

Messrs Tari-Emiyen Benson and Momotimi Gule, in a petition they wrote under the aegis of Concerned Egbema Citizens, alleged that 13 communities were razed during the operation. Some of these communities are Ogbudugbudu, Idebagbene, Ifelegbene, Arantigbene, Kirigbologhagbene, Oboribigbene, Zenijeregbene and Beka Zion.¹⁰⁹ The military, it was reported, used eight gunboats and military aircraft during the operation, shooting indiscriminately from land, sea and air. Benson and Gule also corroborated this arguing that the "use of military aircraft, war boats and heavy weapons such as bombs on fellow citizens is barbaric and need to be condemned."¹¹⁰ Another organ-

¹⁰⁷ The January coup 1966 was said to be a counter-reaction from the core Northern military cadre to put a permanent stop to the political challenges to Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa's government from the Southern part of Nigeria. In order to check this, Nzeogwu/Ifeajuna's Operation Damisa was stage-managed by Five Majors in the Nigerian Army. For more analyses on this, See M. Chris Alli, *The Federal Republic of Nigerian Army: The Siege of A Nation*. (Lagos: Malthouse Press Limited, 2001), pp 211-215.

¹⁰⁸ See Daily Independent (Lagos) 19 August 2004; p. A7.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ See Daily Independent (Lagos) 19 August 2004, p. A7.

isation, the Egbema United Front, also speaking through Sunny Jero and Israel Tiemo, reported:

On Sunday, July 11 and Monday 12, those men in military uniform attacked our village with all the paraphernalia of an invading army, shooting indiscriminately, killing innocent people and destroying villages. The people came in gunboats and heavy weaponry as early as 9 a.m. and started shooting at anything¹¹¹

Chiefs Layema Kuruma and Jackson Lawuru, community leaders from the area, put the number of buildings destroyed during the operation at 500. They added that no fewer than 200 persons, mostly women and children, who escaped into the forest in the wake of the military invasion, are feared missing as their whereabouts could not be ascertained days after the attack by the military.

However, the military authorities disagreed with the claim that they killed and destroyed communities during the operation. The taskforce commander, Brigadier General Elias Zamani, absolved his men from all the allegations. Zamani, speaking through the military outfit's Public Relations Officer, Major Said Hammed, maintained that the aim of the operation was to fish out criminals in the area and persons believed to have killed two America expatriates and some oil workers around the area. His defence:

The taskforce is not an invading army. The outfit is appropriately positioned to restore hope and peace to the Niger Delta. In line with our operations in July 11, the taskforce deployed men on cordon-and-search operations to recover arms and ammunition; to apprehend pirates operating along the Benin River to Sapele as well as criminals operating under the banner of militant youths; and to re-open the water-ways to ensure the return of economic activities along the creeks.¹¹²

A villager alleged that the operation was actually ordered by the presidency, as it did in Odi, with the aim of apprehending suspected criminals. Says the source, "if the only option available to arrest criminals in Ijaw territory is by use of military artillery, aircraft, warboats, bombs and weapons of mass destruction, then we are afraid of the kind of democracy we operate as a nation."¹¹³ The Ijaw leaders in Warri confirmed that gun battle between Joint Security Task Force, Operation Restore Hope, in Warri has led to sudden disappearances of about eighty people and many houses burnt. The Publicity Secretary of the Egbema United Front (an Ijaw Pressure group), Prince Gandy Soroaye, was of the view that the soldiers were upset by unknown youths, "the actions taken was to the extreme and damage done colossal."¹¹⁴

Various regimes and administrations in Nigeria are known to have supervised ignominious looting of state treasury. Successive regimes have also been noted

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² See Daily Independent (Lagos) 19 August 2004, p. A7.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Vanguard Online,

http://www.vanguardngr.com/articles/2002/niger_delta/nd412032004.html.

for flagrant human rights abuses and retarding the developmental process of the country, the Niger Delta inclusive. The Niger Delta, for over three decades, has been a battleground between the local people and the Nigerian security forces. The state has since then adopted the military approach or repression as a means of silencing opposition from the youths of the region and this has resulted in extra-judicial executions and violation of the rights of the people to association and freedom of expression among others. The use of armed forces by the state and oil companies in the region to protect oil production has been responsible for the death of thousands of people, arbitrary detention, torture and villages being razed by soldiers.

However, there is a general assumption that the transition to democracy in May 29, 1999 would automatically improve the lots of the people of the Niger Delta. However, government continues to use the military method, as confirmed in the cases in Odi, Warri, Ilaje and other areas in the region. From all indications, the Nigerian military is yet to come to terms with the principles and practice of democracy. It is therefore true that the years of military in politics have given the leaders a feeling of power and misplaced priorities in their relations with the public without due consideration for peoples opinion and rights.

The general outcry against military operations in Odi could in reality have served as opportunity to restructure relations between the Nigerian military and the public. But the reverse is the case as military operation in Uwheru, where over twenty persons were killed and eleven houses burnt down in the name of "Operation Restore Hope" on January 15, 2004 has shown. Their reasons for such action stem from Brigadier General Elias Zamani team's search for arms, while others argued that the soldiers came to the community to plunder the local people's property after a clash between the Uwheru people and some Fulani cattlemen.¹¹⁵ The region has witnessed such brutality in the heydays of military rule but the continuation of the practice raises serious questions about Nigeria's democratic credentials. The military approach adopted by successive governments has contributed to the spate of militancy in the Niger Delta with the cumulative effect that the region has become militarised. In turn, the militarisation of the region has been responsible for the proliferation of arms in the region. The repeated violent clashes between the youths and security forces has been characterised by the use of semi-automatic rifles, shotguns, machine guns, shoulder-fired rockets, and traditional weapons like fishing spears and cutlasses. These weapons are easy to procure in Warri, for example, at prices that local militants can afford, ranging from US\$570 to US\$2,150.¹¹⁶ In many cases militants engage in hostage taking of oil workers as a means of raising money to purchase these weapons.

The proliferation of these small arms in the Niger Delta has had implications for politics in Nigeria. Politicians are able to enlist the services of militants to attack and intimidate opponents. The origin of these small arms is still unclear but there is consensus

¹¹⁵ H. Eghagha, "Vandalism by the Nigerian Army at Uwheru", Urhubowaado@urhubowaado.info, 22 February, 2004.

¹¹⁶ <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/nigeria1103/7.htm>.

that they were recycled from other trouble spots in Africa. For instance, “in 2002, the Nigerian Customs Service reported that it had intercepted small arms and ammunition worth more than N4.3 billion (US \$30 million) at border posts during the first six months of the year,”¹¹⁷ confirming that some of the weapons used in the Niger Delta conflict are imported, even as some are produced locally. According to Human Rights Watch investigation at the wake of the crisis in Warri, some state security personnel appeared to be dealing in small arms. Local manufacturing of arms take place in the industrial zones of Nigeria’s South-east region, including Aba and Awka.”¹¹⁸ The menace of small arms and light weapons has heightened the general insecurity in the region, threatened oil supplies and reduced government revenue – and with concomitant implications for the Nigerian state. In fact, it is apposite to state that it is the very existence of the Nigerian state that is at stake. Little wonder that the current government has placed the Niger Delta at the top of the national agenda. Indeed, the battle to save the Niger Delta is invariably the battle to save the Nigerian nation from collapse and extinction. There is little doubt that the survival of the state is inextricably tied to the resolution of the Niger Delta crisis.

Concluding Remarks

The Niger-Delta crisis is a culmination of the combination of the structural deficiencies in the Nigerian state and the negative consequences of oil exploration and exploitation that have gone on over the years. The 1990s opened a new chapter for the struggle as the local and international political landscapes experienced changes favourable to the upholding of individual and peoples’ rights as well as issues of environment degradation. Hence, MOSOP and other human rights/environmental rights groups used several international platforms, including the United Nations, to bring the plight of the people of the Niger Delta to the fore. The transition to democracy has not substantially altered the scenario in the Niger Delta. The region has continued to witness the gross violation of human rights since 1999. This is an area that the Nigerian state and the international community must give serious attention to forestall the exacerbation of the Niger Delta crisis and the eventual implosion of the Nigerian state.

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¹¹⁷ <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/nigeria1103/7.htm>.

This position was substantiated during field research in Warri (between April and July 2003) where, as interviewees opined, it was relatively easier to get a rifle than a loaf of bread. The Warri crisis forced many of the oil companies to relocate their headquarters to Port Harcourt and Lagos. This was also responsible for the sudden rise in the number of displaced people who sought refuge in Ughelli, Aladja and Agbarho.

¹¹⁸ This report was based on Human Rights Watch findings in Warri in September 2003 and it can be found in <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/nigeria1103/7.htm>.

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School's Out: strategies of resistance in colonial Sierra Leone

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Koyeima government school was established in 1930 to give practical and technical training to chiefs' sons in Sierra Leone. This was the colonial government's view of the project. The reality proved to be different, and was an example of the resistance shown by Africans to the British view of what 'their place' was. The school was aimed at boys from the rural Protectorate area of Sierra Leone, rather than the better-educated elite of Freetown. The colonial government's strategies to use the school as a means to reinforce and continue colonial rule of the Protectorate were disrupted when the boys walked out of school to demand better conditions. This strike action was part of a larger movement by Africans in Sierra Leone to take control of education to better themselves, rather than promote colonial interests.

While colonial rule is often associated with force and policing, colonial powers also had to provide basic infrastructure to their colonies in order to maximise their return. This included not only roads and transport to extract goods, but also government offices to ensure stability and order. Employing native people in colonies not only saved on wages costs, it also provided a veneer of self-determination and democracy, along with an invaluable link to existing power networks and traditions. Schools were an integral part of this system; providing the literate workers for low-level positions in the administration. By looking at the history of a school in one of the smallest countries in West Africa, Sierra Leone, and the resistance of school students to the imposed educa-

tion system we can draw out the role played by colonial education in the implementation of colonial rule.

European contact with Sierra Leone was among the earliest in West Africa, with Portuguese explorer Pedro de Cintra mapping the area in 1462.¹¹⁹ By the 1700s it was an important slave-trading hub with the market's base located on Bunce Island, in what would become Freetown harbour. But, in 1787, Sierra Leone became the location for a radical plan to settle the 'Black Poor' from London. These settlers were mainly descendants of former slaves who lived in poverty in England, supported by the Committee for the Relief of the Black Poor. The first attempt proved unsuccessful, but the recently established Sierra Leone Company was able to establish a settlement, Freetown, in 1792. The Company was styled as a philanthropic endeavour, but its owners refused to grant the settlers freehold of their land, leading to an unsuccessful revolt in 1799.¹²⁰ Despite this inauspicious beginning, thousands of liberated slaves were settled by the British in Freetown, which became one of their first colonies in West Africa in 1808.¹²¹ The settlers brought there were not native to the area, but had their origins in all parts of Africa and became known as the Krio people, with their own language¹²² and distinctive culture. They controlled trade along the coast, and became part of the movement to 'civilise' West Africa, alongside the colonial powers.

This colony was not what was to become modern Sierra Leone. It extended only over the capital city, Freetown, and its environs. The British were reluctant to expand the size of the colony and take on additional responsibility. But, they also felt a need to thwart French expansion in West Africa and increase trading in the hinterland. The Brussels Act of 1890 had given the colonial powers free reign to expand their empires, using the 'civilisation' of Africa, and particularly the eradication of slavery as a justification. The British feared the Colony was too tiny to survive and would become an isolated enclave surrounded by the French. And so a slow, careful expansion of 'influence' began. But it became clear over the course of 1890 to 1896 that disturbances in the area required more drastic action. The 'sphere of influence' had left the boundaries of British control difficult to establish. This, combined with the adoption of a more pro-active and aggressive policy at the Colonial Office, led to the declaration of the rest of Sierra Leone as a Protectorate in 1896.¹²³ The declaration allowed the British to gain control of this vital trading area, without the responsibility of creating a colony.

So, from the beginning of its life as a colony of the British government, Sierra Leone was effectively divided in two by different forms of rule. This divide between Colony and Protectorate was pronounced; socially, culturally and economically. It was not to

¹¹⁹ Peter Kup, 1961, *Sierra Leone 1400-1787*, Cambridge University Press, London, p. 5

¹²⁰ Leo Spitzer, 1974, *The Creoles of Sierra Leone: Responses to Colonialism, 1870-1945*, University of Wisconsin Press, London, p. 9-13

¹²¹ Peter Kup, 1975, *Sierra Leone: A Concise History*, David & Charles, London, p. 167

¹²² Krio, translation Creole, is based on English and African languages and is now widely spoken throughout Sierra Leone.

¹²³ John Grace, 1975, *Domestic Slavery in West Africa*, Muller, London

become a settler colony, like Kenya, instead the 'settlers' were the Black Settlers, Europeanised ex-slaves of African descent who inhabited the Colony. The Protectorate was seen as an opportunity, not only to stymie French expansion in the area, but also to extract resources and conduct trade. In order to accomplish this, it was necessary to exert sufficient authority over the area to ensure traders' safety and to transport goods. However, with no white population to settle or support there was little incentive to invest heavily in infrastructure. Rather, it made better business sense to attempt to run the colony with as little investment as possible, achieving the maximum return.

The Protectorate was ruled indirectly, through the existing chieftain system, and a Hut Tax was imposed in 1898 in order to pay for administrative costs. This led to an uprising led by Bai Bureh¹²⁴ in the north, and a secret society, the Poro, in the south. The revolt was easily put down by the British, and colonial records show that they believed it to be led and instigated by Bai Bureh alone. A report commissioned by Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, concluded that the revolt had been inspired by the new collection of taxes¹²⁵ and was part of a wider dissatisfaction and anger over the declaration of the Protectorate itself.¹²⁶ The Colonial Office attempted to suppress this conclusion and instead promoted the view that it had been caused by British attempts to quell slavery in the area, thus casting the British colonial project in a more acceptable, 'civilising' light.¹²⁷ This propaganda linked up with earlier claims to be civilising Africa, bringing light to darkness. Missionaries saw the acme of this process to be the conversion of Africans to Christianity, while governments saw an opportunity to create nation-states run on orderly European lines. This promotion of humane imperialism can be seen in the humanitarian rhetoric used at the Brussels Conference of 1889 where the 'Scramble for Africa' was organised and planned.

The British had to balance the desire to be seen publicly as a scourge of slavery and barbaric practices with the need establish trust and confidence with the chiefs of the Protectorate. They adopted a policy of 'standing aloof' from issues like slavery. Official policy was not to become involved in individual cases or enforce owners' rights, though reality on the ground proved different. In addition to this legal detachment, little investment was made by colonial authorities in the Protectorate, particularly in education and infrastructure. The Protectorate area was taken to facilitate trade, and was soon being exploited for its natural resources: iron and diamonds. It became an extractive colony, and there was little incentive to install a complex infrastructure. Instead authority was concentrated into particular areas. The British maintained 'islands of interest' in the Protectorate, following the natural lines of valuable mineral deposits.

¹²⁴ Bai Bureh, a Temne leader, is still revered as a hero in Sierra Leone.

¹²⁵ Sir David Chalmers, 1899, Report of the Insurrection in the Sierra Leone Protectorate, London

¹²⁶ Arthur Abraham, Bai Bureh, The British, and the Hut Tax War, *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 1. (1974), pp. 99-106.

¹²⁷ Danial Magaziner provides an interesting account of the conflict over the Chalmers Report in *Removing the Blinders and adjusting the view: A case study from early colonial Sierra Leone*, *History in Africa*, Vol 34, 2007, p 169-188

This created an unusual system of power and control. Foucault, for example, argues that power is diffused through modern European states using the example of a capillary system bringing blood to extremities. However, in a colony like Sierra Leone, the colonial power was more like a localised virus. It was concentrated in a particular area and only spread for its own survival and advantage. Cooper argues that this was a common feature of colonial power; to establish islands of influence, related to their interests, such as mining or agriculture.¹²⁸ Thanks to this distribution, colonial power was applied unevenly, what Guha calls “dominance without hegemony”.¹²⁹ There was no absolute control over the whole of Sierra Leonean society, and no desire to take up such complete control. In the modern era, anthropologist Ben Jones argues that the state in developing countries can become outward-facing, dependent on foreign aid and so disinterested in rural affairs.¹³⁰ It seems by looking at the colonial state in Africa, we can see a similar process. The attention of administration is directed towards those activities which feed into the interests of the foreign power.

However, the needs of administration compelled the government to take some control of education from the missionary schools which had multiplied in Sierra Leone. Missionary schools trained freed slaves to read the Bible and become part of the Christian mission.¹³¹ But the demands of the colonial administration required more literate Africans to work in low-level clerical positions. The “open-ended academic education” offered by the missionaries was deemed to be too demanding of the Africans “mental development”.¹³² Aside from these benevolent concerns about the limitations of African minds, the main aim in limiting education for Africans was to prevent an educated elite forming, which would challenge colonial rule and develop political resistance to the British government. Even without an overt resistance or rebellion, the build-up of an educated elite creates an imbalance in the power relationship established by colonial rule. When a colonial power seeks to ‘civilise’ or to educate colonised people for its own needs the essentialised difference between coloniser and colonised fades. It is best illustrated by Homi Bhabha’s argument that gradually the colonised person acts as though “white but not quite”.¹³³ This puts colonial rule itself into question. How can

¹²⁸ Frederick Cooper, *Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History*, *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 99, 1994, No. 5, pp. 1516-1545.

¹²⁹ Quoted in *Ibid*, p 1531

¹³⁰ Ben Jones (in press, 2008). *Stateless Society: Rural Developments in eastern Uganda*, International African Library for the International African Institute, Edinburgh University Press and Fountain Publishers, Kampala

¹³¹ Kingsley Banya, *Illiteracy, Colonial Legacy and Education: The Case of Modern Sierra Leone*, *Comparative Education*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (1993), pp. 159-170

¹³² Richard A Corby, *Bo School and its Graduates in Colonial Sierra Leone*, *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 15, 1981, No. 2, pp. 323-333, p. 32: Paulo Freire (1970) argues no literacy is politically neutral freighted as it can be with the assumptions of the establishment, and so it could be argued that providing some, but not adequate, education helped the British consolidate their rule.

¹³³ Frederick Cooper, 1994

colonial rule be justified once the people are 'evolved', 'educated' and, most importantly 'civilised' like a European?

For this reason, at first colonial education was limited to the area around Freetown, and concentrated on the existing elite of Krio people. But as the British colonial government expanded its influence over the Protectorate the demands of the administration increased and it was necessary for them to provide education to create a greater pool of workers for the regime. It could also be argued that the increasing power and education of the Krio people was a threat to the stability of the colonial order, and the people of Protectorate were viewed as a means to shift the balance of power. The demands of the British system of indirect rule exacerbated these needs. By 'sub-contracting' the bulk of administration to the traditional chiefs and native rulers, the British government could maintain its colonies 'on a shoestring'. It expected that each colony would be self-sufficient.¹³⁴ By shifting the burden of local government onto the native population, the British could minimise the number of staff they needed.

They admitted Africans into the central colonial government, but with a strict bar on advancement. The government schools served to fill these vacancies with literate, qualified candidates. This policy was publicly acknowledged at the time. A Times article of 1928 states;

*"Our educational policy in West Africa is the logical deduction and corollary of the idea of 'trusteeship'."*¹³⁵

These aims were served by limiting the education received at the schools. As Ormsby-Gore says, "Education must be adapted to the genius and requirements of peoples in their own environment."¹³⁶ For African graduates to be content with occupying the lower echelons of colonial rule (and getting paid considerably less) it was important that they were not more highly educated than their British superiors.¹³⁷

One of the first schools set up by the government with these aims was Bo school.¹³⁸ It established some of the basic principles future government schools would adopt. The instruction consisted of a mix of academic subjects and practical skills, in order to prepare the future chiefs for implementing British development plans for the Protectorate. The school was located in a rural area to avoid the boys becoming 'citized' and con-

¹³⁴ This policy was continued until the establishment of the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund in the 1940s.

¹³⁵ The Times, Tuesday, Oct 30, 1928; pg. xiv; Issue 45037; col A, Education In West Africa. Insistent Demand., Adaptation To Native Environment. (By the Right Hon. W. Ormsby-Gore, M.P., Chairman of the Colonial Office Advisory Committee on Education in Tropical Africa.).

¹³⁶ Ibid

¹³⁷ Richard A. Corby, Educating Africans for Inferiority under British Rule: Bo School in Sierra Leone, Comparative Education Review, Vol. 34, 1990, No. 3., pp. 314-349.

¹³⁸ For details see Richard A Corby (1981) and (1990)

temptuous of rural life. The training also included moral training and reinforcement of ethnic identity. By retaining elements of the pre-colonial polity, the authorities attempted to usurp and utilise the existing methods of control and authority.¹³⁹ The layout of the school mimicked a typical native village, again to keep the boys 'grounded' in their place in rural village life. Food and clothing followed the traditional rural style, rather than the Westernised style preferred by the elite in Freetown.¹⁴⁰ The archival records of the school's working show how the government attempted to keep the boys connected with their home villages and life. It did not represent an opportunity for advancement or education for ordinary people. Boys were selected by chiefs to attend the school, and so most were chiefs' sons or the sons of local dignitaries. This template was followed in the development of the new government school at Koyeima.

The British established Koyeima School in the Bo District of Sierra Leone in 1929 and recruited boys from Njala to attend. The school was part of the attempt to increase education in the Protectorate area, codified in the Education (Protectorate) Rules of 1930. Mr Greenhill described it to the Governor as;

*"in the nature of an experiment and intended to inaugurate a policy of providing facilities to the natives of the Protectorate for obtaining practical and technical training"*¹⁴¹

The Governor noted that the establishment of the school had gone well, with little disagreement over the appointment of the key members of staff.¹⁴² And, at first, the school seemed to be running smoothly, receiving favourable reports from visitors to the colony in late 1929.¹⁴³ On the 17th of May 1930, though, the experiment appeared to have failed. Lord Passfield at Government House in the UK asked the Governor to report on events at the school, showing how seriously the school was regarded as part of the colonial mission. Governor Byrne reported that 30 Temne boys had left the school and laid complaints before Provincial Commissioner of the Northern Province. In response the Governor sent Mr Blackmore, the Depute Director of Education, to investigate and he visited with Lady Byrne in January 1930. By that time, Mr Keigwin was acting as Principal in the absence of the Director of Education. On his visit to the school the Governor found the situation acceptable, reporting that the boys seemed happy. But the archive contains a copy of the letter sent by the boys. The letter outlines their complaints; arguing that not only did the Koyeima school offer less privileges than the school they had been persuaded to leave, but the standard of teaching was poor, the manual work required harder and the teachers rude and abusive. According to the boys, and later confirmed by the Director of Education, at Njala they had been offered

¹³⁹ Thomas Spear, *Neo-Traditionalism And The Limits Of Invention In British Colonial Africa*, *The Journal of African History*, 44, 2003, p 3-27 Cambridge University Press

¹⁴⁰ TNA, CO271/11, *Sierra Leone Royal Gazette*, 29th September 1905

¹⁴¹ TNA, CO267/630/13, Letter to Governor Byrne from MA Greenhill 20th June 1930

¹⁴² Mr Moss from Agricultural Dept, Mr Edminson as Organiser of Industries and Rev AT Sumner MBE (the only African) as Vice Principal.

¹⁴³ Mr Stockdale, Mr Hooper (Sec of the Church Missionary Society) and Professor Labouré.

free transport to and from school.¹⁴⁴ They also had access to adequate medical facilities while at Koyeima they had to visit the wife of a government official, which some boys found embarrassing.¹⁴⁵ In terms of education, at Njala they had regular daily classroom time, with time set aside for 'practical' activities. However, at Koyeima, they were engaged in hard manual labour, while their time in the classroom was irregular and inadequate, averaging only 2 and a half days a week. As the boys themselves said; "Our prospect for real education beyond severe manual labour is remote." Even worse the teachers used excessive corporal punishment and abusive language.¹⁴⁶

The Director of Education dismissed the letter in a brief note, written at the request of the Governor. He brushed off the complaints, stating that the school was no harder than similar establishments in the Gold Coast, and had only been running for ten weeks, so it was impossible for the boys to judge. The Director of Education omitted some key facts in this report. While the school was only open for ten weeks, 80 boys had been working there for up to nine months, to build the facilities. The Director's report was also belied by a more reasoned and detailed response from Mr Blackmore, the Deputy Director of Education.¹⁴⁷

Mr Blackmore, after interviewing staff and pupils, came to the conclusion that the boys had been harshly treated and some compromise and reform was necessary. In their letter, the boys had offered a detailed compromise solution. In summary, they wanted more hours in classroom.¹⁴⁸ This indicates their understanding of the colonial system. By offering up a compromise, and following the protocol of contacting the Provincial Commissioner, the boys were playing the game by the book. They were keen that their act of resistance should give a result in their favour and so, instead of walking out and not returning, they sought redress through the administration. By resisting the oppressive regime of the school through strike action, they did not mean to destroy the education system, or even their unsatisfactory school, but rather to mould it to better fit their own expectations and ambitions. Richard Corby and Kingsley Banya, through surveys of education in Sierra Leone have shown how Sierra Leoneans viewed the British schools as a means of advancement.¹⁴⁹ The British had attempted to create an education system as a means of control and to support the colonial system. Sierra Leoneans saw it as an opportunity to gain a Western education, and progress into government and professional careers.

¹⁴⁴ TNA, CO 267/630/13 Enclosure 1, despatch dated 17th May 1930, Letter to the Provincial Commissioner, Maburaka, 3/11/29 from the 30 Temne boys

¹⁴⁵ TNA, CO 267/630/13 Enclosure 3, Report from Mr Blackmore, Deputy Director of Education, 16th April 1930

¹⁴⁶ TNA, CO 267/630/13 Enclosure 1

¹⁴⁷ TNA, CO 267/630/13 Enclosure 3

¹⁴⁸ The boys suggested from 7:30 to 11:30am at least five days a week, with fieldwork limited to the afternoons from 2 to 4pm.

¹⁴⁹ Richard Corby, *Educating Africans for Inferiority under British Rule: Bo School in Sierra Leone*, *Comparative Education Review*, Vol. 34, 1990, No. 3, pp. 314-349; Banya (1993)

However, correspondence at the level of the Colonial Government shows that this form of resistance, no matter how it was framed, was seen as an unacceptable rebellion against authority. The Governor's report to London indicated that he believed the rebellion would spread through other schools, if not immediately quelled. He blamed the incident on the insubordination of the Protectorate people. He saw it as a blow to the increasing British control over the area.¹⁵⁰ In their own terms, the boys were doomed to fail. The colonial government was never going to deliver the Western education they wanted. The power disparity was too sharp for the parties to come to compromise. While some changes were made when the school re-opened and it continued to attract students, the general policy and aims of the education system remained the same: to create a literate and docile workforce for lower-echelon administrative posts and malleable chiefs. And while, as Corby has argued, some went onto use their education to resist British rule, like so many other African countries, Sierra Leone was left with almost no educated elite to take up the reins of government upon its independence in 1961.

The education system in Sierra Leone was seriously and adversely affected by the colonial era and the system was perpetuated by the post-independence government. The country remains affected by one of the highest illiteracy rates in the world.¹⁵¹ This short incidence of resistance against the imposition of the colonial ideal of a school that would pay for itself, that would concentrate on the manual labour and practical work involved in empire-building in rural areas, and would limit the opportunities of its students was not a success story. In the end, education remained a tool for the colonial government to use, and access to even this remained limited almost entirely to the sons of the local rulers.

¹⁵⁰ TNA, CO 267/630/13, Letter from the Governor to the Colonial Secretary, Whitehall

¹⁵¹ Sierra Leone ranks 171st out of 177 countries for illiteracy rates. United Nations Development Program Human Development Report 2007/2008:
<http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-2008/>

Review of “Conceptualizing Resistance”¹⁵², by Jocelyn A. Hollander and Rachel L. Einwohner

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Resistance has become a fashionable topic within a diversity of disciplines. The rapid increase of scholarship on resistance is both exciting and productive, but according to Hollander and Einwohner also problematic in the sense that different authors understand and make use of resistance differently, often with a clear lack of attention to definitions (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004:533 - 534). Their work shows that resistance has been used to explain a diversity of behaviors and settings that are very different in terms of the Mode and scale of resistance, as well as the targets and direction or goal of the resistance (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004:535 - 537). Perplexed, the authors ask; “how can all of these phenomena be described with the same term?” (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004:537). In their paper, Hollander and Einwohner aim to clarify the conceptual confusion by presenting a typology of resistance that seeks to move beyond definitional debates and focus instead on the analytical qualities of resistance (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004:534). How to proceed on such an ambitious enterprise? The authors choose to focus on social scientists’ published work on resistance where hundreds of books and articles dealing with resistance in one way or another

¹⁵² Hollander, Jocelyn A. and Einwohner, Rachel L. 2004. “Conceptualizing Resistance”, in *Sociological forum*, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 533 - 554.

serve as the theoretical and empirical material. Their examination of this literature leads them to conclude that action and opposition (in different forms) are core elements that basically all literature on resistance engages with (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004:538 - 539). However, whereas the basic idea that resistance naturally and/or always deals with some kind of activity that occurs in opposition to someone or something is seen as unproblematic the authors suggest that recognition and intent lies at the heart of disagreements in scholarly debates about resistance (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004:539). The questions of whether resistance must be recognized by others ("Must oppositional action be readily apparent to others, and must it in fact be recognized as resistance?") and whether it must be intentional ("Must the actor be aware that she or he is resisting some exercise of power—and intending to do so—for an action to qualify as resistance?") are clearly important questions that scholars researching on resistance, in whatever form and discipline, need to consider and be aware of (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004:539, 542). By organizing literature on resistance according to how it deals with recognition and intent, the authors inductively develop a typology of resistance, identifying seven distinct types, each defined by a different combination of actors' intent, target's recognition, and observer's recognition. By characterizing resistance according to these parameters, they distinguish between 'over resistance', 'covert resistance', 'unwitting resistance', 'target - defined resistance', 'externally - defined resistance', 'mixed resistance', and 'attempted resistance' (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004:544).

Although the authors briefly discuss the empirical and theoretical material behind the typology, it would have been interesting to have more insight into their sampling procedures, e.g. what does it mean that the bulk of literature comes from sociological papers and how did they decide on the 'influential works' published prior to 1995, and since not all of their references, due to lack of space, are not published it becomes very hard to know if they have missed out on certain important works, e.g. there is no reference to the influential work by Guha on subaltern resistance.

The authors suggest that the typology is a means to sharpen the analytical practicality of resistance and help the researcher to move beyond definitional debates that obscure the sociological aspects of the concept. In that sense, the typology helps to control for the diversity of resistance and effectively guide the researcher through the chaos of meanings and uses. Problematizing recognition and intent in the light of resistance is an original but yet interesting approach that emphasizes the diversity of understandings and uses of resistance in academia. The authors rightly claim that here is a big gap between everyday forms of resistance such as satire and style of dress and more conventional forms of resistance (political mobilization) such as demonstrations and revolutions, as well as, between understanding resistance as something that needs to be intended by the actor and resistance as something where the actors' intentions are not at all important. Whereas the first part of the article seeks to conceptualize resistance by laying out some parameters for the concept, the second part seeks to problematize the concept from the position of the typology and draw attention to innate complexities of resistance. The idea is that before engaging with the complexities of resist-

ance, it is necessary to first sort out the concept. Here, the article gives special attention, though very brief, to the complex nature of resistance. By examining its interactional nature, the notion that resistance is not defined by the resisters, but also by targets and/or others' recognition of the resistance, the authors seek to draw attention to the role of power (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004:547 - 551). However, the analysis remains superficial, and the connection between resistance and power is not developed beyond the notion that resistance and domination have a cyclical relationship. Slightly more nuanced is the discussion about accommodation, the notion that agency may constitute both resistance and accommodation to different aspects of power and authority. However, although it is noted that resistance is complex in the sense of being impure, interactional, socially constructed and complex, the authors never engage in any fruitful discussion what this means for the understanding of resistance. Considering the aim of the article—to boost the analytical practicality of resistance—the second part feels somewhat awkward and only remotely connected to the first part. Although the second part brings up very interesting issues, it is never made explicit how these relate to the typology of resistance, and with the brief treatment of these issues they are mainly confusing. Nevertheless, the article is a justified reminder how crucial it is to elaborate on and be aware of strengths, weaknesses, limitations etc. of how one uses resistance as an analytical concept. Considering that resistance constitutes complex social phenomena, it becomes especially important to be clear on how one approaches the concept and what consequences that approach has for inquiries into social change. However, it is important to notice that a diversity of understandings and employments of resistance is not problematic per se. Resistance as a discipline is an underdeveloped area within social science that is lacking in both theoretical and practical experience (Vinthagen and Lilja, 2007). A diversity of meanings and methods should be welcomed and recognized important to extend the practical utility of the concept and understanding of the world. Following this line of reasoning, the author's skepticism, referred to in the beginning, that so many diverse phenomena are called resistance, seems unjustified. Rather, for the concept of resistance to have an analytical potential to understand social change, it seems particularly important to link resistance with an extensive analysis of power relations that emphasize complex social relationships such as structure, agency, choice, identity and knowledge. In their analysis and categorization of resistance, Hollander and Einwohner fail to develop this link at any lengths. Although categorizing/theorizing resistance by the means of a typology can be a good method to draw attention to conceptual confusion, a typology gives an unnecessarily restricted notion of resistance that makes it difficult to think of resistance outside the parameters of recognition and intent. The scientific aspiration to order and classify social phenomena runs the risk of expelling uncertainties and irregularities into a group of others; "...the very act of classifying creates even more ambivalence by relegating everything that does not fit into a sphere of otherness" (Bleiker, 2000:105 - 106). The author's ambition to find a solid foundation for drawing generalizations rests on the notion that the purpose of social science is to observe empirical regularities. This view is problematic because it gives a restricted understanding of resistance and social change that is poorly equipped to deal with the complexities of the social world. With its diverse and complex nature it becomes particularly import-

ant to analyze resistance in specific and context - bound situations rather than by grand theoretical models. Arguing, like the authors of the article, that it is problematic that “different parties (actors themselves, targets, in situ observers, and scholars) interpret the intent behind a particular behavior in different ways” (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004:543) alludes to a positivistic epistemological position where the researcher’s experience is supposed to be invisible. The idea that it is possible to produce a ‘neutral assessment’ of the concept of resistance is problematic in the sense that it conceives of a world that is stable and fixed (Bleiker, 2000). Although it is an ambitious enterprise to clean up the theoretical foundation by constructing ideal types of resistance, this aim fundamentally misconceives of the relationship between theory and practice. In contrast to positivist understanding, theories cannot be separated from the empirical world that they seek to explain since it is theories that constitute the world (Smith, Booth and Zalewski). In other words, how we perceive the world, and what we think we can do about it, fundamentally depends on how we think about it (Smith, Booth, and Zalewski, 1996). Following this line of reasoning, definitional and theoretical disputes over the meanings of resistance are important in themselves and cannot be reduced, packaged and labeled according to a few criteria in a typology, ready to be unpacked and employed when the researcher sees fit. From this perspective, fussy theory and diverse meanings of concepts are not only signs that there is a lack of attention to concepts and definitions, but also that there is an inherent and ongoing power struggle over these concepts. Rather than finding the ‘truth’ about social change, it is the researchers responsibility to reflect on where this truth comes from “What are the legacies of past theories? Whose facts have been most important in shaping our ideas? Whose voices are overlooked?” (Smith, Booth, and Zalewski, 1996).

Accepting the diversity of resistance requires the researcher to come to terms with the death of God, the Nietzschean notion for the loss of certainty (Bleiker, 2000). A post - positivist approach is equipped to do this, and meanwhile, to provide the tools necessary for enquires into the social world that can embrace complexity, rather than rejecting it.

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RSMAG 2008#3

Resistance and Cooperation in a North American Appalachian Community

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Introduction

People who live in rural places usually define the surrounding territory and land as their home, as the places they recreate, collect and use natural resources, and bury their friends and kin. The land is a part of the people, and the meanings they give to places are reflections of themselves and their self-identity. That building over there is not just a building; it is Uncle Warren's cabin, built on the site where my grandmother is buried. But what happens to the meanings of the land and places on the land--indeed to the very meanings local people have of themselves--when the land is transformed from private ownership to public ownership and is managed by a government agency for the benefit of conservation, preservation, and recreation by the public? Examples of this include Protected Areas or National Parks. How do local people make sense out of and adapt to the new restrictions on traditional use and access imposed by the agency to meet a political mandate for preservation? How do the employees of a public-land agency attempt to construct new meanings for the land and places on the land? Do these various social constructions or meanings compete or conflict with one another? What are consequences of competition, conflict, and/or resistance over resources (management problems, degradation of the environment, and vandalism for examples)? What measures can be taken to lessen conflict and resistance over the management of public land?

This paper examines these questions with the overall goal of understanding the perceptions and concerns faced by local residents and United States National Park Service employees over the management of the Big South Fork National River and Recreation Area (BSFNRRRA), located on the Cumberland Plateau of Tennessee and Kentucky. This paper also investigates incidences of conflict and resistance between local residents and National Park Service (NPS) employees over the management of cultural and natural resources within the BSFNRRRA. For example, Uncle Warren's cabin may be a traditional hunting lodge to local residents, but a management problem for the NPS, or a symbol of human presence to the environmentalist who wishes the landscape to be designated as a wilderness area. Finally, this paper investigates measures that can be taken by the NPS to lessen conflict or resistance and promote cooperation over the management of public land, specifically public participation in the management of the BSFNRRRA. While this paper contributes to the body of resistance and conflict theory by providing a case example supporting the utility of James Scott's model of "everyday forms of resistance," it also has applied methodological implications for development projects, especially those impacting local residents' "social identity" and "livelihood."

In summary, the central argument put forth in this paper is that resistance is manifested among those who perceive a threat to both their "social identity" and "livelihood." Furthermore, resistance is either manifested in the form of routine and individual acts or organized and public acts based on the perceived severity of this threat.

Methods utilized in this research study include both quantitative and qualitative methods (a survey, formal interviews, informal conversations, focus groups, participatory mapping, participant-observation, and analysis of issues presented by local residents and special interest groups). Open House meetings sponsored by the NPS were also attended. The purpose of the Open House meetings was to gather public input to help in the development of an information base to assist in the creation of a General Management Plan for the BSFNRRRA. Because of the low attendance at the Open House meetings by local residents, I was hired by the NPS as a consultant to investigate barriers or circumstances inhibiting residents from attending the meetings. Upon completion of my consultant position, I received a grant from the Ford Foundation-Community Forestry Research Program to collect additional data and funding to live one year within the research area. Not only did my residency allow for observation of the annual cycle of resource use, and NPS management policy, but also presented me with the opportunity to be accepted as a member of the community and not as a consultant for the NPS. Information collected during this research period helped to provide information on traditional access to and use of resources within the National Area, in addition to incidences of conflict and resistance between local residents and the NPS.

Research site

The BSFNRRRA is unique among public lands in the United States. It is one of the first attempts to combine the concept of a National River with a National Recreation Area, thereby promoting both preservation of the area's natural resources and the development of recreational activities (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 1980:1-2). Because the BSFNRRRA is relatively new in its establishment, family members still remember when their land was acquired for the establishment of the National Area. Therefore, not only does the site provide a unique case study for research on local environmental knowledge and uses of resources, but also the development of social conflict over competing management concerns.

The "Park," as local citizens call it, was established by Congress on March 7, 1974, by Section 108 of the Water Resources Development Act (PL 93-251), as amended by Section 184 of the Water Resources Development Act of 1976 (PL 94-587). The act created a new public land area and provided for the protection of approximately 125,000 acres of the scenic and remote Cumberland Plateau, located in both Kentucky and Tennessee, in addition to the Big South Fork branch of the Cumberland River. A total of 103.5 million dollars was appropriated for the project, making it one of the largest development efforts in southeastern United States.

The BSFNRRRA is divided geographically into two sections: the river gorge and the plateau area. According to NPS regulations (PL 93-251), the river gorge must preserve both its recreational and wilderness qualities, while the plateau area should allow for the development of recreational and cultural resources (horse trails, roads and paths to rock shelters, the preservation of significant historical buildings for examples).

Before the establishment of the BSFNRRRA, local residents demonstrated strong ties to the Big South Fork area itself. For several residents, it was their ancestors who were among the first Euro-Americans to settle within the area in the early 1800s, with their descendants continuing to live in the same community for over a century. A few families can even trace part of their heritage to indigenous Native American populations. It was also these early self-sufficient farming families that gave place names to certain locations within the National Area, which are still in use today. For instance, the tributaries of the Big South Fork River on which the early communities of Station Camp and No Business were located still bear their names (Station Camp Creek and No Business Creek for examples).

Because a large section of the Big South Fork (BSF) area was purchased by large lumber and coal industries in the late 1800s, consisting primarily of absentee ownership, local residents were allowed continuous free access to resources within the BSF region. Employees of the industries were actually encouraged to use the forest and river as needed. Local residents could hunt, trap, fish, or gather forests products as "freely" as they pleased. The BSF area acted more as a "commons" for residents. For local residents, the area provided the resources necessary in order to maintain their self-sufficient life-style, from firewood and coal for heat, food for the table, medicinal plants to cure

the ill, and swimming holes for entertainment and baptisms. Abandoned log houses of those who settled the area in the early 1800s were welcomed to those who needed a hunting lodge for the night. In addition to selling surplus hogs and other livestock, mountain farmers supplemented their income by cutting timber and gathering roots and herbs, especially ginseng. Not only did the area continue to be important to local residents for hunting, fishing, or the collection of various forest products, but also as a place of ancestral ghosts and family cemeteries; not only a place that symbolizes where they came from, but who they are today in their minds and hearts. In short, the BSF area is very important to local residents' "social identity."

With the establishment of the BSFNRRRA, came NPS regulations and restrictive access to resources within the area. In keeping with its wilderness designation, only 11 motorized access points are now allowed into the gorge area. Traditional and meaningful access points to the river by local residents were not primary criteria in choosing the access sites, traditional fishing spots for examples. The choice of areas for these 11 access points was based primarily on constraints imposed by natural or cultural resources and recreational consideration, such as logical canoe trips and compatibility of canoe access with other recreational activities at the site. Other restrictions pertain to hunting and fishing, horseback riding, camping, hiking, and collection of nuts and fruit. It is illegal to collect items such as ginseng, or to pick flowers within the National Area.

Beginning in 1997, the NPS began to gather public input on the creation of a ten year General Management Plan (GMP) for the BSFNRRRA. Following traditional procedures for gaining public input, the NPS held Open House meetings at local courthouses or town halls to obtain local input on the management of the National Area. Symbolically, according to local residents, Open House meetings presented a hierarchical and militant atmosphere, with NPS employees (dressed in NPS uniforms) leading the topics to be presented and discussed. Overall, the meetings were poorly attended.

The final draft of the GMP was completed in 2006, which serves as the overarching policy under which site specific plans are prepared in future developments. Therefore, the study area provides a perfect opportunity to observe and analyze the policy and methodology park officials are required to follow in creating a management plan and eliciting public participation. The BSFNRRRA also offers a setting to monitor issues and sources of conflict, resistance, and/or cooperation among local residents and NPS employees pertaining to the management of the area's cultural and natural resources.

Conservation, displacement, and resistance

Originally, preservation and sustainable management efforts concentrated on the protection of nature and paid little attention to the needs and concerns of people living in or around newly established protected areas or public lands (Stevens 1997; Hitchcock 1994; Greenberg 1989). Recent studies, however, examine the relationships between conservation/preservation activities and local residents (Chan, Pringle, Ranganathan,

Boggs, Ehrlich, Haff, Heller, Al-Khafaji, and Macmynowski 2007; Xu and Melick 2007; Stonich 2001). Several of these studies demonstrate the social impact on local residents, especially in areas where people traditionally depended on resources for subsistence as a part of their “livelihood.”

In other incidences, people living near protected areas or public lands are impacted by both the over use of an area and depletion of resources due to the “implementation of conflicting natural resource policies and laws” (Kothari, Singh, and Suri 1996:61). Others may be subjected to government policies that restrict land use and access to important traditional resources such as forests, pastures, agricultural land, wildlife, and cultural sites (Hitchcock 1999; Hitchcock 1985). Those who were forced to settle outside of protected areas found that the natural resources of their former lands were now off-limits to local use. Traditional subsistence resource use that was critical for survival became criminalized. Traditional resource use became “poaching,” and settlement became “illegal squatting,” with the “protection” of the protected area from indigenous populations through fences, armed patrols, and threats of jail terms and fines. Stan Stevens (1997) places the origins of this model for protected areas with the creation of Yellowstone National Park in 1872.

An example of the utility of indigenous participation in the control of natural resources, and minimal social impact on the local populations is documented in the works of Marshall Murphee. Murphee (2004) has explored the rural development and conservation of Zimbabwe's wildlife through a program referred to as CAMPFIRE (Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources). CAMPFIRE emerged in the mid-1980s, seeking to restructure the control of Zimbabwe' countryside and giving people alternative ways of using their natural resources. Under CAMPFIRE, people living on Zimbabwe's communal lands, which represent approximately 42% of the country, can claim ownership of wildlife on their land and to benefit from its use. While the program includes the management of all natural resources, it focuses primarily on wildlife management in communal areas, particularly those adjacent to National Parks. Since the CAMPFIRE's official inception in 1989, the program has engaged more than a quarter of a million people in the practice of managing wildlife and reaping of its benefits.

Research also demonstrates the important role of anthropologists in working with policy pertaining to protected areas in order to maintain cultural diversity (Crespi 1989), to promote cultural conservation and community development (Howell 1994), as advocates for local interests in the planning and management of National Parks (Olwig 1980), to document long-term consequences of tourism (Smith 1989), and in order to limit social conflict (Howell 1993; Howell 1989). While working in the 1970s on a folk life survey project in the area that was to become the Big South Fork National River and Recreation Area, Howell was in a position to answer questions that local residents had pertaining to the new “Big South Fork Project” and hear their opinions about the establishment of the BSFNRRRA. Because of her position, Howell was able to inform the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers of residents' competing goals for develop-

ment in the area, thereby curtailing “some” of the initial social conflict and resistance when the project was in its infancy. According to Howell, however, if the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had recognized the larger social impact that the creation of the BSFNRRRA was to have on local residents at the time, and not just give “ cursory attention” to its social impact, then perhaps the degree of social conflict and resistance that currently exists would have been diminished or nonexistent (Howell 1994; Howell 1989). The social impact statement did not assess the possible social and cultural impacts of residents’ impending relocation.

The previous studies indicate that conservation, preservation, and recreation efforts must address the needs and concerns of local people if protected areas or public lands are to be managed with minimal social conflicts and stress, or impacts on the environment. Research also points to the importance of understanding local environmental knowledge along with livelihood strategies, social organization, and the dynamics of public land management (McNeely 1994; Western, Wright, and Strum 1994; Little and Horowitz 1987). Yet despite the growing awareness of social conflict over public land, minimal attention has been given to issues surrounding preservation activities and its social impact on local residents, especially incidences of conflict or resistance after re-settlement of local residents for the purpose of conservation (Oliver-Smith 2006:143). Research in this area is especially important in light of current development projects supported by global ideological practices for and funding of certain kinds of conservation strategies (Gezon 2006).

Methods and theory

Methods utilized in this research study include both quantitative and qualitative methods (a survey, formal interviews, informal conversations, focus groups, participatory mapping, participant-observation, and analysis of issues presented by local residents and special interest groups). A central goal of the research is to investigate the various perceptions towards the management of the BSFNRRRA, focusing on potential conflict between the ideology of private versus public land management issues (conflict between conservation, preservation, and recreational goals for examples), and how this conflict and resistance is manifested. In order to gain an understanding of findings, the paradigms of conflict and resistance theory is used as a framework to analyze data.

One could date the beginnings of resistance theory to the writings of Karl Marx in the late 1800s, with Marx’s prediction of the insurgence of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. Marx’s viewpoint was founded on what he called the “materialist conception of history.” According to this view, it is not the ideas or values human beings hold that are the main sources of social change, but economic changes. Therefore, the conflicts between classes, the rich versus the poor, provide the motivation for historical development. In Marx’s words, “All human history thus far is the history of class struggles.”

Numerous interpretations or expansions of Marx's major ideas are possible, also given rise to various contemporary theoretical positions (conflict and feminist theory for examples). What these various perspectives share in common is a central focus of analysis pertaining to the struggle for scarce resources by groups in society, and how the elites use their power to control the weaker groups. People may invest in meanings over symbols as well as in the means of production, with struggles over meaning as much a part of the process of resource allocation as are struggles over surplus or labor process. Struggles over land and environmental resources are simultaneously struggles over cultural meanings (Peet and Watts 1996).

Drawing on case studies, William Schweri and John Van Willigen (1978) demonstrate three components of what they refer to as a "provisional theory of resistance." In their own study, Schweri and Van Willigen conducted research among local residents who organized to resist the proposed development of a dam and reservoir project by the Corps of Engineers in eastern Kentucky. Resistance manifested itself as residents realized the threat of the dam to their every day way of life. They perceived the costs of the proposed dam as outweighing its benefits, such as the lost of cemeteries, churches, and residents' homes due to flooding of the area.

From these case studies, Schweri and Van Willigen (1978) proposed three components for a "provisional theory of resistance." The components include: 1) resistance processes require the linkage of behavior to "fundamental beliefs" through "ideology," 2) the resistance process is fundamentally a symbolization process, and 3) communities will tend to determine the impact and assess its cost. Cost levels [impacts] are related to the motivation to resist. If the perceived costs are high enough, communities will develop and maintain resistance organizations.

This brings us to a discussion on the current division within resistance studies. While early research focused primarily on public, collective, and organized forms of resistance (at times manifesting in violent forms, grand social movements, or revolutions), James Scott (1990; 1985) illuminated the importance of everyday and individualized forms of resistance. While resistance can be understood through multiple theoretical paradigms, this paper situates itself within the framework of the latter.

The Power of Everyday Resistance

When coercive power is enforced by the state, whether it is a prison guard or an employee of the National Park Service, an individual's power to resist is often curtailed, sometimes severely. Yet, it is not wholly destroyed. What remains may be no more than what James Scott (1985) refers to as "the power of everyday resistance." One of Scott's main objectives in *Weapons of the Weak* is to examine the relationship between the proletariat (poor peasant class) and the bourgeoisie (the rich farmers) in the Malaysian village of Sedaka (a pseudonym). In his study, Scott attempts to refute the Marxist theory of "false consciousness" by studying the social consciousness of the subordinate classes. For example, false consciousness is recognized in the classical Marxist view that the bourgeoisie create a "false consciousness" among the proletariat who are led

to believe that if they were not successful, it is due to their own fault for not working sufficiently hard enough rather than because their opportunities for advancement were blocked by the powerful upper class. According to Scott, a "false consciousness" rests on the assumption that elites not only dominate the physical means of production, but the symbolic means of production as well, and that this symbolic hegemony allows them to control the very standards by which their rule is evaluated (Scott 1985:39).

Although Scott comes from a political economy background, he chose to approach his fieldwork using a phenomenological methodology. His goal is to discover the meaning of actions based on an understanding of their context in a system of values and symbols. Using the technique of participant-observation, Scott attempts to describe the actions and conversations of all participants in village life in the context of changing social relations that resulted from the green revolution. Scott recognizes, however, that observing behavior alone is not enough, but that consciousness of symbols, norms, and ideological forms underlying behavior is needed to fully understand actions of resistance.

Influenced by the reading of Goffman and his concept of dramaturgy, Scott speaks of "on stage" behavior (where one offers credible performances to the other side) and "public transcripts," related to the public realm and found under the control of the dominant group. He also speaks of "hidden transcripts" and "off stage," practiced by both the dominants and subordinates, where both take off their masks and begin to talk safely in the secure limits of their own private spheres. It is in within the private domain that plots start, where discontent and forms of resistance arises. Scott uses this as evidence for a separate ideological consciousness between the peasant class and the elite, thereby weakening the Marxist argument for a "false consciousness."

In his study of hegemonic control of the peasantry by the elite, Scott found that these peasants are not kept in line by some form of state-sponsored terrorism, but what he calls "routine repression" (legal restrictions, occasional arrests, and warnings for example). It will be demonstrated in this paper that local residents of the BSF area claim to experience "routine repression" by NPS rangers, manifested in the form of "harassment," believing that they are treated more unfairly than "outside visitors," especially in the issuance of citations.

Scott also recognizes that because of local economic, political, and kinship ties, the peasants knew that overt political action would cause more harm than good. Therefore, Scott contented that peasant rebellions and revolutions are not always the most effective means of resisting hegemonic control, exploring instead "everyday forms of peasant resistance." Everyday forms of resistance include: foot dragging, sabotage, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, gossip, rude nicknames, character assassinations, and arson (1985:29).

Scott notes that while these actions may not alter the peasants' situation in the short run, it is in the long run that they may be more effective than overt rebellion in undercutting state repression and authority. Furthermore, everyday forms of resistance do not require coordination or planning and typically avoid direct symbolic confrontation with authority or with the norms of the elite. Instead, this form of everyday resistance often acts as a form of self-help for the peasant, acting as an indirect attempt to make an alternative account of the social situation count and to gain back a sense of control. According to Scott, both the peasant class and the elites are simultaneously constructing a worldview.

This is especially true with the changes in class relations due to the green revolution. Although there was always an extreme class division between the peasant class and the elites, there was a mutually held normative ideology that the two classes were dependent upon each other. While the peasants provided needed labor for the rich landowners, the latter were obligated to treat the poor fairly, to provide jobs, and to give alms to the faithful and needy during certain times of the year. With the green revolution, class relations shifted due to changes in the method of planting and harvesting of rice. Because of the introduction of combine harvesters, there was no need of hired labor. The landless peasants no longer had a means of "livelihood." The stinginess of the rich not only brought economic loss to the peasant class, but it also attacked their social identity. The only weapon the peasant class controlled in this struggle was their ability to undercut the prestige and reputation of the rich.

Summarizing, resistance happens because of some perceived threat to a community and its "fundamental beliefs." We see this in *Weapons of the Weak* when the peasants' livelihood is threatened due to the introduction of machinery in the rice fields. Secondly, resistance is a symbolic and dynamic process, often using existing social structures or channels of communication. Lastly, resistance occurs when there is a perceived threat to the continuation of one's livelihood, with the impact and perceived costs to one's way of life influencing the degree of resistance. The latter is congruent with Schweri and Van Willigen's third component for a "provisional theory of resistance," that cost levels [impacts] are related to the motivation to resist. If the perceived costs are high enough, communities will develop and maintain resistance organizations. It is this conceptual framework which is used as a model for identifying manifestations of resistance within the Big South Fork area, that resistance is manifested among those who perceive a threat to their "social identity" and "livelihood," and the form of resistance is influenced by the perceived severity of this threat.

Manifestations of resistance in the Big South Fork area

Examples of Scott's forms of "everyday resistance" among local residents of the National Area include incidences of vandalism and theft, demonstrated at the historic Blue Heron mining site where display cases describing the history of the former coal-mining town were broken into with artifacts (a mining helmet, lunch pail, and auger) either stolen or destroyed. As one NPS employee relayed:

There have been many break-ins, vandalism, destruction, and theft at Blue Heron, yet every time the NPS threatens to remove the mining objects on display, there is an outcry in the newspaper and on the radio. You just can't win.

Other forms of vandalism at the site include the destruction of soda machines and phones at the concession area, in addition to the destruction of signs describing the "ghost structures" located within the historic site. Another form of what Scott describes as "everyday resistance," arson, occurred when the gazebo located at the Overlook which looks down on the Blue Heron mining site was set on fire, and when the port-a-john at the Overlook was blown up with dynamite. Other examples of arson, which occur throughout the BSFNRRRA, include the burning of historic structures, especially log cabins that were built in the 1880s by residents' ancestors. The feeling of local residents being that they would rather "have it burnt to the ground than in the hands of the government."

Forest fires are also continuously set after the closing of trails or roads that prevent access to traditional areas. According to another NPS employee:

People around here get really upset when we [NPS] have to close off vehicular access to areas they use to use in the past. They either rip down our signs saying 'No Vehicles Allowed' or set fire in retaliation ...I would say that 95% of the fires in the Big South Fork are due to arson.

Examples of "everyday resistance" also exist in the form of slander, character assassination, and malicious gossip. Examples of these are found in newspaper articles, nicknames for park rangers such as "jack boot nazis," graffiti such as "NPS Sucks," and even a song on the radio comparing a female NPS ranger to Lizzi Borden. Looting continues to be a problem in the BSFNRRRA, especially of Native American artifacts, in addition to poaching and the illegal collection of medicinal plants such as ginseng, primarily for profit.

The importance of collecting ginseng to supplement local income is demonstrated in an interview with a local resident who is a waitress at a local restaurant:

Well I don't care how much those park rangers tip, they have hurt us financially with all their restrictions on what you can and can't do now in the park. That's why I serve them sneezers. I sneeze in their coffee. ...My family use to make a lot of money collecting ginseng, it was like

a family tradition. We would all go out together and teach the young ones how to harvest the root and put the berry back so plants would be there for future generations. We can't do that anymore. We use to get around \$40.00 [US currency] for a pound of ginseng. This helped out a lot to buy school clothes and other things we needed. Now we have to depend on a government check to help us out financially.

In addition to the importance of collecting ginseng in the past to supplement residents' livelihood, it was also seen as a family tradition and a part of residents' social identity of self-sufficiency.

Other examples of "everyday resistance" include local residents shunning NPS employees when they met them in public places, such as restaurants, gas stations, grocery stores, or the new Super Wal-Mart. Other NPS employees describe how residents often make derogatory remarks about them through "gossip" or that they will write "a nasty article in the local newspaper."

Resistance towards the NPS can be seen when local residents boycott the BSNRRA in general, when they "refuse to have anything to do with that Park again." During an interview with one resident and his eldest son, the resident described the symbolic meaning that the No Business Creek area held for him:

No Business always meant a lot to my family, for camping, now the NPS has turned its meaning on its head. There are restrictions on getting there, and if you do get there, there's more restrictions. You can't even pick a flower for your wife without taking a chance of going to jail. I had a ranger almost give me a ticket because I threw an orange peel on the ground. He said I was littering. Can you believe it? I tell, you, as long as I am alive, my son and his kids will never step foot in the park again.

Similarly, another resident describes her memories of the No Business Creek area:

I remember being with my family at No Business, and then later I took my children there to camp, picnic, to just be near the water. It was a family tradition. It doesn't mean anything to me anymore, because I can't get there. They [NPS] closed off the road to the river, and I'm too old to walk that far and my children refuse to go without me. I suppose those days are a thing of the past.

The previous statements demonstrate the severity of local residents' resistance towards the NPS, when they state that they "refuse to ever step foot in that park again." Resistance also manifests itself when residents boycott cultural festivals sponsored by the NPS, even when the festivals provide educational activities on the history of the area, and when residents resist attending Open House meetings sponsored by the NPS.

Concluding remarks

As discussed previously, due to the low attendance of local residents to Open House meetings sponsored by the NPS, I was hired as a consultant to investigate barriers or circumstances inhibiting residents from attending the NPS meetings. It was discovered that residents prefer communication between themselves and NPS employees on a more informal and common ground. A community center or church for examples, in lieu of the more formal Open House meetings held at courthouses or town halls. In addition, in place of a formal meeting, focus groups proved to be more beneficial by utilizing the methodological technique of participatory mapping in order to acquire local participation and input on the management of the National Area. For example, in using the focus group method and a common ground to obtain local input, the hierarchical arrangement of power is diminished, and the intimidating figure of authority is removed, thereby curtailing conflict and resistance between symbolic opposite parties.

Participatory mapping proved to be most beneficial in identifying locations of resources that are essential for the continuance and protection of the indigenous population's "livelihood" and "social identity." Currently, manifestations of resistance are in the form of routine and individual acts by local residents. Residents have found other means to support their livelihood. However, with the continuance of additional restrictions to access of natural and cultural resources within the BSFNRRRA, impacting areas that are viewed as a part of residents' social identity, resistance may transform into more organized and public acts of resistance. An example of this additional restriction being the closing of the Oneida and Western Railroad bed to vehicular access. The railroad bed, currently a dirt road, also leads to traditional places for camping and family cemeteries. Family cemeteries are very important to the social identity of local residents. This fact was expressed during an interview with a local resident.

The park service needs to realize that this [BSF] area is a big part of who we are, my mom is buried here, my dad is buried here, and my great-grand parents, and so on. If the NPS recognizes this [social identity], then folks would participate more, we feel we are treated as if we were outsiders.

The NPS has been hesitant to close the road due to responses from local residents and the actions that they may take.

In conclusion, it is imperative that the NPS recognizes the continual threat to local residents' "social identity" and "livelihood." To work towards some means of sustainable access. If the cost levels [impacts] are related to the motivation to resist as exemplified in the works of Scott (1985; 1990) and in the work of Schweri and Van Willigen (1978), then it can be predicted that conflict and resistance will also continue to manifest itself between the NPS and indigenous population, and perhaps in the form of more organized and public acts of resistance. The importance of this research may also be of help to other organizations involved in developmental projects that affect the social identity and livelihood of indigenous populations.

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Social Movement, Spectacle, and Momentum

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Introduction

Resistance is strategic. In this article I offer a social movement analysis of the 1991 public controversies and resolution of the jailing of the homeless by Fort Lauderdale Police. It demonstrates the role of the popular intellectual in generating the momentum that is essential for change. I argue that two important success elements are missing from the framing processes: the momentum of oppositional argument and goal attainment which should be a statement of repentance from establishment interlocutors who are being challenged to change the existing order. I argue that activists in social movements make mistakes by not building momentum toward a public outcry leading to an outcome which includes a statement of redemption from the antagonist.

Social movement activists can use interpretive frames that promote collective action and that define collective interests and identities, rights and claims. I refer to these specialists as "Popular Intellectuals". They should be viewed as individuals firmly embedded in social networks trying to influence the public during contentious episodes. My aim is to show that resistance strategies can be taught through a model using a momentum archetype which is the best way to combine ideological work with political initiative.

Visualize Momentum as a Linear Strategy

The term momentum is often associated with the stock market or political campaigns. Revel's Bolero may come to mind when we hear the term because in this piece of music, we hear repetition build to crescendo. As a child, I was introduced to the concept of momentum through the children's book, *The Little Engine That Could*. In that tale, a long train must be pulled over a high mountain. Various larger engines are asked to pull the train but they refuse. The request is sent to a small engine, who agrees to try. The engine succeeds in pulling the train over the mountain while repeating its motto: "I-think-I-can". My mother read the story to me and like many other American children, I learned about optimism through my mom's repetition of the words: "I-think-I-can", "I-think-I-can", "I-think-I-can." As the little engine reached the top by drawing out bravery and then went on down the grade, congratulating itself by saying, "I thought I could, I thought I could," I learned momentum, how it feels and sounds in my mother's affirming voice.

In 1990, I became a member of the Young Democrats and learned how to build momentum in political campaigns. I learned from a successful campaign consultant named, Monte Belote. He explained the logic and phases of a campaign: Name Recognition, Persuasion, Attack, and the final "Get Out The Vote" or "GOTV" phase of a campaign. An obscure, little known, political candidate needs to follow these steps in sequential order to become prominent and get more votes than the opponent. I argue that social movement actors should visualize an ascending, linear path just like a political campaign.

In this article I am not comparing social movements to political campaigns although political organizing is an important part of social movements. In what follows, I offer analysis of the public controversy of the Fort Lauderdale Police jailing the homeless. This police resistance collective-action frame was produced in the process of contention and proved successful. This collective-action frame and the flow chart model promote understanding of the sequence of work steps that make up the process of the development of frames. It is a practical module available for activists across the globe. Scholars will gain new disciplinary understandings of Popular Intellectuals and resistance studies using the momentum archetype to secure specifiable objectives conceptualized as movement outcomes.

Popular Intellectuals must select which frame is receptive to the public in order to create the ascendant momentum leading to a public outcry. After an outcry, the interlocutors must call for reparative treatment recommendations which include a statement of repentance. The charismatic Popular Intellectual ought to create a sense of crisis in the public and bring the movement to a watershed event that leads to the consequences of moral repair.

The Fort Lauderdale Case

In 1991, the Ft. Lauderdale Police arrested the homeless in high numbers under their "Zero Tolerance for Vagrancy Policy." The Police Chief said that the media had a mis-

conception about the police attitude about the homeless; the homeless are not a police problem because they are a societal problem. He said the police help the homeless, and the police never targeted the homeless for arrest. A social movement began to stop the jailing of the homeless. Before I discuss the case, it is important to discuss the theories behind the momentum model.

Current Theoretical Background

Social movement scholars, according to Robert Benford and David Snow look at “framing” as:

Meaning work--the struggle over the production of mobilizing and countermobilizing ideas and meanings. [1] From this perspective, social movements are not viewed merely as carriers of extant ideas and meanings that grow automatically out of structural arrangements, unanticipated events, or existing ideologies. [2] Rather, movement actors are viewed as signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers.” (613)

In language, meaning depends on the context, so this principle can be seen as a tool for changing minds by controlling context.

In their article, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” they explain the verb “framing” as an evolving process:

which entails agency in the sense that what is evolving is the work of social movement organizations or movement activists. And it is contentious in the sense that it involves the generation of interpretive frames that not only differ from existing ones but that may also challenge them. The resultant products of this framing activity are referred to as ‘collective action frames.’(614)


Using a Flowchart Strategy

One might object here and disagree with my choice of constructing a linear flowchart. “A flowchart is a diagram that uses graphic symbols to depict the nature and flow of the steps in a process” (Tribus 2). The purpose of developing a linear flowchart is to show that resistance strategies, which include core framing tasks, can be taught using a standardized process. Admittedly, there are a number of things that can go wrong when you try to standardize action steps and identify only the major action steps in a chronological order. From my research, I have not discovered anyone who has created a flow chart to show social movement steps as a process of core framing tasks leading

to goal attainment. I have created this Social Movement Model (Figure 1) to show a symbolic representation of my concept.

Flow Chart Meanings

There is a systematic way to see how controversy moves through the public and between interlocutors. Implicit in our questioning of the intent of Popular Intellectuals should be the notion of how the Popular Intellectual must select which frame is receptive to the public in order to create the ascendant momentum leading to a public outcry. As a starting point for my analysis, I will provide an explanation of how I perceive the Popular Intellectual as a leader who can deploy sequential actions to create momentum. Referring to the flow chart in this article:



The oval shaped symbol with the words, “Individual in private life with political will,” is the starting point in the process. This depicts a trigger action in the process.

This case study begins in 1991. I started counting the number of homeless people that were booked into the county jail for city municipal ordinance violations. This was easy for me to do since I was in charge of the Public Defender Intake Division. At the same time, I joined the Broward County Young Democrats and began sharing my interest in helping the homeless with others in the group. I asked the President of the club if I could organize a "Homeless Project" within the organization. Several club members began meeting with me regularly and one member offered to create a documentary on our project.

Preparation Step The next step on the flow chart indicates a set up operation for the individual with political will. I had to prepare by establishing a reliable presence in groups and multiple publics.

Process Step This action step tells the individual to become a leader of the group. As Chairman of the Young Democrats' Homeless Project, I joined a loosely organized group of 70 Homeless advocates and providers who met monthly as the "Homeless Coalition." I shared my knowledge of a high number of homeless arrests with the Broward Young Democrats, the Homeless Coalition, and the Police Reform Coalition.

Preparation Step I had to prepare by establishing name recognition as a leader. The Broward Young Democrats Homeless Project continued and so did the making of a documentary called, "The Flame of Hope Auction," which featured members of the club and I organizing dissent on the Ft. Lauderdale jailing issue, hosting a sleep out to raise awareness about the homeless, and planning a charity auction to raise money for the Broward Homeless Coalition. The narrator and producer of the documentary filmed me going to club meetings discussing the project. My name recognition increased as my committee gained prominence through all of these activities. Since I was the leader, I was invited to numerous events. From this point on, I will refer to myself as the Popular Intellectual for this particular series of social movement events.

Decision Step This indicates a question or branch in the process. Please look at the flow chart to see where this step falls into the sequence. Diagnostic framing of the issue happens at this stage. It is important to emphasize the theoretical background of this activity. Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow describe "Core Framing Tasks." They refer to these core framing tasks as "diagnostic framing" (problem identification and attributions), "prognostic framing," and "motivational framing." I will only discuss diagnostic and prognostic framing. The first task for the Popular Intellectual framing the argument is to identify the source(s) of causality, blame, and/or culpable agents. But as Benford and Snow point out, "consensus regarding the source of the problem does not follow automatically from agreement regarding the nature of the problem. Controversies regarding whom or what to blame frequently erupt between the various social movement organizations comprising a social movement as well as within movement organizations" (Benford 616). This was a significant obstacle for the movement organization because religious and charitable organizations are reluctant to challenge to challenge the police.

In May of 1991, I was able to convince an editor of the Miami Herald to write a story about the Ft. Lauderdale Police homeless arrests because I felt that the police's wrongdoing has put the standards or their authority in question.

A front page story appeared in the paper, "Police Vagrancy tolerance is 'zero,'" which investigated the Ft. Lauderdale Police policy for arresting municipal ordinance violators and tied the policy to the opening of a new downtown arts theater. The article said, "In a campaign police call "zero tolerance," officers regularly arrest homeless people sitting on park benches, fishing scraps from trash cans and munching sandwiches outside convenience stores, records, show" (Miami Herald, 1991). The police arrests that the reporter referred to in the article were from my research that I had conducted on every "at large" address arrest for almost 5 months. There were more than 300 arrests of homeless in the City of Ft. Lauderdale in May 1991. I saw this article and the editorial page that chastised the police saying, "Zero Tolerance is Wrong," as my first deployment of framing the homeless as victims being unfairly persecuted by the police.

Process and Decision Steps: I had to identify the culpable agent's leader. I decided it was the Chief of Police. Now that I knew how the Police Chief was going to frame the issue, I was prepared to initiate core framing tasks and use diagnostic framing or problem identification and attributions to identify the source(s) of causality, blame, and/or culpable agents. But as Benford and Snow point out, "consensus regarding the source of the problem does not follow automatically from agreement regarding the nature of the problem. The Homeless Coalition was not very keen on attacking the Police Chief. Controversies regarding whom or what to blame erupt between the various Social Movement Organizations. So instead of trying to build consensus from each person on the Coalition, I went out and met with homeless people and the documentary crew went with me. I brought one of them to a press conference I organized.

I met with a group at a press conference forum of invited guests from the Young Democrats, American Civil Liberties Union, the National Organization of Women, and Union Leaders. I invited the Chief of the Ft. Lauderdale Police to the press conference and meeting held at the United Way. I considered this a coordinated instrumental protest action that directly confronted the decision-making official.

The Police Chief said that the media has a misconception about the police attitude about the homeless. He said, "The homeless are not a police problem because they are a societal problem, and the police help the homeless and the police never targeted the homeless for arrest." The Chief of Police tried to deflect the problem from being a police problem to a societal problem. He also asked, "Is it the business owner's rights or the homeless individual's rights that are important?" He was contradicted when I was able to show the data of the number of homeless arrests.

One guest that I invited to "sandbag", which is a political term used to surprise a guest into contradicting themselves, was a homeless elderly woman who had been mistreated by the police. She chastised the Chief after he spoke. Since framing shifts

context in order to change the moral valence (Fiore 4), I needed to reorient the audience by changing the frame that the Police Chief used as the “police helping the homeless” to the “Police persecuting the homeless.” Framing is competitive between an antagonist and protagonist and I knew that I needed to influence how the problem was understood by presenting a person with first hand knowledge of the police abuse. I presumed that my audience that attended the meeting did not have personal experiences with homelessness and only conceptualized what living on the streets feels like when law enforcement officers encounters them. Through the elderly woman’s testimony of being victimized by Ft. Lauderdale police officers, the press conference became more of a spectacle for the reporters that were present.

My identification of the Police Chief as the culpable agent’s leader is important to establish. This can be seen on the flow chart as a decision. Notice was given to the Chief at the press conference. The second core framing task that Benford and Snow identify is known as “prognostic framing.” Here is where the mistake is made by activists. Whenever the social movement leaders devise a proposed solution to the problem, a plan of attack, and the strategies for carrying out the plan; they often fail to include a call for reparative treatment recommendations which include a statement of repentance. Using Walker’s theory of moral repair, I argue that prognostic and diagnostic framing must include core framing responsibilities with goals that injustice to the victim does not go unaddressed.

The Popular Intellectual ought to identify the wrongdoer to the movement and urge this culpable agent to address the harm, offense, or anguish caused to those who suffer. If the culpable agent fails to make amends after being asked to by the Popular Intellectual, then the public outcry phase should begin.

At this point I developed the prognostic framing that we need to decriminalize the homeless using the slogan, “Homelessness is not a Crime” and proposed a solution to the problem, a plan of attack, and the strategies for carrying out the plan. I wanted the Chief to cease arresting homeless charged with minor life sustaining offenses. The Chief maintained his reality that his officers were not targeting the homeless. I wanted the Chief to be involved with the Homeless Coalition’s reparative treatment recommendations which consisted of housing and treatment and not jail.

Process (Refer to the top of the flow chart)

Since the Police Chief was claiming his Department policy was not targeting the homeless and no apology came from him, I had to coordinate an instrumental and expressive demonstration. I organized a spectacle to show a public outcry of 120 homeless people and their advocates in front of the Ft. Lauderdale Police Headquarters. I considered this an expressive demonstration or a protest that indirectly expresses dissatisfaction to decision-making officials. The protest was featured on the major network English and Spanish television news and in two of the largest daily newspapers in the Ft. Lauderdale metropolitan area. Protestors shouted, “Don’t make us do the time, Homelessness is not a crime.”

Terminator: Moral Repair as a Strategy

At the end of the flow chart, I have placed goal attainment as the end of the process. Movement outcomes should be evaluated in terms of goal attainment for individuals and groups. Margaret Urban Walker in her book, *Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations After Wrongdoing* says it best, "Moral repair is the process of moving from the situation of loss and damage to a situation where some degree of stability in moral relations is regained" (6). She says moral repair is a communal responsibility which incorporates communities having three ongoing tasks to reassert norms:

First, communities are responsible for the reiteration of the standards that have been contravened and reassertion of their authority, at least if the wrongdoing has put the standards or their authority in question. Second, communities are responsible for the legitimization and enforcement of the individual wrongdoer's proper acceptance of responsibility and consequent obligations to submit to or perform reparative action, at least if the wrongdoer is identified, available, and subject in some degree to the community's control. Third, communities are responsible for seeing that injustice to the victim does not go unaddressed, or, more precisely, that the victim does not go unaddressed, but receives acknowledgement that the treatment by the wrongdoer was unacceptable to the community, and assurance that this is a matter of record and due importance to the community. (30, 31)

I articulate these elements of moral repair as a goal of social movements and Popular Intellectuals both theoretically and through reflection on my participation in the Ft. Lauderdale, Florida case.

Framing the Homeless Issue using the Momentum Model

The Ft. Lauderdale case was part of a larger social movement for homeless rights because of the group actions that focused on carrying out, resisting or undoing a social change. A key insight to my approach is the significance of the public outcry which relied on large-scale communications in order to *matter*. The theories behind this model are based on social theory as a technique of illumination. Sharing my experience and calling me a Popular Intellectual may be considered by some a dubious distinction. However, in order to consider then satisfy the conditions and possible flaws of the model I propose, I had to share my lived experience as it applies to the model.

The momentum became what they call in the news business, "a story with legs" since I frequently appeared on talk radio, spoke to news reporters, held meetings with organizations, and convinced the homeless themselves to stand up for themselves. The pub-

licity caught the attention of one of the largest law firms in the state and an attorney met with city leaders and me and threatened a class action suit. The social movement action came to a crescendo when the Miami Herald wrote a story a day or two after the demonstration, "Lauderdale Police Chief: We didn't target homeless." In the article, the Police Chief agreed to have a representative from the police join the Homeless Coalition to help solve the homeless' problems.

In the end, the Fort Lauderdale Police, City Manager, and Mayor strengthened their moral relationship with the homeless and their advocates by agreeing publicly to join the Homeless Coalition. The Chief made an important reparative statement that the police never meant to target the homeless for arrest. An ordinance was created by the City of Ft. Lauderdale establishing a Civilian Review Board as a standing committee made up of civilians to review police actions. The city opened a tent in front of City Hall to house the homeless until a permanent shelter was opened. This tent remained open for almost a year. Today, there is a new Police Chief and City Manager and the City of Ft. Lauderdale has a special unit that is responsible for diverting the homeless who are committing life-sustaining minor crimes into a homeless shelter that was built when the tent was shut down. Unfortunately, the number of homeless arrests for violating municipal ordinances is climbing once again.

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“Fuck Normalization” Young urban ‘troublemakers’ as meaningful political actors

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Before I entered the academic world I was working as a policy advisor for the Dutch national union of high school pupils: an extraordinary position because in most countries high school pupils do not have a union, let alone policy advisors working for them. My job became even more remarkable in December 2007 when widespread rioting broke out in several Dutch cities. Teenagers went out in the streets to demand fewer useless classroom hours and a higher quality of education in general. Such large scale youth uprisings had not been seen in Holland for years. The topic dominated the public debate for days.

A while ago I was reminded of this period after reading an interview with the chairman of the high school union in the newspaper¹⁵³. According to the article this precocious seventeen-year-old was ‘the new hope’ of Dutch politics because of his tactical talents. He was depicted as the architect of the uprisings last December and, also, the catalyst of the return to normality because he closed a deal with the ministry of education. I was rather surprised by the article because I remembered the events quite differently. The union of high school pupils was expected to be in control of the protests.

¹⁵³ See Dagblad de Pers, May 18th, 2008: “Tussen klaslokaal en boardroom.” source: <http://www.depers.nl/binnenland/203020/Tussen-klaslokaal-en-Boardroom.html>

However, we had no idea why the pupils had gone out on the streets so suddenly, let alone where the masses of high school pupils would strike again. We had to watch the news like everyone else to keep ourselves updated. I remember our chair man who sat at a desk with his hands in his hair, not knowing how to handle the wild crowds that he was supposed to be representing.

Seeing things in the middle

While comparing my own memories with the interview I was reading I could not help but think of cows, grass and clouds. This seems strange in relation to a serious topic like derailed teenagers, but this quote of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari explain my rather odd association:

It's not easy to see things in the middle, rather than looking down on them from above or up at them from below, or from left to right or right to left: try it, you'll see that everything changes. It's not easy to see the grass in things and in words ([.....]; never is a plateau separable from the cows that populate it, which are also the clouds in the sky) (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 25)

Deleuze and Guattari explain how words can change the course of events drastically. The words we choose to describe a sudden event necessarily make us look back at it from some distance in time. Looking over our shoulder we lose the capability to be still in the middle of the event, we step outside of it and analyse it from afar. Our structured thinking makes us dissect the event in bite size pieces; we separate the cows from the clouds and the grass.

From our outside position we see a clear hierarchy in the event: we cannot lose ourselves in the meshed grid that carried the event in unexpected directions. We tend to separate the actors involved in the event from the situation surrounding them, understanding their role as a thing in itself, apart from the total experience that the event provoked when we were still in the middle of it.

This need to subsequently structure events from the outside, applies to my example of the high school riots. When looking back at the riots through the words that were written in the interview, it seems that a different interpretation was created to mask the uncertainty triggered by events. The spontaneous chaos that the pupils created in many cities devoid of an articulated and reasonable political message or demand, was incomprehensible and frightening to many. The subsequent confusion was abated by appointing the chair man of the high school union as the architect of the protests. The idea that there was an initial actor deliberately setting the events in motion, an authority with a clear vision who led the ignorant masses, was much more comforting than adolescent pandemonium.

It seems that the collective Dutch memory wishes to remember the high school riots of last December according to a hierarchical structure. The idea of a rhizomatic¹⁵⁴, horizontal movement, a spontaneous network of actions inspired by instant excitement, without rationally formulated demands or motives does not fit into our familiar thought system. We cannot think of such a movement as productive or valuable. Such a movement would lead to mayhem devoid of political meaning and incapable of making political claims.

The incapability to view events 'from the middle' is a recurring error in accounts of urban youth riots in Europe. In this article I will explain why this is problematic to understandings of such events by looking at two recent cases of riots that both took place in Copenhagen. Copenhagen was recently the stage of two fierce clashes between angry young people and the police. In March 2007 thousands of alternative left-wing activists protested the loss of an old squatted youth-house that functioned as their hang out¹⁵⁵. In February 2008 hundreds of youngsters from immigrant backgrounds went out in the streets after an older man was harassed by the police in their neighbourhood¹⁵⁶. In the cases of the Copenhagen riots it was difficult to understand afterwards what drove these youths to reek havoc on the city. However, it is exactly this disturbing and deregulating effect that gives the Copenhagen riots political value. Attempts to give posterior order to the riots serve to distort the political meaning of these events.

I will begin by briefly explaining the general motivation for both Copenhagen riots and by commenting on the differences between the two. Hereafter, I will analyse both cases from a perspective that will reveal some important similarities in the way the rioting youngsters are criticising the rest of society. Although I was not personally present during the riots, I visited the neighbourhood where both events started in May 2008 and interviewed some people involved in the events. I will use material from some of these interviews combined with reflections on the theoretical work of several philosophers to portray the young rioters as meaningful political actors. This analysis will contribute to an understanding of how seemingly senseless violent outbursts become valuable signs of a political struggle, exactly by viewing them as they are: spontaneous disorder generated by an instant excitement, without rationally formulated demands but still with a strong political claim.

¹⁵⁴ Deleuze and Guattari emphasise the concept of the rhizome to be able to describe a network shape of organisation. Grass has a rhizomatic growing-structure; it grows randomly in all directions, connecting different points in an unpredictable and untraceable way. This is the opposite of the growing-structure of trees, which grow in a linear direction that can be clearly and rationally understood, traced and reproduced.

¹⁵⁵ English information on the events can be found on the website of the youthhouse, www.ungeren.dk. On the eviction: <http://www.ungeren.dk/spip.php?article130>

¹⁵⁶ See this article in The Copenhagen Post, published Februari 12th 2008: <http://www.cphpost.dk/get/105589.html>

After explaining how the violent deregulation of existing structures can be seen as a genuine political act, I will elaborate on the claim of equality, as a universal necessity, emerging in such a political act. In both cases of the Copenhagen riots the youngsters involved opposed mechanisms of normalisation. By doing so they make us aware that true equality lies in the fact that we are all in the same world despite differences of beliefs, identity and behaviour. This claim for true equality is not only a criticism of existing political structures, but also the starting point for a democratic political agency that can lead to the emancipation and empowerment of those unrepresented within existing political structures.

The rioting youngsters were not just uncivilised outcasts, the victims of their poor socio-economic life-circumstances. They are political actors demonstrating the necessity to reinvent politics in an urgently active way, in a way that breaks through the structures of well organised and clearly arranged political institutions and makes clear to us that the battle for genuine justice and equality has still to be fought out on the streets.

These young Danes are just an example of how we could see other rioting European youngsters as meaningful political agents instead of members of a lost generation surrendering themselves to nihilistic violence.

A hot year in Copenhagen

The Copenhagen riots are particularly interesting because two at first sight completely different groups of youngsters set the same neighbourhood on fire in a relative short period of time. Norrebro, the site where both of the Copenhagen-riots took place is a lively popular neighbourhood. There are no superficial indications that this area has been the stage of various violent uprisings throughout Danish history¹⁵⁷.

The squatted youth-house Ungdomshuset, located in this area, was the centre of alternative youth culture in Copenhagen until March 2007. The eviction of the youth-house set a series of violent riots in motion that lasted for weeks. During my stay in Norrebro I visited one of the weekly solidarity demonstrations against the eviction and interviewed Else, one of the participants. She told me that the movement grew over time to present a much broader cause than the support for the youth-house alone. People felt affiliation with a general struggle for free space in the city and the right to dissent from the common behavioural norms. The youth-house movement had become the symbol of a struggle for the right to question authority, to question a political system that is increasingly perceived to be the performance of control-politics. Gavin,

¹⁵⁷ Traditionally a strong working class area, Norrebro is known for its politicized inhabitants. The squatting movement BZ had several violent clashes with the authorities in this neighbourhood in the '80. The squatters were fighting for better social housing in the then very run down area. A tragedy took place in Norrebro in 1993 when eleven anti-EU demonstrators were shot by the police. In the late '90 some big riots between young immigrants and the police also took place in the area.

a 26 year old medical student and the flag-bearer of the solidarity demonstration I attended, gave me a similar account of the attraction of the movement in an interview that I had with him later.

This wish to create space for alternatives to the establishment is best expressed by the plan the youth-house sympathisers had to blockade City Hall; symbolically locking-up the politicians in their own institutional domain while, they, the young activists, would have the whole city to move around in freely¹⁵⁸. The movement is still going strong today. Weekly solidarity demonstrations attended by hundreds of people continued until the youngsters recently received the key to a new youth-house. Plans are currently made to involve the sympathisers in the activities of the new house.

It seems the youth that went out on the streets of Norrebro in February 2008 was representing a whole different struggle. A couple of hundred youngsters from immigrant backgrounds left a trace of destruction in the same neighbourhood during one turbulent week. The events were initiated by inhabitants of Norrebro but soon they were joined by other youngsters from different areas of Copenhagen. The Danish media were speculating about the reprinting of the offensive cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed in *Jyllandsposten* as a motive for the youngsters to start off the riots, but both the youngsters themselves as well as different police advocates stated that the cartoons did not play an important role in the violent outburst¹⁵⁹. The police suspected the rioting youngsters to be bored because of the lack of activities in their neighbourhood. Anoir, a Moroccan Danish social worker that works with the youngsters from Norrebro who were involved in the riots, told me in an interview that the youth's frustrations were first of all inspired by the injustice they felt at the hands of the police. The youngsters had told Anoir that the new 'visitation-zones' in their neighbourhood had led to constant 'preventive' searches that went hand in hand with insults by police officers. Perceptions of constantly discriminated and suspected of criminal behaviour put them on edge. When they saw the police were not only insulting them but also a respected older man from the neighbourhood, they flew into rage, sparking of riots. Unlike the youth-house sympathisers, these youngsters were not deliberately trying to stand out from their environment, instead their wish was to blend in. Their goal was not to dissent from the common norms of behaviour, but rather to show that these common behavioural norms of behaviour are stigmatising them against their will.

When analysing my interviews and observations differences between the two cases of rioting first caught attention. The youth-house movement seems to have a lot of elements of a traditional political protest movement: The youngsters involved made comprehensible political statements. From the beginning there was a clear demand¹⁶⁰ and they were capable to communicate their message in a co-ordinate way to the outside world¹⁶¹. The youngsters from immigrant backgrounds seemed to display a more emo-

¹⁵⁸ See: <http://www.ungeren.dk/spip.php?article567>

¹⁵⁹ See: <http://www.cphpost.dk/get/105730.html>

¹⁶⁰ a new youth-house.

¹⁶¹ See their website <http://www.ungdomshuset.dk/spip.php?page=english>

tionally inspired protest without conscious-political claims. Only with help of a local social worker they were able to communicate their motives in a letter sent to the press¹⁶².

This lack of political focus also became clear in the targets they chose to attack. Where the activists of the youth-house destroyed banks and establishments of multinationals like McDonalds, which they saw as representatives of an oppressive capitalist economy, the youngsters from immigrant backgrounds also attacked the library, schools, local shops and even the office of the social workers that support them. The youth-house activist chose deliberately to destroy symbols of the mainstream culture they detest, while the youngsters from immigrant backgrounds seemed to have worked off their anger more randomly. This difference might lead back to the different values and the different view on social participation of both groups. The youth-house activists are struggling for an alternative for the established society they do not wish to be part of because of their divergent behaviour and convictions, whereas the youngsters from immigrant backgrounds are struggling to be accepted as a full part of the same established society that they would very much like to be invited to. The youth-house activists wish to be seen and respected as different, whereas the youngsters from immigrant backgrounds are seen as different, but wish to be respected as equal. In what follows I will argue that this focus on the differences between the two Copenhagen riots is but a preliminary interpretation of the events.

De-regulating existing structures

In an analysis of the riots that took place in the banlieues of Paris in November 2005, Slavoj Žižek interprets these events as a direct effort to gain visibility in a society in which the rioting youngsters experience themselves to be excluded from the political and social space (2007, p.14). The riots in Paris caused general consternation because the youngsters involved did not refer to any political demands or statements and therefore seemed to perform a senseless outburst of violence. Their political claims were misunderstood because their actions did not seem to imply any rational demands. This misunderstanding shows exactly the lack of visibility of these youngsters. According to Žižek's interpretation, the Parisian rioters did not wish to make any other demand than to be taken serious as citizens of the society that seemed unwilling to accept them. Their struggle for visibility had to be performed in a violent way because the closed rational structure of present-day political order did not leave the youngsters any other option. The sense of their actions therefore lay in its disturbing effect in itself. They pushed their way into public awareness in a rather compelling way. This effort to become visible actors in political and social space can also be seen in both cases of the Copenhagen riots.

Despite the fact that the youth-house activists wish to be respected as different and the youngsters with an immigrant background wish to be respected as equal, one could

¹⁶² An article on the letter in The Copenhagen Post: <http://www.cphpost.dk/get/105741.html>

argue that both groups are not taken serious as political actors and wish to gain access to the public domain. The ways in which both groups of young rioters in Copenhagen expressed their political awareness opposes the discourse of established and traditional democratic political institutions. This discourse is reflected in the organisational structure of several European cities like Paris, Amsterdam and Copenhagen where a consensual hegemony of collaborating technocrats from different institutions like political parties, commercial companies and non-governmental well-fare organizations are ruling public life (Swyngedouw (2007), p. 64). This consensual hegemony seems to account for the demands of every social group in civil society because of its horizontal structure that leaves space for diversity. However, one can only participate within civil society when expressing oneself in the appropriate 'civilized' manner or language, when coming up to so called 'procedural discursive expectations' . If one does not speak the appropriate language, one is not taken serious. Outsiders that are not recognised as adjusted citizens are only noticed inside of civil society if they perform some kind of 'uncivilised' intervention. From the institutionalised point of view such an 'uncivilised' intervention is perceived as a destructive disturbance of the order and controls that is necessary to keep society safe. From the point of view of the rioters, it is the only way to break free of the control mechanisms that keep them off side.

By directly addressing the emotions and fears of others the rioters claim space to influence the political system, pushing for the realisation that the democratic consensus is leaving them out as active participants. This standpoint is best reflected in the interview I had with Gavin about the youth-house riots. Gavin explained to me that the violent riots were not the exciting choice of adventure seeking youngsters, but a last act of despair, because they realised it was the only means they had to break the power monopoly of the institutions that would not allow them their own space. During the days of the riots people were put in detention just for walking in areas where earlier actions had taken place, or just for wearing black clothes. Gavin told me:

“No one felt safe and everyone felt judged, so then you might as well do something [use violence, FK]. More and more people saw it as the only way to confront the strict measures of the police. The riots turned into an all or nothing situation in which people felt like they were defending the last free space in the city. If we would let go, it would be over.”

Where Zizek accepts violence as a necessary means for non-accepted youngsters to gain influence within social and political space, Alain Badiou takes this one step further. It is, according to him, exactly the violently deregulating impact riots have on their environment that make them a genuine political act. For Badiou politics necessarily finds itself outside of institutional areas, because politics is about prescribing new possibilities that are overlooked in existing structures. Politics is not about affirming a status quo, but about localising the undefined spaces that are not covered under the presentation of a current situation. When the flaw in the system is uncovered in an

event, a whole new perspective unfolds before us and new possibilities emerge to re-arrange the situation (Badiou, (2005), p. 72). Those revealing these possibilities can transform from meaningless figures on the sideline into subjects whose actions can influence the world.

The deregulating of a current situation and the appointing of the flaws in the existing system is never a comfortable event, it causes turmoil and disorder¹⁶³ (Badiou (2005), p. 100/101). It means rupture and confusion, it turns our world upside down, sometimes in a rather violent way. Youngsters that resist a system that they perceive to be false or unjust are performing a political act, exactly because they deconstruct the existing order. They bring into practice the necessary 'unbinding' effect of a political act. Their actions are political because they manage to step outside of the blind spot of the political-institutional structure in which they were non-existent as actors so that they too may influence society. By disrupting this structure they affirm their own power to act.

To stand up against humiliation is to strive for equality

Following Badiou's theory we can understand how an 'unbinding' and disrupting political event that is shared by singular people in a singular moment can make us paradoxically aware of issues with a universal impact concerning all of us. Badiou states that a just political event should be prescribing a genuine equality which is not founded in mechanisms of normalisation. (Badiou (2008))

In both cases of the Copenhagen riots the youngsters involved challenged the perception of 'normal' citizens that make a contribution to society. Their violent intervention in the peaceful course of events in the city contests general ideas about what is normal behaviour for a respected citizen. However, the direct and confrontational character of their uprising makes it difficult to ignore their presence. The provocative disruption of the rioting youngsters could make us aware that we are still sharing the same public domain, whether we accept their behaviour or not. In the terms of Badiou we could come to realize that we are in the same world, whether we accept it or not (Badiou, 2008). This awareness leads to an understanding of the broader significance of the Copenhagen riots as events prescribing a claim for equality, based on a shared presence in the same world, not on similarity in character, behaviour or belief system.

Fundamental equality does not lie in a shared identity, in who we are, but in the fact that, despite differences of conviction, identity or behaviour, we are in the same world:

¹⁶³ The events that take place in such a deregulating situation can't be predicted nor defined. We can never talk of the politics, but only of diverse singular moments of politics that are each based in a different event and experienced by a different subject. Political truths derived from such events can therefore never become a doctrine, although they do require a full conviction.

...the African worker I see in the restaurant kitchen, the Moroccan I see digging a hole in the road, the veiled woman looking after children in a park. That is where we reverse the dominant idea of the world united by objects and signs, to make a unity in terms of living, acting beings, here and now. These people, different from me in terms of language, clothes, religion, food, education, exist exactly as I do myself; since they exist like me, I can discuss with them-and, as with anyone else, we can agree and disagree about things. But on the precondition that they and I exist in the same world. (Badiou (2008))

An unlimited set of differences is the first and most important thing that characterises the single world we find ourselves in. Exactly because people are always different this is the only just thing we can say of them without being tempted to categorise them. Their equality is therefore not an objective given, but something we decide upon, it is a prescription or a conviction that we decide to follow in every singular political event that we experience again and again.

Political equality is not what we desire or plan; it is that which we declare to be, here and now, in the heat of the moment, and not something that should be. [...] ‘Justice’ is the qualification of an egalitarian moment of politics in actu. (Badiou (2005), p. 98/99)

Therefore the equality between people is the truth that is produced in an axiomatic way¹⁶⁴ in any event that is aimed at breaking mechanisms of normalisation.

Maybe this truth is best expressed in the jacket that the girl wore who was walking in front of me in the solidarity demonstration for the youth-house that I attended. It had the quote “Un-normal and proud: Fuck Normalization” sprayed on the back of it.

The youth-house sympathisers clearly stood up against mechanisms of normalisation that they perceived to be unjust and that would leave them to be seen as divergent or even unwanted outcasts.

¹⁶⁴ The political truth, like all truths, has an axiomatic character. The axiom prescribes the consistency of our actions without defining what this consistency should look like with help of something outside of the axiom itself. Because the axiom can only point back at itself to explain its validity it can never be generalized or reproduced. For any generalization or reproduction we would have to be able to extract certain elements from the axiom that we could apply in an other setting or context. Since this is an impossibility, the axiom is always singular. We have to declare it to be the truth according to which we are willing to surrender completely with all our thoughts and actions. The axiom prescribes our actions not because we can prove that it is true according to an objective standard, but because we are convinced that it’s true.

Also in the riots in February 2008 the youngsters who went out on the streets were suffering under mechanisms of normalisation that they perceived as unjust. They felt stigmatised because their identity as young men from an immigrant background is mistrusted and deprives them from the possibility to be respected as normal citizens. The story of one of the boys who explained the motives of the February 2008 riots to the press from his personal perspective makes this confrontation with normalisation mechanisms clear¹⁶⁵. The boy was once stopped by two police officers for a search when he was walking around in his neighbourhood. He did not display any suspicious behaviour but the officers still wanted to strip search him and made him take off his pants on the street. The boy did not dare to protest because he feared the things the police officers were capable to do to him if they took him to the station, considering what they were already doing to him out in the open. According to Anoir, the humiliations the boy had to undergo symbolised the way many others from the neighbourhood felt at the hands of the police.

This kind of humiliation is being described by Hardt and Negri as a modern torture technique that springs from the overall present control-system that should keep our society safe from the harms that could be inflicted to us by 'unnormalised' outsiders or strangers. These outsiders or strangers are not literally outside society, they are amongst us but can be indicated as outsiders because of their behaviour that does not fit the general norm of what is accepted. (Hardt & Negri (2005) p. 19) By making people look ridiculously different from the well-behaved, their inferior position is defined.

The general consensus of what is normal or accepted has become a coercive doctrine within the political order, a doctrine one cannot escape from. Badiou states that a genuine political event should be aimed at breaking this doctrine of a general, normalising consensus. It is only possible to perceive people as equal once there are no categories to divide them into accepted and non-accepted groups. These kinds of categories are always propagated by certain privileged groups that are performing a false politics out of self interest or feelings of resentment. (Badiou, 2005, p.97)

Democracy as a way of direct emancipatory action

For Badiou, the prescription of equality based on a shared presence in the same world can lead to an understanding of democracy as a liberating process. This is an interesting thought because it indicates how youngsters involved in the Copenhagen riots are not only criticising existing political structures but also how their actions can lead to a positive, alternative interpretation of political agency within these existing structures.

Badiou makes clear that granting certain political privileges to people based on categories of nationality or juridical status can never be a completely democratic act, because it necessarily brings other people, who do not belong to the preferred categories,

¹⁶⁵ Anoir told me this story in the interview I had with him, but the story is also present in the letter that the youngster have send to the press. (see footnote 9)

in an a priori unequal or even prejudiced position. A direct political protest against humiliation, normalisation and exclusion on street-level is therefore more democratic than the dividing structure of democracy in institutional context. In Badiou's view democracy as a form of government always runs the risk that it is not properly representing everybody, because it is inclined to sustain the categorisation of citizens that will benefit privileged groups.

'Democracy' means that 'immigrant', 'French', 'Arab' and 'Jew' cannot be political words lest there be disastrous consequences. For these words, and many others, necessarily relate politics to the State, and the State itself to its lowest and most essential of functions: the non-egalitarian inventory of human beings. (Badiou (2005) p. 94)

Jean Luc Nancy shares this point of view. In his essay "Vérité de la démocratie" (2008) on the heritage of the events of '68, Nancy pleads for a reinvention of democracy as an attitude reflecting the fact that we are always-already-together in the world. Being-in-common with others is a given that does not have to be established by some kind of institutionalised system, it is the way we always-already are. Our most original state of being is always in relation to others; therefore being-together does not have to be realised afterwards. For Nancy democracy is in the first place a state of mind that reflects the awareness of this already being-in-common, even before this state of mind is expressed in a certain organisational form like a state-apparatus or electoral system.

For both Badiou and Nancy democracy is also the state of mind that refuses to bring the common being in a single world under the rule of a consensual, sovereign power-structure. The hegemony of a consensual identity of society or the good citizen should be traversed by democracy as a way of direct emancipatory action that gives freedom to the multiple singularities that make up the world. This kind of democracy is emancipatory because it is aimed at the liberation of those who are not represented in the consensual power structure of governmental democracy.

For Badiou politics can never be seen as means to an end. Politics is not aimed at the implementation of a structure outside of its own event that will guarantee the control of just and equal relations between people. Politics is always an end in itself, in the sense that only within the political event itself the truth of being on an equal basis can be prescribed, and never outside of it. Consequently, democracy should be seen as the political prescription of equality brought into practice in a singular event.

For Nancy democracy is not a prescription that we have to believe in, it is an infinite regime of meaning that we find again and again in the common being in a single world and that precedes any valorisation of this common being. Before we decide whether the being-in-common is beneficial to us or not, or whether we should support or enhance it, we realise that this initial state of being is the only state of being in which we are together on a completely equal basis. Therefore democracy is not an end, but just the beginning of an infinite search for a means to create space for just politics.

For every emancipatory political act we first need democracy as an attitude based in the realisation of the being-in-common. However, democracy as an initial attitude will never guarantee us that the outcome of our political actions will truly be a just situation.

Keeping Nancy in mind, I do not wish to claim that the rioting youngsters of Copenhagen are bringing a new organisation of democracy into practice that should be adopted by others. I simply wish to suggest that we could see their uprising as a search for means to open space for a just politics. One can see democracy as their initial attitude and motivation to strive for genuine equality, but it can be debated whether the actions of the rioters are an appropriate way of searching for equality.

In any case, whether we approve of them or not, both Copenhagen riots can be seen as singular events of genuine politics because of the desire of its actors to strive for equality by breaking an existing and paralysing institutional structure. Experiences of injustice have led the young urban 'troublemakers' to fight exclusion caused by mechanisms of normalisation in a confronting, disturbing and sometimes emotional way. Their 'abnormal' and 'uncivilised' uprising brings the injustice that is produced by the framework of accepted social and political participation to light. By confronting us actively with this injustice, the rioters are showing that they are meaningful political actors in society instead of bored teenagers or passive victims of their deprived life-circumstances. Seeing their actions in this light will also make us aware that our misunderstanding of their behavior is not a sign of their incapacity to make a meaningful contribution to society, but of our incapacity to understand equality as the shared presence in the same world despite any differences.

The spontaneous, rhizomatic and irrational character of riots like the ones in Copenhagen and the Netherlands leads many to think that they just imply antisocial behaviour, because we tend to recognise relevant political and social behaviour only as such if it has a hierarchical structure and a clear, premeditated political program. I believe that this is rather owing to our incapacity to understand the political value of rhizomatic, irrational direct outbursts like named riots, than it is to the incapacity of the rioters to make a significant contribution to society. I hope to have made that clear by explaining that it is exactly the disrupting impact of such riots that make them a genuine political act. Furthermore it is precisely this disrupting impact that can force us to think about equality, democracy and emancipation in a fruitful and renewing way.

The Copenhagen riots show us that youngsters from different backgrounds and with different ideals can still point at the necessity for a common struggle for equality and emancipation, in actions on street-level, but not necessarily performed in a co-ordinate way. I do not see the events in Copenhagen as an argument to strive at one new, generally organised, movement of resistance. The difference that Hardt and Negri make between the masses that let itself be ruled and the multitude that rules itself comes to mind here. (Hardt & Negri (2005)). For Hardt and Negri the multitude is radically democratic, because it does not accept any central sovereignty that is placed above the

rhizomatic network of a multitude of singular and autonomous acting and thinking people. The multitude therefore is a movement of movements, in which groups with at first sight contradictory interests can work together because they struggle against a commonly perceived subordination and for a transformation of existing unjust structures (Hardt & Negri (2005), p. 86/87).

The two Copenhagen riots represented two different struggles, but still some basic similarities can be analysed from both cases. Maybe the rioting Danish youngsters show that a shared struggle for equality could exist once the various urban 'trouble-makers' become aware of their common goals. They don't have to be brought together in a single protest-movement, since the singular events of local politics are the battlegrounds where present day emancipatory struggles should be fought out. A mutual recognition of one another as political actors will be enough for the various young rebellious people to support each other in the moments it is needed. In Copenhagen this awareness is already slowly raising. Gavin told me that a lot of youngsters from immigrant backgrounds had helped the youth-house activists to hide in their houses when they were being chased by the police. Anoir asked me grinning where I thought his rioting clients had gotten the Molotov cocktail from that had destroyed the front door of his office in Februari 2008.

Who knows what this kind of practical and beneficial recognition will lead to in the future?

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“The Battle of Algiers” – blueprint for revolution/counterrevolution?

Dr. Thomas Riegler

Gillo Pontecorvo's *The Battle of Algiers* dramatises a well known episode during the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962). It began as the National Liberation Front (FLN) made a calculated decision to move the existing conflict into the capital. By making Algiers a central battlefield and deliberately striking against civilians, the rebels could count on media coverage as well as French reprisals that would in turn gain them popular support. Their move was effective: In January 1957, after a string of bombing attacks on cafés and public places, the army was called in to deal with the “emergency situation”. General Jacques Massu and the 6,000 men of his 10th Paratrooper division responded with indiscriminate violence, torture and repression. This event was called only afterwards “Battle of Algiers” – it lasted until September 1957, when the last FLN-activists were either killed or arrested. Though the French won it, they proved to lose the war, granting independence to Algeria in 1962 (Horne 1977: 183–202).

Pontecorvo's film would probably never been made, had the FLN not displayed an interest in telling its story. Saadi Yacef, who had commanded the bomb-network during the last months of the *The Battle of Algiers* and had come to hold the post of government-minister, proved critical. Not only did he publish a memoir, but he also founded

the first production and distribution company to make a movie about the struggle. He enlisted Pontecorvo and script writer Franco Solinas and with a budget of US\$ 800.000, half from private sources and half from the Algerian government, *The Battle of Algiers* was then produced on location during five months in 1965. The film was an outstanding success: it won the grand prize at the Venice Film Festival, and survives as one of the most important movies in cinema history (Mellen 1973: 16–23). This contribution explores not only the film's extraordinary impact on left wing revolutionary groups since the late 1960s as a model for revolution, but also the usage of *The Battle of Algiers* as a training device for anti-guerrilla warfare by different militaries. In regard to sources, this article draws almost exclusively from Western publications.

A model for revolution?

Because of Pontecorvo's goal of realistic representation ("dictatorship of the truth") through a distinct grainy newsreel-like cinematography, use of real locations and pedantic observance of both factual information *The Battle of Algiers* still resonates across the years as an authentic and unique insight into the Algerian conflict. Part of this intimate knowledge came from personal experience: Since Pontecorvo was a leading member of the antifascist resistance in Northern Italy during the Second World War, he was familiar with the inner workings and tactics of an underground movement: "The methods of concealment of an underground movement in Rome, as in Paris, as in Algiers, are very similar, so I remembered many things that we ourselves had done when we were an armed underground movement" (Srivastava 2005). As Turin erupted in insurrection in 1945, Pontecorvo took command of the "Eugenio Curiel assault brigade": "He was intensely involved in propaganda for the insurrection: writing slogans and painting placards [...]. He once hijacked a fruit seller's truck with a loud-speaker, put a tape of anti fascist speeches inside it, and left it with the tape playing in Turin's main square, under the Germans' noses. Again, it is hard not to imagine that this was the origin of the scene in *The Battle of Algiers* when a young boy starts making pro-FLN statements from a PA set up by French soldiers." (Behan 2008). Furthermore the movie is based on extensive recherche: Before starting shooting Pontecorvo and Solinas spent eight months researching all aspects of the conflict, meeting representatives of the FLN in Rome, Paris and Algiers, but also taped hours of interviews with French commanders and veterans. For days, former FLN-activist Sala Bazi toured the filmmakers around the Casbah, and told them how his organization made explosives and put them to use. Ultimately, the casting of Saadi Yacef as the rebel leader – the same position he filled out during the real Battle of Algiers – added much plausibility: "I played that part for real. [...] I told myself (that by being in the film) I would be able to guide Pontecorvo, warn him when something didn't ring true. All the events in the film, we shot them in the exact spot where it happened " (Interview by Liza Bear 2004).

As final product of this process *The Battle of Algiers* reveals much of the tactics inherent in asymmetric war – such as random shootings, bombings of public places and even a "suicide"-like mission – but also explores the rationality and effectiveness of "asymmetric" terrorism. The adaptation of a "cell"-like organisational structure is explained

in detail as well as the propagandistic aspect of pamphlets and communiqués. “Perhaps no other film in the history of the art has shown so sympathetically and so minutely the delicate workings of a revolutionary organisation” (Mellen 1973: 68). Thus, from the beginning it was argued that the film could be adapted as a blueprint for revolutionary action. For instance, Jimmy Breslin declared on TV in 1968 that *The Battle of Algiers* is a “training film for urban guerrillas”. Pontecorvo did not challenge such assessments: “The film champions everyone who is deprived of his rights, and encourages him to fight for them. But it is an analogy for many situations: Vietnam for example” (Egbert 1969). Indeed, *The Battle of Algiers* had such a “stirring” effects upon its audiences. At the New York Film Festival in 1967, a *Newsweek* commentator noticed an aspect that troubled him: “Many young Negroes cheered or laughed knowingly at each terrorist attack on the French, as if *The Battle of Algiers* were a textbook and prophecy of urban guerrilla warfare to come” (Hoberman 2004). Within the radical Afro-American community, there was a heated discussion, if and how the film could be used in the major black ghettos. “Are The Revolutionary Techniques Employed in *The Battle of Algiers* Applicable to Harlem?”, asked an essay by Francee Covington in 1970. She reached negative conclusion, arguing that “importing” revolutionary techniques may prove disastrous results, since popular support for a revolution was lacking even within the Black community (Covington 1970).

Many other revolutionary forces had a different take: Both the Black Panthers and the IRA are said to have screened *The Battle of Algiers* for its members and according to Bruce Hoffman the film is the “favourite” of Velupillai Prabhakaran, leader of the Tamil Tigers (Hoffman 2002). It is however difficult to determine if there was any direct nexus between the viewing *The Battle of Algiers* and the evolution of insurrectionary strategy/tactics. Certain is that the film’s inspirational force roused passions, made people identify with the cause of anti-colonialism and international struggles, which were in full swing at that time. Time observed that the leftwing radicals of the early 1970s looked up to the depicted Algerian rebels as role models for their own fight: “Young people have plenty of examples of glamorous, if not always successful revolutionaries [...] Cops in San Francisco and New York both say that the movie *The Battle of Algiers* influenced much of the bombing surge. It centres on the moral dilemma of killing innocent people in the cause of revolution” (Time 1970). During the “Days of Rage”, a violent 1969 demonstration in Chicago’s fashionable Gold Coast district, the “Weatherpeople” imitated the terrifying war whoops of the Algerian women. “We shrieked and screamed as we ran, ululating in imitation of the fighters of *The Battle of Algiers*,” Bill Ayers tells us, “I saw us become what I thought was a real battalion in a guerrilla army, and it felt for the moment like more than theatre, more than metaphor” (Ayers 2003, 170). A few months later, Weather Underground leader Mark Rudd would urge his comrades to wage their own their own Battle of Algiers against military installations and police departments in the US (Time 1970).

Of course, young Western European spectators were also receptive: An admirer and observing student was Andreas Baader, leader of the Red Army Fraction, Western Germany’s most prominent urban guerrilla group, who regarded *The Battle of Algiers* as

his favourite movie. Biographers Klaus Stern and Jörg Herrmann noted remarkable analogies between the movies and Baader's path. They even claim that Baader orchestrated the "Dreierschlag" of 1970 – three bank robberies in West-Berlin during only 10 minutes – after the model of guerrilla action as depicted in *The Battle of Algiers* (Stern and Herrmann 2007: 104, 105). Only three years before, when the Student revolt was in full swing, Baader had planned to make a "socialist" movie about the events in West-Berlin – closely modelled on *The Battle of Algiers*. He is said to have handed director Peter Fleischmann a script, which is now lost (Stern and Herrmann: 90).

And finally, in an interview for the documentary *Terrors advocate* (2007), Yacef Saadi, recalled how he watched the movie in the company of Carlos Ramirez Sanchez, also known as the "Jackal": After the attack on the OPEC-conference in Vienna (1975), this "international terrorist" and his group had taken a pause in Algiers and were comforted by the government: "Carlos had already seen *The Battle of Algiers*. They asked to see me. I went there, we saw the film again and we even played soccer. [...] We tried to have fun like that." (Schroeder, 2007). Far from suggesting any direct connection between Middle Eastern terrorism and "postcolonial" Algeria this anecdote illustrates the film's resonance with all kinds of resistance forces.

Since then *The Battle of Algiers* and the memory of the French-Algerian War as a revolutionary call to arms slowly faded. Pontecorvo himself had remained "silent" after his last movie *Ogro* (1979): "Because (our) certainties have failed. And to make an epic film you can be wrong about the idea behind the film, but you must believe it strongly. Then maybe you will communicate. Now, everyone is uncertain" (Glass 1998). Much of the "grand narratives" Pontecorvo was referring to may indeed have been lost since, but recently the War on Terror and the occupation of Iraq sparked a new wave of political films like *The Road to Guantanamo* (2006), *Redacted* (2007) or *Battle for Haditha* (2007) – all of which were referring aesthetically to the "dictatorship of the truth" and reflected contemporary struggles. And before his death in 2006 Pontecorvo witnessed renewed recognition and interest in his work. Against the background of mounting political and social discontent time seems "ripe" again for a new *Battle of Algiers*.

A model for Counterrevolution and Counterinsurgency?

A surprising after-effect of *The Battle of Algiers* is that it not only inspired revolution, but also counterrevolution. In some paradox way, the movie can be read as an ode to the Para, which projects all those familiar clichés of military precision, virility, stealth and omnipotence. But also the film's insight and documentary quality has been crucial in attracting the attentions of right wing dictatorships and many different militaries across the world. From their perspective, the movie, with its attention to the mindset of the French military, can function as a guide in defeating revolution and insurgency. This "expertise" is articulated through Lt. Colonel Mathieu, described by one reviewer as "the very model of the modern counterinsurgency warrior" – handsome, supremely confident, steely and by far the most developed character in the film. Through him the viewer becomes familiar with the tactical dilemmas of the paratroopers and their counterstrategy: They have to fight an enemy, who not only disregards the "rules of

war“, but moves unrecognisably within a densely populated urban area. The FLN is protected by its clandestine structure in different “cells“ of only three activists with the least possible contact one below the other. Thus according to the Colonel, the challenge is to “know“ an enemy, who does not know even “himself“ – which means collecting any kind of relevant information – names, addresses and hideouts: “For this we need information. The method interrogation. [...] We need to have the Casbah at our disposal. We must shift through it [...] and interrogate everyone.“ In a very graphic way, Mathieu compares the FLN to a tapeworm, who can only be killed, if it loses its head (Solinas 1973: 117).

Quotes such as these form together an effectively compressed analysis of the thinking behind the French counterinsurgency approach. Mathieu is in fact a “composite“ character combining several key officers, one of them Colonel Yves Godard, who served as Chief of Staff during the battle. Like his alter ego in the film, Godard emphasized the overall necessity of intelligence. For him a bomb layer was only an “arm“ that could be replaced, so it was much more important to identify the “brain“ behind the attacks. Without a “brain“ there would be no more terrorism (Hoffman 2001: 81). That meant of course subjecting the Muslim population of Algiers to an indiscriminate and complete “screening“ process in order to get the needed intelligence. In the process of “fishing“ through the cordoned off casbah, the French arrested according to some estimates between 30 and 40 percent of the male population; many of them were “interrogated“ by special teams and subjected to gruesome torture. When the battle was concluded, police commissioner Paul Teitgen, who had personally signed warrants for 24,000 detainees, reported 3.024 persons “missing“. Many of the “disappeared“ had been thrown out of helicopters into the sea or were shot in secret by an execution squad outside Algiers (Horne 1977: 201). As the film demonstrates, the blank “organigramme“ was filled little by little with information coming directly out of the torture centres, symbolizing the dismantling of the FLN network through a long and painful process. The cornering of the last remaining leader Ali La Pointe brings *The Battle of Algiers* to its conclusion. Unwilling to surrender with three companions, their hideout is blown apart. A General present at the scene comments: “And so the tapeworm no longer has a head“ (Solinas 1973: 153).

Although the French eventually lost the Algerian War, *The Battle of Algiers* was considered a victory. Thus their accumulated “expertise“ was in demand and France established several military missions to war academies and training centres both in the US and a number of Latin American countries. For instance, the teachings and instructions of Algerian War veterans such as Colonel Paul Aussaresses, who had been in charge of secret torture teams in Algiers, fell on fertile ground within the Argentinean military. From 1975 on, the Junta was involved in “crusade“-like struggles against “subversives“ and, in this “Process of National Reorganisation“, many of the “methods“ which had been used by the French in Algeria were applied. That meant for example making torture victims “disappear“ by dumping them from “death flights“ into rivers and the ocean. As General Reynaldo Bigone told researcher Marie-Monique Robin, he and his comrades had learned “everything“ from the French: “The squaring

of territory, the importance of intelligence in this kind of war, interrogation methods. Our model was *The Battle of Algiers*" (Robin 2005: 50).

The film was itself was integrated into these teachings as a visual aid: In 1967 – after exiled French Colonel Jean Gardes, a veteran of the battle and member of the rightwing Secret Army Organisation (OAS) delivered a series of counterinsurgency-lectures at the School of Naval Mechanics (ESMA) in Buenos Aires – *The Battle of Algiers* was screened for the cadets. One of them recalled: "They showed us that film to prepare us for a kind of war very different from the regular war we had entered the Navy School for. They were preparing us for police missions against the civilian population, who became our new enemy" (Verbitsky 2005). The movie was also used during courses for Latin American police officers at the International Policy Academy (IPA) in Washington. One scene was picked out in particular: therein French policemen and hardcore elements of the settler population conspire to counter-terrorize the Muslim population by putting a bomb in front of a block of flats in the Casbah, which is promptly destroyed with loss of innocent lives. In reference to clandestine police tactics used by some Latin American dictatorships, A. J. Langguth for example has pointed out, that *The Battle of Algiers* was in fact used as a blueprint for police-terror (Langguth 1978: 120). Martha Huggins reached the same conclusion: "Interestingly [...] *The Battle of Algiers* was banned from movie houses in Brazil during most of the military period for fear that Brazilian victims of security force violence might recognise that the French techniques of search, arrest, and torture depicted in the film were those used by Brazilian security forces" (Huggins 1998: 135).

It was the Iraqi insurgency that aroused a renewed interest: One film critic even claimed, that "Operation Iraqi Freedom, which officially began March 20, 2003, started at the movies". This referred to the special screening of *The Battle of Algiers* by the Pentagon's Office for Direction for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflicts on August 27, 2003 (Hornaday 2006). As New York Times writer Michael Kaufman noted, the Pentagon audience – a civilian led group with "responsibility for thinking aggressively and creatively" on issues of guerrilla war – were "urged to consider and discuss the implicit issues at the core of the film: The problematic but alluring efficacy of brutal and repressive means in fighting clandestine terrorists in places like Algeria and Iraq" (Kaufman 2003). In a 2004 interview, Pontecorvo said he had found the Pentagon's interest in his film "a little strange". The most *The Battle of Algiers* could do, he said, is "teach how to make cinema, not war" (Povoledo 2004). From Pontecorvo's point of view the Americans screened his film not because "they thought the details were identical to Iraq, but because the overall atmosphere is very similar." But he added that "establishment figures will never like this film, because it shows that when people unite they are strong." (Behan 2004). Saadi Yacef was equally critical: "Algeria was a settler colony. Iraq is a modern colonial occupation; geographically, economically and sociologically it's unlike the Algerian situation. *The Battle of Algiers* should be able to teach people some lessons, but the Americans are bad students, like the French were, and they are making things worse" (Harrison 2007: 411).

Conclusion

Utilising film as a showcase in counterinsurgency was a poor choice in the first place: What it did not portray as prominently as torture was how non-violent means, like the recruitment of informers, worked much more effectively than simply tormenting people indiscriminately. The French even operated a group of FLN-turncoats, who infiltrated the casbah and reported on the whereabouts of their former comrades. Their information proved critical for the arrests of almost the entire FLN leadership in Algiers (Alexander 2002: 237–242). “The French had gained accurate intelligence through public cooperation and informant, not torture”, notes Darius Rejali and criticises the *The Battle of Algiers* strongly for promoting the “myth of professional torture” (Rejali 2007: 481) since the FLN in the movie is defeated solely because “torture worked” (Rejali 2007: 546). The history of the Algerian war tells a far different story on this alleged effectiveness of torture: The violence and repression merely antagonised the Muslim population, harmed France’s international reputation as well as the support for the war in the mainland. Further it happened to be the best “recruiting agent” for the rebel movement. In the end, torture was not an efficient mean against terrorism, but proved counterproductive. It is both ironic and deeply troubling that a movie, which is so committed to reveal the horrors of torture, was indeed used as a blueprint for further violence.

But when insurgent groups looked up to the movie as model closely to follow, they also committed a mistake: Western Germany was not Algeria, nor were the black Ghettos of the US. “Thus the film has been misunderstood, particularly by the Black Panthers who have used it as a manual for guerrilla warfare, because it has not recognised that the terrorist tactics carried out by Ali La Pointe and the others were the means not the victory but to temporary defeat” (Mellen 1973: 64). The original outcome of *The Battle of Algiers* was a heavy blow on the guerrilla, not only in manpower but also in matters of prestige: “The FLN’s own command structures were damaged, and its principal political leaders went into exile in the wake of the battle; this no doubt made it easier for them in important respects to pursue subsequent diplomatic and political initiatives, but it had not been their plan, and it deepened the internal divisions that were to resurface violently after independence. In many respects, the ‘battle’ was a disaster” (Harrison 2007: 398). Employing terrorism had failed; it did not spark any popular insurrection but left the isolated network to be crushed. It was a combination of political and military failures, a sceptical French home front and an extremist, uncompromising stance of the settler population and continuing support for the guerrillas from outside that made “L’Algérie française” a lost cause. The movie tends to oversimplify this outcome. Depicting the mass demonstrations of 1960, when protesters almost overran the European quarter, the voiceover in the coda tells: “Two more years of struggle lay ahead. And on the 2nd of July 1962, with the advent of independence, the Algerian nation was born” (Harrison 2007: 401). Constructing this casualty between *The Battle of Algiers*, which was in fact only a minor episode, and Algerian independence is misleading in many ways: It leaves out the long and desperate guerrilla war in the mountains, as well as the long and difficult path to the settlement. Thus *The Battle of Algiers* should not be seen as documentary “truth” in literary sense but – in Ponte-

corvo's words – as "a hymn in homage to the people who must struggle for their independence, not only in Algeria but everywhere in the third world." (Mellen 1973: 24).

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Towards a Pluralist Socialism

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Introduction

Since the 1950's pluralism has become perhaps the most influential theory of the political process in democratic capitalism. Due to pluralism's embrace of capitalist property relations it is not surprising that Marxism and Pluralism are viewed practically as diametrical opposites. Marxists view the pluralist notion of "polyarchy", where apathy is turned into a sign of health for democracy, as a super-structural construct which legitimates capitalist socio-economic structure thus encouraging mass acquiescence to its logic. However, in what could be seen as a vindication of the Marxist critique of polyarchy, pluralism's failure to account for the poor performance of the American political economy in the period following the second world war led major pluralists such as Dahl and Lindblom to call for considerable structural reforms, advocating the need for substantive equality through wealth distribution. They called the American capitalist system itself into question, contending that it "remains both sluggish and feckless in advancing on problems on which it has the advantage of decades of experience in policy making: poverty and mal-distribution of income and wealth, racial inequality, healthcare, public education, inflation and unemployment and industrial relations, for example" (Dahl & Lindblom in Manley 1983 p 372)

Since then Dahl has increasingly called his own theory into question, reflecting upon the notion that polyarchic democracy is the most the current capitalist system can deliver or allow, "In the twentieth century, the existence of a market oriented capitalist economy in a country has been favourable to democratization up to the level of polyarchy; but it is unfavourable to democratization beyond the level of polyarchy" (Dahl

1996 p 646) Considering this, Dahl's posed the question "under twenty first century conditions would democracy be better served by some new institutions, that would complement or perhaps even replace polyarchy? (Ibid p 648)

The failure of the "real socialist" alternative in the twentieth century is taken by many to provide a negative answer to this question. The high hopes bought about by the October revolution were undermined by the real socialist system's incapacity to mediate political difference (cf Held 1999) When politics did not begin to "end" with the dictatorship of the proletariat, as Marx was deemed to have envisaged, Soviet Marxism became wrong footed, leading to many gross repressions. Therefore, with the sudden collapse of much of the socialist bloc in the late twentieth century it became fashionable for free market ideologues to write with a strong triumphalist streak (c.f. inter-alia Fukuyama 1989 & 1992, Friedman 1997) This even led Fukuyama to proclaim that pluralist politics and free market economics constituted the end of ideological history as envisaged by Hegel. Considering the dangerous situation humanity finds itself in at this present juncture, such complacent views are hugely undesirable. They seem more of a case of unsubstantiated theoretical ecstasy than a credible account of the state of the planet. As a sober Alexander Solzhenitsyn warned shortly after the collapse of the Eastern Communist bloc "although the earthly ideal of socialism-communism has collapsed, the problems it purported to solve remain: the brazen use of social advantage and the inordinate power of money, which often direct the very course of events. And if the global lesson of the twentieth century does not serve as a healing inoculation, the vast red whirlwind may repeat itself in entirety" (in New York Times, 28/10/1993) Humanity urgently needs to find a more sustainable, equitable and democratic alternative.

To approach this end the essay will demonstrate how democracy can be improved through a reconciliation of the Marxist focus on the economic structure of society and the pluralist focus on the mediation of political difference. That is to say, I will demonstrate why class analysis is a better critical tool to understand the nature of power in advanced Western societies - laying the groundwork for an improved democratic model for modern societies - and argue that the establishment of a post-capitalist society needs the mediating influence of 'the politics of autonomous groups' if it is not to repeat the mistakes of "real socialism" in the twentieth century, ultimately posing the case for a pluralist-socialism.

The ruling class in polyarchy

The notion of a ruling class is extremely corrosive for pluralism. Clearly, the harmony of interests between competing groups would be completely corrupted by the privileged position afforded to a ruling class. If democracy is taken at its etymological meaning "rule by the people", indicating that the electorate is sovereign, there is not much space to call polyarchy democratic at all if sovereignty is, in fact, possessed by a ruling elite. This is the central notion behind Robinson's (1996) critique of "polyarchic democracy". In contrast, "popular democracy", though it does not enjoy a theory as fully elaborated as its counterpart (thus strengthening the hegemony - in the Gramscian-

an sense - of the polyarchic view) is rooted in Rousseauian-Marxist traditions and places much of the criteria for democracy in outcome. In doing so, "popular democracy" incorporates various considerations of 'social justice', "in which the construction of a democratic political order enjoys a theoretically internal relation to the construction of a democratic socio-economic order" (Ibid p 624). Unlike "popular democracy", by separating the economic from the political, "polyarchic democracy" is able to place the criteria for democracy completely in process eliminating considerations of outcome, thus enabling elites to embrace "democracy" without fearing a challenge to their power. Essentially, in this section I aim to begin to show through class analysis how social outcome can itself corrupt the democratic process. Notwithstanding the liberal separation of economic and politics, the analysis of power (which the essay shall argue to be economically formulated, thus showing this separation to be largely illusory) retains make or break implications for any theory of democracy.

There has been much debate and disagreement as to how power is structured in western capitalist societies. However, C.W. Mill's dismissal of Pluralist theory and its assumed harmony of interests as a "set of images out of a fairy tale" (Mills in Barrow 2007 p 407) was one of inter-disciplinary appeal, accepted by Marxists and elitists alike. Nevertheless, Mills was dismissive of the Marxist notion of a ruling class. Instead he maintained that both practically and theoretically, military, economic and political institutions are a separate source of power, the division of which hinders the emergence of a "ruling class" which would dominate the three spheres. For Mills "ruling class" was a "badly loaded phrase" which presupposed the automatic translation of economic power to political power by joining the purely economic term "class" with a political term "rule". Instead of assuming such "vulgar economic determinism" Mills contended it was more appropriate to talk of the "Power Elite", constituted by institutional trident (economic, political and military) providing separate sources of power.

Mill's dismissal of Pluralism as an adequate description of the way power was structured in American Democracy was well received by pluralism's critics across the political spectrum. However, it is of no great surprise that his separation of the economic, political and military spheres was heavily criticised. Sweezy was the first to elaborate what would become the most popular critique amongst Marxists - "the 'power elite' is overwhelmingly recruited from the upper levels of the class system, the same families contribute to the economic, military and political elites and the same individuals move easily and imperceptibly back and forth from one to other of these 'elites'" (Sweezy in Ibid p 410) Essentially, Mill's own empirical research showed that the "institutionary trident" was controlled by the same social class. Furthermore, Mills failed to appreciate the emerging role of finance capital and financial groups as the emerging vanguard of the capitalist class, which has grown to unprecedented levels at the present. Gore Vidal (born into this class and thus in a good position to know) marks out this 'capitalist class' as the richest 1 percent of American society. He provides an interesting account of how this class rules in the US- "they do get together at Bohemian Grove and they do a lot of picking of Secretaries of State. But they don't have to conspire. They all

think alike.... You don't have to give orders to the editor of the New York Times. He is in place because he will respond to a crisis the way you want him to, as will the President, as will the head of Chase Manhattan Bank" (Gore Vidal in Schweickart, 2002 p 106)

Admittedly, it is too simple to say that the ruling class rules by virtue of them 'all thinking alike'. Another basic and crude mechanism in modern polyarchies for political control is the funding of political campaigns, but there is a variety of other ways in which economic power translates into political power. Schweickart notes that ruling class rule is of an implicit and tacit form, "for in capitalist polyarchy, where it is theoretically possible for a political party to challenge the basic institutions of the system, it is crucial that the interests of the capitalist class are well formulated and buttressed by argument and data that will make it appear that these interests coincide with the general interest" (Schweickart 2002, p 108) This is done through an array of private foundations and think tanks (in the USA varying from moderate conservative or "liberal" such as the Ford Foundation to right wing bastions such as the Cato and Hoover Institutes) which draw up legislation, research policy providing a steady supply of "experts" to testify before representatives and appear on the media.

However, the most formidable weapon to make government conform in the capitalist class's arsenal is the "investment strike". Should government seek to instigate policies which are unfriendly to "business interests" or the "free market", contradicting the interests of Capital, this mechanism comes into play. Recession ensues and unemployment increases, especially in poorer nations where the "investment strike" of local capitalists is made worse by the backing of western capital. In polyarchy government leaders are held responsible for economic performance, so as long as production is directed by those who make no contribution to actual production (i.e. as long as investment remains in private hands) governments will automatically cater for the needs of the capitalist class in order to survive. A capitalist economy is structured in such a way that any alternative seems undesirable. As long as the basic institutions required by capitalism remain in place, prima facie it appears favourable to everyone to appease the needs of capital. Even if capitalism's blatant deficiencies are crystal clear and a more rational and humane mode of production is possible, once in place, capitalism has an extraordinary ability to perpetuate itself. By limiting democracy to political process polyarchy enables ruling class domination of polyarchic systems, producing an outcome which would be defined by Aristotle as "oligarchy" or "plutocracy" with considerable accuracy.

This is the central notion behind Manley's critique of revised pluralism. What he calls "pluralism II" still denies the importance of class, whilst contending that "business interests" dominate polyarchy. Furthermore, it attempts to reconcile the need for major structural change through distribution of income and wealth, more social ownership of productive means whilst supporting incrementalism and the continued necessity of "social pluralism" for democracy (Manely 1893 p 369 - 373) The problem is that "Pluralism II" defends and attempts to justify the same system that bough about the need for revision in the first place. Pluralism II is still dominated by the perceived necessity

and desirability of a capitalist mode of production, blinding it from the central cause of these inefficiencies within polyarchy, the capitalist economy. Conversely, class analysis “sees the maintenance of inequality under capitalism not as a failure of polyarchy - not as an incapacity or even a perversity - but as the whole point” (Ibid. p 372) Pluralism laments polyarchy’s failure to promote equality but, regardless, still views capitalist production as inherently linked to social pluralism and thus justifies its continued existence, even following reform. However, class analysis transcends this view seeing polyarchy’s shortcomings as part of the larger picture - the political economy of capitalism. Essentially, pluralism II fails to accept that economic transformation is the sine qua non of a radically democratized political system and this incapacitates it from proposing anything new.

Socialism and “TINA”

However, the “failure” of the “popular democratic” alternative in the twentieth century has served to justify such a limited definition of democracy. Karl Marx has long been criticised, with justification, for the failure of his predictions concerning the spread of Socialist revolutions. It is not surprising that his analysis of history is more respected than his ‘futurology’, this is especially so in the contemporary world where alternatives with the potential to mobilise the masses in opposition to the current market capitalist/liberal democratic order seem virtually non-existent (Fukuyama 1989 & 1992) The pervasiveness of the “There is no alternative” (TINA) ideology has even come to dominate discourse on the mainstream left in Western societies, where hopes for a more humane society are limited to ‘taming’ or ‘humanising’ capitalism rather than replacing it. Even the most fervent opposition in Western societies to the current globalised capitalist order, embodied by the anti-globalization movement, at most calls itself “anti-capitalist”, when alternatives are proposed (whether based on “old-left” or “autre-mondiste” thought) they are often convoluted and confused with fundamental areas of disagreement (Schweickart 2002) Here one can invoke another, somewhat ignored aspect to Marx’s predictions, concerning the future of capitalism, which can serve to redeem him from the failure of so many Socialist revolutions - “The advance of capitalist production develops a working class which by education, tradition and habit looks upon the requirements of that mode as self evident natural laws. The organization of the capitalist process of production, once it is fully developed, breaks down all resistance” (Marx in Lebowitz 2006 p 29)

Considering Rosa Luxembour’s stress that “the working class demands the right to make its own mistakes and learn in the dialectic of history” (Luxembour 1904) whilst adding a Gramscian perspective concerning bourgeois “hegemony” and the creation of “false consciousness” (Gramsci 1971) complements Marx on this point and can liberate Marxist analysis from the crude economic determinism expressed in the quote above. However this essay shall not consider the views, though by no means are they discarded, that Socialism “failed” due to the mistakes of the proletariat and its leaders, or that TINA is a result, not of Liberalism’s “victory” but of the ideological hegemony of bourgeois values and the ensuing passivisation of the working class. For now I wish

to bring attention to an aspect of the relationship between capitalism and democracy, which is somewhat ignored by Marxism and discourse in general.

Capitalism's corrosive influence upon democracy is an area which has attracted much debate among and between Marxists, Pluralists, Liberals etc. Classic liberal philosophers at times of early capitalism were extremely concerned about the threat to property that an extension of political equality (suffrage) to the mass propertyless would entail. Thus at a time of such capitalist hegemony, where universal suffrage has been the norm in many Western societies for over a century, the dominant "common sense" view that capitalism is democracy's natural concomitant poses a paradox. As well as explaining this in terms of "bourgeois ideological hegemony" Marxism should pay more attention to the influence "democracy" has had upon capitalism.

Far from being a tool to passivise the masses, as some forms of "vulgar" Marxism suggest, increases in political equality served to limit capitalism's excesses, in some places more than others, preventing the system from implosion. The application of universal suffrage and the myriad of rights gained through years of class struggle has served to curb capitalism's tendencies for exploitation. When critiquing CW Mill's exaggerated image of "the Power Elite's" (Mill 1956) omnipotence Herbert Aptheker states this in different terms - "Between the will of that elite and its capabilities of implementing that will, stands public opinion... and this public opinion does affect what the elite tries to do and what it does and how it does what it does... in whole areas of life as in wages and working conditions, housing and education... the desires and power of the masses do exert a great influence..." (Aptheker in Barrow 2007 p 415) Arguably it is polyarchic democracy's ability to mediate, even if such mediation is not satisfactory or favours certain forces over others, between the conflict of interests outlined in the excerpt above that curbed or obstructed to some extent (in some places more than others) the dictatorship of property that unbridled capitalism would create. The vehement and justified opposition an unbridled dictatorship of property would entail is something which undoubtedly influenced Marx's predictions. Clearly, the ruling class has consistently looked to curb and undermine the power of organized labour and has been granted a position of privilege and power in capitalist society to do so. Nevertheless, capitalism has survived, not just due to 'bourgeois ideological hegemony' and the failure of the twentieth century Socialist alternative, but also, in no small part due to 'representative democracy' or "polyarchy" itself. To an extent, this enabled the working class to imprint its class consciousness upon many Liberal societies, enabling them to adapt and incorporate 'socialistic' influences, whilst their "real socialist" counterparts became politically stagnant and almost monolithic.

Bill Warren argues this notion reflects an original aspect of Marxism which years of revision has obfuscated and confused, even forgotten. He laments the fact that the established socialist powers of the twentieth century and the organized working classes in Western societies came to support anti-colonial nationalism in the developing world following the Second World War. This resulted in "the domination of the (third world) working class movement by populist nationalism... reinforced by the petty-bourgeois

ideology of 'neo-colonialism', which tends to divert and dampen internal class struggles by channelling mass discontent against external alleged enemies" (Warren 1980 xii) The theoretical fulcrum of this corruption of Marxism is the revised/ignored role capitalism has to play as a bridge to socialism. Specifically the capitalist transformation of traditional/feudal agriculture and the encouragement of substantial industrialization thus creating the industrial working class and laying the groundwork for socialised production. The upshot of this "corrupted Marxism" is a crude and ahistorical "anti-capitalist romanticism" which entails a premature dismissal of bourgeois/parliamentary democracy as the best political environment for the socialist movement. Following the Bolshevik revolution, Marxists of the Kautskian tradition became wrongly discredited. To Warren, the success of the Bolshevik revolution in a relatively backward country did not disprove the classical Marxist theory on the conditions for revolution, but damaged the socialist nature of the Russian State by having it play the industrializing bourgeois role. Essentially, "the view that capitalism could be an instrument for social advance in pre-capitalist societies was erased from Marxism" (Warren 1980 p 8) in what led to a convoluted and mutated return to pre-Marxist Socialist utopianism.

Manley may be correct in his criticism of Dahl for subordinating class to "just another group" (Manely 1983) However, one should not underestimate the extent to which "the politics of autonomous groups" within representative democracy enabled organized labour to compete with other interests (even if business or 'ruling class' interests have dominated polyarchies overall) and enabled it to imprint its class consciousness upon society. In no small part, this is due to the Liberal preoccupation with how to secure freedom of criticism and action, choice and diversity and accountability in the face of political power, something Marxist theory has arguably underestimated. Even if the capitalist economic structure denies such freedoms to some and grants it to others. Conversely to the Liberal overemphasis upon the separation of the economic from the political sphere, Marxism's tendency not to treat political activity *sui generis* (expanded upon in the next section) incapacitated "Real Socialism" from mediating political conflict adequately.

The "End of Politics"

Though the stress upon the concomitance between politics and economics is one of the most useful features of Marxism, especially when providing a critique of Liberal Democracy, the assumption following that thought that politics would "end" with a classless society was perhaps the most harmful aspect of twentieth century Marxism. In Marxist thought this was born out of the subjection of politics to economic structure, a rejection of politics as a form of activity in its own right, leading to a lack of emphasis upon how politics is managed in a socialist society.

Alex Callinicos is correct in criticising the equation "Marxism = Leninism = Stalinism" (Callinicos in Held 1999 p 285) Indeed, he develops a criticism using classical Marxist theory influenced by Trotsky (1936) to explain the demise of Stalinism through the

concept of "state capitalism" and the exploitative relations it created between the bureaucratic/political class and the working class. However his attack upon Stalinism as a complete violation of and departure from Marxist thought is a dangerous one. For, following Rosa Luxembourge, if the project of the working classes is to learn from "the mistakes made in the dialectic of history", Marxism should incorporate the failure of Stalinism and adapt accordingly. Here, briefly, I wish to suggest how Marxism could begin to learn from this experience.

In order to do this, Stalinism cannot be understood as completely separate from Marxist theory but as one of the possible outcomes, amongst many, which came to dominate the application of Marxist thought to practical reality. By limiting politics to an outcome of the economic structure, Marx did not adequately address just how politics functions in a post-capitalist/socialist society. Indeed, this was in large part due to Marx's aversion to "utopian blueprints" manifested in his polemic against Proudhon in his critique of "historical action [yielding] to personal inventive action, historically created conditions of emancipation to fantastic ones, and the gradual spontaneous class organizations of the proletariat to an organization of society specially contrived by these inventors" (Marx and Engels, 1986, 64) In this light Marx is a scholar of capitalism, it was not his place to tell future revolutionaries how to conduct their post-capitalist economy.

Thus Marx limited himself to proclaiming "politics" to be replaced by an "association of free producers" where "the development of each is the development of all" (Marx & Engels 1848) admittedly, vague at best, but never intended to be more than that. It has been argued Marx's theory doesn't provide an adequate basis for the realisation of this ideal (Held 1999 p 288) The practical application of Marxist thought in the Soviet Union led to a lack of institutions which could manage differences of opinion, alternate political strategies and difference between social forces - notably the peasantry and the working class. Politics involves discussions and negotiations, thus, when politics did not "end" along with the establishment of the "dictatorship of the proletariat", Soviet style Marxism became somewhat wrong-footed, leading to some of the most extreme repressions of the twentieth century.

This is due to the Marxism's underestimation of the Liberal preoccupation with the significance of freedom of criticism, action and the importance of accountability with checks upon political power (Held 1999) In this theoretical vacuum a kind of "faith" in the end of politics following the abolition of private property and the development from "socialism" to "communism" emerged. As experience shows, this vacuum could not be completely filled by the autonomous power of the "soviets" (workers councils) and led to the reification of an already centralised political authority which increasingly coordinated and controlled events (Trotsky 1936) Indeed, Lenin's theory on the "revolutionary party" (Lenin 1917) was as an attempt to fill the empty space within Marxist theory, between the establishment of Socialism and the "withering away" of the state, with a centralised "political vanguard". Length constraints prevent a discussion upon how much Stalinist practice followed Leninist theory. Nevertheless, suffice

it to say, that for a renewed attempt at a “democratization of polyarchy”, Marxism should learn from the negative aspects of the Russian Revolution and adapt accordingly, perhaps the politics of autonomous groups could replace a “vanguard party” in this respect.

Despite the prophetic qualities that some of its advocates have granted it, Marxism is not perfect or monolithic, it must be open to change. In order to do this crude economic determinism must be left behind, everything does not root squarely into and is not perfectly explained by production alone. Indeed, from very early thinkers from the rich neo-Marxist tradition laboured to remove Marxism from its crude economic determinist implications (Gramsci 1971, Lukacs 1923 cpt 2) However, any proposition even slightly hinting at a Weberian separation of the economic and the political has become an anathema for Marxist intellectuals, attacked as if by reflex reaction as a “bourgeois myth” (Barrow 2007) In response, it could be suggested to “vulgar” Marxists that the expectation that politics would “end” along with a classless society is an ethereal notion, born out of a crude determinism which subjects the political sphere completely to the economic. It ignores the intricate web of relationships which form the political sphere, even if ultimately they are subject to economic structure. More analysis is required upon the relationship between economic structure and political institutions in post-capitalism. Can it really be expected that politics will disappear completely in Marxist society?

The immediate “end of politics” is not something even Marx envisaged, he accepted the “bourgeois state” would survive into the beginnings of Socialist society, “Bourgeois law ... is inevitable in the first phase of the communist society, in that form in which it issues after long labour pains from capitalist society. Law can never be higher than the economic structure and the cultural development of society conditioned by that structure.” (Marx in Trotsky 1936 cpt 3) To which Lenin adds “It follows that under Communism not only will bourgeois law survive for a certain time, but also even a bourgeois state without the bourgeoisie!” (Ibid) Even within Marx and Lenin’s account there is a “phase of development” where, under a communist economic structure the old “cultural laws” of the previous capitalist society along with a “bourgeois state” remain. This implies some form of separation between the economic and political spheres, even if this separation is limited to a delayed reaction by political structure to economic change. It would improve Marxism to accept that though the economic strongly impinges on and tends to determine the political, this is not necessarily automatically so, the relationship is more complex.

Conclusion

Pluralism and class analysis have always been viewed as diametrically opposed, competing theses. Nevertheless, Dahl and Lindblom attempted to reconcile their pluralism with “Marxist Humanism” in order to enable pluralism to tackle the exigencies of the American political economy’s poor performance. This is not possible if pluralism does not give a massively increased significance to class analysis (Manley 1983) and the role

classes have in the politics of autonomous groups within capitalist society. However, conversely, a revolutionized society under which democratization of polyarchy is achieved through a reconnection of politics and economics, with ensuing substantial decreases in inequality, will repeat the experience of the twentieth century if it does not provide adequate institutions which can mediate political conflict and relies on centralized authority to do so. Dahl himself acknowledged that socialism and pluralism are not necessarily opposed; “if by definition socialism entails social ownership of economic enterprises...and unless by definition it must be centralized, then a socialist economy could be highly decentralized and organizationally pluralistic” (Dahl in Manley 1983 p 371) Following his thought I propose that Marxism and class analysis should replace Pluralism to democratize polyarchy, whilst Marxism should incorporate “the politics of autonomous groups” to mediate adequately, once polyarchy has been democratized and politics fails to “end”.

This attempt to reconcile Marxism and Pluralism may be viewed with scepticism. It goes against a rich amount of literature placing these theories as diametrical opposites. Clearly, Marxists view Pluralists as apologists for the capitalist system. However this need not be the so. The case has been made for “Socialist Pluralism” before, such thought was a strong current amongst the Czech reformers of 1960’s (Barnard and Vernon 1977, Rustin 1895) The point is not to embrace Pluralism as valid model for democracy per se necessarily embedded within capitalist productive relations, but as a methodology to mediate political conflict, which could serve in post-capitalism. Indeed, C.W. Mill’s dismissal of the “harmony of interests” within pluralist theory as “a set of images out of a fairy tale” (Mills in Barrow 2007 p 407) is correct if accepted that real power lies in the “power elite” formed by a trident of separate political, economic and military institutions (Mills 1956) or in the exploitative power afforded to the ruling class across governing institutions in capitalist society, whether that be due to the nature of the relations between capitalist actors within the state (Milliband 1973) or the inherent nature of state structure (Poulantzas 1976) This influential debate is not entirely relevant to the essay. Suffice it to say that Dahl and Lindblom tacitly accepted the notion of a ruling group when they accepted that business groups are privileged in American “Democracy”. However, since it is unrealistic to expect politics to “end”, under different productive relations that do not create a “power elite” or a “ruling class” and thus do not render a genuine “harmony of interests” implausible, there is no good reason to believe that “the politics of autonomous groups” could not serve as an appropriate methodology to mediate political conflict. This would not necessarily lead to the “withering away of the state” but to its continuation as a space to contend political ends whilst free from economic privilege.

However, Marxism’s credibility as an alternative to the current global order is at a historical low. It is commonly underestimated even ignored in advanced Western societies, attacked as ‘outdated’ or even ‘useless’. Those who harbour such opinions manifest their own ignorance. Marxism maintains many extremely useful features which could serve to democratize polyarchy, notably its analysis of capitalism and stress upon the relationship between the economic and the political. Dahl himself followed

this logic when he suggested that capitalism cannot not allow a further democratization of polyarchy (Dahl 1996) It seems polyarchy cannot be democratized any further without a restructuring of the economic system it operates under. Following the argument expressed in the previous section, that democracy has undermined capitalism (even if capitalism has undermined democracy to a greater extent) in answer to Dahl's question in the introduction, only in a substantial resolution of class conflict, achieved through the incorporation of democratic values into the economic sphere, lies a realistic prospect for a radically improved democracy than that permitted by Polyarchy. The politics of autonomous groups has a lot to contribute if the world's next "October Revolution" is not to degenerate from this goal.

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