

RAMPART JOURNAL

OF INDIVIDUALIST THOUGHT

Autarchy and the Statist Abyss <i>by R. A. Childs, Jr.</i>	1
The Political Spectrum: A Bi-Dimensional Approach <i>by Maurice C. Bryson and William R. McDill</i>	19
The L.F.E. Theory of the Political Spectrum <i>by Bowman N. Hall, II</i>	27
Political Spectra and the Labels of Extremism <i>by D. O. Miles</i>	32
The Anatomy of Structure (The Political Edifice Viewed Outside a Political Context) <i>by Robert LeFevre</i>	40
Why Foreign Aid Backfires and What Can be Done About It <i>by Kerry Thornley</i>	88
A Small Experiment <i>by Jack Semmens</i>	96
On the Other Hand <i>by Robert LeFevre</i>	101

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Autarchy and the Statist Abyss

by R. A. Childs, Jr.

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The Questionable Future of Man

We are living in a historical era.

In any historical era, there are certain dominant cultural and intellectual trends, unifying elements, which allow the period to be classified, interpreted, and understood. Our age is no different. The one thing which *is* different about our age, however, is the strange, confusing mixture of principles upon which our culture is built.

Our religion is built on agnosticism.

Our psychology is built on determinism.

Our art, on helplessness and confusion.

Our literature, on depravity.

And our philosophy, the unifying element in intellectual matters, is based on skepticism, self-righteous uncertainty, and a profound hostility to anyone who claims to have any "answers" to anything at all.

The only unifying element in our whole intellectual life today is the uncompromising certainty that certainty is impossible. With few, ignored, exceptions, there *are* no answers being proposed for the problems faced by man today. There are no theories, no standards, and no positive values.

The result? That most important field of human activity—politics—has been freed from all standards and ideals. The consequence has been the most unfluctuating, certain, trend toward the total state and total war that mankind has ever faced.

Today, the world moves from political crisis to political crisis, always within the same vicious circle, with no end in sight. Wars and mass killings have become so commonplace that the masses of men accept them as inevitable. And historically such a belief is justified by the evidence of thousands of years of mass armed conflict; by millions of charred, bullet-riddled, decaying corpses.

It is a vicious circle, with a future no different than its past. What is the circle? The world moves from political conflicts between states, to political crises, to the full-scale, armed mass violence of war. What some people would like to do is write it off as "historical necessity," and ignore it. But, given man's inherent free will, and his consequent ability to *choose*, there is *no such thing* as historical necessity, and consequently, the future is not inevitably a mere repetition of the past. It is only men's choices which will make it so, or prevent it from being so. The circle is caused by man and can be broken by man.

How? The question of how to avoid this perpetual march towards hell by mankind cannot be answered unless we can discover what choices and values led to this circle in the past, and how these choices can be changed, the values abandoned, and the circle broken.

The State, Its Growth and Its Opposition

Since the state is obviously at the bottom of the whole thing, the impulse of people today is to attempt to break the circle by simply opposing the state. But opposition takes many forms, and before the actions of the state can be stopped in any efficient manner, we have to consider the nature of the state, its functions, its growth, and, as a consequence, how it can be effectively opposed.

The Origin of the State

As has been pointed out a number of times,¹ the state, historically, was born through conquest. When men began to produce, others began to loot them. And when human cooperation—society—developed to the point where, on a regular basis, men were producing more than enough to satisfy their barest necessities, other men set up, on a regular basis, a means of plundering them. This means of predation, which is relatively orderly and systematic, is the state.

¹See Murray N. Rothbard, "The Anatomy of the State," *Rampart Journal*, Vol. I, No. 2; Franz Oppenheimer, *The State* (New York: Vanguard Press, 1926); Albert J. Nock, *Our Enemy the State* (Caldwell, Ida.: Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1946); and Bertrand de Jouvenel, *On Power* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962).

The origin of the state is never a "social contract," as men are inclined to believe, or any sort of agreement among peaceful, productive men. It is always the conquest of one group, or "tribe," by another. As de Jouvenel says: "The state is in essence the result of the successes achieved by a band of brigands who superimpose themselves on small, distinct societies; this band, which is itself organized in a society as fraternal and as full of thieves' justice as you please, behaves towards the vanquished and the subjected as power in the pure state."²

Consent is always attained as a secondary thing: first out of fear, then taboo or religious belief, then out of habit, custom, tradition, and intellectual conviction. The concept of "elections"—opinion mongering on a mass scale—is a relatively recent occurrence, historically, but note that even here the choices allowed the people are artificial and superficial at best, and are always determined by the state itself. People are given a choice only over the question of *who* will be their rulers, and never over the questions of power and authority. And always, there is the minority, which is subordinated to the consensus reached, in the same manner, if need be, as the first subjects were subordinated to the first conquering tribe.

Thus, the first function of the state is born: economic exploitation of those who produce, by the state. All economic wealth is produced by someone: and the state, in its primary capacity, takes it upon itself to see that there is a permanent dichotomy set up between those who produce wealth and those who are to enjoy it—between, in modern terminology, production and consumption, between production and distribution, and between rightful ownership and control. This is necessary for a variety of reasons, but the primary one is that without the dichotomy—between the production of wealth and having the right to consume it—the basic dichotomy between ruler and ruled would not be possible. The state, in other words, needs the dichotomy in order to survive, because without expropriation, there can be no state, no politicians, and no bureaucrats.

Also, we find here the first attempt by the state to create an intellectual justification for its activities. It tries to obliterate the distinction between the economic means of acquiring wealth, production and exchange, and the political means, expropriation. It tries to blur the distinction between a price and a tax, between the earned and the unearned, and between the voluntary and the compulsory. Taxation

²De Jouvenel, *ibid.*, pp. 100-101.

and other forms of state expropriation of wealth, then, become accepted as just another legitimate way of getting an income.

The basis of all early, primitive, political structures is always the same: conquest, expropriation, and fear. And its geographical extension is nearly always small. At first.

And here another question arises: how does the state manage to grow?

The Growth of the State

The state grows in many ways, but there are always a few primary principles which it seems to follow. These principles can best be understood if we see their relationship to the basis of the state: the ruler/ruled dichotomy and the dichotomy between the economic and political means of gaining wealth.

The basis of the state is that it is a tool which some men use in attempting to rule or govern the actions of others. And the basic motivation of those who are a part of the state is to acquire power over others. All political figures who dominate the institution of the state have two primary goals: to maintain the security of themselves and of the state itself, and to extend their area of influence and control. Or: the state attempts to preserve a monopoly of the use of physical force, or predation, or crime, in a given geographical area, and to *extend the area of control*.

There are two basic ways whereby the authority of the state can be increased: (1) The control over the lives and actions of the people within a given territory can be increased. This is increased *vertical* consolidation of state power. (2) The geographical range of control can itself be extended. This is increased *horizontal* consolidation of state power.

The state can only extend the geographical area that it controls by some form of conquest. And it can only undertake such conquest with the support of large numbers of those whom it already controls. How does it get this support, necessary in order to wage wars? Basically, in two ways:

(1) Economically, the state uses its monopoly on expropriation of wealth to create political castes, or "classes." It uses stolen wealth to benefit some at the expense of others, thus creating a permanent basis of support. Thus, today, we see the state being supported by businessmen who are being benefited by defense contracts and other state patronage, tariffs, subsidies, and special tax "loopholes"; unions which are benefited by labor laws; farmers benefited by price sup-

ports, and other groups benefited by other state-granted special privileges. And an especially important sanction/privilege relationship has developed between bankers and the state. Since money is the lifeblood of any advanced exchange economy, whoever can get control of the issuing and lending of currency has indeed got a noose around the neck of the economy—or the people who participate in it. This gives the state a primary control over the economic dealings of men, through currency and credit manipulation, when it needs such control to carry on its activities.

Of course, almost every group is harmed more by the benefits heaped on other groups than it is helped by its own special privileges, but since the state has gotten people to believe that the only valid approach to problems is to increase, rather than to decrease, state powers, no one mentions the possibility of benefiting each group by removing the special privileges of all other groups. Instead, each group supports the state, to benefit itself at the expense of all other groups.

(2) Morally, or intellectually, the state joins hands with the intellectuals—especially the church—in creating a theoretical basis of sanction. Historically, this has been embodied by the union of the “throne and altar,” or, more primitively, the witch doctor and the tribal chieftain. In modern times, the relationship between the state and intellectuals is embodied in the vast and growing network of “public” or governmental schools, on whatever level. State-dictated curricula are an extremely useful tool for building a basis of moral sanction.

In any case, the consequence of this intellectual-political alliance has always been the dominance of some variant of the altruist morality in a society. Altruism has always been the theoretical basis of any ideology of service and sacrifice, especially one trumpeting loudly and clearly the alleged “virtues” of fighting and dying for “one’s country” or “humanity.” Altruism is the morality of self-renunciation and the subordination of the individual to something allegedly “higher,” such as an omnipotent God, whose will is embodied, supposedly, in the church, or such as the “common good,” “one’s country,” etc., as embodied in the state.

The state has always grown in its territorial extent by convincing a sufficient number of people that its cause—self-aggrandizement—is “holy” or “just” or for the “common good.” It convinces “its” citizens that it is in fact fighting for them. The truth, of course, is precisely the reverse: a state has only what it first confiscates from private in-

dividuals, and in conquest and war it nationalizes both lives and wealth, forcing individuals to fight for *it* against another state. Certainly a mere examination of the issue should convince any man that such is the case, for *who* is found to be forcing *whom* to do *what*?

And the state has always grown in the extent of its control over its own people through either responding to increasing demands for state services by becoming a readily available tool for groups of people to use in attaining their ends, or by growing to meet internal or external opposition. Any threat to "law and order" is always a threat, in actuality, to the state's monopoly of violence within a territory, on the part of some "private criminal." It isn't that the state objects to violence, of course, but that it dislikes competition. Any external threat, a threat to its so-called "territorial integrity," is in fact just another way of stating that there is a dispute over the question of jurisdiction, or *which state* shall exercise authority over someone or something.

The state is always ingenious in using any threat to its own monopoly of violence as a justification for increasing its own power because, as has already been pointed out, it is generally able to get a large number of people to identify state interests with individual interests. Thus, historically, the state has usually been able to get a large number of people to unite in support of it, in order to face a portrayed "common enemy," as in war or rebellion or riots. And, historically, this has been the major tool for furthering the growth of all states.

History of the National State

If these principles concerning the growth of the state are to be held as universally valid truths, then they must be shown to have historical, and not merely theoretical, validity. In fact, if they are true, then it might be expected that by applying them to history, we can watch the development of the state as a growing institution, unfold before us.

As an example, let us see how the principles operated in the rise of the "national" state in the history of Western Europe.

Nothing dominates the history of Western Europe more than seemingly unending political and religious conflicts—especially those involving the jurisdiction of rulers.

The early state, wherever it is found, is always small, because large-scale conquest requires a large-scale springboard, which has to be built, piece by piece. It grows through wars and conquest. The aim of political and religious leaders has always been to extend and unify their control over others. They seek order.

The aim of the "common" men has always been security and peace—the absence of armed conflicts and violence touching *them*. They want to be left alone. In a sense, they too want order, or at least predictability, so that they can live, and even on occasion plan for the future.

Small states can never give people this, and never have. The small state principle, when mixed with the desire of rulers to extend their influence or authority, has always led to armed conflict—small wars and frequent, disorderly victimization of people. The ordinary people dislike frequent political-military conflicts of this sort, because they are always the victims. As is natural for human beings, they dislike being victimized, and wish for a way out. In the feudal period of Western Europe, this was precisely the case.

Centuries of wars and military conquest had created a multitude of states, or feudal estates, ruled by feudal barons, forever seeking to extend their influence, through military means. There was no one central authority over most large geographical areas, and those few authorities which did claim dominance over any such area—such as numerous pseudo "kings" at the top of the feudal hierarchy, and the Roman Catholic Church—were simply too weak to gain the monopoly over physical force needed to bring order to the chaos precipitated by feudal lords forever challenging one another's authority by victimizing one another's subjects. There was no unifying coercive authority, the principle of victimization was accepted by nearly everyone, and the consequence was competition in conquest and victimization. The conquest and victimization were united by a single dominant value in this period—the desire of every ruler, political and religious (the two were often identical), to extend the area of his influence.

There were three fundamental alternatives open to the people of this era:

(1) They could keep things the same, reacting conservatively to the situation. This would mean stagnation.

(2) They could make political rule more unified and extensive, so that there would be only one exerciser of violence in any large area. This would bring predictability and unity to predation, and would limit the amount of *open* violence exercised, because there would be fewer inter-state conflicts, as a necessary consequence of having fewer states. Or so they thought.

(3) They could abandon the entire state-conquest principle. This

would mean opposing and abandoning victimization and the use of physical force to settle disputes.

Now, the first was impossible, since the decline of the church in the fourteenth century destroyed the only unifying *moral* element, thus increasing the feudal "struggle for power." It was also undesirable to most people, since it didn't solve anything.

The third was unknown, and practically inconceivable to them, because violence had been accepted for so long as a means to obtain one's values. The church reinforced this belief, with the dogma of original sin, which taught that such would always be the case, depravity being inherent in the nature of man.

So, they turned to the second alternative, because they believed that with political unity would come stability and security. The masses, through habit, custom, and tradition, had come to regard the state as a necessary evil, and supported unification. Their sanctioning of the concept of a national state and obedience to it once it became a reality, arose out of their mass fear of open, unpredictable violence, as was frequent during the feudal period.

How was this unification accomplished? It was a complex affair, one which can only be summarized here.

The first and primary tool which the numerous kings used to get the support of people in their drive for political unification of their own kingdoms, in attempting both vertical and horizontal consolidation of power, was to unite the people against a common enemy; thus there were political conflicts among various *small* states, with the inevitable chaos, wars, and bloodshed.

And the primary group responsible for supporting this attempt at unification and consolidation of power was the rising middle class.

Increasing trade and a revived commerce, a consequence of the contact with the East through the Crusades, brought with it a money economy and a prosperous new middle class. Such trade had been practically impossible before the Crusades because the political obstructions of the feudal barons made it totally unprofitable. The Crusades led to a boom in the development of transportation routes, and after the Crusades were over, the routes were converted to trade.

Kings made use of the new rising middle class, by promising it stability and the economic freedom to trade over large geographical areas without frequent, random, victimization by feudal politicians.

That is, instead of branding as the villain state interferences with economic freedom, and political victimization, the kings portrayed as the villain, the existence of *many small states* and sought a *single*

large one in their place. And so, by branding as their common enemy *competition in victimization*, the kings were able to unify the new middle class, and gain its support, in waging war against that common enemy.

The kings, with the support of the middle class, hired standing armies, equipped them with the newest weapons, the longbow and gunpowder, and made war against the feudal barons, who were unable to stand with their obsolete knights against the modern armies of the kings.

In Spain, for example, Ferdinand and Isabella fought for political and religious unity, and suppressed the nobility by allying themselves with the middle class. The middle class supported the monarchs, and the monarchs in return promised vigorous enforcement of "law and order," stabilization of the currency, and the building of roads and bridges.

In France, Louis XI utilized the middle class to suppress the nobles, offering the middle class, in return, economic privileges—such as subsidies and protective regulations. The lower classes paid for his privilege-granting with heavy taxes.

In England, Henry VII suppressed the nobles with the wholehearted support of the common men and the middle class, who yearned for peace and order. The middle class needed peace and order for their business activities, and nearly everyone was drained by conflicts, conquest, and wars. Henry even made commercial treaties with foreign countries, giving trade a chance to grow.

In all three instances, the state grew as a result of increasing demands for its services—such as protective regulations—and as a result of meeting both an internal *and* an external threat.

In every case, the support of the middle class had to be secured. *And* the kings gained that support by promising to make economic exploitation more predictable, and violence less frequent. In fact, the state obtained the support of people by promising to alleviate the hardships caused by *states*. The conditions which the national states proposed to terminate were in every case the result of conquest, expropriation, and war—in short, of the previous activities of the state. And the middle class sought to fight the conditions by using the very institutions which had caused them, except on a larger scale.

So, the state grew, to meet the demands of the people. Vertical and horizontal consolidation of state power was accomplished. Did the people get what they wanted? They did not. The little feudal

wars were replaced by big national and dynastic wars, which the growing states were now in a position to initiate. The much larger states found themselves the masters over huge captive economies, ripe for exploitation and confiscation, and used the wealth they proceeded to confiscate for bigger and more destructive wars. In other words, they accomplished little except the growth of the state. Feudalism was replaced by mercantilism, then semi-controlled capitalism, then by the modern cross between fascism and socialism. Small states were replaced by bigger ones, and victimization has grown, not diminished.

Today and Tomorrow

Wars didn't stop then, and they haven't yet.

Expropriation and conquest continue, and the result is the continuance of the vicious circle: political crisis, usually over some problem of jurisdiction, to political conflict, to war, to increasing political crises, *ad infinitum*, with no end in sight.

Searching for an end, people find themselves faced with the same choices as yesterday:

(1) They can keep things the same. This conservative reaction will mean more of the same, with moral stagnation, and an endless series of wars and conflicts. Provided, of course, that mankind does not blow itself up in the process.

(2) They can turn to a world government, an ultimate global authoritarian state, the ultimate in horizontal and vertical integration of political power. This, needless to add, would merely increase victimization and create even more conflicts. It is today the solution advocated by a number of groups, such as some of the "humanists," who are forever prattling about a world government being the solution to all the world's problems—ignoring, of course, the fact that governments are the *cause* of most of these problems.

(3) They can abandon the entire state-victimization principle. This choice is today called *autarchy*, and is in principle opposed to the rule of man by man, to the authoritarian subordination of the unique individual human being to anything outside of his own will. It is the most radical solution to the problem mankind faces: state-imposed murder of the entire human race. Autarchy entails, first and foremost, the acceptance of individual self-sovereignty, the respect for individual rights, and an uncompromising hostility to the state. How can it be achieved?

Opposing the State

The first and most basic question which people must ask themselves today is whether or not they want to be politically free. Those who do not want either themselves or others to be politically free will have no interest in anything libertarians have to say. They are already committed, and the consequences of their beliefs put into practice may be seen in every graveyard throughout the world. Their beliefs are manifested in every state action, in every use of violence to gain their values, in every war, throughout history. And their beliefs are leading mankind off a cliff into an abyss. The only answer they have to the vicious circle tightening around the neck of mankind, like a hangman's noose, is strangulation—the permanent annihilation of the human race.

Those who do want to be politically free have only to understand a single principle: *A premise reaps its own logical consequence.* It is the premise of violence and statism which has brought man to where he is. And the first and foremost task of any libertarian who wishes to attain political freedom is to understand the nature of the state, and oppose it.

But how can it be opposed? Let us examine the attempts and failures of two supposedly “anti-state” groups in America: modern conservatism and the “new left.”

Conservatism as an Opponent of the State

(1) *The Intellectual Basis.* Modern conservatives have a marked tendency to blame the problems of man on innovators and radical intellectuals. As such, many conservatives are almost violently anti-intellectual, and base their arguments for liberty and against the state on three anti-intellectual beliefs. Ayn Rand has designated them as “the argument from *faith*—the argument from *tradition*—the argument from *depravity*.”³ Let us examine them in that order.

(a) *The Argument from Faith.* Since most conservatives are anti-intellectual, and do not oppose the state *per se*, but only isolated activities of the state, it might be expected that not only their arguments in defense of liberty, but those in defense of the principle of the state as well, will be based not on any rational, philosophic base, but on mysticism. Such is the case. Consider, for example, the words of James Burnham: “Neither the source nor the justification of government can be put in wholly rational terms. . . . Consider the prob-

³Ayn Rand, *Capitalism: the Unknown Ideal* (New York, New American Library, 1966), p. 198.

lem of government from the point of view of the reflective individual. I, as an individual, do in fact submit myself (at least within certain limits) to the rule of another—to government. But suppose I ask myself: *why* should I do so? Why should I submit to the rule of another? *What* justifies his rule? To these questions there are no objectively convincing answers in rational terms alone. . . . But why should I accept the hereditary or democratic or any other principle of legitimacy? Why should such a principle justify the rule of that man over me? . . . I accept the principle, well . . . because I do, because that is the way it is and has been.”⁴

One accepts the principle of statism and violence because that is what one accepts. And where is the way out of the circle? There is none. Just as you can, on mystic grounds, give no rational basis for your belief in the state and violence, so you can give no rational ground for *limiting* the power of the state, and have nothing but prayer with which to answer a looting politician, seeking horizontal and vertical consolidation of his power. Reliance on faith means the rejection of reason; and the rejection of reason, the only objective means of communication among men, reaps its own logical consequence: reliance on physical force to attain one’s ends.

(b) *The Argument from Tradition.* Since most conservatives reject reason, and rely on faith, the logical consequence is that they turn not to philosophy for answers to the problems of man, but to what men have done in the past. And since what men have done in the past is basically the same as what they are doing now, the answer of the conservatives to the problems of today is: stagnate and give up. Russell Kirk, for example, “cannot write a book without sneering at ‘defecated rationality’ or the ‘puny private stocks of reason’ possessed by individuals. Mr. Kirk prefers to remain an ‘intellectual dwarf perched on the shoulders of a giant—Christian, Western tradition.’”⁵ Now, Mr. Kirk may indeed be an intellectual dwarf, as he confesses, but how can unthinking repetition of traditional habits and customs solve any of the problems of man? It cannot. Tradition is nothing more than a list of the rules and habits other people have followed, for good reasons, for bad reasons, or for no reasons at all. This is little more than primitive ancestor worship, and will get us nowhere.

(c) *The Argument from Depravity.* Man, confesses the conservative, is damned by God and can never find any ultimate solutions

⁴James Burnham, *Congress and the American Tradition* (Chicago: Regnery, 1965), pp. 6-8.

⁵James M. O’Connell, “The New Conservatism,” *The New Individualist Review*.

to the problems facing the world because he is doomed to failure from the start, by Original Sin. Original Sin means that men are innately depraved, weak, fallible, and wicked. For that reason, they cannot be trusted with unlimited political power, and the power of the state must be limited. How do we prove the existence of this Original Sin? We accept it on faith. What are the consequences of this type of argument? If you accept the principle, your first impulse is to stagnate and give up. If you reject it, you reject their only argument for limiting the power of the state.

Notice, in all three of the conservatives' arguments, that the arguments for limiting the power of the government, and for opposing the state, are based on knowledge with no source and no rational justification. Or, since knowledge is the correct identification of a fact of reality, their arguments are based on absolutely no knowledge at all. Those who reject such invalid forms of arguments, and who want to use their minds and reason to find solutions to problems, will reject from the start any question about the desirability of opposing the state, because the justifications of such opposition, as offered by the conservatives, are irrationality, tradition, and depravity. Since irrationality, tradition, and acceptance of man's depravity are not a way out of any dilemma, it might be expected that the majority of people will reject, along with them, any thought of limiting the power of the state. Such is the case. A premise reaps its own logical consequence, and faith, tradition, and depravity reap nothing but stagnation for man, and a prelude to hell.

(2) *The Practical Result.* What is the practical consequence of these conservative beliefs? What is the primary tool used by conservatives in opposing the growth of the state? Political action.

Conservatives propose to oppose the growth of the state by supporting politicians. And what do politicians do? They support the growth of the state. Conservatives would have you believe that you can dehydrate a plant by watering it, or get rid of rats by feeding them.

Remember that one of the ways a state grows is by responding to increasing demands for state services. What do the conservatives constitute? An increasing demand for politicians. The conservatives abandon their businesses, their voluntary institutions, and rush to bestow their attention on the state. And they expect the private sector to grow and the state sector to shrink. X

And more: by rushing into politics, what principle are the conservatives abandoning, and which are they accepting? Voting and

political action itself implies a sanctioning of the state, and hence of its basis—the rule of man by man. The conservatives would fight the principle by adopting it. They oppose the state—by sanctioning the entire governing process. What will be the result? The growth of the state.

Modern conservatives are not even primarily interested in individual liberty any longer. William F. Buckley, Jr., for example, has stated that the conservatives have had to abandon their former interest in shrinking the size of the state, because they need a larger, healthy state to pursue their primary interest: opposition to communism, at home and abroad. Why do they oppose communism? Because communists advocate a totalitarian government and the destruction of individual liberty.

What tool will the conservatives use in opposing it? A totalitarian government and the destruction of individual liberty.

The conservatives thus end up supporting the growth of the state in every way imaginable:

They constitute a sharp increase in demand for government services—to eliminate the hated communists, whereupon the state grows to meet the demand.

They portray the existence of a deadly internal threat to liberty—not the state itself, but “domestic communists,” whereupon the state grows to meet the threat. This is called “internal security.”

They portray the existence of a Satanic force abroad—the world communist conspiracy—which is an evil, warmongering force, desiring world domination. Whereupon the state grows to meet the “foreign” menace to liberty. This is called “national defense.”

They employ the state to wage bloody wars against the communists, thus providing for so vast an increase in state power that, as Dean Russell once said, “we are fast becoming a caricature of the thing we profess to hate.”

What is the result of these wars? In the words of Randolph Bourne: “The moment war is declared . . . the mass of the people, through some spiritual alchemy, become convinced that they have willed and executed the deed themselves. They then with the exception of a few malcontents, proceed to allow themselves to be regimented, coerced, deranged in all the environments of their lives, and turned into a solid manufactory of destruction toward whatever other people may have, in the appointed scheme of things, come within the range of the government’s disapprobation. The citizen throws off his contempt and indifference to government; identifies himself with its

purposes, revives all his military memories and symbols, and the state once more walks, an august presence, through the imaginations of men. Patriotism becomes the dominant feeling. . . .”⁶

And with patriotism, comes that inevitable growth of the loved and worshiped idol: the state.

What else does it accomplish? “Our” people unite against a “common enemy” and the state grows. Other people, fearing “our” state, unite in support of their own.

The result? Endless political crises, political conflicts, and *wars*.

It would seem that the conservatives are less than effective in opposing the state. Let us see if the “new left” fares much better.

The “New Left” as an Opponent of the State

(1) *The Intellectual Basis.* There is no unifying ideology in the “new left” today. The only unifying elements at all are a hatred of the Vietnam War and the draft. Ideologies in the left range from old-line Marxism and Trotskyite communism to the libertarianism and voluntarism of what was formerly called the “old right.” Consequently, there are few intellectual proposals for solving the problems of mankind emanating from the “new left”; at least none that are agreed upon. “Get Out of Vietnam!” and “End the Draft Now!” are the two dominant themes.

(2) *The Practical Result.* What is the primary tool used by the “new left” in opposing the state? Physical obstructionism. The “new left” seeks to neutralize the actions of the state through demonstrations and physical, often violent, oppositions to it.

What are the consequences? The state has portrayed the “new left” as a threat to “law and order,” as an enemy, and has unified most of the common men behind itself, in opposition to that “common enemy.” The physical obstructionism of the “new left” has become an internal threat to the security of the state, and the state has used that threat as one would expect—to justify an increase in its own power.

The “new left” had wanted to decrease the power of the state. Has it done so? Quite the contrary. The state, as always, has turned the threat of force into a resource for accumulating force in itself.

⁶Randolph Bourne, “The State,” in *War and the Intellectuals* (New York: Harper, 1964), p. 67.

What is the way out? Apparently, if you use the state, it grows, and if you physically oppose or threaten the state, it grows. Power begets power, and violence begets violence. A premise reaps its own logical consequence.

So it seems that if we are to oppose the state, we must find a third alternative, based on a different premise. What premise? Well, if violence leads to more violence, it follows that one cannot use violence in attempting to decrease its use. So, instead of violence, adopt the principle of voluntarism, reason, and persuasion; in short, education.

If the state grows by responding to demands for state services, then we must seek means *outside of the state* to accomplish our ends. If the state grows to meet threats to its own monopoly of violence, then we must threaten no one. Governments *cannot be abolished*, but they *can* be abandoned. How? In the words of Robert LeFevre: "They will be abandoned when YOU demonstrate that you can manage your affairs without the supervision of a *pater familias*. In short, when YOU abandon your political adolescence and come of age, you will stop seeking to impose your will upon others, and at the same time demonstrate that your will is strong enough to control your actions within a framework of non-molestation.

"Do this in your own case with your own life in your own affairs and no political agent or agency can justify its existence on grounds that you require its help."

Prelude to the Renaissance

The problems of mankind are basically problems of conflict. And whenever conflict resolution is attempted on the level of action, the use of physical force will be the result. It follows, therefore, that any attempted solution to conflicts, if violence is to be avoided, must be approached on the level of opinions and evaluations. The tool must be education.

Following the wrong *principles* has brought us to the present state of the world, and following the right ones is the only way out.

A premise reaps its own logical consequence—in practice as well as theory.

What is needed, then, is to discover the right premises and formulate the right principles, all of which belongs to the field of philosophy. It is only a philosophical renaissance which will halt the present suicidal trends.

⁷Robert LeFevre, "Autarchy," *Rampart Journal*, Vol II, No. 2, p. 16.

(1) In epistemology, the theory of knowledge, what should be developed is a theory validating man's ability to *know* reality. In the final analysis, the only way to get men to turn themselves into sacrificial animals is to destroy their self-esteem. The only way this can be done is by getting them to reject their minds. And the only way this can be accomplished is by convincing them of the impotence of the mind. Mysticism and skepticism have brought us to where we are. Reason is the only alternative.

(2) In ethics, or morality, what should be formulated is a set of principles based on the requirements of man's life, giving men both the tools they need to live, and the justification for man's pursuit of his own well-being. It ought to be made clear that the life of an individual human being is an end in itself, and therefore the only proper principle underlying human relationships is the principle of *voluntarism*.

(3) In psychology, what is needed is a science based on the existence of man as a *thinking* being—and the development of the principal requirements of the mental health of the individual.

(4) In political philosophy, what ought to be developed are the requirements of a society based on voluntarism, which means: contract, consent, and trade—a society completely opposed to statism, coercion, violence, and war. The consequences would be the development of a philosophy of ownership and economics, built on the foundation of a man's right to own whatever property he can acquire without violating the rights of others *and* man's consequent right to consume the fruits of his own labor, or to trade them for what he values more. The principle of victimization, or the use of violence or the threat of it, to gain values or settle disputes, must be repudiated, renounced, and abandoned. The ruler/ruled, production/distribution, and ownership/control dichotomies should also be repudiated. It must be recognized that wars are almost always over a state's jurisdiction, or the question of *which* state is to own certain people and property, and can *only* be ended by the acceptance of the principle of *private property*, rather than the fiction of "public" ownership (which is actually ownership by politicians and bureaucrats), and the consequent responsibility of individuals to protect their *own* property *themselves*.

(5) In history, men must be shown that the real villain responsible for the alleged "abuses" of free enterprise has been, always, the intervention of violence—especially *state* violence—into the economic

dealings of men. The state has always perverted any basically free market system by fostering exploitation, corruption, monopoly, and special privileges. The alleged "flaw" in American capitalism was the fact that *capitalism cannot coexist with the state*, and any mixture is always an unstable one. Consequently, the answer to such abuses is *not and never can be the growth of the state*, but must rest on the abandonment of the state. We must recognize the inherent malevolence which lies in creating any sort of a division between producing wealth on the one hand, and having the right to consume it on the other.

And finally, the real task for intellectuals lies in educating people to an understanding of the fact that the state is an *unnecessary evil*, that there is nothing good which the state does now that could not be done better by private individuals, and that each and every productive social group would benefit more by giving up their own state-granted special privileges, along with those of all other groups, than by keeping both.

Then, perhaps, men will be freed from the state, from the coercive subordination of the individual to man-made authorities, from the whole bloody mess of violence, statism, and war.

Perhaps men will abandon superstition, and move forward to light the pathway to the new renaissance—to a rebirth of individualism, and the inviolate sanctity of the individual human personality.

This is the challenge of autarchy. Perhaps it is only an ideal, but what in life—next to life itself—is so worthy of cultivation?

Consider the alternatives.

The Political Spectrum: A Bi-Dimensional Approach

by Maurice C. Bryson
and William R. McDill

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William McDill is doing doctoral research in economics at the University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida. He attended New Mexico State University (B.A., 1960) and Stanford University (M.A., 1961) and has done economic analysis for Stanford Research Institute and Douglas Aircraft Company. He was a Republican candidate for the California legislature in 1964.

Laurence McGann in "The Political Spectrum" (*Rampart Journal*, Winter, 1967) raises some cogent arguments concerning the form of a proper model for the political spectrum. Briefly, the following points may be noted. First, a simple linear picture of a left-to-right alignment, with communism at the far left and fascism or nazism at the far right, is unsatisfactory in that it neglects the essential similarity between these two extremes, viz., their common totalitarianism. This similarity gives rise to a circular model in which communism and nazism occupy adjacent locations, with "democracy" at an intermediate location on the other side of the circle. Mr. McGann quite properly criticizes the circular model for ignoring the possibility of political structures that are more free, or less totalitarian, than existing democratic ones. He then proposes an alternative linear model in which the linear position represents not "left-" or "right-ness," but rather degree of government control, with degree of individual safety as a concomitant variable.

Another criticism, more severe from an analytical viewpoint, could have been leveled against the linear and circular models. This con-

sists of a failure to recognize important distinctions between alternative philosophies which tend to be lumped together or at least closely associated in any linear model. Specifically, the term *right-wing* is commonly used to denote not only fascism, but also such concepts as the objectivist philosophy of Ayn Rand or the laissez-faire economics of Milton Friedman. And yet, even the most biased of analysts must recognize profound differences between these latter philosophies and fascism; since, in fact, these differences would appear to place the conflicting viewpoints practically at opposite poles, it is obvious that no small modifications in the form of the political spectrum can account for the differences. Moreover, substantially similar criticisms could be leveled against the linear model proposed by Mr. McGann. In classifying ideologies only according to the degree of governmental control, his structure lumps together fascism and communism at one extreme—a grouping which might not appear totally unreasonable in today's political environment, but one which would have been badly misleading before the Second World War. More dangerously, it lumps together at the other extreme those whose philosophy is dominated by an opposition to governmental control, whether they be Goldwater Republicans or "hippies" opposing narcotics regulations. Once again, the differences between the groups are too important to be glossed over.

Many of these problems may be resolved by recognizing that we are in fact confusing two political issues that are quite distinct: the degree of government control that is exercised, and the direction in which that control is applied. Control, regardless of its magnitude, may be used to promote egalitarianism within society (the classical "left-wing" goal), or may be used to promote stability within society and hence allow the more qualified to maintain social advantage. To be sure, at the extreme points some of these distinctions may be moot points: in a state of total anarchy, there is no governmental control and hence the question of how control is being applied becomes indeterminate; and if governmental control is absolute, then all citizens are subordinate to the state and the question of egalitarianism vs. privilege becomes meaningless. But these are pathological cases of little interest in a functioning society. At all intermediate points, the difference between the two issues is of great importance.

We therefore arrive at a bi-dimensional model of the political spectrum. Position on the vertical axis represents the degree of governmental control advocated (*statism vs. anarchy*), and position on the horizontal axis represents the degree of egalitarianism favored

sent the two political extremes on a small or local scale. But now, suppose he views a fascist at position *F* and a communist at position *C*. In reality these two are more widely separated in their philosophies than are the local Democrat and Republican; but when our observer at *O* looks at them, they do not appear to be at all in opposite directions. On the contrary, as indicated by the arrows, they are in roughly the same direction as far as the observer is concerned. Their common totalitarianism appears, to him, to outweigh completely whatever differences in method they might have. A person with more statist leanings, however, would be more likely to discern the differences; and an individualist who locates himself near the anarchist extreme might even say that *C, F, D, R,* and *O* all look like a pack of totalitarian scoundrels with no important differences at all. Thus we have the natural submersion of differences that leads to such confusions as the circular-spectrum model.








The questions of "individual safety" posed by Mr. McGann also fit nicely into the bi-dimensional framework. He argues that the individualist must be willing to accept a certain amount of governmental control in order to maximize his personal "safety-freedom"—that is, to achieve a satisfactory balance between safety from the arbitrary encroachments of his neighbors and freedom from the arbitrary whims of the state. For the individualist whose ideal society would simply permit him to develop his own talents to the utmost, the safety factor is inherent in the left-right axis. In general, the farther right the existing political climate, the more protection the individual will have from others in society. However, it should be clear that as a political structure takes on a more right-wing aspect, it must also accept a greater degree of governmental control to remain stable. An extremely competent individualist might ideally like to see a governmental system in the far lower-right-hand corner of our coordinate plane, with virtually no government interference, but with the minimal government control being used to permit the widest possible spectrum of individual rewards. Obviously, such a system would not long endure; in the absence of governmental restraint, the disprivileged masses would sooner or later rise up to demand a degree of egalitarian reform. We may generalize to the extent of noting that the farther an individual locates himself to the right, the higher the position on the statist axis he will be forced to accept in order to realize any viable over-all position. The individual's location of his philosophy on the left-right axis corresponds to his generation of safety-freedom preference curves in Mr. McGann's terminol-

ogy. Considerations of feasibility then determine how far he must go up the statist axis; this corresponds to the location of a safety-freedom maximum as described by Mr. McGann.

The authors have found the bi-dimensional spectrum to be an especially useful tool in discussing and analyzing the mechanics of political activity—a somewhat more complicated process than the descriptive one of identifying an ideology. The mechanics of a political process seem to be most affected by two readily understood phenomena. First, while the most qualified, well-educated, and influential persons in society tend to be located to the right of center, the great mass of voters tends to be slightly to the left. This merely reflects the well-known Lincoln aphorism about God's apparent love for the common man; but more important for our purposes, it means that a political party or coalition cannot long remain in power if it is totally denied access to the masses of left-of-center voters. The second phenomenon, equally understandable, is that the party in power inevitably moves toward a more statist position. That is, it seems much more likely that one will attempt to justify the application of political power if one *has* the power. Once the power is applied, of course, there tends to be a coalescing of opposition in the opposite quadrant. How well and how fast the opposition may extend its influence seems to depend on many facets of the then-existing political environment.

Hence, the political process as pictured on the coordinate graph takes on the appearance of a stylized little clockwise minuet. The party-in-power moves toward a statist posture. The opposition appears somewhere in the anarchist half-plane. Required by the exigencies of running the government, the "ins" begin to draw on the well-qualified citizens of the upper-right-hand quadrant, thus drifting toward the right. As soon as the "outs" recognize the opportunity and can cast off the necessary ideological encumbrances, they can effect a coalition with disaffected citizens in the lower-left-hand quadrant; the "ins" are always vulnerable to attack at the right flank. (The simile is structural, not political; the right flank, in political terminology, is really the left wing.) Finally, since most of the voters are left of center, the "outs" have the opportunity of getting a majority, whereupon they become "ins" and the process begins again.

This process may be seen in the accompanying series of diagrams, giving a simplified picture of how a history of American political developments appears graphically. First, after the initial Federalist



A CHRONOLOGY OF POLITICAL DYNAMICS

governments before 1800, the Jeffersonian Democrats allied themselves with the frontiersmen in the new Western states to form the first real political party. From this coalition came the Jacksonian Democratic party and its left-wing-based opposition to the National Bank in the 1830's. Growth of the government's power led to the Whig reaction against "King Andrew" after 1830.

To the extent that the Whigs were able to ally themselves with free-soilers in the West, they were able to realize political success in the 1840's. But the alliance was too tenuous to withstand such an emotional issue as slavery, and the party eventually fell apart—resulting in the growth of the new Republican party, based in the politically prosperous domain of the old free-soilers.

Under the impact of the Civil War, the Republican party was not long in becoming statist. By 1870, it was a powerful but politically vulnerable alliance of "bloody-shirt" reconstructionists and businessmen of the prosperous Northeast. To the opposition went the partially disenfranchised South and the still-weak labor and grange organizations. The Democrats were organizationally very weak during the closing years of the nineteenth century, but were tapping enough of the lode of left-of-center votes to be a constant threat from 1876 on.

By 1900, the Democrats had reached substantially a position of parity, although the individual popularity of its candidates and the generally high level of prosperity in the country kept the Republicans in power. But by the 1920's, the Democrats had forged an alliance of potentially mammoth proportions, including Southerners, most farmers, urban minority groups, and labor. With the obvious strength of this coalition, the magnitude of Democrat victories after 1930 is not at all surprising.

Since 1930, the Republican party has been a basically weak alliance of business and the rural right wing—isolationist at first, then anti-communist-interventionist. By 1948 and 1952, however, the vulnerable right flank of the statist coalition finally started falling apart; first the Southerners fell out, and more recently the anarchistic "new left" has evidenced the continuing disintegration. Once again, the "ins" today are vulnerable to attack within the political heartland, where the votes are.

Whether the Republicans can soon effect enough of a coalition to get a winning combination is problematical. Only with great difficulty has a Republican-Southern bloc become a factor in presidential elections, and the current prospects of getting many votes from farther to the left are remote indeed for the Republicans. Part

of the problem is the essential truth that there are not many political entities active in the lower half-plane of the spectrum ("organized anarchists" being somewhat of a contradiction in terms). Thus, there is little communication among the disaffected groups. Nevertheless, the opportunity for coalition is there. The Goldwaterites who oppose public welfare programs and the Berkeley radicals who oppose public police measures have much more in common than either would care to admit. Moreover, there are other signs of incipient coalitions forming, notably, the inroads among white minority groups made by the George Wallace forces. Finally, some of the liberal "ins" themselves have taken note of the threat. In his commentary following the 1968 State of the Union address, Daniel P. Moynihan made the highly cogent observation that the political strength of the future belongs to that group which can best capitalize on the groundswell of anti-government, anti-establishment opinion, both left and right, among the young.

The foregoing has concentrated on the relevance of bi-dimensionality to domestic politics. Internationally, the picture gets more complicated, but many of the same concepts are relevant. For example, the establishment of Mao Tse-tung's totalitarian-but-classless society in China provides a textbook example of extreme left-wing statism, vividly demonstrable in the graphical system even though far outside the domain of typical American political activity. Meanwhile in the Soviet Union, one can see the natural drift of such a left-wing statist society toward the right, in search of managerial talent.

Finally, it should be noted that while the two axes used in the discussion here appear to be the most useful ones in general, they are not exhaustive. Under some circumstances, issues which cannot be categorized as left-right or statist-anarchist, and which are in fact independent of these axes, can become important. A clerical-anti-clerical axis has always been relevant to French politics, and was vitally important to the United States in 1928. Under wartime conditions, an internationalist-isolationist axis may supersede the others (although pro-war groups are sometimes identifiable uniquely as right-wing statist). A white-black "racism scale" and an active-passive "degree of radicalism scale" could also be considered, and in the future the advent of sensitive scientific questions could introduce altogether new issues. In any event, though, it seems to the authors that much is to be gained from the principle of bi-dimensionality or multi-dimensionality in political discourse—both philosophically and practically.

The L.F.E. Theory Of the Political Spectrum

by Bowman N. Hall, II

A graduate of Wabash College (A.B., 1966), Bowman N. Hall, II, is a candidate for a Ph.D. in economics at Duke University. He is presently a part-time instructor of economics at St. Andrews College in Laurinburg, North Carolina.

The thoughts expressed herein were sparked by Laurence McGann's "The Political Spectrum" which appeared in the Winter, 1967, number of this journal.¹ Mr. McGann there rightly criticized the circular theory of the political spectrum (Figure 1) for it includes no political situation less collectivized than democracy. Thus it fails to meet the requirement that any such theory must include all possible forms of political condition. Anarchy, the state of no political regimentation, does not appear on the circular theory.




Figure 1

¹Readers might be well advised to review this article to gain a better perspective on the L.F.E. theory.

Realizing that the circular theory is unacceptable, Mr. McGann suggests the linear theory of the political spectrum (Figure 2) as a more valid alternative. The linear theory classifies possible political (or a-political) conditions by their degree of regimentation of the people by the state. Regimentation, of course, may vary from 0 to 100 per cent.²




Figure 2

Mr. McGann, employing the linear theory, goes on to establish a graph of the "ideal" degree of state regimentation depending on one's subjective predilections for safety and freedom. The purpose of the present article is somewhat different, for it is to suggest the abandonment of the linear theory as well as the circular.

Admittedly the linear theory, by its very nature, contains all political philosophies. Unfortunately, while quantity is gained by using it rather than the circular theory, some quality is lost. Clearly, the "left-right" division of political philosophies is not relevant in this construction. For example, fascists (extreme "rightists" as the term is used today) and communists ("leftists") would appear right next to each other, say at about 98 per cent and 99 per cent respectively.³ So too would individualist anarchists and collectivist anarchists appear together on the left side of the diagram. However, the former anarchists are closest in philosophy to John Locke and Adam Smith, while the latter are closest to Marx and the utopian socialists. Classifying these two anarchist groups together is rather absurd for they differ in their attitudes toward private property, certainly a funda-

²Democracy here appears to fall at about the 50 per cent level. Whether this is accurate (I confess to having no idea) is not as important as the fact that democracy, having some regimentation, falls somewhere between the two extreme poles.

³I hereby propose the Hall theory of political regimentation: no matter how authoritarian, no system can be completely totalitarian for the simple reason that bureaucrats are too inefficient. Thus, I have left even communism with a 1 per cent "degree of freedom."

mental political distinction. Perhaps, then, a left-right linear theory might be better (Figure 3):




Figure 3

But alas, this is just the circular theory unbent; where are our anarchists? Certainly not on the right, but then neither on the left or in the center. Degrees of political regimentation have been sacrificed.

It seems obligatory that we reject both linear and circular theories. Yet, if we are to have a plane geometric diagram of the political spectrum, the only choice seems to be a combination of lines and circles. At this stage, the author wishes to submit the "lopsided figure eight theory" of the political spectrum (Figure 4).⁴ This appears in the form of a graph, the Y-axis of which is "political regulation." For the collectivists, one might translate this as "well-intentioned guidance of all facets of an individual's life (e.g., cradle to grave) to ensure his happiness and security from pressures of the market place and from the pressures of choosing between political candidates—especially ones which might form an opposition to the present government." A small-d democrat would take this to mean "well-intentioned guidance of most facets of my neighbor's life to guarantee that he doesn't get any more handouts from the benevolent government (which we both support financially) than I do." For the individualist, political regulation may be translated simply as "oppression of one man by another." On the X-axis, one finds "respect for private property." Many readers will question whether there can be a lack of respect for private property at the same time as there is a lack of political regulation, as does the author, but at least two political philosophies on the sample spectrum (Figure 4) seem to think this feasible.⁵

⁴The author cautiously submits the L.F.E. theory as being original. However, he confesses to having done precious little research in the area of theories of political spectrum.

⁵This seems to be a totally inconsistent position but the collectivist anarchists, e.g., Bakunin, Kropotkin, Malatesta, Goldman, Berkman, etc., hold that the abolition of private property and its corollaries, capitalism and the wage-system, will lead to a communal society without government oppression. Similarly, fascists, while apparently interested in regimenting people as much as possible, pay lip-service all the while to private property (restricted, of course, as may be necessary to meet the needs of the state).




Figure 4

The L.F.E. theory combines the best of both circular and linear theories without their objectionable qualities. Overall political exploitation can be measured by a curve sloping downward and to the right, splitting the "eight" in half. So the higher and farther to the left a man's political condition, the more politically exploited he may expect to be. Low and far to the right indicates a position approaching pure objective freedom.

"Rightists" in this context become "upper-halfists," and "leftists" are "lower-halfists." Thus, in the main, political philosophies which are similar in fact (libertarians and individualist anarchists), similar in their conception of man and the state (conservatives and fascists), or similar in their modus operandi (fascists and communists) appear near each other on the figure. Furthermore, a line from the origin splitting the lopsided figure eight into two ovals serves quite well to separate the "statist" from the "anti-statist" philosophies. This is useful not only for identifying various philosophies for their true nature but also to reveal what *should* be the distinction between left and right, e.g., statist versus anti-statist. But, as shown above, since the distinction is not in fact along these lines, the left-right linear theory must be found wanting.

Thus, the L.F.E. theory embodies the best of the linear political regimentation theory in the statist versus anti-statist division and the best of the left-right linear and circular theories in the "upper-halfist"

versus "lower-halfist" division. What then are the limitations of L.F.E. analysis? First, a logical point must be made. To say that the United States is next to Mexico and that Canada is next to the United States is, of course, correct. But we must remember that Canada is not next to Mexico. Similarly, socialism is next to communism, which is next to fascism on the diagram. But socialism and fascism can only be said to be similar in that they both are located on the statist oval. Second, some inaccuracies arise from putting a given philosophy actually on the eight rather than somewhere near it. For example, the collectivist anarchists appear farther right on the "respect for private property" axis than do conservatives. By definition collectivist anarchists are thoroughly opposed to private property so their position on the eight is inaccurate, but necessary since they are anti-statists. This suggests a criticism of any theory, including L.F.E., of the political spectrum. Models are designed to be representations in miniature of some phenomenon. In constructing a model, as great realism as possible must be strived for. Nevertheless, complete realism cannot be achieved "in miniature" because this is a contradiction in terms; complete realism comes only in the phenomenon itself. Therefore, any theory of the political spectrum is subject to inaccuracies. What is herein postulated may be treated as a more realistic inaccuracy.

Political Spectra and The Labels of Extremism

by D. O. Miles

D. O. Miles is a physicist at the Lockheed Research Laboratories in Palo Alto, California. His field is experimental liquid-state physics, and he has authored numerous scientific papers on the results of his work. He also holds patents on scientific apparatus, and some of his inventions are presently being marketed.

He wrote the following article during the heat of the Goldwater-Johnson campaigns in 1964, "in response to inaccurate labeling which attended that contest."

Introduction

Complex ideas or phenomena are sometimes made easier to understand if we can construct what scientists call a "model." If the model we construct is a good one, the various parts correspond to the parts of the complex idea or phenomenon. The resulting visualization is an aid to understanding.

An example is the pendulum, which has long been employed to illustrate the tendency of human beings to overcompensate when taking corrective action against some trend deemed undesirable. Although the pendulum model is not perfect in all respects, it is very useful. Nearly everyone is familiar with the manner in which a pendulum in air repeatedly swings from one extreme position to another. Further, most people can appreciate how, if the pendulum were hung in a tank of molasses as a damping fluid, the pendulum might slowly approach the equilibrium position and stop with little or no overshoot.

The proposed damping fluid tending to arrest or minimize oscillations in the case of society is, of course, governmental controls. The decision whether to employ a thin damping fluid like milk, or a very viscous one like cold tar, is made by experts such as social scientists, economists, and governmental officials.

The above brief discussion of the pendulum model serves to suggest how useful a model may be in stimulating thought and encouraging constructive controversy. Generations of Americans have been able to better comprehend economic and social problems by use of this model, and thus more intelligently contribute to the governmental processes.

It is not intended, however, to pursue the pendulum model further. Our point is merely to state that, once a good model is constructed, our understanding of an otherwise obscure and complex phenomenon may be increased, our thoughts may be clarified, and enlightening discussion may ensue. Conversely, it must be cautioned, a poor model may not only fail to bring comprehension, but worse, give the illusion of comprehension while promoting a misconception.

The Linear Model of the Political Spectrum

Over the last decade, another model of an important phenomenon has become popular. We shall call this the linear model of the political spectrum. This is a geometrical model. In it, the range of governmental systems is displayed by positioning them along a line, as depicted in Figure 1. At the ends of the line are placed what is regarded as the two extreme opposites of politico-governmental systems in the world—*communism* at the left end, *fascism* at the right end. Between these extremes are more moderate forms of government, with democratic and representative forms being positioned near the center.



Fig. 1—The accepted linear model of the political spectrum.

The linear model has some serious failings. Placing communism and fascism at opposite ends of the line is artificial. From the broad, overall viewpoint of governing systems, and from the viewpoint of the individual citizen as well, communism and fascism have much more in common than they have differences. Dominant in both is the overpowering superiority of the government as compared with the individual. "Der stat ist alles, der einziger ist nichts" (the state is everything, the individual is nothing) differs very little from communism's submission of individual goals and initiative to those of the

collective or group. The individual in either system faces the same iron-fisted environment. The difference that in fascism this absolute authority in all matters rests with one dictator, whereas in communism it rests with the central committee, is trivial. The employment of mass extermination to accomplish goals set by the government is common to both systems, as witnessed by the murder of 6,000,000 Jews in 1941-1945 by the German fascist government¹ and the murder of 3,000,000 Kulaks in 1932-1933 by the Russian communist government.² The common end-point of extremism attained by both these systems is absolute, total authoritarianism on the part of the government, at the expense of all human rights and individual liberty.

If these systems are so similar, why are they then so antagonistic? Totalitarian governments, bent on conquest and motivated by fanatical zeal, even though they have much in common, can never trust each other, and seem always to come into conflict. The fact that fascism and communism have been at each other's throats does not in the least detract from their similarities as governmental systems.

Hence, we suggest that in any model of the political spectrum, fascism and communism be associated at the extreme of absolute governmental power, rather than separated. This immediately suggests what the opposite extreme point in our model should be. The opposite of absolute governmental power is no governmental power whatsoever. This is called *anarchy*. Thus, if we must employ a linear model of the political spectrum, let us think of the ends of the line as representing all-powerful government on the left, and no government at all on the right. Then, if citizens are in the middle of the line and move towards the left, they sacrifice individual rights in order to give government more power and control. If they move to the right, their government becomes weaker as more rights and responsibility devolve upon them as individuals. However, even this improvement in the linear model leaves much to be desired.

A Two-Dimensional Model

On a two-dimensional surface, let us draw a circle as shown in Figure 2. At two diametrically opposite points we position the polit-

¹William Bridgwater and Seymour Kurtz (eds.), *The Columbia Encyclopedia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), third ed., p. 1083.

²Computed on the basis of excess deaths over normal for the Kulak farmers during the years 1932-33, by William H. Chamberlin, *Russia's Iron Age* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1934), pp. 66-92.

ical opposites of anarchy (symbolically at the bottom of the circle) and absolute governmental power (symbolically at the top of the circle).




Fig. 2--Two-dimensional (circle) model of the political spectrum.

In this model we perceive refinement sufficient to differentiate between communism and fascism. Hence, the former is placed on the left side of the upper extreme, and the latter on the right side. What is the significance of this slight differentiation? The left half of the circle represents multi-man rule; the right half represents single-man

rule. Thus, next to communism on the left, but further removed from totalitarianism, we place socialism with groups or committees of planners who exercise governmental control. Next to fascism on the right, we place monarchies. In general, then, as we proceed downwards around the left part of the circle in the direction of arrow (1), we encounter increasingly weaker multi-man rule systems. Arrow (2) on the right depicts increasingly weaker single-man rule systems. When, finally, the extreme of anarchy is reached, the arrows meet and all differences disappear due to the disappearance of governments.

The chief feature of the circle model is its graphic portrayal of the division of control between government and the individual citizen. The division existing in America today between governmental control and individual liberty could presumably be located on the circle. However, we could not decide whether to locate America's position on the right half or the left half of the circle, because ours is neither a multi-man nor a single-man rule system, but a mixture. Hence, the two-dimensional model is not geometrically complete enough to include our hybrid system.

The Three-Dimensional Model

We propose yet another degree of sophistication of the model for the political spectrum, as shown in Figure 3. Here, the model has become three-dimensional and is drawn isometrically as a sphere. Like the earth, it has two poles, which may be thought of as ice caps of extremism. The south pole represents anarchy. The north pole represents totalitarianism, or the absolute control by the government of each individual's actions.

The lines parallel to the equator mark differing degrees of sharing of control between individual citizens and their government. At the equator, half of all decisions would be made by the individual and the other half made for him. At the north pole, he could not even travel to the next city to visit relatives without filling out forms to obtain government permission. (This last statement would be humorous, were it not that some of the world's people have lived under governments where this very thing was demanded!)

Next, we call attention to the great meridian line passing through both poles. Along the left half of this meridian, labeled (1) in Figure 3, are positioned all purely multi-man rule governments. Along the right half, labeled (2) in Figure 3, are all purely single-man rule




Fig. 3—The three-dimensional (sphere) model of the political spectrum.

governments. By deviating from the meridian line and proceeding into areas between, as shown by point A, we achieve any desired mixture between multi- and single-man rule.

An additional feature of the three-dimensional sphere model is that its size or radius may be varied for each government considered, to signify the technological and manpower resources available to said government.

Thus, the three-dimensional model as above proposed is a three-variable system, with horizontal position (angle of longitude) achieving any degree of hybridization between multi- and single-man rule, vertical position (angle of latitude) depicting any degree of sharing of control between government and the individual, and spherical radius indicating the net resources behind the government.

Unless we have overlooked some other critical variable, any governmental system may be pictured in this model. If there are other variables not included, the next degree of sophistication of any geometrical model would require a four-dimensional surface. The utility of such a model would, however, be impaired due to our lack of ability to draw the model, build it out of plexiglass, or even to visualize it in the mind's eye.

Some Practical Implications of the Three-Dimensional Model

If the superiority of the three-dimensional over the presently accepted linear model be admitted, then certain changes in our thinking must follow. However, as will be pointed out below, these changes will not in the least discourage the sacred practice of name calling!

Most prominent among the changes called for by the three-dimensional model are alterations in categorizing the conservative and ultraconservative elements in America. It has become a world-wide practice to associate the American ultraconservative philosophy with fascism. This is a downright error, if we examine the improved model carefully. Do not misunderstand. We do not propose to remove the extremist label from the American ultraconservative. We simply wish to place the *correct* extremist label on him! He is not, as the fascism label would suggest, at the extreme of advocating an all-powerful government. Indeed, the American ultraconservative is constantly saying, "Limit the power of government." Where he belongs is somewhere close to the extreme of no governmental power—of anarchy. Hence, it is suggested that ultraliberals henceforth hurl the epithet "anarchist" rather than "fascist" at their ultraconservative opponents. There is no danger in this of calming the tempest, for *anarchist* is considered to be just as dirty a word as *fascist*. It even sounds worse! Furthermore, it falls from the tongue with a more masculinely curse-like sound: *an-ar-chist!*

However, lest some liberal prefer his old ways of doing things and prove too unprogressive to adopt the new terminology, let us remind him that he himself has undoubtedly many times placed his conservative opponent in the camp of anarchy without realizing it. How many times has our intransigent liberal asked his conservative opponent, when arguing about government intervention in welfare, "Then you mean to say you would do nothing?" And the conservative probably had to admit that he would, indeed, have his government do absolutely nothing.³ The implication both of the question and the reply is of weak or inactive rather than powerful government—of anarchy rather than absolutism.

Thus, let ultraconservatives henceforth be called *anarchists* rather than *fascists*. This will detract not a whit from our fun, and it at least is a shade closer to the truth.

³There is good reason why the government should not step in, as is pointed out by Henry Grady Weaver, *The Mainspring of Human Progress* (New York: The Foundation for Economic Education, Inc., 1953), pp. 144, 145, 202.

The Anatomy of Structure (the political edifice viewed outside a political context)

by Robert LeFevre

The following article by Rampart College president Robert LeFevre is an excerpt from the Home-Study Course now being offered by the college (Lessons 49-51). It compares the system and the structure as means used by men to accomplish their goals, analyzes the flow of power in structures, and discusses the withdrawal of sanction by individuals who seek to maximize human well-being.

When the *Rampart Journal* published Laurence McGann's article, "The Political Spectrum" (Winter, 1967), a spate of comment was stimulated, the results of which are included in the present issue. There seems to be a considerable interest in trying to place various political theories and structures in some kind of a framework of reference.

This is, of course, meritorious to all students of political theory and to all those who are trying to idealize the most rewarding and satisfactory government imaginable.

While the argument ensues as to the proper meaning of *left* and *right* and whether we should have a circular, linear, or three-dimensional political model in order to geometrically locate various theories, it might also serve a useful purpose to consider the question on a rather broader basis.

The political structure is one method which men have devised for getting things done. There are other ways also devised by men, for the harnessing of human energy in an effort to obtain a desired result. Before we become lost in the niceties of geometric location on a "more-government—less-government" scale, we might find it useful to compare the political structure per se with the voluntary and systematic way of getting things done without employing the structure.

When we find humanity afflicted with some specific disease or virus, we call in the scientists and the medical specialists, and ask them to isolate the germ and then to tell us how we can deal with it. It is implicit in the scientific method that researchers obtain to some type of detached attitude in their examinations. We don't have advocates of tuberculosis as opposed to cancer. Rather, we have the accepted view that any germ which injures man need not be advocated.

This doesn't mean that we lose our tempers when we discover the character of a new germ, however deadly. And it certainly doesn't mean that we punch a patient in the nose when we discover that he is harboring some dread virus.

Thus, the medical profession, so far as is known, hasn't come up with a chart depicting the relatively dangerous aspects of germs in some kind of hostility sequence. We don't have a chart showing, on the one hand, mild infections from cuts and bruises, leading on the other end to gangrene. We don't emotionalize about our diseases; we seek to cure them. It really doesn't matter too much whether we are dealing with lordosis or leukemia. The object is health—the properly functioning individual within a framework where he will live and work with other healthy specimens of his own species. Whatever the malfunction, let's try to cure it.

It might be desirable to look at the two broad ways we have of getting things done, within just such a context. If there are some forms of government which are less harmful than other forms, this may be of interest to the hair-splitters and the emotionalizers. But if even a less harmful form is still harmful, the task we ought to consider is that of eradicating the harm, not that of advocating some special but (hopefully) milder form of that harm.

The two broad ways we have of getting things done can be called *the system* (voluntary) and *the structure* (involuntary).

The System

For human beings to live and to maximize their well-being, organized human effort is mandatory. Individually, man does not have enough strength, acumen, endurance, or longevity to manage without the help of others of his kind.

It is all very well for those of us who believe in individualism to insist that we are completely independent and self-reliant and that we don't need anyone else. Reality, that of our natures and of the world we live in, gives us the lie.

Rather than insisting that we are completely independent and require no one else, we might do well to amend this statement to read: Each man is capable of independent conduct to the extent that he does not need to become a parasite on others. Independent conduct which eliminates parasitism is desirable. Total independence, while conceivably possible, is not desirable for it would inevitably result in the decline of our standards of living, which decline would continue to the point of mere subsistence. And in such a situation, survival would be possible for a very limited number of people, and virtually impossible for children. The end of the human race as such could be predicted with confidence.

We can begin our study of organized human effort with two ultimate givens:

MAN IS

ORGANIZATION IS

The tendency among many is to presume that man's well-being is constantly diminished by the existence of organization. Thus, they imagine that man, qua man, finds his interests injured or destroyed by organization, qua organization. Such persons view the picture this way:

MAN

VERSUS

ORGANIZATION

But this is unrealistic. Man is not necessarily thwarted by organization although his energies, needs, and wants may be thwarted by the wrong kind of organization. Experience shows that men fulfill themselves and satisfy their needs and wants through organizations, when the organizations are correctly put together.


In all the cycling periods of time, men have found only two ways of organizing human energy to reach specific goals. They can organize voluntarily, offering rewards to those who agree to work with them. Or they can organize coercively, offering punishment to those who refuse to work with them.

Most certainly, they can also seek to combine these two methods and establish organizations which employ both the "carrot" and the "stick."

However, while one cannot deny that compulsory and coercive organizations may very well reach the goals intended, they can only

do so through the process of disrupting some of the wants and needs of others, whereas when voluntary methods are employed exclusively, no major disruption is possible, since each individual is always capable of exercising his own value judgment so that he can withdraw from an organization if, in his judgment, it no longer serves to fulfill his needs or wants.

Perhaps a better way to look at man in conjunction with organizational effort is this:



In order to discuss this issue thoroughly, we are going to refer to any kind of voluntary organization or association as a *system*. This is the kind of organization which is found in the market place when the market is uncoerced.

Whenever we find a coercive organization or association, such as is the rule with governmental organizations, we are going to refer to it as a *structure*.

What concerns us are the methods to be employed by means of which man's well-being, both material and otherwise, is to be maximized. So we must discuss both systems and structures. To discuss structures requires that we discuss governments, per se. We must not limit ourselves to any particular type or kind of government. Rather, we must seek out and list those factors which differentiate *any* government from *any* system.

We have already pointed out that for a government to exist in fact, there must be three factors present. Someone must be willing to make decisions for others and to enforce those decisions. Those upon whom these decisions are to be enforced must be willing and tractable. There must be a point of friction; that is, there must be a place where the enforcement proceedings can *physically* occur.

Formal government can be defined as *a group of men who sell retribution to the inhabitants of a limited geographic area at monopolistic prices*. Informal governments do not seek to sell. Rather, they seek to enforce their wills upon others without consulting them in advance to obtain their acquiescence and submission. An informally established government can be brought into existence by one man with a gun. Any bank robber or other armed brigand is simply setting himself up as the temporary government of his victim. He is not seeking to obtain voluntary cooperation. He is seeking to obtain coerced obedience.

Informal types of government can have a kind of organizational structure. We are all familiar, at least through newspaper accounts, with the organized gang, the international crime syndicate, and other types of informal governments. Informal government can be defined as *certain men or groups of men who seek to impose their controls temporarily upon other men with whom they have an immediate point of frictional contact*.

All organization activity, whether systematized or structured, is put together for the purpose of obtaining specific patterns of behavior from others. Thus, all organizations, if we reduce their functions to simple terms, are engaged in the processes of motivation.

A system seeks to motivate those from whom it wishes a patterned behavioral response, by offering a value that will be accepted voluntarily. A structure seeks to motivate those from whom it wishes a patterned behavioral response, by threatening to remove a value, or by the actual removal of a value.

It follows that all structures impose upon the value choices of individuals and thus help to minimize human well-being to some degree or to a total extent.

Many people suppose that the only way to motivate human behavior is to set up a structure or process of compulsion or retribution. Formal governments rely on retribution, whereas informal governments rely on direct compulsion. That is to say, a formal and established government seeks to obtain willing acquiescence. It sets down a structure of rules or laws, disobedience to which will bring punishment. Informal governments are invariably temporary, and rely upon direct and immediate compulsion in order to obtain the motivated response sought.

One of the discernible difficulties with all coercively operated structures is that the more formal they are at the outset, the more

they gravitate toward informal operations. Additionally, if an informal government is organized, its tendency is to drift toward formality. This latter is especially observed when we watch the progress of revolutionary juntas. They begin as organized gangs opposing the more formal governmental organizations they seek to supplant or overthrow. A dictatorship is the culmination of government in its extreme form. It combines the elements of the formal with the elements of the informal. There will be, in most dictatorships, the formalized rules, disobedience to which will be punished; and there also will be the will of the dictator which can be expressed coercively at any moment, irrespective of any rules that may have been promulgated in advance.

Thus, all governments, whether formal or informal, contain elements which move toward ultimate control of others.

All formal governments, beginning with the tribal council or the town-hall type of democracy, up to and including dictatorships, rely on politics. Politics may be defined as *the method adopted in governments for obtaining motivation toward a monopoly*. In all political actions, a monopoly of control and method is sought. Governments are the perpetual enemies of competition. They begin by seeking a monopoly of force over the inhabitants of a given territory. They end when their monopolies become total. This means that governments are invariably their own worst enemies. As with any parasite, total success means extermination.

A recapitulation of these points may help.

Human well-being is maximized through voluntary organization.

Human well-being is minimized through coercive organization, whether formal or informal, because individuals are unable to act on the basis of their own values.

To maximize human well-being, each individual must be free to act upon his own value judgments with the implicit prohibition that in so acting he does not impose his will upon any other individual. Through voluntary organization, each individual is free to maximize his own well-being through the exercise of his own value judgments, without imposing on any other.


A voluntary organization is called a *system*.

(It could be claimed that the individual is, himself, a system. In a sense this is true, but it need not concern us. The area of concern relates to organized human energy and the methods and goals of such organized effort. For our purposes, we can accept the fact that each

individual who has not joined with any other individual has been organized by nature and in this respect his freedom and well-being are not in question).

It is at the point where two or more persons find a common interest or a common goal, that human energies will either collide or coalesce.

When human energy from two or more individuals becomes organized toward the accomplishment of a given objective, we can call that organization a *system*.



The rectangle is the system itself. It could be a married couple, a partnership, a fraternal organization, a church, a school, a business, an industry. The simplest way to describe its operation is to describe the operation of any business.

However, in thinking of systems there are three basic types: (1) The family. (2) The business. (3) The fraternity.

These can be organized singly or in any combination.

You will note the essential characteristics of any system:

1. It has a point of input where messages from the system's environment are communicated to the system. This is indicated by the arrow at upper left, called *wants*. Incidentally, some people use the term *needs* to illustrate the same point. *Want* is a word that relates to economics; *need* is a word relating to psychology. When a person desires food, clothing, shelter, and so on, we refer to this as a *want*. If a person desires love, a feeling of appreciation, or an object for his affection, this can be called a *need*.

2. It has an organized method of procedure illustrated by the circle in the center, "organized action."

3. It has a point of output where the results of organized effort (goods or services) flow back into the environment in an effort to satisfy the wants which were communicated at the beginning. This is shown by the arrow at upper right.

4. It has a cybernetic loop wherein the environment signals its degree of pleasure or displeasure from the results of the output, and issues new input information so that the organizational operation can be increased, diminished, or corrected in terms of environmental (market) demand.

This same design serves to explain *any* method wherein human energy is voluntarily organized in the accomplishment of any objective.

In this sense, all systems are ecological. That is to say, all systems exist within a general environment wherein the system feeds on its environment, and in return supplies something to that environment. As long as the environment is "wanting" something that the system will supply, the environment will continue to demand it from that system. As long as the environment is willing to pay for that good or service (supply something in return), the system will continue to produce what is demanded.

Every system is horizontal in its relationship to the environment. That is to say, it exists within its environment or market, and is neither above it nor below it. Systems operate on a quid pro quo basis. This is simply one way of explaining the law of supply and demand.

The key factor of any system is the cybernetic loop. What is a cybernetic loop? To explain it, perhaps this illustration will suffice. Most of us have watched baseball games. We'll see a batter drive a hard fly out into center field. The fielder takes a look at that arching spheroid and runs to the point in the field where he calculates the trajectory of the ball will terminate. Then what happens? We see the fielder do a sort of dance, advancing, retreating, stepping to first one side or the other, as new inputs (information) are communicated to him through his eyes so that he recalculates and corrects his first estimate as to the termination of the trajectory. Finally, if he is good enough, he will correctly determine in advance where the ball is to come and his gloved hand will be there to catch it.

Why doesn't he simply take one look at that fly ball, walk over to the place where the ball is to come, and catch it? Because, as a human being, his evaluation of the inputs aren't that accurate! He corrects himself constantly *while in motion*; so that in the end he will maximize his chances for success.

That is cybernetics. It is the study of corrective actions taken after a commitment to action has already occurred. And this is what every system must do, if it is to survive. It must constantly get

the "feedback" from its environment so that it can correct its output in terms of new informational input.

This is why all systems require management. This is one of the prime functions of management. It must deal with the informational input so that corrections can be constantly made *while in motion*.

We all experience much the same thing when we drive a motor vehicle. We don't just set the car into motion aimed at its ultimate destination. We *manage* the car *after* it is set into motion. We correct its progress constantly by adjusting speed and direction, so that information we didn't have at the beginning is fed into the car's behavior so that our ultimate destination can be reached.

The human brain is undoubtedly the finest cybernetic calculator ever produced. But using the brain is a tiring process. And we live at a time when we have a great yearning to make everything automatic. So we are now engaged in building machines and computers that can simulate the behavior of the human brain and make corrections without employing individual judgment.

There is one overriding temptation all of us face when we find ourselves engaged in any capacity within a system. We not only want to make things easier for ourselves and, hence, minimize our personal judgment factor, we also want to make the operation of our system perpetual. This can be called the longing for immortality.

Once we have a successful system running, we not only want it to run automatically, we want it to run forever. But this would presume that the same input demands would be received over and over again and no correction would every be required.

To begin with, Henry Ford received correct information from his market respecting the desire of the average man for a reliable, cheap means of motor transportation. Henry Ford nearly went broke when he failed to alter his output in spite of new demand inputs. He insisted on making all his cars alike, black, and standardized. So long as there was enough demand for this type of vehicle, in a market starved for any vehicle, he prospered. When market demand changed and people wanted cars that were different, better, faster, more comfortable, and in different colors, they stopped buying Fords and began purchasing other kinds of cars. Reluctantly, Ford had to listen, and finally had to alter his output. Had he not done so, there would be no Ford Motor Company today.

But there is another way of assuring that the output of a given

system will continue to be accepted by its environment. This is the process of structuring. It is the process of corrupting a system so that the system itself corrupts its environment, and then it doesn't matter what the *real* feedback information may be, the system can continue to function in spite of the fact that its output is no longer wanted or acceptable.

An environment, through political action, can be compelled to accept and sustain a system that is no longer wanted. And the temptation to indulge in this type of corruption confronts every successful businessman.

If a businessman can get a law passed that will protect the system from competition; or can guarantee a purchase of the product; or can penalize its competition; or can get tax-paid support of one kind or another; then the businessman can ignore his own market and simply act to please an overarching structure.

Now go back to Page 46 and look at the drawing of the system again. Let's imagine that this is a system relating to the manufacture of widgets. Within the rectangle there will be a whole series of subordinate systems which in combination produce the system of the widget factory. There will be, for instance, a personnel department. The wants of the factory in terms of personnel are communicated to the personnel manager. He must hire the men and women whose skills and abilities are required in terms of widget manufacture. Then there is a purchasing department, a bookkeeping department, a financial department, a sales department, and so on. Each of these is a subordinate system to the widget factory itself. Each of these is a minor system within the overarching factory system.

In a free market there will be a number of competing widget factories. Each factory is a subordinate system to the overarching system of the widget industry. But the widget industry is a subordinate system in the overarching system of the entire national economy. And a national economy is a subordinate system in the overarching system of a world economy. And a world economy is a subordinate system to the overarching system of humanity itself. Thus, while each system is horizontal to its market, it has a vertical relationship to both subordinate and overarching systems.

When a businessman succumbs to the temptation of seeking immortality for his particular system, and manages it successfully, we can say that his system becomes structured. It is now dysfunctional in respect to the alteration of demand. But, instead of perishing, the


system continues to function due to the corruption that has been brought into play.

Imagine the workings of a cell in a human body. As most of us know, cells die and are replaced by new living cells. The cell itself is like a system. It lives within its own ecology by feeding off its environment and by providing something in turn so that its environment can feed.

Now, suppose a cell refuses to supply what the environment needs. Properly, it will die and the environment will be rid of it. But suppose it is being sustained artificially and keeps on producing that which the environment doesn't require. This is, in a sense, a cancer cell. It should have died, but it keeps living. It is now dysfunctional. It robs the environment of something, but it does not return anything that is wanted. It is a pirate cell, a bandit. It is dysfunctional. And it prevents the formation of a new vital cell or system that would be functional.

The nature of this dysfunction, both with the cell and the human system of organization, is this:

Dysfunctional attributes now serve to introduce dysfunction both to subordinate systems and to overarching systems in a rigid line



from the now dysfunctional system, or cell, which penetrates adjacent cells or systems.

This illustration shows what happens when a system (B) becomes dysfunctional. By means of governmental regulation and taxation (represented by Line D—D), System B can now receive payment, not because its market wishes the goods or services offered, but because government has intruded to make it profitable for the system to continue to produce irrespective of changing market demands.

The rigid Line D—D drawn across the workings of System B guarantees that input information (I) will not affect output (O). In a subordinate system (C) the contagion spreads, introducing additional frictions and preventing immediate response to new input information; i.e., System C management now wishes to benefit by the rigidity of government support. The same effect is noted in the overarching system (A). As the rigid line extends across adjacent systems, they too become dysfunctional to the degree that they accept the intrusion of the state.

Thus, instead of permitting death (business failure) to occur, we sustain, through artificial corruption, the dysfunctional operation. The dysfunction spreads. Other systems are corrupted and soon become structured. The structure is rigid. It does not respond to environmental demands. If this process is permitted to continue without check, the dysfunction spreads more rapidly and soon ultimate overarching systems are corrupted.

Note that as long as there is an overarching system which is not entirely dysfunctional, dysfunctional subordinate systems can survive.

But when an overarching system becomes dysfunctional, death finally strikes. It no longer removes a single dysfunctional system. Instead, it strikes to remove an entire culture, or at least an overarching system. If the entire culture is protected by corruption and structuring, it is conceivable that the dysfunction could bring death to the ultimate overarching system, humanity itself.

The principal difficulty here seems to be man's superstition that death is always evil and that life is always good. This is not true. Function is always good and dysfunction is always bad. Rightfully, dysfunction brings death which, in this case, is good. If the individual cell or the individual system is permitted to die, it can be replaced by a cell or system that will serve its environment. If not, death is postponed, and when it does come, the effect is far more deadly and devastating.

The System

There are three ways in which systems can be classified. They are: the family, the business, and the fraternity. Remember, a system is a way in which human energy is organized for the purpose of getting something done. And, characteristically, if we are speaking of a system, we are speaking of a way of getting things done not requiring coercion or force. Systems, as we use the term here, require voluntary cooperative effort and exclude coercion. We classify the three principal systems as we do because each of these classification arises from a particular type of human necessity based upon the nature of man.

The family is the product of what we could call *biological necessity*. Man, by his nature, requires a mate to reproduce. The result of his mating is a family relationship. The family is not created by coercion (as a rule, although we have all heard of shotgun weddings) for, characteristically, we are attracted to members of the opposite sex and will seek one out unless we are prevented one way or another.

As a matter of fact, various societies going back to very ancient times, have sought ways and means of regulating this relationship. The drive toward the creation of a family is so strong that only rarely has it been successfully suppressed. Even when laws prohibited mating, or strictly enforced the selection of the mate, individuals would thwart and defy these rulings, being pushed forward almost irresistibly in their desires. Possibly the most successful attempt to prohibit families has been carried on by the Catholic Church for members of its clergy. The church has made up for this prohibition for its priesthood by encouraging the strongest of family ties and by discouraging birth control for all members of the congregation. Other disciplinary faiths have militated against the family from time to time with only faltering success.

Possibly one of the least successful efforts to interfere in this particular was attempted by the followers of Karl Marx, who saw in the family relationship a constant renewal of man's age-old drive to own property privately. Additionally, it was claimed that middle-class family relationships were immoral and that it would be far better for children to be raised by the state, freed from the amateurish care of their inadequate parents. Furthermore, with the state as parent and guardian, there would be no cases of children being sold into slavery or prostitution, no cruelty to children, and no inadequacy in their instruction.

When these attempts were made in Russia and in China, after each of the major communist uprisings, the people responded in such ardent rejection of the new rulings that they had to be abandoned. Men and women, at least in these cases, rejected the antiseptic and anti-familial program. Men and women continued to select their mates, to have their children in the usual way, to grow attached to them, and to raise them as before. Although the state might be entirely willing to remove all responsibility for child raising from men and women under its structure, and although these same men and women may be willing to relinquish responsibilities in other areas, when it comes to the family the state has learned to tread lightly.

Imperfect though we may be as parents, the love and even the error of affection prove to be far superior to engineered and totally regulated upbringing by the politically motivated experts.

We define a family as an organized association of human beings having at its base at least one male and one female, with an arrangement for the addition of other persons, notably the young. Families can have more than one male and one female at their base. And once the family has been organized and even a single child puts in an appearance, the loss of either of the parents does not eliminate the family relationship. Although a family begins with one male and one female, subsequent losses can produce all-female families or all-male families, or any number of variations.

Families can be either small or large and are not necessarily limited to blood relatives, although this is usual.

The family is a system for combining and organizing human energy in response to biological necessity.

What is a business? A business is a system for getting things done which is based upon *economic necessity*. You do not have to pass laws to compel people to organize businesses any more than it is necessary to pass laws to compel families to come into existence. We start businesses or families because we anticipate that conditions will be better for us if we do these things. A business is organized for profit. It does not have to be organized for dollar profit although this is both usual and commendable. But there are certain types of businesses, notably in the service area, which are not expected to make dollar profits but which do return enormous psychic satisfaction to the owners, managers, or other participants.

So long as a business operates as a system, it must serve as a portion of the human ecology. That is, it exists because in a business en-

vironment (the market) the business provides a good or a service that persons want and will voluntarily purchase. Thus, the market supports the business because the business provides something the market wants. It exists on an exchange basis: *quid pro quo*.

We have already discussed what occurs when a business system is corrupted and becomes a structure.

What is a fraternity? This is a system for organizing human energy based upon *communication necessity*. All human beings have a yearning to fraternize with others who have similar interests and with whom communication in those interests can occur.

Like a business, a fraternal system depends upon voluntary choices. We organize a group of men or women in order to accomplish something which always deals with large areas of sympathetic communication. Or we join an existing group for the same reason. Governments, or some informal type of coercion, may be exerted to regulate or to eliminate fraternal behavior. As a matter of fact, many military commanders are constrained to demand non-fraternization of their troops when they are bivouacked in a foreign territory.

As with similar restrictions placed upon business or the family, such regulation may have some results. But no one has to pass a law to compel fraternization. As human beings, we have a drive to communicate with others who feel or who think as we do in certain specified areas.

These basic systems can exist in combination. A church is a kind of fraternity run along business lines. A school is a kind of business run along fraternal lines. There have been family-type business fraternities, and so on in every possible combination.

The main point to understand is that the family, the business, and the fraternity come into existence because of the nature of man. It is not necessary to use force to compel their existence. They survive because of basic human necessities. And it does take force to suppress them. Indeed, suppression is never easy and sometimes it is impossible.

The next thing to keep in mind about systems is that although of a voluntary character, each system provides for a large measure of order. Every system has its own rules or laws which must be obeyed by those within the system. By adhering to these rules or laws, order is produced which is always necessary if we are to get things done. Most of us do not think of voluntary systems as being capable of producing law, much less order, so this point requires examination. Let us take them in reverse order; first, the fraternity.

Nearly every effort undertaken to organize a fraternal order of any kind begins with the creation of a constitution, a charter, and a set of by-laws. The persons instrumental in the founding are careful to set down in writing what it is that the fraternity has adopted or will adopt as its overriding purpose. The area of interest is spelled out. Then the methods to be employed in furthering the objectives are set forth. Little is left to chance.

When it is organized, other persons are now urged to join in the fraternal system. Usually, they are required to pay dues. Always, they must conform in some degree to the objectives set forth and the methods employed. The rules are precise, methods of procedure are specified, and the fraternity can begin its life. It must do these things or the organization cannot proceed in an orderly fashion. The entire aim and objective will be lost unless orderly procedures are invoked.

Of course, the rules are never binding upon non-members; the organization is a system and remains voluntary. Anyone who agrees to join, submits to the rules set forth as a matter of his own choice. If he does not agree to the rules, he does not join.

If it is found after he has joined that he fails in the fulfillment of his promises or refuses to obey the rules, he is asked to leave. Or if he finds that for any reason he no longer wishes to be associated, he withdraws. Thus, he obeys the rules when it pleases him and if the rules displease him, he separates or is asked to go.

The rules are the means employed to obtain order. They are not an end in themselves.

If the members of a fraternity make the error of assuming that their real function is the formulation of more and more rules by means of which the members are to be bound, they may find themselves with a diminishing membership. They have organized for the purpose of having luncheon meetings, or promoting sound business practices, or supporting a hospital, or dancing or marching; or some other objective attracts them. If the objective is buried under a weight of new rules and directives, those joining will find that they prefer to leave.

The same general observations must be made concerning a business. It is started because of economic necessity. Those responsible seek profit. But profit requires orderly behavior. Rules must be set forth; company policy must be determined. In large firms, company policy may be reduced to writing and new employees asked to read

the book. In smaller firms, rulemaking is more informal but exists nonetheless.

As an employee you will be told when the work day begins and when it ends. You are told where you are to work, what you are to do, and how you are to do it. The pay is specified, as are coffee breaks, vacation, so-called fringe benefits, and the like. The employee is bound by the rules. But he does not have to stay. He can quit. And if he does not obey the rules or will not produce as he was asked to produce, he may be asked to leave. The employee joins volitionally because he wishes to further his own economic position. He gives up a certain amount of his time in exchange for a certain amount of dollars and cents. If all goes well, he will remain a satisfied employee. If it does not, he will quit or he may be fired.

The system is voluntary. No one outside of a given business is bound by the rules promulgated by the managers of this business. Entrance and exit remain volitional.

Thus, the business is a system depending upon voluntary acceptance of the rules by the members. It is supported in the market by the voluntary support of customers in the market. The entire procedure is voluntary, under rules that create order. The rules are not an end, but a means to an end. The end sought is orderly procedure.

With the family, the creation of laws or rules is far less obvious but the process occurs, all the same. For a household to operate with efficiency, rules and procedures must be understood in advance. Hours are set for the serving of meals and for appointments of various sorts. The budget is determined. There has to be an organized procedure if affairs are not to degenerate into chaos, discord, and bitterness. Husband and wife unite in this process, sometimes almost unconscious of the role they play.

She sets the hours for the events important to her—meals, shopping appointments, and so on. He usually sets up the budget and determines the time for getting out of bed and for getting into bed. The job of setting these rules into existence and following them is one of trial and error, in most cases. And if errors are made—and usually very costly and painful errors do occur—the disappointment and the sorrow and even the tears and recriminations when a rule is broken serve to provide a system of law enforcement that is unparalleled in any governmental agency for brevity and for emotional impact. As with the fraternity and the business, the parties to the system *want* to work things out. They are motivated, not by fear or force, but by

a desire to maximize their own well-being. Every effort is made by both parties if the arrangement is to succeed. If one party will not cooperate, the chances are good that the marriage will fail. It certainly will fail if both parties remain uncooperative and stubborn.

In the event failure occurs, the parties separate. Today, the government intrudes, both in the creation of the family and the dissolution of the marriage. But this is only the legal side of it. The practical aspect suggests that legality never made a marriage succeed and never prevented a break-up.


If, in any system, the rules become oppressive and cannot be endured, then a split occurs and whoever leaves finds himself in a world where he is free of the controls he experienced within the system. He is free to create or join another system, or he is free to stay out.

For example, if a man working for General Motors quits, he does not automatically find himself employed at another job. He is free not to work if he so desires. If he does desire another job, it takes that decision together with a series of other actions before he will get it. The same is true with departure from a fraternity or from a married state.

Note that the system is characterized not only by its voluntary nature, but by the limitation to the application of the rules. A family does not pass rules for other households in the neighborhood. One business does not seek to force another business to follow the rules it has established for itself. The charter and by-laws of Rotary are not binding on the Elks. Interestingly, the rules in all systems follow the lines of property ownership and control. The rules are for the people who work or live and communicate within the system, and most of the rules relate to the behavior of individuals respecting the property that is owned or acquired by the system.

There is still another characteristic. This should be emphasized. In all systems, the rules are never an end in themselves. They are a practical means toward the order and organized procedures that are essential if the system is to succeed and survive. This means that at the moment the system is begun and at the moment each new individual joins a given system, the rules are emphasized. This is the educational process. The rules have to be emphasized so the individual will learn just what kind of behavior is expected of him. Once his behavioral patterns are set, the rules are put aside in large measure. When order manifests, rules can be neglected and even forgotten. They are only important as a means for obtaining a desired goal.

So, at the inception of a system (family, business, or fraternity) great emphasis is placed upon forming the rules and seeing that everyone knows them. As order begins to result from the rules (and the rules are constantly amended, repealed, and replaced until order appears), then order dominates the scene and the rules are put aside. The process could be diagrammed as follows:



Nowhere is this more in evidence than when children come to enlarge the family circle.

The infant is born into the care of a virtual dictator, the mother. Nature has prepared her for the natural role of tyrant. The infant is helpless without her. She does everything for him, and to the infant it must seem that she does everything to him. She feeds him, burps him, washes him, dries him, wraps him up, changes him, fondles him, croons to him, puts things into him, takes them out, rolls him over, puts him back. She fills his world and his life. His only recourse is to kick and yell. He is unable to communicate his wishes, but they are anticipated as no political dictator has ever learned to manage. Thus, the infant is met by total law and total control.

But as he grows and slowly matures, the mother begins to remove herself gradually from such a completely overbearing position. She grants him more and more latitude, until he is creeping by himself and finally walking. He has many little catastrophies in process, but she lets them occur. This way he learns. All through his infant years she is busy repealing the rules she has established. She does it as rapidly as the infant responds by agreeing to the orderly procedures she desires.

Finally, usually sometime during the teens for most normal children, the degree of order has reached a high enough level so that the parents (both of them now) begin instructing the child in an understanding of self-reliance and self-responsibility. This is a process which begins much earlier without the child understanding it. Early training is for the purpose of establishing acceptable conditioned reflexes. He is given chores; asked rather than ordered to cooperate. And if the process has been correctly employed, in time he emerges as an adult, subject to the customs that have now become habitual without more than occasional recourse to reminders of the rules long established.

It may serve a useful purpose to point out that when we are dealing with structures, notably political structures, the process is precisely reversed.

First of all, systems precede structures. A structure is a corrupted system. Therefore, before structuring occurs, there is already a high degree of order. Of course human beings are not perfect and all orderly arrangements break down on occasion. When such variations are treated with impatience and intolerance, the temptation arises to use force to prevent recurrences. But structures have the opposite direction in their growth. They originate when order is already well established within a system. Now the rules which are formulated become an end in themselves. Indeed, they become sanctified and often a matter of ritual and even obsession.

The structure, relying as it does on force, is not voluntary. It introduces compulsion and coercion. Deviations from the rules are not met by tears, lectures, and recriminations. Rather, they are met by police, courts, jails, and, in extreme cases, with death. If a person decides that he wishes to get out of the structure, he finds that he must first obtain permission from whoever heads the structure. This is not always easy or possible. And if he does manage to get out of a given structure, he will find that he has merely exchanged one set of masters for another. There is nowhere that he can go to get into free territory. There is virtually none.


Further, the characteristic of all structures is that they ignore property boundaries and all rights, while professing to uphold them. Indeed, the fundamental pattern of the structure is to molest the boundaries of every dissident to bring him into harmony with the rules. Thus, with the passing of time, structures tend to create frus-

tration, resentment, aggression, disorder, and a breakdown leading to war and chaos.

Systems, with the passing of time, operate within the property limits and tend to create satisfactions, profit, happiness, and a high degree of order.

Perhaps it is time for us to take note of a most compelling fact. Human energy must be organized in an orderly fashion for us to get things done. It is the system that does the job and creates the order we seek. It is time we stopped crediting structures for doing the job that systems perform.

The results of a structure might look like this:



If we are truly concerned with maximizing human well-being, we are going to have to seek effective ways and means of maximizing order, so that we can produce and consume at the high levels our capacities make possible.

The Structure—A Corrupted System

The difficulty most of us experience when we try to talk about government is that the word conveys so many meanings and so many emotional impacts. In general, people associate the word *government* with “law and order.” As we have shown, law and order are really the products of systems and not necessarily of structures. But this fact does not prevent people from equating law and order with government.

Thus, if a person says: “I believe in good government,” his hearers normally think they have heard him say: “I believe in good law and order.” Of course if he says: “I don’t think we need any government,”

the assumption is that he has declared himself against law and order and thus must be an anarchist.

Perhaps if we can assist in explaining and making useful the words *system* and *structure*, we can help to show that while law and order are necessary and desirable provided they come into existence through the voluntary acceptance of those who decide to be ruled by them, they are neither desirable nor necessary when laws are imposed upon those who do not choose to be so ruled, and thus such laws lead to frustration, aggression, rebellion, and disorder.

We have already set forth the proposition that for government (structure) to exist, there must be three factors present: (1) There must be at least one person who is ready, willing, and able to impose his rule upon others. (2) There must be those who are willing to accept such an imposed rule. (3) There must be a point of frictional contact in which the force of the governor can be expressed upon the governed.

Most modern governments are a derivative of territorial control and hence a government could normally be defined as a group of men who sell retribution to the inhabitants of a limited geographic area at monopolistic prices. However, a government can exist which has no territory, and thus the general definition will not always suffice. For instance, a group of men can select a particular class or race or group of men, identifying them by their religion, their jobs, their color, or their language, and can impose a kind of government over them without bothering with the acquisition of territory. Into this classification would fall any criminal gang; the United Nations; any labor union; or any militant church group which imposed its rules by force and violence over a specific group of persons or organizations.

The single identifying characteristic of any government, whether territory is involved or not, is the characteristic of force. And it must be the kind of force before which the subject is nearly helpless and from which he will have the greatest difficulty in extricating himself.

Another identifying feature is this. All governments exist on surpluses. Although any government can own and operate productive enterprises, and many of them do, those who govern are always members of an elite which does not engage in productive work but busies itself with regulating others and punishing them according to the customs or laws that are adopted. It is these persons, who do not produce, who must be supported by the surpluses others produce.

Ideally, men should not have structured government. All such

structures impair human liberty and in the long run prove destructive of human well-being.

But the tendency so many have is to equate freedom with anarchy, and law and order with government. So it is usually presumed that if government is removed, anarchy will follow. And since anarchy means a lack of law and order, and indeed is often viewed as synonymous for chaos, it is understandable why the people often say that no matter how bad a government may become, having even a very bad one is better than having anarchy.

Factually, if human beings had to choose between chaos and government, they would have to choose government. Fortunately, this is not the choice that appears before us. The assumption seems to be that in freedom, human beings and human energy are uncontrolled, whereas in government, human beings and human energy are controlled; but this is to forget the nature of human energy, which always operates under the control of the individual. The real choice before us is this: Shall we have a situation in which each person controls himself; or should we have one in which some persons control other persons?

Here, there is no question as to the choice to be made. Indeed, it is not certain that there really is a choice here. Nature has ordained that each individual does, in fact, control himself. A system set up in harmony with the facts of nature could hardly be amiss. Nature has seen to it that no individual is ever endowed with the power to control other individuals without their own consent and individual control.

Now the argument is apt to revert to the question of man's basic nature. Is man "good" or is he "evil"?

It is obvious that if each man controls himself and if each man is basically good, no government would be necessary. If all men were good, government could be eliminated at once. But this does not seem to be the case. Although men do control themselves as individuals, they have certainly demonstrated their ability to perform evil acts, and even to perform them with evil intent.

Are men, then, basically evil? If so, those who favor government may seem to have the better of the argument. But do they? If all men are basically evil, it would follow that the men given power over other men would also be evil. And thus, if men are evil, it would be far better to deal with them if they did not have power than if they did. It thus appears that if men were basically good, we would not

require government; if men were basically evil, we could not afford to grant any man the power of government.

Well, what is the nature of man? Candidly, it appears to be neither good nor bad. It is, rather, opportunistic. We know from prior lessons that men seek the "good" (profit) for themselves. Whether they will adopt means and methods which are in harmony with the good they seek depends upon the opportunities available and the educational level obtained. The truly educated man acts with ends and means in harmony because he has learned that principles are important to him even as they are important to others.

Whether you will favor or advocate government control over others will depend upon the kind of education you acquire. Very few men advocate governmental controls over themselves. But they constantly believe that others must be controlled by some outside force even though, in their case, no such control is necessary since they are quite willing to control themselves.

The time has come for us to examine the governmental structure. This is necessary because it is important to discover whether or not we *can* devise a kind of governmental structure that will preserve freedom.

There are very few men who, while calm and reasonable, would ever advocate limitless government or total tyranny. We will assume that you, as well as most other people, really favor some kind of "limited government." So there is no necessity for us to compare the merits of limitless government with the merits of limited government. Even top office-holders will usually advocate limited government. The question really centers on the area between so-called limited government and no government at all.

It also appears that the only reason serious-minded people favor even limited government is because of the continuing fear that other persons will impose on them and that unless they have a means of defending themselves and of punishing those who have thus managed to molest them, they will be vulnerable to everyone. There are only two brief comments to be made here, since we did cover protection, defense, and retaliation in earlier lessons. What we must keep in mind at this point is that every individual does in fact control his own energy. If he does good things or bad things, it is because he wishes to. Therefore, in fact, the entire process of obtaining safety among others is a process relating to motivation. You cannot control another. But if you can assist in motivating him so that he does not

want to molest you, then he will not molest you even though you might be vulnerable to him.


People usually begin organizing their energies by creating a system in which they get something done. There are two fears to which they are susceptible: (1) Others will not voluntarily cooperate, either within my system or in the system's environment, and therefore I must use force. (2) My system is working fine now but I cannot foresee the future and therefore I must protect my system now so that it lasts forever regardless of what is to happen later.

It is the fear of incorrect motivation in others that causes us to convert and corrupt a system into a structure, or it is the fear of change which conceivably could lead to death. Thus, we long for control over others, although nature has not provided us with this attribute; and we long for eternal life, even though nature prefers that the smaller cell perish to preserve the larger system.

The system exists within its environment (the market) and its relationships to it are quid pro quo. This was illustrated on Page 46 by the horizontal direction taken by the arrows that lead in and out of the system. With all systems there is a something-for-something arrangement.

The system which begins to resort to force will find the direction of flow changing from horizontal to vertical. Further, while all systems recognize the sanctity of property boundaries and grant authority only to owners, and limit the authority to that which each owner owns, as power begins to flow, boundaries are trespassed. A system respects the property rights and boundaries of all. A structure respects no boundaries and no property rights whatever.

With corruption, the system changes its shape and begins to appear as follows:




This is the power structure and it would describe either a government, a military organization, or a criminal gang. Wherever motiva-

tion is invoked by force or the threat of force, power and force replace the quid pro quo, something-for-something arrangement. Motivation is now obtained without offering to trade. Obey me or suffer the consequences, is the constant rule of all structures.

In all structures of power, power flows from the top down.

Since all structures are merely ways of organizing human energy, every structure is filled with people, office holders, and each of them has a certain amount of power.




The higher a person's office is within the structure, the greater the power at his disposal. The degree of power can be illustrated by placing office holders near the base of the structure or near the apex. The person at the very peak is viewed as the ultimate power-holder, the sovereign, the king, the president, and he acts here as though all persons and property beneath him were his and that he was their owner and could command them just as an owner rightfully can command his own property. He has the power to consume them, discard them, trade them off, or give them away. He becomes the only decision-maker over many people who, if they were within a system, would make their own decisions.

In designing a structure, the concept is that where power is compressed and concentrated, there it is greatest. So as we rise in this pyramid to the apex, the lateral lines come closer and closer together. This illustrates the concentration of power. Now we can use this illustration to show the relative degrees of power within competing structures. One which rises high and has an acute apex is more powerful than one which peaks only a short distance from the base, with the apex an obtuse angle.

The purpose of political science is to try to keep the pyramid as nearly an equilateral triangle as possible. But the tendency of all power structures is to elongate vertically. With the passing of time,

power struggles force the structure to higher and higher levels. Each succeeding "leader" tries to gain a little more power than his predecessors and succeeds to power precisely because he does so. But his advisors, if they are wise to the risks of concentrations of power, will attempt to bring equalization.

No one yet has figured out how to create a power structure and at the same time limit its vertical growth. A power structure beginning as an equilateral triangle, or even as an obtuse-angled triangle, finally rises to the point where the upper angle is sharply acute.



The best the political scientists have been able to do is to extend the base laterally in an effort to bring back equalization. This process is called "broadening the base." (See Figure 3.)

The reason for this phenomenon of vertical growth relates to the nature of human ambition and its predictable behavior within a power structure. When a "leader" has attained to power, he fears that someone will take his position from him. So even while he basks in the sunlight of superior power and prestige, he is planning to make himself even more powerful in order to forestall his possible rivals.

This entire process of growth and the remedial effect of broadening the base can be described in another way. (See illustration, Figures 1, 2, and 3.) Suppose we make an analogy. Imagine individual human beings as though they were pieces of electrical equipment. Each one is wired to handle house current at 110 volts.


If such a man can get himself placed in a power structure, and most especially if he can get himself placed at the top of such a structure, he will have considerably more voltage at his disposal than he would normally have.

Where does he get this added voltage? It is clear that nature does not provide it. Rather, it is provided by the power structure, which

serves to coalesce and condense the power, amplifying it until it can surpass by millions of units the normal individual human supply.

This is illustrated as follows: The flow of power is always from the top down. But the energy that enters the structure comes up through the floor of the pyramid. Recall that the structure is not something that exists within its environment (the market), but rather it sits on top of the environment and thus any energy coming from the market must move upward. Until this energy is activated, it is merely potential power. The relation of the persons within the structure to the persons below the structure is the relationship of superiors to inferiors. The energy comes from the inferiors, and becomes activated through their supplication and sanction. The energy made available to persons in structures could be called the *sanction of the victims*.*

Those who benefit from the power flow are not those who perpetuate its existence. Those who perpetuate it are the victims of it—those who, in spite of their inferior position to it, insist that it must be there. This insistence is based on fear. For people in general are fearful of their neighbors and hence fear their own environment. So, they assist in creating power structures which will plunder and enslave them, because in process these power structures will also be capable of plundering and enslaving their neighbors. And while they do not wish to be the victims of plundering and enslavement, so fearful are they of their neighbors that they will sanction the perpetuation of power structures to be used against others. This is the entire reason for governments. This creates a circulatory system of which the structure is the mechanism. Energy seeps into the base through supplication and the sanction of the victims. This energy is now coalesced and



*I am indebted to Ayn Rand (*Atlas Shrugged*, Chap. 4, "The Sanction of the Victim") for her introduction of this phrase, which seems to me to precisely describe and identify the source of governmental power.

condensed in a kind of generator effect which amplifies it many times and creates a powerful vertical thrust that shoots upward to the highest point. Here the energy can be called power, which comes into the use of the person at the apex who releases the power flow.

This power flows down in the form of laws, regulations, orders, decrees, ukases, and demands for money, support, and obedience; it inflicts punishment up to and including death for those who resist.

Power and Structural Variation

One of the important facts to be kept in mind about power structures relates to their relative vulnerability. The more power that is made available in a structure, the taller it becomes. The taller it becomes in relation to its base, the more vulnerable it is. It is not the small power structures that people fear, it is the tall and mighty ones.

People begin by fearing their environment and they create structures to assist them in controlling their fears concerning the motivation of others. When a structure becomes large and powerful enough, people fear it, too. But it is now too late. They have assisted in creating a social cancer which is now far beyond their influence. They suddenly discover that the structure is regulating their environment and injuring it, and they begin to realize that they are a part of the human ecological system and the structure is injuring them.

They have three general reactions to this awakening. They try to get into a structure, and thus into a situation which, compared to their position beneath the structure, appears to be relatively safe and rewarding. Or they try to get "better men" into the structure to reduce its power. Or they are made to believe that the real danger they face does not come from their own structure but from a neighboring one. At this point they may actually seek to enlarge their own structure so they can make war on a neighboring structure to reduce it. The larger the neighboring structure has become, the more likely is it to be attacked. The taller it is in relation to its base, the more likely is it to be reduced in war.

Usually, all three reactions can be anticipated, with emphasis shifting from one to another, sometimes encompassing all three at once.

But all three reactions are the reactions of emotion and do not get to the root of the problem, which is found in the destructive effect of all structures upon the environment over which each exercises power.

Usually, the reaction to "get into the structure" results in vastly increased reliance upon political action. But most people seem to

understand that *everyone* can't get into political office. Democracies seem to provide an answer. For by participating in the voting process, which is no more than a formal process of sanctioning the rule by others, many persons can be led to believe that "they" are the government. This is pure illusion. All structures require two classes, a political elite and a non-elite operating within an environment.

The single contribution of the socialist here is to envision a structure so vast that the entire environment and all men in it are gobbled up by the structure. Should this process succeed, and it is doubtful that it could succeed on a global scale, it would structure the human race. This would, in effect, afflict all men with a social cancer at once. It might very well eliminate conflict, which is what the socialists claim, but it would also eliminate all systems and their healthy competitive function within an environment. In the end, under such a comprehensive structure, we would find human beings becoming something other than human. What they would become, if they survived at all, is open to the widest conjecture. But their basic nature as individual men would be altered. They could no longer think or act from self-interest.

In Russia, where the most advanced socialist ideas were the subject of experiment from 1917, the trend has been away from mass man and toward the re-emergence of self-interest under a variety of disguises and names.

Usually, when an effort is made for *all* men to seek sanctuary within the structure, a deviation occurs and most men seek to find "good" men to "represent" them within the structure. This deviation is so common that we can probably anticipate that it will continue unchecked until there is a broader understanding concerning the fundamental nature of structures.

In monarchies, the search for "good" men in positions of power has usually found most of the population on its knees praying to the Almighty for a wise and good king. There is little evidence to encourage the belief that prayers of this kind are answered with frequency.

In democracies, the process is called "beating the bushes," although prayers are not totally abandoned. Many who are politically active and who are aware of the effect of power upon them and upon their environment, go on a search for "good" men they can back. They are motivated in two ways: They either want the oppressions pouring from the structure to be reduced or eliminated, or they want the power to be used to benefit themselves or their particular group, class, or industry. Normally, we can expect both motivations. The search

for a "good man" is conducted with much fanfare and publicity. Were we able to observe this type of behavior among a lower species, we would be convulsed by its nonsense. Since it happens to us, it is taken with great seriousness.

To make a long and ludicrous process brief, the culmination, usually in what is called a "national convention," results in a candidate or a pair of candidates being chosen to "represent" all of us. And after each candidate thus chosen walks among us promising both increases and decreases in power, as the mood of his hearers is interpreted, a national popularity contest ensues and a single man emerges as the victor.

He now mounts to the apex of the structure, assumes the robe of office, and the scepter of power is placed in his hands. Going back to our analogy of the 110-volt man, we now have a creature provided by nature with a modest degree of energy and power, who has at his disposal the accumulated sanction of millions, publically obtained. In effect, he takes the oath of office and is "plugged in." The result is electric. He has a "mandate" (sanction) from the people. He responds predictably. Thunder rolls from Olympus and a Jovian attitude is assumed. New laws are invoked and new levies demanded.

His followers, anticipating that he will reflect their pleasure, are ecstatic. His victims are appalled. But as he views himself from this eminence, he comes to realize quickly that he cannot simply act to please his followers. His eminence is god-like and he must be all things to all men under his sway. His followers begin to feel oppressed, and his opponents quiver with frustration and a mounting feeling of helplessness.

Each new decree rolling down the slopes of the structure strikes consternation and terror among the rank and file. And presently they are off again, beating the bushes, convinced that although before the election they had selected a good man, something has happened at those dizzy heights to change his character.

The truth is that no man is wired up to handle this much voltage. If we examine any candidate before he becomes politically activated, and if we examine his daily life before or after his experience on the heights, we will find that he is but a man after all. Not a one has been able to correctly and perfectly handle even his own affairs. Each has been guilty of folly, shortsightedness, crass motivation, and confusion from time to time. With power at his disposal, these weaknesses are magnified and inflicted upon the populace.

But meanwhile, the straining population, its environment victimized

by thousands of oppressions, is seeking a good man again. And the process repeats. It may go on for generations or centuries. It is here that an adroit politician can begin to let every one of his subjects know that the real reason for their plight isn't his fault at all. Either his plight was caused by his predecessors whose follies he cannot quite detect and remedy (since he is committing them, too), or the environmental convulsions are caused by neighboring structures. Ours is a good structure, he will assure, but those persons "over there" have had a bad structure. And it is very powerful. We must now increase our own structure, make war on the neighboring power, and reduce it. This will restore the environment.

This idiocy is accepted as gospel and the nation girds for war. The girding process itself disrupts the environment still further but that can now be forgotten. In a real sense, war absorbs the entire environment into the structure in a burst of patriotic fervor. Histories, as they have usually been written, tell us with monotonous repetition the story of political rise to power and politically inspired war.

If we are fortunate, the war will ultimately cease, both sides drained of manpower, blood, and resources, with respective environments crippled and distorted in a state of vast disequilibrium. Then comes the healing pause, in which we are too weak, even as victors, to carry on as before. The systems slowly begin to reappear, and distortions in the market are met with conversion to consideration of human wants.

But the government structure remains a throbbing center of power. It waits as various "leaders" emerge, posture briefly in their moment of glory, and modify existing coercions.

But the same structured procedures continue and presently we will be tearing up our ecology, our economy, and our geography again. Finally, after long experience, we begin to see the truth of what Lord Acton so wisely voiced. "All power tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely."

At this point we take a good, hard look at the structure we have. And a great light begins to dawn. The structure was designed in such a way that finally all power got into the hands of one man. That is the problem. We become philosophic. No one man should have so much power. We must redesign the structure and do it in such a way that it will not elongate vertically. Or we must put it together so that no one man can dominate it, or if he does, he will automatically be removed.

The idea of getting along without the structure and relying on

competitive systems within the environment seems so terrible that we cannot conceive of it. Haven't we just experienced what those (the latest enemy) people are willing to do to us? We've got to keep the structure at whatever cost, but everything will be all right if we can just limit government.

Down through the years we have experimented with every conceivable kind of structure in an effort to have our cake and eat it, too. Probably no one has said this better than Rose Wilder Lane in her book, *Discovery of Freedom* (unfortunately, now out of print). I quote from page 15 in her chapter on "The Living Authorities":

"Look at any available records of any people, living anywhere at any time in the whole history of the Old World.

"They revolt against their king, and replace him by another king; they revolt against him, and set up another king. In time they revolt against monarchy; they set up another *kind* of living authority. For generations or centuries, they revolt and change these rulers; then they revolt against that kind of authority, and set up another kind. . . .

"They replace the priest by a king, the king by an oligarchy, the oligarchs by a despot, the despot by an aristocracy, the aristocrats by a majority, the majority by a tyrant, the tyrant by oligarchs, the oligarchs by aristocrats, the aristocrats by a king, the king by a parliament, the parliament by a dictator, the dictator by a king, the king by . . . there's six thousand years of it in every language. . . .

"All these kinds have been tried, too, in every possible combination: the priest and the king; the king who is the priest, the king who is God, the king and a senate, the king and the senate and a majority, the senate and a tyrant, the tyrant and the aristocrats, a king and a parliament—try to think of a combination; somewhere it has been tried."

This describes with precision what men have done for thousands of years. We struggle with a particular structure, trying to find good men who can be entrusted with power. When finally we discover that all these attempts fail to give us what we want, then we set about redesigning the structure in an effort to prevent or limit the abuses which were all too apparent in the structure we have been using.

Curiously, the Oriental view of this problem is quite different from the Occidental and it is of interest. Those governments which can be traced to concepts of law and rule stemming from Greco-Roman sources, have generally taken the view that men cannot be trusted with power. Therefore, the western world has tended to elevate the law to a position of superiority and to hold it above the interplay of decisions in day-to-day living. Indeed, the law is often elevated to such a degree that it is presumed to be divine and any violation of it

becomes not only a social intrusion but a sin of considerable magnitude. Thus, western practice has tended to isolate and elevate a body of law which is loved and revered and obeyed with great devotion both as to its letter and its accompanying ritual.

In the eastern procedures, no such veneration for the law is found. There the belief has held that governments will always be governments of men. To paraphrase a Chinese sage: "If you have a bad ruler but good laws, you will have a bad government. A bad man will not be restrained by good laws. If you have a good ruler but bad laws, you will have a good government, for a good ruler will not enforce bad laws. Thus, in every case, it is man who makes the government."

The Oriental problem seems to be that they have found no formula for finding good men. And if we can agree with them that in the end government is only men, we may also wish to agree that laws are only man-made pronouncements and neither better nor worse than the men who formulated them and got them enacted.

If we combine the Oriental and the Occidental position, we will probably accept the eastern wisdom and then add to it the conclusion to be drawn from centuries of experience. When it comes to power, there are no good men. And we might even extend that to point out that governmental pronouncements we call law are no more than written statements concerning human behavior. The whole body of law is an effort to enforce a legalized morality retroactively through retribution. It would have to follow that if a legislature issues a decree which is in harmony with nature, then certainly it is not up to government to enforce it, for nature will take care of the matter adequately. As a matter of fact, the collecting of money from the taxpayers through coercive practices to enforce a law, even though the law is in harmony with nature, is an exercise of power against the innocent and cannot be anything but unjust and perverse if we care to examine the matter.

But then we have laws which are contrary to, or other than harmonious with, nature. And these are a positive menace for they deny reality and seek to create artificial restraints and encouragements at the expense of some to help others. Taxes must also be collected to enforce these laws. And each incursion against the taxpayers, as well as the additional incursions against others who are to be restrained or handicapped by the law, distorts the environment of man and creates disequilibrium, leading to a lessening of the number of human satisfactions available.

Thus, laws are either in harmony with nature or they are not.

If they are in harmony, they are merely an added expense and unnecessary. They provide modest distortion. If they are out of harmony, then they are a positive menace, both in themselves and in the matter of financial involvement for enforcement purposes. This obvious condition has led one cynic to observe that there are only two kinds of government: bad and worse.

It would appear that the combined experience of humanity, coupled with the employment of reason and logic, leads us to melancholy conclusions respecting governmental structures. But perhaps we ought to examine at least some of the basic efforts that have been made to provide a system of limited government.

If a governmental structure could be provided that would be supported without taxation; would serve to restrain and prevent all crime; would protect against foreign invasions; but would never impose upon an honest man in his rightful and fully justified procedures of day-to-day life, then certainly we could all relax and rejoice, knowing that a satisfactory solution had been found.

In an effort to create or formulate this ideal government, men have experimented for centuries of time. Listed here are some of the more popular forms of governments (structures) that have been employed, together with a brief explanation of their principal characteristics.

1. *Patriarchy* (matriarchy). An extension of the rule of the father (or mother) beyond the family limits. It implies wisdom and age. The patriarch is venerable. This is probably the first true government to appear. It is not really a government until the patriarch can be supported by the efforts of others (taxation) and until others are willing to be ruled by him.

2. *Monarchy*. Rule by one. The monarchy is a natural development from a patriarchy. Implicit is the idea that the job of monarch is inherited; it is within the family. The king has royal blood whereas his bureaucracy have noble blood, and they comprise an elite. The king is presumed to have divine rights. His subjects have no rights at all. The king merely bestows privilege since all rights are in him, and he can do no wrongful act. It is presumed that the king is sovereign (owner) of the entire realm and all persons within it. Obviously, as the owner, he can do no wrong with what he owns.

3. *Limited monarchy*. This is an effort to provide some boundaries to the power of the king. Usually, this limitation is provided by establishing a second apex within a given structure to accommodate a representative body, a parliament or a senate or an assembly.

4. *Oligarchy*. Rule by a few. No particular number is specified. However, what is specified is that each of the oligarchs is presumed to hold the same rank and to control the same amount of power as each of his fellow oligarchs. It introduces the idea of political competition between men in power, in an effort to forestall concentration of power in one man.

5. *Theocracy*. Combination of church and state. Most monarchies have an obvious theocratic tendency. Nearly all governments either pretend to be carrying out some kind of divine will or divine pattern, or, as with communist and socialist forms, they set the government up as though it were a divine hierarchy in itself and thus help to engender a kind of worship of the state.

6. *Democracy*. Rule by the people. In theory it would mean that all the people rule all the people. That would result in each person ruling himself or in no one ruling anyone else. This has never been attempted in pure form for the obvious reason that no political structure would be required for it. A pure democracy probably could not be structured. It might be a delightful and fully satisfactory way to conduct our affairs although it might result in the disemployment of all professional politicians.

7. *Republic*. This is a more practical structure, in many ways superior to other forms. It can lead to one-man rule while deceiving the populace into thinking that they are making the decisions. It is representative government and is a modification of democracy along practical structural lines. The people vote, not on issues but for representatives. In a pure republic, the representatives now convene and vote for those who are to occupy the structure above them. These now meet to select those above them. And this goes on until the topmost power-holder is chosen.

The feature of the republican method is the interior resolution of problems and the interior elevation of men, as opposed to the democracy where everything is done openly and as a result of popular clamor. In as pure a democracy as can be imagined (Athens), the citizens actively participate in full public view. In as pure a republic as can be imagined (Soviet Union)—see Plato—secret procedures occur constantly with the recognition that the masses know little or nothing about affairs of state and it is not good to worry them with details. Rather, it is good to condition them to believe in the infallibility of their representatives. In the United States, we have attempted to combine both the republican and the democratic features.

8. *Dictatorship*. From the politician's view, this is the most practical

and efficient. Dictators are usually viewed as men backed by immediate military power. But this is true of all governments. Keep in mind that a dictator is merely a man whose *word* is law. He might have been elected or appointed, or have risen to power through military conquest, bribery, or other corruption. But when he simply issues an order and it is carried out without question or recourse, he is a dictator in practice, whatever other titles he may carry.

9. *Bureaucracy*. This is one of the names given to the elite who hold governmental offices. In a monarchy, the bureaucracy will probably be chosen from the nobles and is frequently called an aristocracy. In a republic or a democracy, the bureaucracy will usually be composed of orators or lawyers. In a theocracy, the priesthood will comprise the elite, and in a dictatorship firmly established, the generals will hold the important posts.

All governmental structures have bureaucracies for the same reason that all business systems have employees. Laws do not administer or enforce themselves. An elite must be available which is essentially *above* the law in order that the law be enforced on others. Note: The policeman speeds in order to arrest the civilian speeder.

There are many other names which have been devised but those above are the most common, and have been the most widely used.


Withdrawal of Sanction

We have listed a few of the types of governmental structures which men have devised and employed since the days of primitive savagery. Each has ended in diasaster of one kind or another. If the structure was strong enough to preserve itself over an appreciable period of time, it became oppressive and tyrannous. If it was unable to accumulate such strength, then it collapsed or was taken over by a stronger adjacent structure.


Actually, there are only three basic types of structures. The multitude of names employed to describe them relate to modifications or compromises with the basic concept.

The equilateral triangle we have previously used illustrates the structure of all governments where power finally is placed in the hands of one man. Such governments have been called patriarchies, monarchies, dictatorships, and tyrannies. The men in power have been called patriarch, caesar, tyrant, tsar, president, king, emperor, kaiser, and lord protector. If all power finally is centered in the hands of a single decision-maker, then the equilateral triangle illustrates the basic nature of that structure.

When men became discouraged over the constant recurrence of tyranny in all structures leading to one-man rule, the idea emerged of having more than one at a position of top power. This is the oligarchy. It looks like this:




The oligarchs are selected to hold top power jointly (hopefully, the competition between them will prevent any one of them from seizing all power). The action we have referred to as "sanction of the victim," whereby the energy seeping into the base of the structure is activated, now takes place. The generator action is followed by an upward thrust to the top of the structure. But in this case there is no peak. The ceiling is level and pressure is more or less even under that floor on which the oligarchs meet. Since all power (not energy) flows from the top down and the oligarchial structure does not have a top, a power flow does not immediately occur. The picture might appear as follows:



This happy cessation of motion lasts anywhere from a few seconds to a minute or two. Then one of the oligarchs will call the meeting to order and assume the gavel or other symbol of power. It doesn't make any difference what method is used, the fact is that the oligarchs must coordinate their energies or quit. They coordinate. The result is that a slight peak now appears above the man holding the gavel. As he employs it, the power thrust begins to reach him for his dispensing. A power flow begins. As it does, the apex of power over him enlarges, making possible greater power in his hands; the power flow

increases. By successive steps the platform of the oligarchs is arched over by a power apex which finally approximates the precise form of the monarchy, dictatorship, or any other one-man-rule type of structure.



So far as is known, there has never been a single deviation from this pattern. Every oligarchy has ended in one-man domination, usually a one-man dictatorship.

In actual fact, dual control of a single enterprise, asset, system, or structure is contrary to nature. An ultimate decision-maker will always appear. And all ultimate decisions are made within a single brain. Others may advise; others may dispute; but in the end, only one plan of action or one decision can be meaningful over a single item at a given point in space and time.

Back in the Jurassic age this fact was ably demonstrated when nature introduced a giant lizard known as the stegosaurus. This monstrous creature had two brains, or two centers of nervous ganglia which had to pass as brains. One was in the creature's skull; the other, at the base of the tail.

In theory this should have been excellent. The nervous tissue available then for the transmission of messages was of poor quality and it sometimes took many seconds between the inflicting of an injury on a saurian and the reception of a message concerning that injury. In other words, most of these giants could be seriously injured or even killed and not know a thing about it until later. So the appearance of the stegosaurus with two brains should have solved the problem, for messages could be routed to one brain or the other and the transmission time could be cut down. Apparently nature was ex-


perimenting and the experiment was disastrous enough so that it wasn't repeated.

The poor stegosaurus became a victim of his own monstrous indecision. Equipped by nature to be capable of both fore-thought and after-thought, he had no ultimate brain to which to refer disputes. Instead of speeding up his reaction time, the lapse became longer through confusion. Nature abandoned the model.

In a sense, the oligarchy is an attempt on the part of man to build a political stegosaurus. The motive is excellent: to design a structure where all power will not accumulate in the hands of one man. But the result is disaster as all power finally does centralize in the hands of one man.


The next design conceived by man was democracy. A pure democracy probably would look like this and would not be susceptible of structuring:

Because of the human tendency to fear its own environment, a pure democracy without a structure was not attempted. Rather, something like this was designed:




The problem here is of another character. It relates to the distortion horizontally rather than vertically. Spelled out, it means that if all the people attempt to act directly on all the problems, any sizable population will be incapacitated by numbers. Democracy leading to monopolies will work best at the town-hall level where a limited number of persons can state their views and seek a monopoly of decision. But if a large nation attempted this pattern, there would be as many as a million town halls, each with about 200 persons. Decisions made in one would be contrary to decisions made in others. Confusion and conflict would be the inevitable result. So a pure democracy has not been attempted, nor even one more pure than that of the early Athenians.

Instead, we came forward with the republic, which is nothing more than a modified democracy in which, through successive balloting, those to exercise power rise higher and higher, as their numbers are reduced to manageable proportions. A pure republic would look like this:




When some of the leading citizens in this country concluded that a structure was mandatory, we attempted to devise something brand new. We were not satisfied with any of the attempts that had been made before. We did not want a monarchy. We were fearful of a democracy. We wanted a republic, but we saw nothing that might prevent our republic from finally putting all power in the hands of one man.

We had been inspired by the Declaration of Independence. Had a structuring of it been attempted, it would have looked like this.



Obviously, no structure was ever considered. Nor could it be. The idea that the people would retain sovereignty, and that their government would be beneath them and, hence, their servant, is contradictory to the function of a structure. If the people can govern their government, then, in fact, the government is not a structure and there would be no point in having it at all. Actually, a government is, of necessity, above those over whom it exercises the decision-making function. If the people are really above their government, then there is no government.

What was designed looked like this:



We began with the base and then drew up the power lines to a broad platform, the first level in a republic. Then we saw that if we continued that process, we'd simply end with one-man rule all over again. So we provided three branches to the structure, thus instituting an oligarchy of branches rather than an oligarchy of men. We would have an executive, a legislative, and a judicial branch. Any two of them would be powerful enough to check the growth of any one of them. This, we presumed, would give us a balanced government. We called it a system of checks and balances.


To make certain that this fundamental structuring would not be tampered with, we relied on a written constitution which was built around that basic design. But we did more than this. Everything we could think of to limit future growth was introduced. We kept the separate states, which, in theory at least, retained some sovereignty. Then we put the president in for four years only, with an automatic ouster at the end of that time. To select the president and to avoid popular democratic procedures, we designed the electoral college. In theory this meant that the best men in each state would meet and select, from among their number, *their* choice for president. The whole device was taken over by the political parties and it never worked precisely as it was intended.

The legislative branch was divided into two houses, an upper and a lower. The upper house, the Senate, would hold office for six years and originally these men were to be chosen from the separate state legislatures, another republican device. The 17th Amendment turned each state into a senatorial election district, but prior to 1913, senators were protected in their ivory towers by never being vulnerable to popular pressures.

The members of the lower house were chosen democratically in

election districts, the boundaries of which were determined by population. And each representative in this house was elected for two years.


When we got to the judicial branch, we decided to remove it from politics entirely and so we asked the president to appoint the justices of the supreme court for a term of life or during good behavior, whichever should prove to be shorter.



What was the result of this careful effort to limit government?

If you will examine the *Government Organization Manual*, issued by the U. S. Government Printing Office twice each year, you will be able to weigh the result. In this government publication, a listing of all governmental functions at the federal level appears. In the 1967 edition, it takes 26 pages to tabulate the legislative function; nine pages to tabulate the judicial function, and 518 pages to tabulate the executive function.

Total power as yet does not reside in the executive branch. Nonetheless, the accumulation of power there has served to eclipse the other branches so completely that the picture we now see appears as follows:




It is important that we learn these facts without malice and bitter-

ness. The effects we see are not the result of evil men practicing all manner of deliberate evil on others. What we are seeing and experiencing is the result of a wrong philosophy, which is contrary to the nature of reality and which results in oppression, war, taxation, regulation, and the destruction of the natural environment of the human organism, the market place. The result, in spite of all the efforts made, was predictable. It is predictable that any future effort to create a limited government will come to precisely the same end. We have already recited the reasons.

Where did we get the idea that we could really limit government? Limited government is a popular phrase. Most believe in it. It has an honorable past and is part of our heritage.

As Whigs we believed that we should not be subjected to the unlimited power of a king. So we championed the idea of a legislative branch and said that we would not have taxation without representation. What we were talking about looked like this:



If you ask any king, he will tell you that the existence of a parliament or a senate or an assembly limits his power. He is telling the truth. It does. Also, if you talk to the men in the legislative branch, they will aver that the existence of the chief executive limits their actions. This, too, is true. It does. Then, isn't a government with two peaks (or, better yet, one with three, as in the American case) an indication of limited government? No, it is not. What we see in this illustration are *divided powers*, not *limited powers*.

To the men *in* government, their powers are not total and they are limited. But to the man on the street, it makes no difference to him whether he is punished because of an executive order, a legislative enactment, or a judicial writ. *All power* is in the state. That it comes to him from one branch or department rather than from another is only of academic interest.

In essence, if we are to have a structure, limitless power must be

at its disposal. If it does not have limitless power at a given instant, it must be capable of acquiring it or go down in defeat. Thus, every structure is a potential dictatorship and it is merely good political science never to reveal this fact. A wise politician employs his power with conservative restraint, much as a businessman conserves his capital and other resources. No businessman runs around bragging about how much money he has. If he did so, he would find prices rising all about him. Similarly, no politician who knows his skills will spend his time bragging to his constituents about what he can do to them. Rather, he lets it be known that he has very little power, which power he assures us will be used *for* our benefit, *never against* us. And it is only in times of real emergency when the mask slips and we see the hasty motions of the chief politicians as they do as they please with anyone and everyone in an effort to preserve the structure which they dominate.

Is there any way in which a government structure can be limited or reduced in size? Of course. Since these are power structures, we can always create a superior power structure wherein greater power will reside. This is both the political and the military method.

Let us suppose, for example, that Party A is in control in a given country. You are worried because Party A has too much power. To oust that party becomes your principal aim in life. So you work for Party B until, finally, Party B is big enough to oust Party A. But now, Party B is larger than Party A was when you became concerned with it. There has been no solution along ideological lines here. The only solution which has been offered at this point is a change of personnel, with no change at all to the concept of rule by the accumulation of power.


Certainly in any political or military struggle, the victory is apt to go to the more numerous. This is guaranteed in popular governments relying on the voting process.

The process of overcoming or reducing a power structure by imposing a still more powerful structure looks like the illustration below.

Obviously, this has happened in this country in respect to the power of the individual states. These have been largely eclipsed by the dominance of the larger power structure over them.

The United Nations idea of a world federation is precisely this same step carried one more level upward. If a world structure can be created, then it would certainly be possible for it to dominate the

national structures just as our national structure dominates our state structures. This vertical type of suppression can go on indefinitely so long as superior and more powerful structures with a broader base and with larger amounts of sanction at their disposal can be devised to rest upon the smaller ones which precede them.



This provides no solution, however. Indeed, it is a part of the problem.

There may be other ways of dealing with the problem, but the most practical appears to be the withholding of sanction from the structure. All structures are dependent upon this energy being made available to them. If that energy is cut off, the structure would be an empty shell and would simply exist on a non-functional basis.

One of the barriers to understanding here relates to the tendency we all have of supposing that our sanction is given when we pay our taxes. And how do we keep from paying taxes; ergo, how can we keep from sanctioning?

The fact is that when a government obtains a virtual monopoly of money and credit, the withholding of tax money, even if it could be done, would not check the growth or the power of the structure. The government can simply turn on the presses and print more money or, through the banks, relax credit, and a lack of tax money would not slow it down perceptibly. It might even increase the inroads against the populace.

The sanction of which we speak has nothing to do with any action by government in which you are victimized. The victim of aggression is not, at the moment of aggression, providing his sanction. The

sanction comes later when the victim, having already suffered because of some incursion against him, now goes to the government and says, in substance: "You have taken some of my resources and I want them back." At this point, the government in substance responds: "We don't blame you. We really didn't want to hurt you. But we had a project that simply had top priority so we took your resources in order to accomplish it. Now, if you will just file the correct papers, we will take some resources from others and turn them back to you."

The victim sanctions the looting of others as a defensive or retaliatory move in order to get his own returned and in order for him to remove himself from the role of victim. But this is the sanction by which government grows. When you accept any kind of a handout, benefit, pension, social security, subsidy, or even police protection, government literature, advice, or whatever from the state, you are, in essence, justifying government's future incursions against others. Although you are probably making the mental note: "I'm just getting back some of what I've paid," you are becoming a statistic the government can use to demonstrate that the program it has must be supported. "Mr. Smith (and others) is now depending on our handouts, benefits, pensions, social security, medicare, and other things, and would be lost without these goodies."

Thus, you sanction the state at the point where you voluntarily accept something from the state when a choice is open to you not to accept.

Note that if you have no choice, such as when you pay taxes, or when there is no competing free-market good or service available as with a government postal system, a government highway system, and so on, you are not sanctioning, you are being the victim. Make this distinction in your mind. When you have no choice and are forced, you are the victim and you are not sanctioning. When you have a choice and are not forced, but you accept a government "benefit" of any kind, then you are not a victim but you are sanctioning.

If you stop sanctioning governmental procedures, it will not be able to use you as a statistic to justify either future growth or present programs.

There is one other area of concern here and it must be mentioned. Governments (structures) obviously obtain energy from those who sanction. That is, they grow as the apparent need for their goods and services enlarges.

But they also grow from another source that is frequently overlooked. Structures expand from opposition! When a danger appears to threaten any structure, this is taken by those in the structure as a justification for enlarging the structure in order to protect it. We are all familiar with this process when the threat of war looms. Note that it is also true domestically. When assassinations of top political leaders have occurred in the past, the immediate result was an enlargement of the state in an effort to prevent such an occurrence again.

Nor does the threat have to be so dramatic or drastic. The mere appearance of an opposing force at the structural level, has the effect of competition in the market. It encourages growth on both sides.

So it appears that if we are ever to put our environment into balance and maximize human well-being by avoiding structures and the conflicts they stimulate, we must do so in such a way that we withdraw our sanction while at the same time not appearing to be dangerous.

This can be done. It will take an informed citizenry and one that is aware of the virtues of self-discipline and the meaning of freedom. Curiously, even the men in government will have no reason to oppose a peaceful move which withdraws sanction yet does not seek power.

If people would control themselves, manage their affairs peacefully, and in good order, and simply reject out of hand all governmental overtures, the men in government would begin to resign and seek more favorable employment.

There may be other ways to proceed, but if you think about this, you may find its practical applicability. In any case, what is suggested is moral and reasonable. Wise and good men cannot oppose it. The only real question becomes, how many wise and good men are there?

Why Foreign Aid Backfires And What Can Be Done About It

by Kerry Thornley

Kerry Thornley is managing editor of *Ocean Living*. His article, "Freedom on the Freeways," appeared in the Summer, 1967 issue of the *Rampart Journal*. Thornley is a graduate of a Comprehensive Course at Rampart College.

Although a sophisticated understanding of the market place is not required for the awareness that government aid to foreign lands seldom achieves its stated purpose, it takes at least an intermediate grasp of economics to fully realize *why* this is so—indeed, why virtually all forms of government "aid" must always eventually do more to create general poverty than wealth, no matter how "well administered" they might be.

Essentially, however, we can point to the coercive nature of the gathering of such monies as the chief problem, and argue that—whether we call it taxation or extortion—the appropriation of property by means of the threat of force is bound to have undesired and widespread long-range consequences, primarily because it drains from an economy funds which would otherwise have gone into increasing its productive and distributive capacities.

Further, a "trick-or-treat" society in which the use of threat and force becomes customary is one in which it becomes increasingly uncomfortable to live and work. Violence becomes more and more common and the government grows stronger and stronger, and more expensive. Eventually, the risks and burdens of production begin to exceed its rewards, at which point starts the decline or fall of one more civilization which, if left alone, could have finally, *without*

sacrifice, fed the entire world—or, better, taught the world to feed itself.

Equally devastating are the shorter-range effects of such aid programs on the recipients. Almost without exception the overall result is to *decrease* economic independence, the first step to wealth, by fostering dependence upon the system of aid distribution. In reference to U.S. foreign aid this trend has been noted by several authorities, including *New Republic* contributing editor Asher Brynes, who was a consultant to the Economic Cooperation Administration, which directed the U.S.-aided postwar reconstruction of Europe. In his book, *We Give to Conquer*,¹ Brynes notes with horror that food production *per capita* has *declined* in the world's five worst-fed nations since the Food for Peace Program began aiding them in 1955—whereas it had remained more or less constant, despite rising populations, before then.

Brynes' explanation, which unfortunately reflects his basically authoritarian orientation, is that the "taking of these grossly cut-rate U.S. foods has encouraged the underdeveloped officialdom, so to speak, to skimp the making of peasants into farmers in planning a country's future."² What it has actually done is to damage the market for locally grown crops.

As a result, capital or credit for small farming purposes is even more difficult to obtain in "underdeveloped nations" than before, which is just one of the many factors behind the ever-increasing mass migration from village to city in those areas. Over the past three decades, urban centers where this trend prevails have doubled, tripled, and in some cases quadrupled in population! Slums with no historic parallel have bloomed into existence and the sight of human beings starving to death in the streets of once-wealthy cities such as Calcutta and Bombay has grown common. As for the future, it promises nothing less than the worst famine in the history of the world.

The precise degree to which American aid has contributed to this mounting crisis cannot be calculated, but its role is obvious not only to students of the free market and foreign affairs observers, but to the people it is supposed to help. South Vietnam's Buddhists, for example, "view American aid, in its current phase, as contributing to Vietnamese suffering. . . . Since the aid disrupts the economy, and encourages corruption on every level, they do not look upon American

¹Brynes, *We Give to Conquer* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1966).
²*Ibid.*, p. 197.

protection as beneficial," reports the *Time-Life* Tokyo bureau chief, Jerrold Schecter, in *The New Face of Buddha*.³

And regarding this corruption Schecter states: "American aid provides the major impetus for unpredictable corruption in Vietnam because accountability is difficult and unstable conditions increase the demand. . . . The Vietnamese, particularly the Buddhist hierarchy, see the aid money being squandered by a small group of military men who send large amounts to France every month. A prominent Vietnamese journalist said, 'As far as the Buddhists are concerned, they see the suffering and poverty in rural areas increasing, and they feel there must be a contradiction between American aid and the failure of it to reach the people. They blame the government in Saigon.'"⁴

So not only is so-called foreign aid a philanthropic failure, but it fails as well in stemming revolutionary sentiment and, instead, provides it with legitimate fuel. Another reason for this is touched upon by Byrnes when he writes that the "record shows that programs of foreign aid tend to stabilize aided governments even before they provide for the betterment of aided people. All the Western countries set up their schedules of donations-in-kind and disbursements of goods or cash in ways that provide bonuses for *political* stability in the receiving countries. Their leaders in office are in effect given a helping hand through foreign aid."⁵ Not to call such an "aid" policy "imperialism" and not to call the aided governments "puppet states" is to exercise considerable restraint. That it makes more enemies than friends for the U.S. should not come as a great surprise when one considers that there are always more people out of political power than in—while, one way or another, it is usually the "in" people who derive the prime benefit from U.S. aid—people who are, possibly without exception, ruthless authoritarians. The only conceivable result can be a decline in U.S. popularity.

But in terms of general world peace and prosperity, it is not in the undermining of economic independence through extra-market giveaways or in the corruption of bureaucrats through temptation or in the alienation of great numbers of people through support of their oppressors that American aid provides its most immediate threat—but in its emphasis upon industrial development at the expense of agricultural

³Schecter, *The New Face of Buddha* (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1967), p. 154.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 153.

⁵Byrnes, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

development. For it is thereby putting into the hands of governments around the globe the means to produce, if necessary, heavy weapons and munitions at the same time it is all but crippling the capacities of such nations to feed themselves. And when the people are starving (and ignorant), they inevitably demand that their government "do something," and since any "positive" action the government takes internally is bound to worsen conditions, the historic last resort is to focus attention on an external enemy and declare war.

Non-Political Alternatives

Realistic expositions of governmental operations usually make gloomy reading, for states are organizations which—once their superficial propaganda is examined rationally and rejected for what it is—are seen to do nothing whatever that is constructive in the long run. They are basically agents of destruction and no amount of bally-hoo can justify them objectively.

Yet no critic of any governmental policy can long escape the challenge to "provide an alternative"—as if the natural "alternative" were not that the havoc-producing state operation be suspended.

But any solution involving the ending of activity, even destructive activity, is branded "negative"—as if legalized plundering and killing were positive endeavors!

Further, it is labeled "unrealistic," since obviously no government is actually going to stop doing anything on the advice of anyone who is armed with nothing more threatening than a logical argument.

This last is a valid point, perhaps.

So, to a lesser degree, might be the other. For to suddenly end a state program is often to produce a large amount of short-range destruction—simply because most such operations represent vicious cycles in which one mistake is periodically inaugurated to more or less offset another. Abruptly halting aid to "underdeveloped nations," now that they are economically addicted to it, would doubtless result in immediate acute starvation where at present there is only chronic malnutrition. So an alternative of some kind must after all be provided by the responsible critic—one designed in this case to bail out the victims of twenty years' worth of government help.

Yet such an innovation is not easy to come by—precisely because governments continually step in and obstruct this or that possibility!

For example, were it not for innumerable artificial trade barriers combined with a deliberately restrictive, domestic agricultural policy,

North America could become on the strength of its natural gifts one of the "bread baskets" of the world, much as certain areas within the continent are to other parts of it. But this would require a world-wide free market, a hands-off policy by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and a few years for technology and marketing to fill the subsequent demand for mass production and cheap transport in food commodities.

Another possibility would be for American business to loan capital, at profitable rates of interest, to enable the peasants of the world to become small farmers. But not only would the U.S. government have to permit such wholesale monetary exports, it would mean as well that the "underdeveloped" governments refrain from nationalizing the investments after they are made, a score upon which they have in general a pretty poor record. It would further require that extra-market competition from the U.S. in the line of aid loans and food giveaways be discontinued, so both capitalist and peasant-farmer would be motivated to participate.

Either or both of the "positive programs" above could solve the problem in short order, if only the states of the world would permit them to work. But if nothing succeeds like a free market, nothing fails like a foolish daydream. There is no reason to imagine governments will soon suddenly go into the business of voluntarily relinquishing power!

Since what is economically workable is unrealistic politically, and vice versa, the constructive critic is clearly in a double bind. If he can therefore come up with any sort of solution which shows promise, he is at least being a good deal more realistic than those who are unable to suggest anything better than the present backfiring programs.

On these terms it is entirely possible that the most down-to-earth recommendations so far have fallen from the lips of East Indian holy men and their disciples.

A "Third Force"

In 1952 a man Nehru had predicted would be the next prime minister of India renounced his political career, rejecting the conviction that governmental approaches could solve his country's problems. Jayaprakash Narayan, who had worked with Mahatma Gandhi from the early days of the Freedom Movement until Gandhi's death, now joined an effort which in many respects was a more fitting heir to the Gandhian legacy than the Congress Party.

Under the leadership of Vinoba Bhave, a wandering mendicant, this group had taken up the job of trying to bring about a rural renaissance aimed at establishing economic independence among the inhabitants of the villages—one of the first Gandhian goals abandoned by Nehru. Vinoba Bhave's *Sarva Seva Sangh* movement began by persuading owners of large estates to voluntarily turn land over to individual peasants, and thus became known in the West as *Bhoodan*, or "land-gift."

It was soon discovered, though, that instead of becoming farmers, many recipients were selling their land for quick cash and moving to Calcutta and other urban centers. (Aside from the already-mentioned pressure of the so-called Food for Peace Program, other state-originated factors behind the widespread desire to exchange rural for urban life include Soviet propaganda—which, in confusing the "means of production" with entrepreneurial skill in causing prosperity, tends to convey the upsidedown idea that economic health is dependent upon industrial development—and indoctrination of a less direct sort by the Indian government. The latter state, through its constant political tinkering with the economy, tends to create the impression that it is in the process of producing a modern industrial society by fiat and that prosperity is therefore bound to be "just around the corner," so to speak, in the metropolitan targets of political attention.)

To insure that the land-gifts would be farmed, a system was worked out whereby the peasant was given a leasehold on the land, in place of ownership, endowing him with the right to farm it but not to sell it. Abandoned land reverted to a village co-operative which then granted the leasehold to a new applicant. The name was changed from *Bhoodan* to *Gramdan*, or "village-gift."

About 36,000 Indian villages, out of a total of 500,000, have to date opted for *Gramdan*. In Hyderabad, an area long considered a communist stronghold, the appeal of this nonviolent program was great enough to seriously undercut that of those who advocated the path of violent revolution, a refreshing contrast to the failures of U.S. aid.

Despite its successes, the movement has not yet been able to solve the basic problems of capital and credit. Money is needed to extend *Gramdan*-type land holdings, to provide equipment, fertilizer, and seeds, and to strengthen the rural economy's access to its market.

The prospects for a future solution may have been hit upon, though, when American libertarian social philosopher Ralph Borsodi met with

Jayaprakash Narayan in February of 1966 at the Gandhian Institute for Social Studies in Benares. They soon recognized that India's problems were the same as those of other "underdeveloped nations" and not much different, even, from those of impoverished rural populations within nations enjoying a more advanced level of economic development. Out of this meeting grew a larger conference which concluded that the "Gandhian movement should be internationalized . . ." and that an "international agency, the International Foundation for Independence, should be organized. Its purpose should be to satisfy the capital needs of the movement, to provide the credit needed to realize a program of rural renaissance. The board of trustees of the foundation should include not only public-spirited men and women, but also bankers, businessmen, and technical experts who could help insure that the funds were used as a permanent, revolving fund, instead of merely as a one-time charitable contribution. . . ."⁶

That the foundation was not conceived of as just one more charity organization is further insured by the following excerpts from a paper prepared on March 22, 1967, for the Conference of Voluntary Agencies to Vitalize a Third Force in Underdeveloped Areas:

"Because assets of the foundation will be held in commodities, rather than currencies, IFI will be able to: 1) transfer funds from one country to another either in the form of commodities or in its own 'money of account' based on a unit determined by a 'commodity basket'; and 2) offer inflation-deflation proof debentures to investors in any nation. . . ."

"Because it is nonprofit, although paying investors a relatively low fixed interest, it will create an ever-expanding revolving fund to be loaned at low interest rates. . . ."

"Because it offers securities to investors who profit from their purchase, it emphatically will not qualify as 'charitable' despite its high purposes. . . ."

"IFI will be incorporated in a country which has no income tax so investors need pay only their own nation's taxes, if any. . . ."

"Initially, the only loans should be short-term productive loans. That is, a loan to plant a crop which can be repaid from the harvest; or something the borrower needs which can be repaid within a crop year from the production which the purchase has made it possible to

⁶Robert Swann, "Vitalizing a Third Force in Underdeveloped Areas" (Exeter, New Hampshire: International Independence Institute).

create. . . .”⁷

What sets this approach apart from the solution of foreign investment in the free market is that it begins with circumstances as they are in today’s world, not as they would be if governments ceased to pester us. What separates it from the political solutions on a qualitative level is its dedication to nonviolent means.

Few who are familiar with history will expect the politicians of the planet to allow any such “third force” to develop without opposition. On the other hand, it will not be easy to popularly justify steps taken against a movement so moral, both in traditional and natural schools of thought. Further, Gandhian techniques of nonviolent nonco-operation, to which this effort would undoubtedly turn when confronted with state interference, are not to be dismissed lightly.

While many critics of passive resistance methods charge that they would not function against sufficiently ruthless authoritarians, it must be recalled that the only time they were ever employed on a massive scale they worked against the British state—and the revisionist historians have offered convincing evidence that it has behaved fully as ruthlessly as any other government of this century.

Also, an excellent theoretical demonstration of how effective these techniques could become in a more civilized world than we now inhabit is given in the closing chapter of Eric Frank Russell’s science-fiction masterpiece, *The Great Explosion*.⁸ Perhaps Jayaprakash Narayan and those who share his dream will bring us closer to living in that kind of world.

In any case, their work deserves minute examination by the libertarian capitalist—for its possible weaknesses as well as its exciting potentials. With the advantages that could accrue to it from sound economic counsel, a movement based upon the Gandhian devotion to nonviolence could have a profound impact toward advancing the evolution of human freedom.

⁷The title of the paper from which these statements are quoted, not as they appear but in an order more appropriate to the organization of this article, is “Organization of the International Foundation for Independence.” The quoted remarks represent some of the best thoughts to be found in the literature about IFI. Elsewhere expression is now and then given to this or that cliché which tends to indicate an imperfect comprehension of economic principles—though certainly nothing as blatantly mistaken as much of what passes for economic truth over the mass media!

⁸Russell, *The Great Explosion* (New York: Pyramid Publications, 1963), p. 92; published earlier in a Street & Smith publication under the title, “And Then There Were None.”

A Small Experiment

by Jack Semmens

The author is a teaching assistant and graduate student in political science at Arizona State University who earned his B.A. degree in social science at Monclair State College, New Jersey. He is a 1966 graduate of a Comprehensive Course at Rampart College.

Introduction

The famed historical life and *early death* of such American utopian collectivistic experiments as New Harmony and Brook Farm should serve, one might think, as adequate indicators for the modern idealist that the road to perfection lies not in that direction. The more contemporary "great experiment" begun in the Soviet Union in 1917 certainly ought to have cured even the most hard-core, well-intentioned seeker after an ambiguous social justice. However, those who should know better are making the same intellectual mistakes today that their more ignorant precursors had slight enough excuse for making. Specifically, those who should know better are American college students.

Teaching in the political science department of a large university in the Southwest, I recently conducted a small experiment. The experiment resulted from a discussion in class one day of some of the fundamental ideas expressed by Marx. I maintained that the principle, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need" was unworkable as a sufficient cause for motivation to production. I further stated that once this became apparent within a given society, men would either discard the system or provide compensatory adjustment to take into account the deformities of the collectivized social structure; and if this second course was taken, amorality would become a new molding principle for the erstwhile humanitarian idealist who created the situation to begin with. Several of my students were dismayed at my skepticism as to the viability of a communal arrangement and asserted that previous experience was improper proof of my argument, that if conditions were right such an arrangement could survive and thrive. Thereupon I put it to them that they might participate in a little experiment to test their hypothesis. Six of them

readily agreed and we set about to establish the proper environmental conditions.

Immediately it was pointed out that previous communal societies had failed partly because saboteurs had been included in the midst of those seriously concerned with the business of bringing about true justice. This stumbling block was quickly eliminated with the figurative liquidation of the entire class of "bourgeois parasites"—an obvious improvement over the Bolshevik technique, which to have been comparable must have physically murdered almost the entire population of Russia in 1917. The experimental group was to consist simply of the six voluntary members with the remainder of the students to serve as sort of a control group for comparison purposes. The commodity to be socially allocated according to need was, naturally, their scores in the course. The exact nature of the division of goods was left somewhat in abeyance with the stipulation that the majority would decide how this ought to be done when the semester had been completed.

The six had high spirits and were sure that they would succeed where others had failed because they all knew the direct nature of the challenge, and, of course, because they, as a group, had more of a sense of social conscience than any other to date. At long last, a blow was going to be struck against private greed and selfishness, from the ashes of which would rise, like a new Phoenix, a spirit of brotherly love and sharing (or something roughly along those lines, if not so grandiose). I wryly wished them luck, though I was quite as skeptical as ever and was sure that disaster awaited them at the end of the term.

The Statistical Result

Quantitatively speaking, the outcome was something of a catastrophe. Setting out to prove the superiority of a collective system from a standpoint of production output, this gallant little band, like all of its historical antecedents, provided another example of just the opposite effect.

Statistical computations indicate that the difference between the two means is significant.¹ In terms of chance, then, this particular outcome is unlikely.

¹The statistical test used in this instance was a difference in means test with a negative direction predicted. Model 2, which does not assume $\delta_1 = \delta_2$, was used. At the .05 level with the estimated degrees of freedom 10.5, we obtain a critical region beginning with t value of -1.804 . When we compute our difference in means, we obtain a t score of -2.1 , which falls well into the critical region, indicating that these results could have occurred through chance approximately 3 per cent of the time. We therefore reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the two groups.

The following figures constitute the relevant statistical data:

<i>Experimental Group Scores</i>	<i>Control Group Scores</i>	<i>Combined Scores (showing disper- sion of experi- mental group)</i>
66.1	79.9	79.9
59.9	79.7	79.7
54.5	79.6	79.6
47.7	77.0	77.0
41.6	69.9	69.9
41.0	69.4	69.4
41.6		
<hr/>	68.8	68.8
310.8(a)	64.1	66.1*
51.8(b)	63.7	64.1
9.3(c)	63.5	63.7
	63.1	63.5
	62.9	63.1
	60.9	62.9
	57.5	60.9
	57.4	59.9*
	56.3	57.5
	55.7	57.4
	55.5	56.3
	54.2	55.7
	50.6	55.5
	45.4	54.5*
	31.6	54.2
	<hr/>	50.6
	1,366.7(a)	47.7*
	62.1(b)	45.4
	11.6(c)	41.6*
		41.0*
		31.6
		<hr/>
		1,677.5(a)
		59.9(b)

(a) Sum of Scores

(b) Mean or Average Score

(c) Standard Deviation of Scores, i.e., how widely they are dispersed from high low in terms of assumption of a normal curve

We can be reasonably confident that the difference in the output in terms of grade scores of the students in the two groups had something

to do with the nature of the allocation of rewards for each individual in the group. In the control group, where each student's grade depended upon his own individual effort, the average output was substantially higher. In the experimental group, where individual effort accounted for only one-sixth of one's own grade, the output was substantially lower. All things else being equal, one might go on to predict that if the experimental group were enlarged, the performance would suffer further.

From a causal standpoint two factors have yet to be explained. First, the experimental group experienced twice as much absenteeism as the rest of the students. I rather suspect this was affected by the social structure in much the same manner as the intellectual performance; however, it is possible that exogenous factors may have intervened, and only further testing can trace this down.

A second and more important consideration is one of raw material. Since participants were enrolled on a voluntary basis and not controlled for intelligence, it remains a question as to whether the social structure caused the poor performance or whether anticipation of poor performance led one to join in the communal group. To put it more bluntly, do the less intelligent tend to favor some sort of collectivism to cover for their own inadequacies? There was some indication that this might have been a partial motivation for several of the participants.

In either case, the conclusions to which one is led to do not speak well for collectivism. Should we assume all entered the agreement with high intentions, the communal arrangement appears inefficient. Should we assume that some entered with the idea of exploiting the abilities of the others, then the communal arrangement appears an immoral tool for the expropriation of the production of some individuals for the benefit of others.

The Human Reaction

The results in terms of the figures are impressive in themselves. However, the outcome in terms of qualitative developments was even more startling. This little band of six volunteers, intent upon demonstrating the viability of brotherly love as manifested in a system of unselfish sharing as an adequate motivational factor for material production while providing a higher spiritual reward, ended up at each other's throats as the semester drew to a close. Even though the potentially parasitic and obstructive bourgeoisie had been eliminated (through the voluntary nature of the arrangement), participants in

the experiment became suspicious of one another. Those who were at a material disadvantage by virtue of the communism of the arrangement, accused the others of loafing and not keeping good faith with the original compact. The hostility increased over the closing weeks of the term to the point where the members of the group were becoming concerned over what each member was doing with his spare time—whether enough of it was devoted to study. A spy system was seriously advocated with a “goon squad” rather hesitatingly mentioned to make sure all parties were living up to their obligations. Another proposal centered around the idea of setting up a committee to investigate administrative procedures that could possibly be established to improve production and increase worker morale.

It was extremely interesting to me to observe how this rather small experiment in collectivism was seemingly impelled along a course all too familiar to students of recent political history. In this microscopic collective society the individual was no longer his own man. What one did directly affected the entire group and they were naturally concerned—exit here privacy. The steps to rectify the situation ranged from the totalitarian spy system and goon squad to the social democratic establishment of a committee to seek a non-existent political answer to a moral and economic question.

Toward the end of the term, when it had become readily apparent that the experiment was going to lead all of the participants to academic disaster, a reassessment session was held. All expressed concern that justice be done, all were willing to go along with whatever everyone else wanted. Of the four at the bottom of the scale, not one would state his opinion on a solution when asked, yet at the time of decision all four voted not to let the upper two out of the agreement. This then became the group's policy. Thus, responsibility also became divorced from each individual and seemed somehow to belong to the group. Individually, the students were not anxious to urge compulsion; as a group action, though, this became very acceptable.

In conclusion, I think we ought to step back and take a good look at the apparently inherent accouterments of a collectivistic social order. From this brief consideration we have seen that it is probably less efficient than an individualistically profit motivated arrangement. We have also seen some of the effects it can have in the interrelationship between men—that six people could set out to illustrate the virtues of brotherly love through sharing but end up demonstrating a hostility toward one another that goes very far toward proving just the opposite.

On the Other Hand

Autarchy and the Statist Abyss

R. A. Childs, Jr., goes at once to the point at issue between those who wish to stand on principle regardless of conclusion and those who profess a principle but depart from it whenever the conclusions appear to be unwelcome or "impractical."

This well-argued essay is weakened by a dogmatic assertion: ". . . the state is obviously at the bottom of the whole thing. . . ." This is a position that is valid only if it is supported by evidence and logic. There is no question but that the evidence and logic are both available and that Mr. Childs is competent to recite them. His omission may raise a few hackles. There are those who will contend that it is the natural greed of human beings that is at the "bottom of the whole thing." And there are others who may contend that it is "poisonous individualism" that causes our repeated adventuring in war and destruction.

If it is seen that whereas men may be greedy and may be individualistic but that until they organize a state they are incapable of waging war, then Mr. Childs' position can be sustained. Without a state, men may riot, murder, conduct forays, and organize temporary gains for the purpose of various types of predation. But it is only when a state is formally brought into being that it can consistently sustain itself through legalized taxation, and thus carry on the type of non-economic destruction we call war.

When men without a state attempt to wage war, they either formalize their military efforts into a state or they break off the engagement after a destructive confrontation. A state is a kind of regulated and continuous war waged against its own people which makes possible a consistent warlike stance against other people. Men without the state are bound by economic necessity. Their predation, although it can be vicious, is short-lived. But the state is that particular organized structure which can operate parasitically over its own

economy so that it will be excused from economic necessity when it wishes to aggress against an adjacent economy.

Aside from this omission, Mr. Childs has performed a noteworthy service in setting forth the position of the autarchist.

The Political Spectrum A Bi-Dimensional Approach

Maurice C. Bryson and William R. McDill seek to bridge one area of alleged omission from the McGann article in the Winter, 1967, *Rampart Journal*. Messrs. Bryson and McDill wish to emphasize the significance, not only of the amount of governmental intervention in an economy, but the direction taken by that intervention.

While calling attention to direction as well as degree, the authors provide another useful service, for they demonstrate rather well that political positions are rarely permanent. In an effort to rise to power, political alignments and realignments are constantly being made. This leads to a more or less circular motion around the fixed central axis that someone somewhere has to make collectivist decisions for others.

The L.F.E. Theory of the Political Spectrum

"The L.F.E. Theory of the Political Spectrum" by Bowman Hall, II, is an effort to probe the McGann political spectrum model, not to convert it into a circular system but to combine the best features of the linear with the circular. Hence the name L.F.E., which is short for the "lopsided figure eight theory." This is such an enchanting title that it is easy to suppose that Mr. Hall is pulling the legs of McGann et al. If so, he does it with such good grace and charm that it is impossible to take offense.

Possibly his finest contribution is found in the two final sentences: "Therefore, any theory of the political spectrum is subject to inaccuracies. What is herein postulated may be treated as a more realistic inaccuracy."

Political Spectra and the Labels of Extremism

D. O. Miles provides one more effort to examine the geographic placement of various political dogmas. Writer Miles has added a dimension and comes up with a globe in three dimensions. This line of reasoning is meaningful and makes an additional contribution

to the geography of political theory, because Miles can show not only the degree of control and the direction of control, but the resources available by means of which control can be attained.

Why Foreign Aid Backfires and What Can Be Done About It

Kerry Thornley offers what is virtually a two-subject article which might have been improved by a separation. The first portion deals with the nature of foreign aid and why it tends to create results which are dissatisfactory and often entirely contrary to the goals sought. This is as well argued and well organized as any short writing on the subject. When he finishes, writer Thornley, without equivocation, has argued cogently and well in favor of the market and in opposition to governmental intervention.

But when we come to the sub-head, "A 'Third Force,'" Mr. Thornley backtracks, possibly unknowingly. He turns to India for his locale and describes the land reform movement (*Sarva Seva Sangh*) in which owners of large estates were persuaded to give parcels of land to peasants for their own use. But he is distressed when the peasant recipient of land turned around and sold it, hastening to a better life in some urban center rather than working the land.

Since free recipients of land are often more interested in "cashing out" than in producing, he then favors the type of land distribution which has been recommended by virtually every collectivist land-reformer from the days of Zapata in Mexico to Castro in Cuba, not excluding the agrarian reformers of China, Taiwan, and Russia. This is to have land revert to the village collective and to have it offered on a "leasehold" rather than by ownership. Thus, any peasant who wants to work can obtain land for use, but when he stops working, the land reverts to the village commune.

A village commune is dependent upon force and some form of government. Having first argued that the market place will resolve the problems without political intervening, Mr. Thornley then goes on to show that the market must be aided by some type of government of land because an owner who will not work the land is an abomination and must be replaced by one who will. But the non-owning peasant will *never* be able to accumulate capital reserves in land or other real property and thus will never be more than a tenant, and at that a tenant to the state. He becomes, in essence, a kind of serf, tilling his field for the good of the commune. And if at any time

he stops tilling, he can be ousted in favor of a more productive peasant.

It is imperative here to grasp that violence and force are inherent in the owning of land by a village commune.

It might be worth while in this case for a further study to be made of the employment of the land purchased from the peasants who had obtained that land through the process of a generous gift. The following must generally apply. The purchaser of the land would have been interested in purchasing it in order to profit one way or another. If the purchaser is merely the original land owner who had been prevailed upon to part with the land, then, in fact, he was not a giver of land, he was a giver of money. Apparently land donors did not generally follow this practice.

In any case, the purchaser of the land from the peasant planned to do something with the land, either selling it himself to someone who would pay more, or putting it to use. In the end, regardless of how many times the land changes hands, someone is going to come along who will have to put it to use in order to justify his purchase. At that point, the land will be put to use. Further, it will be put to its most advantageous use, whatever that may be.

If we are to reason as consistently as Thornley does in the first section of his article, we will have to sustain the right of any given peasant to receive the land and then to put it to whatever use he deems best, including sale. Indeed, it could be anticipated that a completely free market in land would lead to many exchanges of land at constantly rising prices until such time as the price of the land could only be justified on the grounds of putting it to use. At that time, assuming ownership rather than a leasehold, the land will be utilized.

It would appear that the planners of India's future who may fear that a given land owner will not do what they would like to have done at a given moment, are engaged in downgrading private ownership in an effort to arrive at a collectivist conclusion seemingly closer to their central scheme. But in the end, it is the owner who will put land to its ultimate highest usage and who will develop the land most fully. Tenants are notoriously disinterested in improving property through investment. And the individual who is diligent in plowing money into improvements should certainly be in the position of an owner so that he can ultimately profit on the basis of what he has created in the way of stable wealth.

If these things are kept in mind in conjunction with the Thornley

article, it will prove to be rewarding and stimulating. Thornley is so delighted with what he views as a nonviolent approach that he overlooks the flaw. Why would any state object to this "third force"? Isn't it in essence a reliance upon statism? It isn't really a revolt against the system of state control.

A Small Experiment

Jack Semmens reports a case study in socialism. This classroom experiment will remind the reader of the now classic "Lesson in Socialism" by high school teacher Thomas J. Shelly (published in 1951 by the Foundation for Economic Education, Irvington-on-Hudson, New York, and later made into a film presentation). Teacher Shelly hit upon the device of sharing grades according to need, to illustrate to his pupils the effects of socialism.

This article is especially significant in the extrapolations drawn by the author concerning the human reaction to collectivization. It is probably safe to assume that somewhat similar reactions could be anticipated in repeated experimentations conducted on any scale.

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