McMahon-Hussein Correspondence
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The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence[1] during World War I was a 1915-1916 exchange of letters between the Sharif of Mecca, Husayn bin Ali, and Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in Egypt, concerning the future political status of the Arab lands of the Middle East, where the United Kingdom was seeking to bring about an armed revolt against the Ottoman Empire, a German ally during the War.
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[edit] Origins and ramifications
[edit] The Damascus Protocol
On his return journey from Constantinople in 1915, where he had confronted the Grand Vizier with evidence of an Ottoman plot to depose his father, Faisal bin Hussein visited Damascus to resume talks with the Arab secret societies al-Fatat and Al-'Ahd that he had met in March/April. On this occasion Faisal joined their revolutionary movement. It was during this visit that he was presented with the document that became known as the 'Damascus Protocol'. The document declared that the Arabs would revolt in alliance with Great Britain in return for recognition of Arab independence in an area running from the 37th parallel near the Taurus Mountains on the southern border of Turkey, to be bounded in the east by Persia and the Persian Gulf, in the west by the Mediterranean Sea and in the south by the Arabian Sea.[2][3]
Following deliberations at Ta'if between Hussein and his sons in June 1915, during which Faisal counselled caution, Ali argued against rebellion and Abdullah advocated action, the Sharif set a tentative date for armed revolt for June 1916 and commenced negotiations with the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon.[2]
The letter from McMahon to Hussein dated 24 October 1915 is key. It stated on behalf of the Government of Great Britain that:
The districts of Mersin and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab, and must on that account be excepted from the proposed delimitation. Subject to that modification, and without prejudice to the treaties concluded between us and certain Arab Chiefs, we accept that delimitation. As for the regions lying within the proposed frontiers, in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to interests of her ally France, I am authorized to give you the following pledges on behalf of the Government of Great Britain, and to reply as follows to your note: That subject to the modifications stated above, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and uphold the independence of the Arabs in all the regions lying within the frontiers proposed by the Sharif of Mecca.[4]
[edit] The Arab Revolt
Although the correspondence did not result in a written treaty, McMahon's promises were seen by the Arabs as a formal agreement between them and Great Britain. On this understanding the Arabs established a military force under the command of Hussein's son Faisal which fought, with inspiration from 'Lawrence of Arabia', against the Ottoman Empire during the Arab Revolt.[3] In an intelligence memo written in January 1916 Lawrence described the Arab Revolt as
beneficial to us, because it marches with our immediate aims, the break up of the Islamic 'bloc' and the defeat and disruption of the Ottoman Empire, and because the states [Sharif Hussein] would set up to succeed the Turks would be … harmless to ourselves … The Arabs are even less stable than the Turks. If properly handled they would remain in a state of political mosaic, a tissue of small jealous principalities incapable of cohesion (emphasis in original).[5]
The Arab Revolt began in June 1916, when an Arab army of around 70,000 men moved against Ottoman forces. They captured Aqabah and cut the Hejaz railway, a vital strategic link through the Arab peninsula which ran from Damascus to Medina. This enabled the Egyptian Expeditionary Force under the command of General Allenby to advance into the Ottoman territories of Palestine and Syria.[6]
The British advance culminated in the Battle of Megiddo in September 1918 and the capitulation of Turkey on 31 October, 1918.
[edit] The Hogarth Message
In January 1918 Commander David Hogarth, head of the Arab Bureau in Cairo, was dispatched to Jeddah to deliver a letter written by Sir Mark Sykes on behalf of the British Government to Hussein (now King of Hejaz). The message assured Hussein that
The Entente Powers are determined that the Arab race shall be given full opportunity of once again forming a nation in the world. This can only be achieved by the Arabs themselves uniting, and Great Britain and her Allies will pursue a policy with this ultimate unity in view.[7]
and with respect to Palestine and in the light of the Balfour Declaration that
Since the Jewish opinion of the world is in favour of a return of Jews to Palestine and inasmuch as this opinion must remain a constant factor, and further as His Majesty's Government view with favour the realisation of this aspiration, His Majesty's Government are determined that insofar as is compatible with the freedom of the existing population both economic and political, no obstacle should be put in the way of the realisation of this ideal.[8]
The meaning of the Hogarth message, and in particular whether it modified the commitments made in the Balfour Declaration is still debated,[9][10] although Hogarth reported that Hussein "would not accept an independent Jewish State in Palestine, nor was I instructed to warn him that such a state was contemplated by Great Britain".[11]
[edit] Declaration to the Seven
In the wake of the Balfour Declaration and the publication by the Bolsheviks of the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement seven Syrian notables in Cairo who were members of the newly-formed Party of Syrian Unity issued a memorandum requesting from the British Government a "guarantee of the ultimate independence of Arabia". The Declaration to the Seven issued on 16 June, 1918 in response stated the British policy that the future government of the regions of the Ottoman Empire occupied by Allied forces in World War I should be based on the consent of the governed.[12][13]
[edit] Allenby's Assurance To Faisal
On 19 October, 1918 General Allenby reported to the British Government that he had given Faisal,
official assurance that whatever measures might be taken during the period of military administration they were purely provisional and could not be allowed to prejudice the final settlement by the peace conference, at which no doubt the Arabs would have a representative. I added that the instructions to the military governors would preclude their mixing in political affairs, and that I should remove them if I found any of them contravening these orders. I reminded the Amir Faisal that the Allies were in honour bound to endeavour to reach a settlement in accordance with the wishes of the peoples concerned and urged him to place his trust whole-heartedly in their good faith.[14]
[edit] Anglo-French Declaration of 1918
In the Anglo-French Declaration of 7 November, 1918 the two governments stated that
The object aimed at by France and Great Britain in prosecuting in the East the War let loose by the ambition of Germany is the complete and definite emancipation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations.[15]
According to civil servant Eyre Crowe who saw the original draft of the Declaration, "we had issued a definite statement against annexation in order (1) to quiet the Arabs and (2) to prevent the French annexing any part of Syria".[16]
[edit] Following World War I
During the Revolt Faisal had commanded the northern Arab army in Transjordan, Palestine, and Syria. In 1920 he was chosen as King of Syria by the Syrian National Congress but was expelled by France, now the mandatory power, following the Battle of Maysalun.[17]
The Arabs believed that Great Britain's undertaking to them was violated by the region's subsequent partition into British and French League of Nations mandates under the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement between Britain, France and Russia of May 1916 (made public by the Bolsheviks after the Russian Revolution)[18][19] and by the Balfour Declaration of November 1917 which favoured the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine.
[edit] Lawrence's post-war advocacy
Lawrence became increasingly guilt-ridden by the knowledge that Britain did not intend to abide by the commitments made to the Sharif, but still managed to convince Faisal that it would be to the Arabs' advantage to go on fighting the Ottomans. At the Versailles peace conference in 1919 and the Cairo conference in 1921 Lawrence lobbied for Arab independence, but his belated attempts to maintain the territorial integrity of Arab lands, which he had promised to Hussein and Faisal, and in limiting France's influence in what later became Syria and Lebanon were fruitless. However, as Churchill's adviser on Arab affairs (1921–2) Lawrence was able to lobby for a considerable degree of autonomy for Mesopotamia and Transjordan. The British placed Palestine, promised to the Zionist Federation in 1917, under mandate with a civilian administration headed by Herbert Samuel, and divided their remaining territory in the Middle East into the kingdoms of Iraq and Transjordan, assigning them to Faisal and his brother Abdullah, respectively. [5][20]
[edit] The 'Thrice-Promised Land'
The debate regarding Palestine derived from the fact that it is not explicitly mentioned in the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence. The Arab position was that "portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo..." could not refer to Palestine since that lay well to the south of the named places. In particular, the Arabs argued that the vilayet (province) of Damascus did not exist and that the district (sanjak) of Damascus covered only the area surrounding the city itself and furthermore that Palestine was part of the vilayet of 'Syria A-Sham', which was not mentioned in the exchange of letters.[21] The British position, which it held consistently at least from 1916, was that Palestine was intended to be included in the phrase. Each side produced supporting arguments for their positions based on fine details of the wording and the historical circumstances of the correspondence. For example, the Arab side argued that the phrase "cannot be said to be purely Arab" did not apply to Palestine, while the British pointed to the Jewish and Christian minorities in Palestine.
In response to growing criticism arising from the mutually irreconcilable commitments undertaken by the United Kingdom in the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour declaration[22] the Churchill White Paper, 1922 stated that
it is not the case, as has been represented by the Arab Delegation, that during the war His Majesty's Government gave an undertaking that an independent national government should be at once established in Palestine. This representation mainly rests upon a letter dated the 24th October, 1915, from Sir Henry McMahon, then His Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt, to the Sharif of Mecca, now King Hussein of the Kingdom of the Hejaz. That letter is quoted as conveying the promise to the Sherif of Mecca to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories proposed by him. But this promise was given subject to a reservation made in the same letter, which excluded from its scope, among other territories, the portions of Syria lying to the west of the District of Damascus. This reservation has always been regarded by His Majesty's Government as covering the vilayet of Beirut and the independent Sanjak of Jerusalem. The whole of Palestine west of the Jordan was thus excluded from Sir. Henry McMahon's pledge.[23]
A committee established by the British in 1939 to clarify the various arguments did not come to a firm conclusion in either direction.[24]
[edit] See also
[edit] Notes
- ^ Also sometimes known in the literature as the 'Hussein-McMahon Correspondence'.
- ^ a b Paris, 2003, p. 24.
- ^ a b Biger, 2004, p. 47.
- ^ October 24 1915 letter from Sir Henry McMahon, High Commissioner in Egypt, to Sherif Husayn of Mecca, archived at UNISPAL.
- ^ a b Waïl S. Hassan "Lawrence, T. E." The Oxford Encyclopedia of British Literature. David Scott Kastan. Oxford University Press 2005.
- ^ "Arab Revolt" A Dictionary of Contemporary World History. Jan Palmowski. Oxford University Press, 2003. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press.
- ^ Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Correspondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916, UNISPAL, Annex F.
- ^ Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Correspondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916, UNISPAL, Annex F.
- ^ Friedman, 2000, p. 328.
- ^ Kedourie, 2002, p. 257.
- ^ Huneidi, 2001, p. 66.
- ^ Friedman, 2000, pp. 195-197.
- ^ Choueiri, 2000, p. 149.
- ^ Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Correspondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916, UNISPAL, Annex H.
- ^ Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Correspondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916, UNISPAL, Annex I.
- ^ Hughes, 1999, pp. 116-117.
- ^ "Faisal I" A Dictionary of World History. Oxford University Press, 2000.
- ^ Federal Research Division, 2004, p. 41.
- ^ Milton-Edwards, 2006, p. 57.
- ^ "Lawrence, Thomas Edward, 'Lawrence of Arabia'" A Dictionary of Contemporary World History. Jan Palmowski. Oxford University Press, 2003.
- ^ Biger, 2004, p. 48.
- ^ Zachary Lockman "Balfour Declaration" The Oxford Companion to the Politics of the World, 2e. Joel Krieger, ed. Oxford University Press Inc. 2001.
- ^ British White Paper of June 1922, The Avalon Project at Yale Law School.
- ^ Report of 1939 British committee on the Hussein-McMahon correspondence, archived at UNISPAL.
[edit] References
- Biger, Gideon. (2004). The Boundaries of Modern Palestine, 1840-1947. London: Routledge. ISBN 0714656542
- Choueiri, Youssef M. (2000). Arab Nationalism: A History. Blackwell Publishers. ISBN 0631217290
- Cleveland, William L. (2004). A History of the Modern Middle East. Westview Press. ISBN 0-8133-4048-9 (see pp. 157-160).
- Federal Research Division (2004). Syria: A Country Study. Kessinger Publishing. ISBN 1419150227
- Friedman, Isaiah (2000). Palestine, A Twice-Promised Land. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 156000391X
- Hughes, Matthew (1999). Allenby and British Strategy in the Middle East, 1917-1919. London: Routledge. ISBN 0714649201
- Huneidi, Sahar (2000). A Broken Trust: Herbert Samuel, Zionism and the Palestinians, 1920-1925. IB Tauris. ISBN 1860641725
- Kedourie, Elie (2000). In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and Its Interpretations, 1914-1939. London: Routledge. ISBN 0714650978
- Mansfield, Peter (2004). A History of the Middle East. London: Penguin. ISBN 0-14-303433-2 (see pp. 154-155).
- Milton-Edwards, Beverley (2006). Contemporary Politics in the Middle East. Blackwell Publishing. ISBN 0745635946
- Paris, Timothy J. (2003). Britain, the Hashemites and Arab Rule, 1920-1925: The Sherifian Solution. London: Routledge. ISBN 0714654515
